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Workers' Comp Blog

The New Jersey Workers’ Comp Blog is published by John H. Geaney, Esq. and focuses on covering all aspects of Workers’ Compensation law in the state of New Jersey.

Functional capacity examinations (FCEs) can be very useful in determining the ability of a worker to perform essential job functions by removing the guesswork and instead providing accurate data on an employee’s physical abilities. In The Matter of Thalia Tretsis Middlesex County, Sheriff’s Office, No. A-3682-19 (App. Div. February 15, 2022) provides some important guidance on the use of FCEs.

Ms. Tretsis (hereinafter “the appellant”) injured her knee at work when she fell on ice in the County parking lot on March 6, 2015.  She treated with authorized doctors and returned to work, eventually resuming full duty.  However, some months later she began to have knee problems again and saw Dr. Gregory Gallick, who performed arthroscopic surgery on January 5, 2017.  Following the surgery the appellant experienced continuing knee pain.  Dr. Gallick approved light duty work in mid-February 2017, but appellant’s knee pain continued to bother her.  Dr. Gallick next ordered an FCE because he felt that the appellant was not recovering as well as he had expected.

Kinematic Consultants (now known as Atlantic Kinematics) performed the FCE on June 8, 2017. Dr. Gallick reviewed the results and opined that the appellant could not perform the full duties of a Sheriff’s Officer.  Appellant told Dr. Gallick that she “did not feel comfortable going back to her regular job” because of the pain and weakness in her knee.

On June 27, 2017, the County’s employee benefits specialist attended an employee status conference with the appellant to review the FCE results.  The FCE showed that appellant’s ability to life was limited to 35 pounds.  The appellant requested that the County send her to another orthopedic specialist.  The County agreed.

On July 13, 2017 Dr. David Epstein evaluated the appellant. The appellant advised Dr. Epstein that she was still having pain and discomfort in her knee.  Dr. Epstein recommended gel injections which did not remove the pain.  Dr. Epstein then recommended another FCE.

Kinematic then performed a second FCE on September 18, 2017, which documented that the appellant still had a deficit in her balance on her right side.  The report concluded that the appellant had continuing pain in her knee, which was worse when bending, walking and standing.  The FCE report concluded that the appellant could only perform light duty work.

Following the second FCE, Dr. Gallick reviewed the results and reached the conclusion that the appellant was at maximal medical improvement for her workers’ compensation injury and was unable to perform the essential functions of her job.  Dr. Epstein reviewed the second FCE and agreed that appellant was at MMI and was unable to perform her full duties.

On September 28, 2017 the County served appellant with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action with intention of removing her from her position.  Following a departmental hearing, the County issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action on November 19, 2017 and removed appellant from her position with the County.

Appellant sought a hearing following her removal.  At the hearing she did not testify but she presented testimony from Dr. Donald Polakoff, who examined the appellant on May 1, 2019 and concluded that appellant could perform the essential job functions.  He said that the appellant was able in his office to hop on one leg at a time, do pushups and squats, and lift a box over her head while doing three knee bends.  Dr. Polakoff admitted that he could not give an opinion on appellant’s fitness prior to May 1, 2019 because he had not seen her before that date.  He also did not offer any expert opinion on the value of FCE reports.

The Administrative Law Judge heard from various witnesses including departmental employees, Dr. Gallick, Dr. Epstein and Dr. Polakoff. She concluded on March 12, 2020 that appellant could not perform the duties of a Sheriff’s Officer at the time she was removed in 2017.  She rejected the appellant’s argument that Kinematic may have improperly performed the FCE.  An appeal followed to the Appellate Division, and appellant argued that the County’s actions in removing her were arbitrary and capricious and never identified the essential functions of a Sheriff’ Officer.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of appellant’s case and rejected the argument that the County failed to provide proof of the nature and scope of appellant’s required duties.  As an aside, the Court also noted that appellant filed an application for an accidental disability retirement pension following her removal, which the Division of Pensions and Benefits deferred pending the outcome of the removal case.  In its decision, the Appellate Division gave deference to the expertise of the professionals who performed the FCE.  The Court also cited to the applicable regulation, N.J.A.C. 4A: 2-2.3 (a) (3), which authorizes a public entity to remove an employee for inability to perform the functions of the job.

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The case of Brian Smith v. Township of South Hackensack, No. A-3258-20 (App. Div. February 18, 2022), addressed an unusual procedural question seldom, if ever, seen before.  The Appellate Division decision provides hardly any factual background at all other than this brief summary:  “Plaintiff, a volunteer firefighter, was struck by a South Hackensack fire truck at a time when, as he alleges, the individual defendants were using the truck to bar hop.”  There is no discussion of why or when the accident took place.  But Mr. Smith did not file a workers’ compensation claim.  Instead he chose to file a personal injury complaint in the Law Division against South Hackensack and other defendants.

The defendants moved to dismiss the civil suit in November 2020. They argued that the Division of Workers’ Compensation possessed exclusive jurisdiction. The Superior Court Judge transferred the case to the Division of Workers’ Compensation over plaintiff’s opposition.  However, the case never got listed because the Division of Workers’ Compensation’s computer system never recognized the case, nor listed the case, as no claim petition was ever filed. Mr. Smith then moved to reinstate his civil complaint. The judge denied the motion and wrote to the Division of Workers’ Compensation advising of the transfer order.

The Supervising Judge of the Division of Workers’ Compensation then responded that no action could be taken until the filing of a formal claim petition like any other workers’ compensation case.  The Superior Court Judge again refused to reinstate the civil case and commented that Mr. Smith could file a petition stating that the petition “is filed under court discretion.” Mr. Smith did not wish to file a petition in the division because he felt that would be a concession that there was jurisdiction in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.   

Mr. Smith then appealed to the Appellate Division, which ruled that the judge “abused her discretion in putting plaintiff to the peculiar burden of prosecuting a claim in another forum for the sole purpose of proving this other forum lacks jurisdiction over the claim.”  The Court added:

Plaintiff commenced his action in the superior court and, as the suitor and ‘master of his complaint,Puglia v. Elk Pipeline Inc., 226 N.J. 258, 282 (2016), plaintiff was entitled to pursue the matter in the superior court until such time as defendants are able – if ever – to show that the occurrence falls within the workers’ compensation laws.

The case discussed four grounds for invoking primary jurisdiction: when the issue 1) is a matter “often determined by trial judges and juries;” 2) when the Division is “best suited” to determine the issue; 3) when there is no risk of inconsistent rulings because 4) plaintiff has declined to file a petition for benefits in the Division.

In this case the key fact was that Mr. Smith never filed what is often called a protective Claim Petition in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.  When there is both a superior court action and a claim petition in the Division of Workers’ Compensation, a superior court judge may sometimes stay the civil action pending a determination of jurisdiction by the Judge of Compensation.  The Appellate Division ultimately held that the Division of Workers’ Compensation did not have exclusive jurisdiction over this claim based on a clear reading of the civil complaint as it was drafted.   

The Appellate Division added that “the Division should not have been assigned by the trial judge the task of deciding the issue that may determine whether plaintiff should be relegated to workers’ compensation benefits rather than personal injury damages.”  It should be said that the use of the word “relegated” is unfortunate.  It suggests workers’ compensation benefits are inferior.   Benefits in workers’ compensation are often more generous than those in superior court, particularly where the plaintiff is at fault or where coverage is limited.  Putting this aside, this decision is a very helpful one.  The Court clarified an important point for practitioners: a superior court judge cannot compel a plaintiff to file a claim petition.  The plaintiff is the “master of his or her complaint,” which means that a plaintiff has significant flexibility in presenting the case as he or she sees fit.

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Workers’ compensation practitioners have all heard of the defense of deviation from employment.  But where does the defense come from?  The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act has well over 100 sections to it, but nowhere will you find any reference to the defense of deviation from employment.  Yet the defense does exist.  We know that because the New Jersey Supreme Court said 20 years ago in Jumpp v. City of Ventnor that the distinction between major and minor deviations still prevails, even though there is no mention of it in the statute and no mention of it in the 1980 Amendments.  

The principal sources of workers’ compensation law are the statute itself and the cases that have been decided over the years.  The single best treatise on workers’ compensation ever written remains Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law.  The author wrote 50 years ago about this distinction between major and minor deviations and suggested a framework to view this important defense. He said one must focus on the following:

  1. The extent and seriousness of the deviation
  2. The completeness of the deviation (i.e., whether it was commingled with the performance of duty or involved an abandonment of duty);
  3. The extent to which the practice of horseplay had become an accepted part of the employment; and,
  4. The extent to which the nature of the employment may be expected to include such horseplay.

The deviation from employment defense focuses on the conduct of the employee.  It is not a medical-oriented defense such an idiopathic injury or a defense that the injury at issue is a preexisting medical condition.  The cases in New Jersey fall into two broad categories:  those involving actual travel and deviations from the normal itinerary, and those involving somewhat outrageous conduct in respect to what an employer would normally tolerate at work.

An example of the first category would be an employee who is assigned to travel from Cherry Hill, N.J. to Washington D.C. to meet with a customer. The employee decides on the way down Route 95 to literally deviate from the expected travel route in order to visit a popular restaurant 60 miles to the west in Gettysburg, PA.  An accident occurs on leaving the restaurant in Gettysburg.  This sort of unwarranted side trip would be denied as a deviation from employment.  It would be a major deviation because of the sheer distance involved.

An example of the second category would be an employee who brings ankle weights or jump rope into work and then during a break decides to do some aggressive exercise near her desk, falling and then fracturing her femur.  In this case the denial again focuses on the worker’s activity and how far afield the activity is to the normal work duties.

It is not necessary for this defense to prove that the employee drove far out of the way.  In the Jumpp case the injured worker, who drove around town checking pumping stations, only deviated by about 20 or 30 feet in pulling into a post office parking lot to get his personal mail.  He fell in that lot and fractured his pelvis. The Supreme Court held that this was a major deviation from employment because the activity in getting his own mail was completely unrelated to his job in maintaining pumping stations in town.    

The line between major deviation and minor deviation is not always clear.  In Trotter v. Monmouth County, petitioner had been cutting grass on a very hot day in 1972.  He and a co-employee, Mr. Adcock, joined several other workers who started throwing water at one another to cool off.  Then Trotter chose to take Adcock’s motorcycle for a ride. He drove off County property for two or three minutes and ran into a telephone pole. The court found that this conduct constituted a deviation from employment.   

In contrast, the injured worker in Cooper v. Barnickel Enterprises, decided to take a coffee break in the morning when he was unable to speak with his instructor, who was teaching a class.  Petitioner drove his company truck to a delicatessen five miles away from the union hall where his instructor was teaching the class. He had an accident along the way.  He said he was going to get a good cup of coffee.  He passed several coffee shops along the way.  He said, “I was going to kill some time, go get my coffee, come back and if I had time I’d sip it and when the class was over I would talk to John (the instructor) without interrupting him.”  The Judge of Compensation ruled in favor of the employee and found just a minor deviation.  The Appellate Division agreed that this was a minor deviation from employment. 

Outrageous conduct was the crux of Money v. Coin Depot Corp.  Mr. Money worked as an armored truck security guard.  He was required to carry a handgun.  He and two other employees were transporting money when the decedent pulled out his gun and placed it against his chin.  He had played Russian Roulette on prior occasions.  This time when he pulled the trigger he killed himself.  The Appellate Division found that this was clearly a major deviation from employment because the petitioner’s actions created an extraordinary risk of harm.

As can be seen from these cases, this defense requires a thorough examination of the facts and an understanding of the normal work duties.  As Professor Larson points out, if the departure from normal work activities is an accepted part of employment, then the Judge of Compensation will not find it to be a deviation.  In Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, the petitioner got splashed with gasoline while filling a customer’s gas tank. His boss suggested that he change his clothes.  Mr. Secor declined and then later lit a match while smoking a cigarette. His clothes burst into flames, and he was seriously burned.  The court found this to be a minor deviation.  There was clearly no outrageous conduct here; the most that can be said is that the injured worker was clearly negligent, but mere negligence does not amount to a major deviation.

When you consider this defense, you may want to view it this way:  does the activity have some relationship to work or is it akin to abandoning employment?  The more outrageous the activity, the more likely it will be viewed as a major deviation or abandonment of employment.

The post Understanding The Deviation From Employment Defense appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

On January 18, 2022, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded round three of Diane Lapsley v. Township of Sparta, a case that dates back to February 3, 2014.  On that date Mrs. Lapsley, a librarian for the Township, left work early when the Township closed the library due to a snowfall.  Her husband picked her up.  Mr. Lapsley parked his car in the lot adjacent to the library.  The Lapsleys stepped off the library curb, walked about 18 feet along the parking lot when Mrs. Lapsley was struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by a Township employee. The accident caused significant injuries to Mrs. Lapsley’s leg, requiring multiple surgeries and leaving her leg disfigured.

The twist in this case occurred right at the beginning, as Lapsley did not file a workers’ compensation claim.  Instead, her lawyer filed a civil complaint against the Township and the coworker who was driving the snowplow.  The Township moved to dismiss the civil suit based on the exclusive remedy provision.  The Law Division stayed the civil suit and referred the matter to the Division of Workers’ Compensation.  The Judge of Compensation properly found that petitioner was injured in a Township owned and controlled parking lot and ruled that the case was compensable.

Lapsley appealed to the Appellate Division, which reversed and found that the accident was not compensable because the Township did not instruct Lapsley on where to park, nor how to enter and exit the municipal complex.  The Appellate Division also observed that the parking lot was a shared one with the Township, School Board and public. 

The New Jersey Supreme Court took certification and decided the case this week.   The Court first observed the key provision in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 that states “employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer.”  The Court then went on to comment on this last clause: “excluding areas not under the control of the employer.” It said:

[t]he Legislature used the phrase ‘excluding areas not under the control of the employer’ in its definition of employment because it intended to include areas controlled by the employer within the definition.  That phrase was intended to make clear that the premises rule can entail more than the four walls of an office or plant.

Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J. 298 (1998).  The Court referred again to Kristiansen at page 317 for the proposition that “This Court has stated that control exists when the employer owns, maintains, or has exclusive use of the property.”

The Supreme Court found Mrs. Lapsley’s accident to be compensable because the accident occurred in the parking lot adjacent to the library, and the Township owned and maintained that lot. The reversal was not surprising at all. In fact, it was like an instant replay where an umpire calls out a baseball player at first base but the replay shows the runner to be five feet past the base when the ball reaches the first baseman.   In other words, this was not a close call at all.  Yet this case is going to prove to be an important one because of the new parking lot legislation that passed this month.

Readers of this blog are aware that the Governor signed a new parking lot bill earlier this month which may open the door to arguments for compensability for accidents that take place in shared multi-tenant parking lots.  That new law states:

Employment shall also be deemed to commence, if an employer provides or designates a parking area for use by an employee, when an employee arrives at the parking area prior to reporting for work and shall terminate when an employee leaves the parking area at the end of a work period; provided that, if the site of the parking area is separate from the place of employment, an employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment while the employee travels directly from the parking area to the place of employment prior to reporting for work and while the employee travels directly from the place of employment to the parking area at the end of a work period.

It is just a matter of time before Judges of Compensation will be deciding claim petitions for injuries in multi-tenant parking lots.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Lapsley does not comment on the new law because that law was just passed a week before this decision was released.  Claimants’ counsel may argue that a fall in a multi-tenant parking lot should be found compensable under the new parking lot law, even though the employer does not own the parking lot.  Employers will argue the point that the Supreme Court made in Lapsley, namely that the statute says “excluding areas not under the control of the employer” when deciding issues of compensability under the premises rule.  We will keep readers apprised on this issue over the coming months.

The post New Jersey Supreme Court Finds Parking Lot Accident Compensable appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

In the first few days of 2022, two major legislative developments have significantly impacted workers’ compensation law.  The legislation effectively repealing the Supreme Court decision in Hersh v. County of Morris, 217 N.J. 236 (2014) will have a long-term impact on workers’ compensation in New Jersey; the resumption of the public health emergency will likely have only a short-term impact.

Governor Signs S771

Governor Phil Murphy signed S771 on January 10, 2022, which added the following new language in N.J.S.A. 34: 15-36 in relation to compensability of accidents in parking lots:

Employment shall also be deemed to commence, if an employer provides or designates a parking area for use by an employee, when an employee arrives at the parking area prior to reporting for work and shall terminate when an employee leaves the parking area at the end of a work period; provided that, if the site of the parking area is separate from the place of employment, an employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment while the employee travels directly from the parking area to the place of employment prior to reporting for work and while the employee travels directly from the place of employment to the parking area at the end of a work period.

This new provision was a response to the aforesaid Hersh case, which involved an injury to an employee of the County of Morris, which rented space in a private garage for 65 employees.  The decision in Hersh created a great deal of controversy and discussion.  The facts were that Mrs. Hersh could not park in the county building next to her office because she lacked seniority, so she parked in the private garage in one of the 65 leased spaces.  She then walked one-half block to Washington Street.  While crossing the street, she was struck and was seriously injured by a motor vehicle which had run a red light. The petitioner’s injuries were found not compensable because the County did not own the garage and did not control the garage.  The Supreme Court found that the County did not derive a direct business interest from paying for employees to park in the private garage and noted that the accident occurred in a public street. The Court also commented that there was also no added or special hazard in crossing the public street.

                The new legislation is significant in the following respects:

  1. It may not matter any longer that the employer does not own or control the parking lot, particularly if the parking area is not adjacent to the employer’s place of business;
  2. It will also not matter that the injury occurred while the employee was walking on public property on the way to the employer’s place of business from a lot designated or provided by the employer. This accident is now compensable.
  3. What matters is whether the employer “provides or designates a parking area for use by an employee.”

In examining this bolded phrase more closely, one can say that the word “designates” is fairly clear in meaning.  A parking area marked off for one employer’s use for its employees will clearly fall within this definition.   But that has been the law for a long time!  There was no need for a new law to tell us the designation of a parking area by an employer means controlling parking.  The problematic word is the verb “provides.”  What is the legal definition of “provides?”  Well, “provides” is not really a word with a legal definition at all.  The dictionary definition is “makes available for use.”  Clearly, that applies to the situation in Hersh because the County leased and therefore provided parking.  But many employers lease space in a building and do not designate any specific parking area alongside the place of employment.  Yet there may be ample parking.  When asked by employees or job applicants about parking, such employers may respond that parking is provided, simply meaning that employees will not have to pay for parking.   Does an employer “provide” parking when the employer makes sure in its lease that its employees have access to parking lots at no cost to the employee, even if the employer does not own the lot or control the lot?

What if judges interpret the word “provided” in this expansive way?  Then virtually all injuries in parking lots will be found compensable now, whether the employer is just a tenant in the building or not.  That results in a complete reversal of the 1979 Amendments.   Only injuries occurring to employees who park in public streets will then be found non-compensable.  Such a reading would clearly conflict with the most important paragraph in N.J.S.A 34:15-36 in respect to commencement of employment:

Employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer…”  This language is the heart of the so-called “premises rule.”  The new parking language did not remove the 1979 definition of commencement of employment. It is still there.  Control or the absence of control is essential to the definition.  The key language is: “excluding areas not under the control of the employer.” 

How does one square this language about areas not under the control of the employer with the language in the new law about an employer which provides a parking area?  Does the employer have to argue that the landlord, not the tenant, provides the parking area? If that is the argument, the counter argument will be that all employers which lease space pay for common area maintenance charges and therefore indirectly provide parking.  Using the wrong word in a statute can be like pulling on a thread.

In the opinion of this practitioner, S771 conflicts with the premises rule. The word “provides” is the problematic word that will lead to a plethora of appeals.  Counsel for petitioners injured in parking lots where space is leased are going to argue for broad interpretation of “provides,” and employers are going to argue that the law still excludes areas not under the control of the employer.  One does not need a crystal ball to predict that the Supreme Court ironically will someday have to resolve an inherent conflict created by a legislative response to negate the Supreme Court’s own 2014 decision!   My own guess is that the sponsors of this new law were thinking of how to counter the result in Hersh, which involved off-site parking leased by the employer.  If the law had just focused on off-site parking areas, there would not likely be a wave of future litigation over the meaning of “provides.” 

One other point is worth mentioning about S771, and it is a fairly common problem encountered with workers’ compensation legislation.  Just as with the passage of the Hand and Foot Bill two years ago, this legislation fails to make clear which cases will be covered.  By stating “this law shall take effect immediately,” the legislation did not answer whether the new law applies only to cases that are filed after January 10, 2022 or applies to all cases presently pending in the Division as of January 10, 2022.

The Resumption Of A Public Health Emergency

Executive Order 280 signed by Governor Murphy this week reinstates a public health emergency in New Jersey.  By way of background, Governor Murphy signed S2380 on September 14, 2021, which defined certain Essential Workers who contracted COVID-19 at work.  The law created a rebuttable presumption that the virus was work related for such Essential Employees.  The Essential Employee law specifically referenced the contraction of COVID-19 during the public health emergency.

In June 2021, Governor Murphy declared that the public health emergency had ended. The Governor did not mention anything about the end of the legal presumption, but many practitioners, including the undersigned, reasoned that there was no longer a presumption since there was no longer a public health emergency. This week’s renewal of the public health emergency will certainly be viewed by judges of compensation to mean that the presumption of compensability again prevails.  As readers know, this legal presumption shifts the burden of proof to the employer to disprove that the virus was contracted at work.  There is, however, no presumption of impairment. The burden of proof remains on the injured employee to prove a compensable impairment for purposes of obtaining an award of permanent partial or total disability benefits.

The post Key New Jersey Legislation In 2022: Expansion Of Compensability Of Parking Lot Injuries And Resumption Of Public Health Emergency appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

It is not widely known but the new 2022 workers’ compensation benefit rates are 10% higher than those in 2021! Yes, you read that correctly – 10% higher than in 2021.  That is the highest jump in benefit rates since the early 1980s. The annual percentage increase in maximum and minimum benefits from 1990 to 2021 was rather modest.  In the last 32 years the highest benefit rate increase was five percent.  Most were two to three percent a year, and in 2011 the maximum rate actually dropped slightly.

Consider this:  the minimum rate for temporary disability benefits in 2021 was $258; the minimum rate in 2022 will be $284 (10% higher).  The maximum rate for temporary disability and permanency benefits in 2021 was $969; the maximum rate in 2022 will be $1,065 (10% higher). 

What does this mean? First, it means that a high wage earner will be compensated for lost time at $1,065 for each week of lost wages before reaching MMI, not $969 as in 2021.  It also means that payouts for permanency awards will be dramatically higher, requiring employers and carriers to raise reserves sharply.  The first 90 weeks will be rated at $284, or 10% more than current 2021 rates.  An award of 15% currently amounts to $23,220.  That is because 90 weeks times $258 equals $23,200.  An award of 15% at 2022 rates will be $25,560, a 10% increase.  Those are the lower awards, but when you get to high percentage awards, the dollars will be much more impactful on employers and carriers.   An award of 50% will cost almost $20,000 more than in 2021.  In 2021 that award would be $193,800.  Add 10% more for the same disability award in 2022.

That’s not all.  This hike in benefit rates also raises counsel fees rather sharply. That is another cost employer and carriers will bear.  On a percentage award, like 30% permanent partial disability, counsel for petitioner generally get a 20% fee.  For example, a 30% award in 2021 amounts to $56,934 for a fairly high wage earner.  The counsel fee would be 20% of that award or $11,386.  Now that fee will rise by 10%.  Since respondent pays 60% of the petitioner’s attorney’s counsel fee on an order approving settlement, the rate hike means employers are going to pay quite a bit more money in counsel fees for petitioners’ attorneys.   It is also worth noting that this means injured workers will have to pay more in dollars to their attorneys.

Why the massive rate hike in workers’ compensation benefits? Rates in New Jersey are tied to the increase in the statewide average weekly wage. The Department of Labor must have calculated that the statewide average weekly wage is up 10%.   Inflation has been jumping in many sectors of the economy, and that fact is driving wages higher.  There is a big shortage of workers in New Jersey and most states.  This in turn fuels wage inflation, and higher wages translate to higher awards.

There is a built-in flaw in the New Jersey Act.  Remember that annual rates are adjusted according to the increase or decrease in the statewide average weekly wage.  The focus is on wages.  Yet many injured workers get back to work after an injury and do the same job with no impact at all on working ability or wages.  They can get an award by proving a material impact on non-work activities. So if an injured worker testifies at settlement that there is no impact on earnings or working ability (only an impact on activities of daily living), why should employers be paying 10% more in 2022 than 2021 for the same injury?   That award appears to be for functional loss only.  It does not make sense for a worker to get an award of $44,154  (25% of partial total) for an operated rotator cuff injury in 2021 with no impact on wages, but get an extra $4,400 for the same rotator cuff injury occurring in 2022.  

Next consider the injured worker who has a very physical job and can no longer do that job due to the work-related rotator cuff tear.  Suppose that worker has to take a lower paying job. If so, wages will be impacted for many years, perhaps for the rest of the working life.  The worker’s family will be directly affected.  That’s the person for whom the weekly rate hike was intended.  In addition, every Judge of Compensation will likely award a higher percentage of disability in that scenario.  Those are the two ways to put more money into the pocket of a worker whose wages are truly impacted by an injury.

While hikes in weekly benefits are good news for injured workers, what about the impact on employers and carriers? This year’s 10% benefit rate hike is very bad news for employers who have not been able to raise prices during the pandemic.  Their revenues are declining or static while the cost of business is rising sharply, and the cost of workers’ compensation is a big part of that increase.  Some employers have had to close down, or they have seen their revenues plummet due to the impact of the coronavirus.  The timing could not be worse for those employers.  The public sector will also be affected by this large percentage hike in weekly benefit rates.  When public employers pay more in workers’ compensation benefits, taxpayers are actually footing the bill through higher property taxes in a state with enormously high property taxes to begin with.

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On December 8, 2021, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of a claim for serious back injuries filed by Meghan Ryan-Wirth, a school nurse, against the Hoboken Board of Education and the Pooled Insurance Program Joint Insurance Fund. Petitioner, a school nurse, was injured participating in a morning Cardio Club activity with teachers and students. The case is important because it is one of the first cases to discuss the recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, 245 N.J. 157 (2021).

The key facts are that Ms. Ryan-Wirth filed a claim petition and motion for medical and temporary disability benefits seeking an order compelling the Hoboken Board of Education to pay for her fusion surgery as well as temporary disability benefits.  Capehart Scatchard defended the Hoboken Board of Education and the Pooled Insurance Program.  Shareholder Andrea Schlafer successfully handled the trial and the appeal.  

The facts of the case were unusual. Petitioner, a full-time school nurse at the Hoboken Middle School, applied for a position as a student monitor for some extra income.  The service was known as the A.M. Care Program for students who needed to arrive early to school. Teachers and other staff who provided monitoring services received a stipend of $30 per day. Petitioner arrived on September 10, 2019 but claimed to have received very little instruction on her first day. The next day on September 11, 2019, she came to school early with the intention of participating in the A.M. Care Program.  However, she was informed that there was no need for more monitors that day.

The facts were sharply disputed at this point in the case.  Ms. Ryan-Wirth testified that upon entering the school she was greeted by the Principal, who was dressed in workout clothes. She claimed the Principal informed her that there was no need for any additional A.M. Care Program monitors that morning, but that she was welcome to participate in the Cardio Club. Ms. Ryan-Wirth maintained that she felt pressured to participate in the Cardio Club because the Principal was her boss.  She also claimed that she was never informed that she would not be paid for participation in the Cardio Club, which was next to the cafeteria where the A.M. Care Program was located. She said that she changed into gym clothes and then went into the Cardio Club.

Ms. Ryan-Wirth suffered serious back injuries on September 11, 2019, while pulling a car tire in a relay race, falling backwards on her rear end.  She was taken by ambulance to the hospital and ended up having major spine surgery.

Witnesses for the Board disputed petitioner’s version.  The Principal testified that he saw petitioner that morning wearing workout attire before participating in the Cardio Club. He told her that there were already enough monitors for the A.M. Care Program but that she could attend the Cardio Club if she wanted.  He added that petitioner would not be paid.  

According to the program website, the Cardio Club had a goal of infusing math into fitness activities for students. For example, the website described a recent session in which students ran outside and “calculated pace and clocked sprint times.” Some runs were mapped using GPS technology, and students could monitor their heart rate, according to the website. 

There were other witnesses who testified in this case.  Ms. Ryan-Wirth called a teacher to testify on her behalf, but that testimony harmed her case.  According to the teacher, it was petitioner who asked the teacher if she was going to participate in the Cardio Club, and petitioner said it looked like fun to her. This teacher also said that she thought Cardio Club was completely voluntary and would not be a paid activity.

On cross examination, petitioner admitted that she had a personal motive for wanting to participate in the Cardio Club.  She said that six weeks after giving birth, her doctor cleared her to exercise.  She went for walks and she went to the gym twice a week. After giving birth, she participated in a weight loss challenge to lose 30 pounds by Christmas for a cash prize.

Petitioner’s attorney maintained that petitioner was on school grounds on a work day when she was injured, and she felt pressured to participate in the Cardio Club.  The Judge of Compensation ruled against petitioner and held that petitioner’s injury did not arise from work.  Petitioner appealed.  The Appellate Court first reviewed the recent decision in Goulding where a cook volunteered to participate in a Family Fun Day and was injured while cooking for guests and employees. In that case the Supreme Court ruled that Ms. Goulding’s injury was not a recreational activity because she was doing the same work she always did during the week and because she did not participate in any of the games or activities.

The Appellate Division believed that Ms. Ryan-Wirth was not participating in a recreational activity under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 because the Cardio Club was not really a social or recreational activity given its emphasis on learning for students.  But as to petitioner the Appellate Division held that the activity did not arise out of work. The Court said:

The record demonstrated that the petitioner is a school nurse not a teacher. Her job duties were to perform health screenings, treat illnesses, make referrals to primary care providers and monitor immunizations. She acknowledged she was not performing any of her duties as a school nurse at the Cardio Club…Petitioner was not monitoring, supervising, instructing or otherwise assisting the student participants.  Petitioner’s participation in the Cardio Club was limited to engaging in cardiovascular exercise. It was not a “regular incident of employment” as a school nurse within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.

The Appellate Court also endorsed the finding of the Judge of Compensation that petitioner’s motivation was very much a personal one in exercising and attempting to lose weight.  The Judge of Compensation had found as follows:  “She also said that she had a personal health goal to lose 30 pounds by Christmas, and by doing so she would earn $661.  She admitted that there was a personal stake in getting healthy, and that she enjoyed working out.  She went on to say that she worked out whenever she could, even engaging in 5k races while pregnant and after her pregnancy came to term . . . She thought Cardio Club would be ‘fun’ and chose to do it.”

The Court also made short shrift of petitioner’s argument that she was compelled to participate. The Appellate Court focused on the several lay witnesses who testified that the Cardio Club was voluntary, and employees were not reprimanded for not participating. The Court found that there was no hint of compulsion.

In the main this case is consistent with Goulding in finding that the overall activity itself  — the Cardio Club — was not a recreational or social activity since student learning was primary.  The Appellate Division seems to be saying that the Cardio Club was really about education – as to students and perhaps as to teachers who work with those students.  Similarly in Goulding, the Supreme Court found that there was a business purpose to the Saturday afternoon Family Fun Day for the employer.  That event also was not considered recreational or social under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.  To win a recreational or social activity claim, the employee must prove a benefit to the employer beyond improvement of health and morale.  In both cases the court felt that this test did not apply because the over-arching purpose of each activity was not really recreational or social. 

Yet Ms. Goulding’s injury was found compensable, while Ms. Ryan-Wirth’s was not.  Neither was found to be participating in a recreational or social activity but one won, and one lost.  How do we square the two results? The Appellate Division concluded that one difference between the two cases was that the Ms. Goulding was doing her regular job as a cook at the Family Fun Day.  Ms. Ryan-Wirth was not doing her regular job as a school nurse. The Supreme Court went so far as to say that Ms. Goulding was actually working at the event.  Yet Ms. Goulding was not paid: she volunteered her time.  The differences are subtle, but it is clear that Ms. Ryan-Wirth lost because the court saw no connection between her activity and her job as a nurse and because of her personal interest in exercise.

In the end the case was not about the recreational or social activity statute but rather a straight analysis of the “arising out of work” standard.  Neither the Judge of Compensation nor the Appellate Division saw how petitioner’s injury arose from her work as a nurse or a monitor in the A.M. Care Program. The decision makes sense for the reasons stated by both the Judge of Compensation and the Appellate Division.

What is left of the statutory section 7 test? It seems to be much more restricted now to activities where there is no business purpose, such as an after-work softball game between employees of one company against another company.  That would be an example of a statutory recreational activity that would be found not compensable because there would be no way to argue that a softball game between two law firms, for example, would promote a benefit to the employer beyond improvement of health and morale.

The post Back Injury To School Nurse Found Not Compensable Where She Participated in Cardio Club Activity Before School appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

Many claim petitions have been filed in the Division of Workers’ Compensation seeking awards of permanent partial and total disability as well as dependency benefits arising from exposure to COVID-19.  The high number of COVID claim petitions reflects the fact that well over 1.2 million cases have been confirmed as COVID positive in New Jersey, and more than 28,000 deaths have been traced to COVID exposures.  Given the high number of claim petitions already filed and the expectation that thousands of more petitions will likely be filed, this blog focuses on some of the important considerations in defending COVID-19 claim petitions.

Is The Petitioner Entitled To A Legal Presumption Of Compensability?

That is the first consideration that practitioners must focus on when receiving a COVID claim petition.  The Essential Employees bill was signed into law on September 14, 2020 retroactive to March 9, 2020.  The law creates a presumption of compensability for certain categories of employees:

  1. Public safety workers or first responders, including any fire, police, or other emergency providers;
  2. Those involved in providing medical and other healthcare services, emergency transportation, social services, and other care services, including services provided in health care facilities, residential facilities or homes.
  3. Those who perform functions which involve physical proximity to members of the public and are essential to the public’s health, safety, and welfare, including transportation services, hotel and other residential services, financial services, and the production, preparation, storage, sale and distribution of essential goods such as food, beverages, medicine, fuel and supplies for conducting essential business and work at home, or;
  4. Anyone deemed an essential employee by the public authority declaring the state of emergency.

What does the presumption mean? Does it mean that the employer automatically loses?  No, it means that the burden of proof does not rest on the Essential Employee to prove that he or she contracted COVID from work.  It is presumed to be work related.  The burden shifts to the employer to disprove the case.  The statute provides that the presumption is “rebuttable.” An employer could rebut the presumption, for example, if the Judge of Compensation were to find that the employee more likely contracted the virus from his or her spouse or children or from travel to another state or country rather than from work.

Has The COVID Presumption Ended?

Most defense practitioners think the answer is affirmative on this question.  The reason is that Governor Murphy declared the end of the public health emergency on July 3, 2021.  The rationale for the Essential Employee Law rested on the public health emergency and refers to it in the law itself.   While the Governor never specifically said on July 3, 2021 that the COVID presumption in workers’ compensation no longer prevailed, many practitioners reason that the presumption must have ended because the law was in response to the existence of a public health emergency.

If defense counsel are correct that the presumption ended on July 3, 2021, what are the implications for workers’ compensation claim petitions?  Right now the end of the presumption does not mean all that much because many claim COVID petitions are still getting filed.  Without a presumption, the claimant has to prove more likely than not that he or she contracted the virus at work.  That is just like all other occupational disease claims in New Jersey where the burden rests on the petitioner to prove his or her case on compensability.  But over the long term, as COVID becomes more community based and more prevalent in our population, it will be harder for petitioners to prove exposure at work.  Some scientists predict that eventually most Americans will contract some version of COVID-19, and it will be more like the flu – for which employers almost never get claim petitions.

Why Are Special COVID Occupational Interrogatories So Important In COVID-19 Claim Petitions?

In all occupational claims, such as COVID claim petitions, both parties can propound interrogatories on the other side to answer.  Unfortunately, New Jersey uses form interrogatories in occupational disease claims. These are mostly outdated and focus heavily on exposure to asbestos or industrial pollutants. There are no questions about family exposure, travel exposure, or community exposure in the approved form interrogatories. There are no questions about quarantine or mask use.   Counsel on both sides should prepare relevant interrogatories customized to address COVID claim petitions.  Otherwise answers to the form interrogatories will come back with nothing but objections such as “this interrogatory is irrelevant.”  If there is an objection to the use of special interrogatories, then counsel should file a motion for permission to serve special interrogatories with the Judge of Compensation. 

From the defense side, interrogatories must address exposure potential at home with relatives or friends, out-of-state vacations or travel, holiday gatherings, dates of positive testing, quarantine periods, and current symptoms and treatment.  The timing of COVID diagnosis is always important to focus on.  A little less than one year ago, just after Thanksgiving 2020, there was a massive surge in positive COVID testing in every state. The reason was that people were gathering in homes without necessarily taking precautions that are generally required in their workplaces.  

In cases where there is no presumption of compensability, interrogatories are still very important. Where this is no presumption, the burden rests on the employee to prove that he or she more likely than not contracted COVID-19 at work.  The proofs may focus on specific individuals who tested positive and who were in close contact with the petitioner. The employer will have to contact such individuals or check personnel information when such claims are made.  All the same investigation and discovery is done by defense in a non-presumption case as in a presumption case.

Who Has The Burden Of Proof On Permanent Partial Disability?

The claimant always has the burden of proof on impairment and disability.  The Essential Employee Law did not change that.  One does not automatically get an award of permanent partial disability for having work-related COVID.  There must also be proof of an impairment which substantially limits one’s activities of daily living or materially impacts one’s working ability.  COVID cases are being settled in the Division, but this practitioner is not aware of any full trials yet on COVID claims. 

Is There Any Other Law That May Provide A Presumption Relevant to COVID-19 Cases?

The Thomas P. Canzanella Law passed in 2019 states that public safety officers have a presumption of compensability in a variety of circumstances, including exposure to communicable diseases. The statute references exposures during epidemics as well as airborne exposures.  This presumption is also rebuttable. 

What Kinds Of Allegations Are Contained In COVID-19 Claim Petitions?

This practitioner has scores of COVID claim petitions, and the variety of physical and psychological injuries is noteworthy.  Some of the claim petitions involve only a very short absences from work with no treatment at all from any medical provider.  Those are the minor claim petitions.  Others involve patients who continue to have health problems months after recovering from the initial bout of COVID, namely “long haulers.”  Those can be high exposure claims.  In addition, most large defense firms are defending COVID dependency cases in the Division. 

Although it is difficult to generalize about the types of allegations, the most common allegation appears to be respiratory because the virus often attacks the lungs first.  There are many COVID claim petitions where the claimant was diagnosed with lung damage or pneumonia.  Another common allegation is anosmia and ageusia (loss of smell and taste).  There are allegations of cardiac injuries, visual disturbance, as well as neurological injuries, such as severe migraines and brain fog. There are also claims for causally related anxiety and depression.  Clearly every case is unique, which underscores the need to do detailed investigation and discovery.

What Sort Of Medical Experts Are Being Retained By Respondents In COVID Claim Petitions?

If you think about most workers’ compensation claims, orthopedic experts are mostly used to assess permanency.  That is not the case with COVID claim petitions.  The experts most suited to assess causally related permanency in COVID cases, in the opinion of this practitioner, are physicians with a background in internal medicine, occupational medicine or physiatry.  There are also cases where both sides need to retain an ENT, ophthalmologist, psychiatrist or psychologist.  This is a major challenge in COVID claims for both sides precisely because both sides are used to retaining orthopedic doctors who are familiar with workers’ compensation and who understand the legal standards.  Most of the COVID claim petitions in the Division have not gotten to the permanency stage, and it will be interesting to see which experts emerge in this area.

Why Is Past Medical Discovery So Paramount In COVID Claim Petitions?

More is known about COVID at the present time than was known in March 2020, but much more remains to be discovered.  No one really knows what the long term effects of COVID are.  Practitioners often find in defending COVID claim petitions that someone with prior medical issues often files a claim petition for a worsening of that preexisting condition.  The COVID virus seems to frequently attack preexisting medical conditions.  Employers, adjusters and practitioners have to obtain PCP records to assess the prior medical diagnosis.  PCP records may have very important information about prior conditions and also about initial conversations regarding the source of the COVID exposure. 

Depending on the allegations in the particular case, it may be necessary to obtain prior allergy records, prior records of treatment for diabetes, prior treatment with pain doctors for migraines, prior psychological treatment, prior cardiology records, and prior ophthalmological records among others.  This information may be directly relevant to causation.  Is the worker being treated now for a long standing condition?  Is it a prior condition that has been worsened by COVID?  In the latter example, the employer may be entitled to a credit at the time of the permanency award.  In short, medical discovery remains crucial to explore in formal and in informal discovery in order to properly defend COVID claim petitions. Collaboration among carriers, employers, adjusters, and nurses will be needed to identify appropriate experts to perform permanency examinations around the state.

The post Practical Advice In Defending COVID-19 Claim Petitions appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

Every defense lawyer knows that success in workers’ compensation court is the ultimate team sport.  There are many key participants:  employers, supervisors, adjusters, counsel, account managers, brokers, experts, IME doctors, physicians, nurse case managers and vendors such as investigators.  All play important roles but more often than not, the adjuster is the quarterback.   It has been this practitioner’s experience that the role of the adjuster is absolutely vital to the outcome of a workers’ compensation case. There are many dozens of skills needed to be a successful adjuster.  This blog focuses on only eight skills which successful adjusters all have in common.

  • Understanding That Not Everything That Happens At Work Is Compensable.

Good adjusters have a sound understanding of their state workers’ compensation laws. They know that claims must arise out of and in the course of employment.  They will deny a case, for example, where an employee is just walking along a corridor at work and feels knee pain but does not fall or strike anything, or an employee puts on a coat to leave for home and feels a tear in the shoulder, or the employee starts jumping rope during a break on the premises, falls and fractures an arm. These are examples of incidents that happen at work but do not arise from work.  Good adjusters immediately flag the causation issue and focus the attention of their counsel on potential defenses. 

  • Mastering A Checklist Of Important Issues In Every Case

Whether an adjuster has a written or a mental checklist of issues, good adjusters have many important tasks to complete with new files:   A) checking on prior claims; B) ordering an ISO; C) Considering whether there is jurisdiction in the state; D) Determining the accurate wage and rate; E) Investigating whether there is joint employment; F) Discovering whether there is subrogation potential and reserving lien rights; G) Evaluating whether to retain a nurse case manager; H) Deciding whether and when to put excess carriers on notice;  I) Assessing whether there is Second Injury Fund potential; J) Focusing on potential Medicare and Medicaid liens;  K) Properly reserving the file, and L) Taking statements from the injured worker and witnesses.   These are just some of the many analytical issues that adjusters focus on every day and all day long.  Defense counsel and clients in every state can attest to how invaluable it is to receive a well prepared and comprehensive file.  It speeds up the life of the file and puts the case on the right path.

  • Knowing When To Do Surveillance Or Social Media Searches

A talented adjuster has an intuitive sense of when to do surveillance.  Many times defense counsel will receive a file pre-packaged for success.  For example, in one case our office received a file from an adjuster with surveillance videos showing a man working a physical job over a period of days while out of work and receiving temporary disability benefits for an injury.  When I asked the adjuster what led her to obtain surveillance, she said, “The doctor said his injury would require him to remain home and rest.  I called several days in a row, and he never answered his phone.  So I assigned surveillance right away and found him working another job.”  The case was dismissed for fraud.  

There are various points in the case when adjusters will consider surveillance and social media investigation.  The adjusters know the case better than anyone, having read all the treating notes, and often having spoken with the injured worker before counsel is retained. 

  • Reading All The Medical Records And Physical Therapy Notes

Good adjusters read everything of a medical nature, including PT notes.  In fact, they will often say that the most helpful records are the PT notes because physical therapists ask a lot of questions that doctors often do not ask, including recent recreational or home activities.  In one of our firm’s cases an adjuster pored over dozens of pages of PT notes involving a worker who was having protracted problems with his knee long after surgery.  The doctor was puzzled by the slow recovery.  The adjuster sent us PT records, called our office and said, “See page 17, first paragraph.  The petitioner was hiking in New Hampshire six weeks ago, jumped from a height, reinjured his knee and went to the ER.”  That brief comment in the PT notes observed by the adjuster won the case.

  • Focusing On Subtle Changes In The Mechanism Of Injury

Every good adjuster pays very close attention to changes in how the injured worker says he or she got injured, and then checks for any significant variation in the mechanism of injury.  It may be that the worker initially says he or she slipped but did not fall or strike anything, but when seen by the treating orthopedic doctor sometime later, the history suddenly changes to falling out of a truck and landing hard on one’s spine.   Adjusters live their cases and seldom miss material changes in the history of the accident.  They spot the red flags that then become the basis for defense counsel to contest the claim petition.  

  • Knowing When To Settle And When To Try The Case

As Kenny Rogers so famously said,  “You’ve got to know when to hold ‘em and know when to fold ‘em.”  The decision when to settle and when to go to trial is seldom a simple one. There are often many complicated factors having to do with the proofs in the case and the chances of success at trial or on appeal.  Good adjusters are in constant communication with their clients throughout the case, and collaboration is critical on this issue.  Ultimately the carrier or the client makes the final decision on whether to settle or to go to trial, but defense counsel and the adjuster must be on the same page.

  • Recommending Highly Credentialed Treating And Evaluating Doctors

Sometimes adjusters make recommendations on the appropriate treating and evaluating doctors, and sometimes nurses or defense counsel make recommendations, or all of the above.  Experienced adjusters know the reputation for excellence of many physicians and they also know which physicians understand the workers’ compensation system.  The physician must not only have great credentials but he or she must understand what terms like “maximal medical improvement” or “aggravation” mean in the context of workers’ compensation.   Adjusters also know which doctors take the time to obtain a detailed past medical history and which doctors ask about other potential causes for the impairment at issue.   

  • Quarterbacking The Case

One of the most significant skills of a good adjuster is the ability to keep all stakeholders informed, move the file from point A to point B and keep the file moving toward closure.  Skilled adjusters know the importance of communication and keeping clients, brokers, counsel, nurses and all those involved in the case well informed.  No matter how involved or complex the file is, the skilled adjuster strives for timely communication.  It is certainly true that the best adjusters are proactive.  They anticipate issues and they make suggestions throughout the life of the case.  Success in court depends heavily on timely and frequent communication.

The job of a workers’ compensation adjuster can be challenging, sometimes stressful, and is always impactful.  In this practitioner’s view, adjusters are the lifeblood of every insurance company or third party administrator.  There are probably dozens of more skills that make a huge difference on the outcome of a case, far more than the eight mentioned briefly above.  For example, every adjuster must  communicate effectively with injured workers and their attorneys, document their files and keep on diary.   Those skills alone could be the subject of an interesting blog.

From a defense lawyer’s standpoint, the importance of having an talented adjuster on a file can never be overstated. Time and again it is the adjuster’s good work that allows defense counsel to reach a successful outcome in workers’ compensation court.

The post Why Good Adjusters Are Crucial To Success In Workers’ Compensation Court appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

Readers of this blog are aware that earlier this year the New Jersey Assembly introduced legislation to create employment rights under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act for workers who reach maximal medical improvement but cannot perform their job any longer.  Many employers have written to say they were shocked this bill was being introduced.  This week Governor Phil Murphy signed into law A2617, which provides as follows:

Following a work-related injury, an employer shall provide a hiring preference to an employee who has reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and is unable to return to the position at which the employee was previously employed for any existing, unfilled position offered by the employer for which the employee can perform the essential functions of the position.”

The bill, which applies to employers with more than 50 employees, is notable for what it does not say and what it does not answer. 

  1. Does it mean that if five applicants apply for a job and one of them is an existing employee who has reached MMI following a work-related injury, the job must go to the employee who is at MMI? Are there any circumstances where the employer can refuse to provide the open job to the existing employee?
  2. Does it mean that an employer is insulated from a law suit if the employer interviews each of the five applicants and then decides to make an offer to one of the non-employees based on a good faith perception of better credentials or qualifications? 
  3. Does it mean that the employer has an affirmative duty to advise any employee with a work-related injury who cannot perform his or her job of all other jobs that are now vacant or may be vacant in the near future before making termination decisions?  The answer is probably yes.
  4. Under the ADA or NJLAD the employee must make a request for reasonable accommodation, but this law doesn’t say anything about that.  Does this law really obviate the need for an employee to make a request for accommodation and instead put the burden on the employer to initiate a discussion of all open jobs?  Unfortunately, this seems to be the case. There will need to be great communication among department heads, HR and workers’ compensation professionals going forward.
  5. Since the law is now part of the NJ Workers’ Compensation Act, does the Judge of Compensation have the power to enforce this provision?  Or must an aggrieved employee file a civil suit?  Until now, a Judge of Compensation has had virtually no jurisdiction over employment issues.

The law says nothing about remedies, penalties, counsel fees for violations, or procedures to enforce this provision. The timing of the law could not be more ironic: there are estimated to be 11 million unfilled jobs in the United States, and hundreds of thousands of unfilled jobs in New Jersey.  It has never been easier to find a job than it is right now. 

This law does acknowledge that employers do not have to create a new position to accommodate an employee, but of course that is nothing new either.  That statement simply reflects existing law under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and the ADA. 

For defense lawyers and workers’ compensation practitioners, this provision is worrisome because the preference language can be stretched in any direction.  One must assume that legislators would not pass a soundbite law that added nothing to existing law.

An amendment to the original draft was added late to state, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or affect any right of an individual with a disability to a reasonable accommodation under the ‘Law Against Discrimination.’”   But that raises the ultimate question.  What rights does this law provide over and above those existing rights that employees already had under the ADA or NJLAD?   What hole in the legal landscape was this provision designed to fill?

The post Governor Signs Job Preference Law For Employees Who Have Reached Maximal Medical Improvement appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

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