The Appellate Division on June 6, 2019 rendered a reported Opinion on the issue of when disclosure of materials prepared or collected prior to the institution of litigation is required. The matter is Paladino v. Auletto Enterprises, Inc. t/a Auletto Caterers, 2019 WL 2375475.
On October 9, 2015, Plaintiff was a guest at a wedding reception held at Defendant’s catering facility when she fell and injured her left knee, lower back, and right ankle while walking down a staircase. She immediately reported the accident to Defendant, such that Defendant prepared an accident report that same day, and shortly thereafter gave notice to its insurance company. The insurance company promptly retained an investigator.
Two weeks after the accident, on October 22, 2015, a senior claims examiner spoke with Plaintiff, and sent Plaintiff a letter advising that an investigator was looking into the accident. The investigator was instructed to photograph the accident scene and obtain statements from both Plaintiff and representatives of Defendant.
The claims examiner later certified that the intent in retaining the investigator was to “prepare a defense for [Defendant] in the event that [Plaintiff] filed a lawsuit,” and further certified that as the insurer was not disputing coverage, it did not hire the investigator to look into coverage issues.
The investigator arranged to meet with and take a recorded statement from Plaintiff on October 26, 2015. However, on the appointment date, the investigator was contacted by an attorney who advised that he had been retained by Plaintiff, such that the appointment was canceled. The next day, Plaintiff’s recently retained counsel sent a letter of representation to the insurance carrier.
Therefore, on October 26, 2015, the investigator inspected Defendant’s catering facility. In the process, the investigator took photographs of the scene and prepared a diagram of the area. The investigator also obtained recorded oral statements from two of Defendant’s employees, and approximately one week later also obtained a recorded oral statement from a third employee.
On December 3, 2015, Plaintiff’s counsel and a photographer visited Defendant’s premises for a documentary inspection. Thereafter, in January 2016, Defendant’s insurance carrier provided Plaintiff’s counsel with a copy of video surveillance that had actually captured Plaintiff falling on the staircase, as well as a copy of the incident report.
Plaintiff and her husband subsequently filed suit and Defendant filed an Answer. Thereafter, in Answers to Interrogatories, Defendant disclosed that the investigator had taken photographs of the staircase, had prepared a diagram, and had obtained recorded statements from three of Defendant’s employees, none of whom witnessed Plaintiff’s fall. Significantly, asserting that they were protected by the work-product privilege, Defendant did not produce the photographs, diagram, or statements,
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel the production of the photographs and the recorded statements by Defendant’s employees, having withdrawn a prior request for the diagram prepared by the investigator,
Without hearing oral argument, the Trial Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion, relying on Pfender v. Torres, 336 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 2001), on the grounds that because the photographs and statements were obtained by the insurance carrier before litigation, the carrier “may have” had interests apart from protecting its insured’s rights. Defendant sought leave to appeal the Order compelling the production. The Appellate Division initially denied leave, but the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and remanded the same to the Appellate Division “to consider [it] on the merits.”
In the appeal, Defendant made two arguments. First, it contended that the Court should reject the rationale of Pfender and, instead, adopt the reasoning set forth in Medford v. Duggan, 323 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 1999). Second, Defendant- applying the standard set forth in Medford– urged that the Appellate Division should reverse because Plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 4:10-2(c).
The Court began by noting that the Work Product Doctrine and Rule 4:10-2(c) should be understood as exceptions to New Jersey’s general policy of “encouraging full and open discovery of all relevant information.” 2019 WL 2375475 at Page 2. In most situations, parties to litigation have the right to discovery of all relevant information concerning the action. See Rule 4:10-2(a).
One of the recognized privileges that is an exception to that general policy is the Work Product Doctrine. See O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 218 N.J. 168, 188 (2014). That doctrine was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
The Work Product Doctrine is set forth in Rule 4:10-2(c), which states:
“[A] party may obtain discovery of documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things otherwise discoverable under R[ule] 4:10-2(a) and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative (including an attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” (Emphasis added.)
Defendant argued that a conflict exists in precedent concerning the scope of the Work Product Doctrine as discussed in Pfender compared to Medford. Defendant argued that Pfender essentially established a “bright line rule” that material obtained by an insurer before litigation is not protected by the Work Product Doctrine. Defendant urged that Medford established a “case-by-case test,” whereby material prepared by or for an insurer can be protected under the Work Product Doctrine if it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and the party seeking the same cannot establish a substantial need for it.
While the Appellate Division indicated that it did not find Pfender and Medford to be irreconcilable, as Defendant asserted, it did indicate that “the rationale and holding of Pfender needs to be clarified and properly understood as consistent with a case-by-case analysis.” 2019 WL 2375475 at Page 4.
The Appellate Division thus stated that:
“[W]e clarify that there is no per se or presumptive rule that materials prepared or collected before litigation are not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Instead, as set forth in Rule 4:10-2(c), there is a multi-part, fact-specific test. The first inquiry is whether the materials were prepared or collected in anticipation of litigation or trial by another party or that party’s representative. See R. 4:10-2(c). The representative can be an ‘insurer or agent’ of the party. Ibid. If the materials were prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial, to obtain the materials, there is a two-part standard that must then be satisfied. See ibid. The party seeking the materials must (1) show a substantial need for the discovery; and (2) demonstrate that he or she is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials. Ibid. See also Carbis Sales, Inc., 397 N.J. Super. at 82, 935 A.2d 1236 (first citing Medford, 323 N.J. Super. at 133, 732 A.2d 533; then citing Pfender, 336 N.J. Super. at 391, 765 A.2d 208). Moreover, if such work-product materials are compelled to be produced, “the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” R. 4:10-2(c). 2019 WL 2375475 at Page 5.
Significantly, the Court also noted that:
“The scope of the work-product doctrine has other limitations. It has long been established that the doctrine only protects documents or prepared materials; accordingly, it does not protect facts. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513, 67 S.Ct. 385; R. 4:10-2(c); O’Boyle, 218 N.J. at 188-89, 94 A.3d 299. Moreover, in considering statements, the doctrine does not protect statements that are prepared in the normal course of business. See Miller v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 339 N.J. Super. 144, 148, 770 A.2d 1288 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 554, 691 A.2d 321 (1997)). Finally, we have previously clarified that the protection of a statement will usually be lost if the person who gave the statement is later called to testify at trial. See Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J. Super. 84, 100, 599 A.2d 528 (App. Div. 1991). In Dinter, we held that ‘where a fact witness testifies for an adverse party, the factual statement of that witness must be produced on demand for use in cross-examination as a potential tool for impeachment of credibility.’” 2019 WL 2375475 at Page 5.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division in this matter reversed the Order compelling Defendant to produce the photographs and recorded witness statements, and remanded with a specific instruction to the Trial Court to conduct further proceedings and apply a “case-by-case, fact-specific analysis” to determine whether the photographs and witness statements are within the ambit of the Work Product Doctrine.
Thus, this Opinion is a very helpful elaboration by the Appellate Division on exactly under what circumstances materials secured by an insurance company prior to litigation are subject to disclosure. The specific facts of a given case will accordingly determine whether disclosure is required.