The Appellate Division on January 22, 2019 decided an interesting case regarding insurance coverage which has been approved for publication. The matter is Katchen v. GEICO et al., No. A-5685-16T4, 2019 WL 272926 (App. Div. Jan. 22, 2019).
In December 2015, Plaintiff Katchen was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Significantly, at the time of the accident, he was operating a Harley-Davidson motorcycle which he owned. Before settling with the other driver or that driver’s $25,000 policy limit, Katchen submitted a UIM claim under three separate insurance policies he maintained:
1. A motorcycle policy issued by Rider Insurance Company;
2. A commercial automobile policy issued by Farmers Insurance Company of Flemington; and
3. A personal auto policy issued by GEICO.
GEICO “disclaim[ed] coverage” pursuant to an exclusion in Section IV of its policy, which addresses both uninsured motorist, or “UM,” and underinsured motorist, “UIM,” coverages. That provision stated:
“LOSSES WE PAY.
We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage caused by an accident which the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle arising out of the ownership, maintenance[,] or use of that vehicle.”
However, Section IV also contained an exclusion of coverage for “bodily injury sustained by an insured while occupying a motor vehicle owned by an insured and not described in the declarations and not covered by the Bodily Injury and Property Damage liability coverages of this policy.”
Because while the motorcycle was owned by Plaintiff Katchen, it was not listed on the policy issued and GEICO determined that it did not constitute an “owned auto,” which the policy defined as a “vehicle described in this policy for which a premium charges shown for these coverages.” As a result, GEICO denied the claim.
Plaintiff Katchen then filed a declaratory judgment action naming the three carriers, seeking a declaratory judgment that the UIM coverage of all three carriers applied to the subject accident. GEICO responded by filing a motion urging the court to find its “owned motor vehicle exclusion” to be “valid, unambiguous and enforceable.” The Motion Court denied that motion, finding that the language of GEICO’s policy was ambiguous.
The parties subsequently came to an agreement that Rider and Farmers would pay their respective pro rata share of the total of $975,000.00 in UIM coverage owed to Plaintiff Katchen, and GEICO would pursue this appeal. If GEICO did not prevail, it would pay its pro rata share as well. Plaintiff, Rider and Farmers all opposed GEICO’s appeal.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division indicated that “in this appeal, we consider whether an auto insurance form may combine uninsured (UM) and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in a single section and include exclusions not listed on the policy’s declaration page. We also consider if an insurer may exclude UIM coverage for an accident involving a vehicle owned by the insured but not covered under the subject policy.”
The Appellate Division accordingly held that “Because we find the exclusion does not violate public policy or result in ambiguity, we reverse.”
On appeal, contract interpretation is de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Committee of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). When an insurance contract terms are clear and unambiguous, the Court interprets the policy as written, using the “plain, ordinary meaning” of the words used. Zacarias v. Allstate Insurance Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001). But where an ambiguity arises, the policy is interpreted in favor of the insured and against the insurer. President v. Jenkins, 180 N.J. 550, 562-63 (2004).
An ambiguity exists when “the phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.” Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 247 (1979).
Insurance policies are to be interpreted narrowly, but the provisions within are presumed valid and effective if “specific, plain, clear, prominent and not contrary to public policy.” Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80, 95 (1997).
The Respondents argued that GEICO’s policy, which addressed both UM and UIM coverage in the same section, violated various statutory mandates. GEICO responded that the exclusion unambiguously bars UIM coverage for loss sustained by Plaintiff while operating a motor vehicle he owned but did not insure under GEICO’s policy.
The Appellate Division agreed with GEICO, finding that the policy was not ambiguous. For example, the Court observed that any ordinary reasonable person understands that a motorcycle is a type of motor vehicle.
While acknowledging that the exclusions did not appear on GEICO’s declaration page, the Appellate Division noted that requiring such would result in even more “fine print” and run the risk of making insurance policies more difficult for the average insured to understand, and would also “eviscerate the rule that a clause should be read in the context of the entire policy.”
Thus, the Appellate Division stated that “The failure to list the exclusion at issue on the declaration page does not automatically render the contract ambiguous. Reading the GEICO policy in its totality, we conclude the exclusion is clear and unambiguous. The fact that the exclusion is not mentioned on the declaration sheet does not bar its enforcement.”
Accordingly, the Katchen opinion is a very instructive recent summary by the Appellate Division of the procedure that will be utilized in analyzing contracts and insurance policies.