Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

automobile accident

Defendant Jarrod Cooney (Cooney), a shift manager at a 7-Eleven in Bellmawr, left the store mid-shift in his own car to pick up a pizza for himself and a coworker. On his way back to the store, he caused a car accident, injuring Plaintiff Alex Seccia. 7-Elevenโ€™s posted rules prohibited employees from leaving the store during their shift and paid them for โ€œa straight [eight] hours.โ€ Employees, including Cooney, remained clocked in for eight hours, including their thirty-minute break, and ate their lunch in the store. Cooney claimed he had his bossโ€™ permission; the boss denied it. Seccia sued Cooney and 7-Eleven, alleging Cooney was in the scope of his employment for which 7-Eleven was vicariously liable. The issue in Seccia v. Cooney, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1663 (App. Div. July 22, 2026) was whether Cooneyโ€™s pizza run was within the scope of his employment with 7-Eleven.

After discovery, Seccia settled with Cooney, but continued to pursue his claim against 7-Eleven. However, 7-Eleven moved for summary judgment, arguing that by leaving the store in direct violation of store rules, he was not acting within the scope of his employment and for which 7-Eleven could not be vicariously liable. The trial court agreed, and dismissed Secciaโ€™s complaint against 7-Eleven. Seccia appealed.

Vicarious liability, also known as the doctrine of respondeat superior, holds an employer liable for its employeeโ€™s negligence based on the idea that an employee is the agent of and acts on behalf of their employer. It follows that an employer can be found liable for the negligence of its employee if, at the time of the accident, the employee was acting within the scope of their employment. The key focus of the respondeat superior standard is on the relationship between the employeeโ€™s job responsibilities and the alleged negligent conduct. Thus, an employer will not be liable for the employeeโ€™s conduct that occurs beyond the scope of the employment.

Under New Jersey law, an employee who is โ€œgoing toโ€ or โ€œcoming fromโ€ their job is not considered to be acting within the scope of their employment. However, in contrast, under the โ€œdual purposeโ€ rule, an employer can be liable where the employeeโ€™s personal affairs are also in furtherance of the employerโ€™s business interests. The determining factor is whether the employer has control over the employeeโ€™s actions, meaning an employeeโ€™s travels to or from the workplace, regardless of whether their coming or going is in the beginning, middle, or end of the work day, the critical factor is whether the employer controls their travel. Such exceptions that indicate the type of control for which the courts will find an employer liable for its employeeโ€™s conduct is if the employee is running a special errand for the employer or when the employer requires the employee to use their own vehicle for such an errand.

On appeal, Seccia argued that the trial court misapplied the โ€œgoing toโ€ and โ€œcoming fromโ€ rule, for which Cooney was acting in the scope of his employment. Seccia argued that this only applied to employees commuting to and from the workplace both before and after the dayโ€™s work, but any mid-shift travel during the workday is distinct and for which the employer can be responsible. Further, because the summary judgment standard assumes issues of fact in the non-moving partyโ€™s favor, he had his bossโ€™ permission to go get pizza and, as a result, 7-Eleven must be bound to his negligent conduct. The Appellate Division disagreed. It found that Cooneyโ€™s actions, even though done mid-shift, were outside of the scope of his employment because driving to pick up a pizza was โ€œdifferent in kindโ€ from his authorized role as a 7-Eleven manager. Nor did his actions serve a โ€œdual purposeโ€ of both his and 7-Elevenโ€™s interests. Finally, nothing in Cooneyโ€™s leaving 7-Eleven to get a pizza land outside of the โ€œgoing toโ€ and โ€œcoming fromโ€ rule. Cooneyโ€™s boss, though he may have authorized the trip, did not send Cooney to get the pizza, nor did he require Cooney use his own vehicle, thereby lacking any control over Cooneyโ€™s excursion or make it a special errand or a task done for a palpable benefit of the employer but Cooneyโ€™s own benefit in order for 7-Eleven to be vicariously liable for Secciaโ€™s injuries.

The Courtโ€™s holding emphasizes that the โ€œgoing toโ€ and โ€œcoming fromโ€ rule applies wholly independent of when the travel occurs during the workday, placing the focus on the interaction between the employer and its control of the employeeโ€™s conduct and whether the employer yields some tangible benefit from the employeeโ€™s travel.

Plaintiff Ravon Hinton was involved in an automobile accident with Defendant Keyla Rivas Acosta on September 17, 2023. Immediately following the accident, Hinton offered to Defendant to settle the claim if Defendant would pay him $500 in cash. Acosta agreed to settle and, after negotiation as to the amount, paid Plaintiff $400. The issue in Hinton v. Acosta, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 806 (App. Div. Apr. 22, 2026) was whether this oral settlement agreement was enforceable so as to bar the lawsuit subsequently filed by Hinton against Acosta.

The accident happened when Hinton was walking across an intersection in Paterson and was struck by Acostaโ€™s car. It was a dark and rainy night and Hinton was wearing dark clothing. Immediately following the accident and before police arrived Hinton told Acosta that there was no need to call the police or file an insurance claim or pursue any legal action against her in exchange for $500 in cash.

Despite that offer, Acosta contacted the Paterson police department and Officer Cesar Nunez arrived to respond to the call. Thereafter, the interaction between Hinton and Acosta was captured on Nunezโ€™s body worn camera. In the footage on the camera, it shows Hinton repeatedly expressing his desire to accept $500 cash from Acosta. Caught on camera are the negotiations between Hinton and Acosta concerning a cash settlement for this accident in which Hinton eventually agreed to accept $400 to settle.

However, Acosta did not have that much cash and told the officer she would need to stop at an ATM to secure the funds to pay plaintiff. Hinton, Acosta, and the officer thereafter located an open ATM and, while on the officerโ€™s camera, she withdrew the agreed upon cash and handed it to Hinton.

Despite this agreement, Hinton retained counsel who filed a civil complaint against Acosta on May 13, 2024. The lawsuit claimed that Hinton suffered serious injuries to his brain, neck, back, and knee due to the accident. Acostaโ€™s attorney filed an answer, denied liability and included the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction and release based upon the oral agreement between the parties as a complete defense to the lawsuit.

Defendant Acosta thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to enforce the oral settlement made at the scene of the accident. She used certifications from the officer and witnesses, deposition testimony from the officer, as well as his body camera video footage to support her motion.

The trial court judge granted the motion, dismissing the lawsuit. He found that the body worn camera footage and the officerโ€™s testimony supported that the plaintiff was lucid, aware of the implications of his conduct, controlled the negotiations, and that there was clear evidence of an offer and acceptance.

This appeal ensued. Plaintiff argued that there was no meeting of the minds, that a hearing should have been held concerning its viability as a contract and plaintiffโ€™s waiver of his personal injury claims were unenforceable because the settlement agreement occurred within 30 days of the accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 17:29B-15.

The Appellate Division noted that settlement agreements โ€œare encouraged as a matter of public policy because they promote the amicable resolutions of disputes and lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by โ€ฆ courts.โ€ These types of agreements are governed by principles of contract law. They are freely enforceable unless there is fraud or other compelling circumstances that should bar their enforcement.

To be valid, a settlement requires an offer and acceptance. And, the terms of the agreement โ€œmust be sufficiently definite [so] that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained by each party with reasonable certainty.โ€ The Court further noted that once the parties agree on essential terms and show an intent to be bound by those terms, then they have created an enforceable contract.

Here, plaintiff argued that he never accepted defendantโ€™s offer to settle and that he did not have the requisite capacity to enter into an agreement. He also argued that the body worn camera footage was ambiguous.

The Appellate Division disagreed with plaintiffโ€™s position. The Court found that the officerโ€™s body worn camera footage showed that the parties voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement. That footage showed that a valid agreement was reached. Further, the footage showed that the plaintiff was not pressured into this settlement. To the contrary, it showed that Hinton repeatedly stated that โ€œhe just wanted his moneyโ€ and โ€œwanted to go home.โ€

The Court also rejected the argument that N.J.S.A. 17:29B-15 applied to these circumstances. Under this statute, no insurance release or waiver of rights by a claimant to compensation for personal injury or wrongful death, arising from an accident, executed within 30 days is enforceable without a written disclosure informing the claimant that he may seek legal representation.

The Appellate Division found that this statute only applied to a waiver or release with an insurance company and that it did not apply to private party settlements โ€“ which is what happened in this case. Hence, the Court found this statute to be inapplicable.

Thus, the Appellate Division upheld the trial courtโ€™s decision to dismiss this lawsuit based on the oral agreement reached between Hinton and Acosta at the scene of the accident.

In January, 2019, Plaintiff Martchela Popova-Mladenov was injured in a motor vehicle accident when Defendant Jason Coigne swerved into her lane on I-295 in Mount Laurel, causing her to hit him. She complained of neck pain, but she chose not to go to the ER. A month later, complaining of lower back pain, a doctor took an X-ray, which showed โ€œmild degenerative disc disease.โ€ She had a lumbar MRI a few months later, which showed a pre-existing, degenerative condition to her lower back. In 2021, Popova-Mladenov filed a lawsuit against Coigne, alleging she sustained permanent injuries to her lower back. The issue in Popova-Mladenov v. Coigne, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 258 (App. Div. Feb. 12, 2026) was whether Popova-Mladenov met the โ€œverbal thresholdโ€ and could prove she had sustained a permanent injury through objective clinical evidence, rather than only exhibiting subjective complaints of pain.

New Jerseyโ€™s Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) allows drivers seeking New Jersey automobile insurance to choose between one of two tort options: โ€œlimitation on lawsuitโ€ and โ€œno limitation on lawsuit.โ€ Those who choose the โ€œlimitation on lawsuitโ€ option, otherwise known as the โ€œverbal threshold,โ€ can only succeed in a lawsuit for non-economic โ€œpain and sufferingโ€-type damages if their injuries meet the โ€œverbal threshold.โ€ They can do so by proving they have one of several listed injuries, including, among others, a โ€œpermanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.โ€ They also must prove their permanent injury through accepted diagnostic tests, and not entirely upon their subjective responses or complaints of pain.

Prior to trial, both parties obtained experts to offer opinions on Plaintiffโ€™s claims of injuries to her lower back. Plaintiffโ€™s expert, Dr. Joshua Landa, arrived at the conclusion that the accident caused damage to Popova-Mladenovโ€™s lumbar spine, including a permanent aggravation of pre-existing degenerative changes. Defendant Coigneโ€™s expert, Dr. Seven Carl Hausmann concluded that the objective clinical evidence from the MRIs of her lumbar spine showed her condition was โ€œconsistent with degenerative spondylosis, which is age-relatedโ€ and was not due to, and pre-dated, the accident. Plaintiff produced a second report from Dr. Landa to rebut Dr. Hausmannโ€™s conclusions, confirming that the condition of her lower back pre-dated the accident, but that condition made them โ€œsusceptible to injury,โ€ and the pain she experienced after the accident had not resolved and was โ€œlikely a permanent injury.โ€ The emphasis on โ€œlikely,โ€ included in the opinion, is important.

At trial, Dr. Landa testified on Popova-Mladenovโ€™s behalf, stating that though the objective condition of Plaintiffโ€™s spine pre-dated the accident, he confirmed that his opinion that she had a permanent injury was based on her continued, subjective complaints of pain. After Plaintiff had introduced all of her evidence, Coigne asked the court to dismiss Plaintiffโ€™s complaint. He argued that Plaintiff failed to meet the verbal threshold because Dr. Landa could not prove she had a permanent injury based on objective medical evidence, only Plaintiffโ€™s ongoing, subjective pain. The trial court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffโ€™s complaint, and she appealed.

In reviewing the trial courtโ€™s opinion, the Appellate Division focused on Dr. Landaโ€™s opinion that Plaintiff โ€œlikelyโ€ had a permanent injury, and that, after he admitted the MRI established the condition of her lumber spine was degenerative and pre-dated the accident (and could not show objective evidence of an injury caused by this accident), Dr. Landa based his conclusions as to Plaintiffโ€™s permanency for the purposes of the verbal threshold on her complaints of pain alone. The Appellate Division referred to New Jersey Supreme Court precedent, which stated that subjective complaints of pain, โ€œstanding alone, are insufficient to satisfy the verbal threshold,โ€ and a plaintiff must present objective clinical evidence from diagnostic tests, like an MRI, establishing a permanent injury.

Here, the Appellate Division concluded that Dr. Landa could not identify anything in Plaintiffโ€™s lumbar MRI that showed objective medical evidence of an injury caused by the accident. As a result, because his conclusion that she sustained a permanent injury to her lower back was based solely on Plaintiffโ€™s own complaints of pain, and no objective diagnostic test, she could not meet the verbal threshold, and the trial court properly dismissed her complaint.

After testifying at her deposition that she had no intention to undergo surgery, Plaintiff Yvonne Terrell changed her mind and testified at trial that she would have the surgery, causing the Appellate Division in Terrell v. Chitra, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 84 (Jan. 16, 2026), to consider whether that changed testimony would allow her to claim future medical costs from the surgery.

After a motor vehicle accident in 2018, Terrell sued Defendant Penafranc Chitra for injuries to her neck, back, and right shoulder. Noting the acute, traumatic herniated disc in her spinal column, Terrellโ€™s primary treating doctor, an orthopedic surgeon, recommended she have a cervical discectomy and fusion. He explained the significant risks of the surgery to Terrell, which included paralysis and death. Terrell, a nurse and primary care-giver for a disabled son, worried about how a surgery would affect her and did not have the surgery in 2019 or 2020. Even after several other doctorsโ€™ opinions, she testified at her deposition that she felt the risks were too great to have the surgery. In his report in mid-2022, her medical expert stated Terrell, though still in pain, chose not to have the recommended surgery. Prior to trial she never amended any of her discovery responses to indicate any intention to have the neck surgery.

Ahead of trial, Chitra conceded that the accident was her fault, allowing the case to proceed on the issue damages alone. Working off of Terrellโ€™s choice not to have surgery, Chitraโ€™s attorneys asked the court to bar any evidence Terrell intended to introduce regarding the future medical costs of her surgery. The court agreed, and prevented her medical expert from offering an opinion as to those future medical costs.

At trial in the Fall of 2023, Terrell changed her story. She said her son had recently passed away and, since she intended to retire shortly and she did not want to have pain for the rest of her life, stated โ€œsurgery may help,โ€ and she wanted to have the surgery โ€“ but made no firm decision to do so. In light of that testimony, Terrell, over the defenseโ€™s objection, asked the court to reconsider itโ€™s decision on barring evidence of her future medical costs. The trial court agreed, and allowed her to introduce her medical expertโ€™s testimony as to both her need for the surgery and its cost, $250,000. Upon hearing this testimony, the jury returned a verdict of $1,300,000; $1,000,000 for pain and suffering and $300,000 for future medical costs, including the surgery.

Chitra appealed. Critically, she claimed that Terrellโ€™s future medical costs were inadmissible due to both her failure to disclose her intention to have the surgery prior to trial and because the introduction of the cost of the claimed surgery tainted the juryโ€™s award on pain and suffering.

The Appellate Division agreed. It found that Terrellโ€™s failure to amend her discovery responses at any time before trial to show any intention to have the surgery prejudiced defendantโ€™s ability to defend against her claims that the surgery may occur. At no time from her deposition until she testified, including a lengthy pre-trial process and Chitraโ€™s motion to strike evidence of future medical costs, did Terrell provide any suggestion she considered surgery; if she had done so, the defense could have prepared their defense accordingly. Because she did not, the Court determined, she prejudiced Chitraโ€™s defense. The Court also noted she never made a definitive statement that she would have the surgery and, as her attorney admitted at oral argument before them, she still had not had it by late 2025.

Finally, the Court determined that because the trial court improperly allowed Terrell to present her expertโ€™s opinion of her future medical costs related to the surgery, that evidence tainted  the jury as to the value of her injuries and affected their decision on pain and suffering. As a result, the Court vacated the full $1,300,000 judgment and sent the entire case back to the trial court for a new trial on damages, barring Terrell from introducing any of the contested evidence as to the purported surgery or its costs.

Of note, affecting the Courtโ€™s determination of prejudice, the Court found that had Terrell made a definitive statement as to surgery before the close of discovery in 2021, or if she had the surgery, that surgery would have been covered by her Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits available through her auto insurance. But, because of her indecision and failure to have the surgery, the PIP statute of limitations may have expired, barring Chitra to seek reimbursement from the insurer.  The Court found that Terrell must bear the consequences of failing to choose to have surgery when PIP benefits would have been available to pay for it. Moreover, by rule, PIP-payable future medical costs are not admissible at trial and should not have been presented to the jury.

In Plonski v. Amador-Hodgson, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 48 (App. Div. Jan. 12, 2026), Allan Amador-Hodgson, a bus driver for New Jersey Transit (NJT), was driving a NJT bus up the New Jersey Turnpike, just below the speed limit of 65 m.p.h. Ahead of him he saw a box truck, operated by Adam Plonski (with the two plaintiffs, his relatives, as passengers), traveling between 30 to 33 m.p.h. Unable to change lanes to the left lane due to a tractor trailer (itself traveling above 70 m.p.h.), Amador-Hodgson attempted to slow down and change lanes as the tractor trailer passed, but failed to do so in time, causing the right-front portion of the bus to strike the left-rear portion of the box truck, injuring the plaintiffs.

After the plaintiffs filed suit against Amador-Hodgson and NJT (Defendants) for their negligence in causing the accident, the Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Plonski and his employer, alleging Plonski himself was negligent for driving the box truck too slowly and contributed to cause of the accident. Before the case went to the jury, Plonski (along with his employer and the plaintiffs) filed motions for summary judgment based on the dash-cam video from the bus and Amador-Hodgsonโ€™s testimony (in which he lied, saying the box truck cut him off) claiming Amador-Hodgson alone was 100% liable for the accident. The trial court agreed, finding that no additional discovery could affect the issue of liability. Amador-Hodgson filed a motion for reconsideration which included expert testimony describing a โ€œlooming crash,โ€ a crash that arises when a vehicle traveling with the flow of traffic rear-ends a vehicle ahead traveling far below the flow of traffic due to the difficulty inherent in the trailing driverโ€™s ability to judge that vehicleโ€™s speed. Though denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court acknowledged New Jersey Administrative Code (NJAC) itself established a minimum speed for the turnpike at 35 m.p.h. Nevertheless, the trial court still found the Defendant could not establish Plonskiโ€™s speed caused the accident because โ€œno reasonable fact-finder could conclude Plonski driving too slowly makes him at all liable for this accident,โ€ and his speed, at best, was trivial factor in the accident. The court concluded that the โ€œevidential record is so one sidedโ€ that the Defendants must be deemed 100% liable as a matter of law.

On appeal, the Appellate Division disagreed, reversed, and sent the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. The appellate court found that the trial court improperly stepped into the shoes of the jury in determining that Plonskiโ€™s driving the box truck at 30 m.p.h. played no role in the causing the accident. Indeed, the appellate court specifically noted that the trial court referred to the NJAC which itself established Plonski could share in some liability for the accident. It determined that, particularly at the summary judgment stage, when a juror could conclude Plonski breached his duty to drive the box truck as a reasonable driver would under the circumstances, it was not the courtโ€™s role to weigh evidence and determine truth, but only to determine whether there were any genuine issues of material fact for trial. Since there was a genuine issue as to whether Plonskiโ€™s speed was a causal factor in the accident, it was up to the jury, not the court, to make that determination.

Conventional wisdom often suggests liability is all but a foregone conclusion in rear-end accidents. However, the Appellate Divisionโ€™s affirmation here undermines that belief. Knowing that, under certain circumstances, the operator of a vehicle travelling unsafely below the speed limit or flow of traffic may be the legal cause of a rear-end accident and create liability for the operator, a similarly-situated defendant may have an avenue of inquiry and legal argument for shared liability.

Plaintiff Aiyonna Daniels was struck and injured by defendant Chaunsa Busseyโ€™s motor vehicle while she was attempting to cross a T-intersection of a two-lane road with a four-lane road.ย  She characterized this area as qualifying as an โ€œunmarked crosswalk.โ€ย  The issue in Daniels v. Bussey, 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1159 (App. Div. June 26, 2025) was whether the trial judge made a mistake in refusing to charge the jury of the duty of an automobile driver in yielding the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway in an โ€œunmarked crosswalk.โ€

The plaintiff was attempting to cross from Mainbridge Lane, a two-lane street, across Levitt Parkway, a four-lane roadway, in Willingboro, New Jersey when she was struck by defendantโ€™s vehicle.  These two roads form a T-intersection.  At that intersection, the four lanes of Levitt Parkway are bisected by a grassy median.  There was no sidewalk on either side at Levitt Parkway or the median where the plaintiff was attempting to cross. 

However, there was a crosswalk across Mainbridge Lane with a crosswalk across Levitt Parkway, just a short distance away.  Plaintiff did not follow that path.  Rather, she was walking on the sidewalk along Mainbridge Lane, stepped off of that corner into an unmarked area and attempted to cross the four lanes of Levitt Parkway directly when the accident happened.

The case went to trial and the parties conferred with the judge as to what law the judge should charge the jury with as to the obligations of the plaintiff, as a pedestrian, and the defendant as the motorist.  The defendant disputed that the area where plaintiff crossed constituted an โ€œunmarked crosswalk.โ€  Further the defendant objected to a jury charge which stated that a driver of a vehicle must yield to a pedestrian crossing at either a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk.

In analyzing this situation, the judge refused to accept the plaintiffโ€™s position that the area where plaintiff crossed Levitt Parkway constituted โ€œan unmarked crossingโ€ and accepted defendantโ€™s position that the jury should not be charged with the law that would govern a driverโ€™s obligations when a pedestrian crossed the roadway at an โ€œunmarked crosswalk.โ€

After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant, finding defendant was not negligent.  This appeal ensued.

The plaintiff argued that the trial court judge did not charge the jury with the appropriate law and should have charged the jury that the driver of a motor vehicle must yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection.

The Appellate Division found that the area where plaintiff crossed did not constitute an โ€œunmarked crosswalkโ€ or an area to be considered an unmarked crosswalk. Under New Jersey law, there must be sidewalks on both sides of the streets that run laterally for the area to qualify as an โ€œunmarked crosswalk.โ€  Here, for the court to consider that the area where she crossed was an unmarked crosswalk, sidewalks needed to be present on both sides of Levitt Parkway, but there were no such sidewalks present. 

Further, the Appellate Division noted that [because] Levitt Parkway did not have the necessary constructed components, the statute does not permit the inference of an unmarked crosswalk at that location.โ€  Thus, the Court found that the charge selected by the trial judge and provided to the jury was appropriate and reflected the โ€œfactual realityโ€ of the area of the accident.  Hence, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, leaving in place the jury verdict in favor of defendant. 

Plaintiff Melissa Presbery was stopped at a red light when she was rear ended by defendant Jason Willitts.  Willitts was unable to stop due to a wet roadway.  The issue in Presbery v. Willitts, 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 406 (App. Div. Mar. 17, 2025) was whether the trial court correctly denied the defendantโ€™s request for a Mockler jury charge, as well as some other trial errors alleged by the defendant.

According to the defendantโ€™s testimony, he could not recall if it was raining but the roadway was wet because it had rained.  He was in the right hand lane and observed the red traffic light as he approached the intersection where plaintiff was stopped.  He noticed fewer vehicles in the left lane, so he moved into that lane.  As he was slowing down for the red light, he could not control his vehicle and his car hydroplaned, could not stop and he lost control.  His car subsequently collided into the rear of plaintiffโ€™s vehicle.

In his pretrial Memorandum, defendant requested a jury charge pursuant to Mockler v. Russman. The proposed charge would have read as follows: โ€œ[i]f a driver is operating [their] car as would a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, [they are] not to be held negligent merely because [their] car skidded or slid, resulting in damage or injury to another.โ€ย 

Following the trial testimony, the court conducted a charge conference to discuss charges to be read to the jury and the defendant again requested the Mockler charge.  The trial court denied the defendantโ€™s request, stating that the jury would get to decide whether defendant was acting as a reasonable and prudent person whether the Mockler charge was there or not.  The trial court judge distinguished Mockler, finding that defendant was aware of the wet roadway, and he did not โ€œsuddenlyโ€ come upon the condition.

The trial court judge concluded that defense counsel was permitted to argue that defendant was not doing anything wrong and that he was acting as a reasonably prudent person. (There was also an issue with the defendantโ€™s request for an aggravation charge which will not be discussed in this article.)

The jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded non-economic damages in the amount of $240,000.  Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the court made a mistake in not giving the Mockler charge and also improperly utilizing an aggravation charge.

This appeal ensued, with defendant arguing that the court made a mistake in denying his request for a Mockler charge.

The Appellate Division found that Mockler, which was decided over 50 years ago, has never required that a trial court provide the Mockler charge.  The Court found in this case, that the jury did not lack a basis to find defendantโ€™s inability to stop was anything other than negligence.  It was given an appropriate negligence charge regarding the operation of a motor vehicle.  The jury was instructed that automobile drivers are โ€œrequired to use reasonable care in the control and management of their vehicles.โ€  As for defendant negotiating the wet roadway, the jury was further instructed that โ€œa driver is required to make such observations for traffic in road conditions, and to exercise such judgment to avoid collision or injury to others on the highway as a reasonably prudent person would have done in circumstances.โ€

The Appellate Division pointed out that the plaintiff was free to argue in her closing argument that defendant failed to exercise due care, just as defendant was able to argue that he exercised reasonable care under the circumstances, including navigating the wet road.  Hence, the jury was able to consider both partiesโ€™ arguments regarding the road conditions and determine whether defendant exercised due care under the circumstances.  Hence, the Appellate Division found that there was no requirement that the Court provide defendantโ€™s personally crafted proposed Mockler charge.

The Court denied the defendantโ€™s other requests as well and upheld the trial courtโ€™s decisions, as well as the jury verdict.

Plaintiff Debbie Williams-Siraj claims to have been injured in an automobile accident on September 28, 2017, when the vehicle driven by defendant Lynne Schwartz collided with her.  Although plaintiff claimed to have suffered significant injuries to her lower back including spinal disc herniations and fractures, she had been previously diagnosed with chronic and progressive lumbar disc disorder with radiculopathy.  The issue in Williams-Siraj v. Schwartz, 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 427 (App. Div. Mar. 19, 2025) was whether plaintiffโ€™s bodily injury claim was subject to dismissal due to her failure to provide an expert report which included a comparative analysis of the plaintiffโ€™s residuals prior to the accident with the injuries suffered in the automobile accident at issue.

Plaintiff alleged that she was injured when the defendant Schwartz operated her car in a reckless and negligent manner in changing lanes into the path of plaintiffโ€™s vehicle, purportedly causing plaintiff to swerve onto the curb.  Although the cars never actually collided, plaintiff claimed that the incident caused significant injuries to her lower back including spinal disc herniations and fractures. 

However, two days before this incident, plaintiffโ€™s pain management doctor told her that she was a likely candidate for spinal surgery because of her chronic and progressive lumbar disc disorder with radiculopathy. 

About one month after the automobile accident, plaintiff for the first time sought treatment at a hospital emergency room.  According to the records, plaintiffโ€™s knee gave out, causing her to fall.  However, plaintiff reported a history of a herniated disc and lower back pain.  Although she was not admitted to the hospital, a few days later, she was admitted because her back condition had worsened.  Two days after that, she underwent a lumbar fusion surgery.

Almost two years later, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant, claiming that the accident aggravated her existing condition in her back.  Her automobile policy limited the coverage for which she could recover because she had elected the โ€œverbal thresholdโ€ limitation.  Discovery ensued and, prior to the end of discovery, plaintiff still had not retained any expert witnesses nor served any expert reports to substantiate her injury. 

The defendant filed for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffโ€™s complaint should be dismissed because she alleged an aggravation of her pre-existing injury but had not provided expert testimony to compare plaintiffโ€™s condition before the accident to the injuries suffered as a result of the accident.  Thus, the defendant asserted that she had not established that the accident caused an aggravation of her pre-existing condition.

In opposition, plaintiff now submitted two expert reports. Although she did not move to reopen discovery to permit the proper consideration of these reports, the trial court nevertheless considered the substance of each report.

In the first expert report, the doctor concluded that plaintiff had โ€œsignificant pathologyโ€ in her lower back and suffered a โ€œnew neurologic injury with motor and sensory deficit[s]โ€ that were โ€œcausally related to her motor vehicle accident.โ€  In the second expert report, that doctor noted that before the accident, plaintiff โ€œhad chronic back pain that was controlled with medications, [and] after the car accident she had  significant injuries that made her disabled [and required her to walk] with a walker . . .โ€  This expert also opined that her injuries were permanent and caused significant change in her life.

Nevertheless, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant and concluded that plaintiff was obligated under the law to provide a Polk analysis of the medical records.ย  To satisfy the verbal threshold requirement, Polk (case of Polk v. Daconceicao) necessitates that a comparative analysis showing aggravation of the pre-existing injury must be provided by an expert.ย  Because plaintiff failed to do so, summary judgment was granted on behalf of the defendant.ย  This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division noted that plaintiff had elected the verbal threshold option in her insurance policy.  Once that option is elected, the New Jersey law is triggered which provides that plaintiff may only recover for her pain and suffering if she suffers โ€œa permanent injury with a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.โ€  Further, the statute finds an injury is permanent โ€œwhen the body part or organ, or both has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment.โ€  Plaintiff must also establish permanency with โ€œobjective clinical evidence.โ€

Because plaintiff was claiming an aggravation of a pre-existing condition, the Appellate Division noted that a diagnosis of aggravation of a pre-existing injury or condition โ€œmust be based upon a comparative analysis of the plaintiffโ€™s residuals prior to the accident with the injuries suffered in the automobile accident at issue.โ€  This analysis โ€œmust encompass an evaluation of the medical records of the patient prior to the trauma with the objective medical evidence existent post-trauma.โ€  Further, the Court noted that without this comparative analysis, โ€œthe conclusion that the pre-accident condition has been aggravated must be deemed insufficient to overcome the threshold of N.J.S.A. 39:6(a)-8 (the verbal threshold).

The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court did correctly determine that plaintiff was required to provide this comparative analysis, i.e., a Polk analysis to defeat summary judgment.ย  She claimed that a pre-existing condition was aggravated by her injuries she purportedly suffered in this accident.ย  However, she did have a substantial prior history of issues concerning issues to her back which was so significant that two days before this accident, her doctor recommended that she have surgery to address it.ย  According to her MRI reports, plaintiffโ€™s lower back was already compromised as early as 2013.ย  She did not seek any initial emergency treatment.ย  The only time she sought treatment following the accident was when she fell down one month later.

Additionally, the Appellate Division noted that plaintiff had failed to produce any expert reports before the close of discovery.  The court noted that the trial courtโ€™s inquiry could have ended there and arguably should have.

Nevertheless, the Court also considered those expert reports that were submitted outside of discovery.ย  In reviewing them, however, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that these reports did not meet the required Polk standard.ย  Specifically, one of the experts failed to do any kind of comparative analysis and the other expert only made vaguely conclusory statements about the ultimate impact of the purported injuries.

Thus, the Court agreed that the plaintiff was unable to establish that defendant proximally caused the permanent injuries for which she sought recovery.  Therefore, the Appellate Division did affirm the trial courtโ€™s decision to grant summary judgment and dismiss the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Linda Brehme filed a lawsuit against defendant Thomas Irwin for a rear end accident in which she claimed to have suffered bodily injuries.  At trial, plaintiff filed a motion to admit into evidence her projected future medical expenses.  This motion was denied by the trial court judge because she had not exhausted her personal injury protection (PIP) limits.  The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in Brehme v. Irwin, 2025 N.J. Lexis 11 (2025), was whether plaintiff had waived her right to appeal this ruling by accepting payment for the final judgment and executing a warrant to satisfy judgment.

The trial was a damages only trial because Irwin had admitted he was at fault.  Plaintiff had a $250,000 PIP policy with his insurance carrier, New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company (NJM).  NJM paid approximately $142,900 in benefits.  Brehme never exhausted her remaining PIP benefits but claims that NJM cut her off, although it is unclear exactly when that occurred or on what basis.

Almost two years after the accident, Brehme filed her personal injury complaint against Irwin.  The trial took place three years and eight months later, which was a damages only trial because Irwin admitted liability.  Although she received no medical treatment for the three years prior to the trial, in June 2022, Brehme relied on the amended collateral source rule, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, and asked the trial court judge to admit into evidence her projected future medical expenses. 

The trial court judge denied this motion because Brehme had not exhausted her PIP benefits.  During trial, the judge also denied her motion for reconsideration on this issue.  Prior to appealing from the final judgment, plaintiff did not seek leave to appeal this interlocutory evidentiary ruling barring her claim for future medical expenses.

Ultimately, the jury awarded Brehme $225,000 for pain, suffering, disability, impairment and loss of enjoyment of life.  It also awarded $50,000 for past lost wages and $0 for future lost earnings.  The total verdict was $275,000.  On July 7, 2022, the trial court judge entered the final judgment, which also included pre and post judgment interest.

Irwinโ€™s insurance company paid the final judgment, which Brehmeโ€™s counsel deposited into his trust account.  On July 18, 2022, Brehmeโ€™s counsel also signed a warrant to satisfy judgment.  Thereafter, on July 29, 2022, after Brehme accepted payment of the final judgment and the warrant had been executed, Brehmeโ€™s counsel wrote to the trial court judge stating that he was trying to file an appeal regarding the barring of Brehmeโ€™s claim for future medical expenses.  He submitted a proposed order under the five-day rule, which purportedly memorialized the ruling barring evidence of future medical expenses.  

Irwin filed the warrant to satisfy judgment on August 8, 2022.  On that same day, Brehme filed her Notice of Appeal (to the Appellate Division) from the final judgment.  The Notice of Appeal was filed three weeks after plaintiff had accepted payment of the final judgment and three weeks after her counsel executed the warrant to satisfy judgment.   

The Appellate Division denied the appeal as moot.  It noted that Brehme never advanced, either on the record or in writing, that she intended to pursue her claim for future medical expenses.  Rather, she accepted and received the full final judgment amount and later signed a warrant to satisfy judgment before indicating her desire to appeal.  Thus, the Appellate Division concluded that the final judgment precluded her appeal challenging the trial judgeโ€™s denial of future medical expenses. 

Brehme filed a petition for certification before the New Jersey Supreme Court, seeking to reverse the Appellate Division decision.  Certification was granted by the Court.

Before the Supreme Court, Brehme argued that she filed her Notice of Appel within the forty-five-day deadline required under Rule 2:4-1 (time to file an appeal), and that the rule did not require a party to announce its decision to appeal before that deadline.  She further argued that, although her attorney executed the warrant to satisfy judgment before writing to the judge to request an order that memorialized his evidentiary ruling, she preserved her right to appeal since she filed the Notice of Appeal on the day that Irwin filed the warrant to satisfy judgment under Rule 4:48 (filing of warrant of satisfaction rule).  Plaintiff argued that she should be permitted to appeal the earlier trial evidentiary ruling, excluding her future medical expenses claim and that the Appellate Division made a mistake by dismissing her appeal as moot.

The defendant, however, argued that Brehme failed to clearly make her intention to appeal known before she accepted the benefits of the final judgment.  Further, he argued that if Brehme prevailed on the merits, by obtaining permission to admit into evidence future medical expenses, even though her PIP limits have not yet been exhausted, the only remedy would be to vacate the final judgment for the damages trial because evidence of pain and suffering and future medical expenses are not separable.  Further, Irwin argued that prevailing on appeal would nullify the final judgment, rather than potentially increase it.

The Supreme Court pointed out that, although Brehme complied with the deadline under Rule 2:4-1, that rule did not address whether a plaintiff can accept final payment of a judgment, execute a warrant to satisfy judgment, and then appeal.ย  The Court further noted that Rule 4:48-1 (warrant of satisfaction rule) also does not address that issue.ย  That rule provides that when a party satisfies a final judgment, a warrant must be executed and delivered to the party making satisfaction.ย 

The Court agreed with Brehme that Rule 4:48-1 does not alter the forty-five-day time period prescribed in Rule 2:4-1, i.e. the time to file a Notice to Appeal.ย  However, the Court also noted that Rule 4:48-1 โ€œalso does not explicitly address the legal effect of accepting a judgment and executing a warrant to satisfy the judgment before filing a Notice of Appeal.โ€ย 

However, the Supreme Court noted that New Jersey common law has addressed in other contexts whether a plaintiff can accept payment of a final judgment, execute a warrant to satisfy that judgment, and then appeal.  It noted that the longstanding general rule was โ€œthat when a litigant accepts the benefit awarded . . . by a final judgment, that litigant is precluded from afterward challenging the validity of the conditions by an appeal.โ€  When one party pays a judgment and the other accepts the money and executes a warrant to satisfy judgment, โ€œthe legal effect of what transpires is that a contract is entered into between the parties to terminate the litigation.โ€   

However, in other case law, the Court explained that an appeal could be maintainable if it would serve to increase but not reduce the amount of the judgment.  But, the parties seeking to appeal must make it known prior to accepting final judgment that it intended to appeal an issue which would not impact the final judgment other than to potentially increase it. 

Thus, the Supreme Courtโ€™s holding was as follows:

When a plaintiff accepts the final judgment, that party may still appeal if the party can show that (1) it made its intention to appeal known prior to accepting payment of the final judgment and prior to executing a warrant to satisfy that judgment, and also that (2) prevailing on the appellate issue will not in any way impact the final judgment other than to potentially increase it.

In applying these principles to the within case, the Court found that plaintiff did not make her intention to appeal known prior to accepting payment of the final judgment and prior to executing a warrant to satisfy that judgment.  To the contrary, she accepted payment of the final judgment, her counsel deposited the money into his trust account and also signed a warrant to satisfy judgment.  It was not until three weeks later that plaintiff filed her notice of appeal from the final judgment.

As to the second prong of this ruling, the Court found that plaintiff was also unable to show that prevailing on the trial court evidentiary ruling would not impact the final judgment and only potentially increase it.  The Supreme Court pointed out that personal injury awards are generally not divisible.  Evidence of pain and suffering โ€œis inextricably linked to evidence of future medical expenses.โ€

The Court noted that one jury could not hear evidence relevant to pain and suffering and another jury hear evidence relevant to future medical expenses.  These two claims would need to be considered simultaneously and they are not fairly adjudicated separately.  Because plaintiff did not receive treatment for three years, it is possible that a subsequent jury could consider the evidence differently to find that she is entitled to less damages.  It would not be guaranteed that the issue of future medical expenses would only increase the sum the jury awarded to her.  Because the evidentiary issue on this appeal was not separable from the underlying final judgment, plaintiff could not show that it would only increase the final judgment.

In summary, the Supreme Court found that plaintiff could not show that she expressed her intention to appeal before accepting payment on the final judgment and before her attorney executed the warrant to satisfy the judgment or that the appeal would not impact the final judgment other than to increase it.  Hence, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffโ€™s appeal could not proceed and that the Appellate Division properly dismissed it as moot.  Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division decision dismissing the appeal. 

Plaintiff Mildred Green filed a lawsuit against defendants Ricardo Arboleda Guapacha and Alba Vidal due to an automobile accident.  Green and Arboleda Guapacha were both stopped at a red light before the accident occurred.  Green was in the middle lane and Arboleda Guapacha was in the left lane. The issue in Green v. Arboleda Guapacha, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2899 (App. Div. Nov. 21, 2024), was whether Arboleda Guapacha owed any duty of care to Green who made a left-hand turn from the middle lane of the roadway.

The facts were undisputed that Arboleda Guapachaโ€™s vehicle was in the left lane of traffic and Greenโ€™s vehicle was in the middle lane of the roadway before Green began to turn left.  The only lane of traffic that was authorized to turn left at that intersection was the lane that Arboleda Guapacha was traveling in.  Green was in the middle lane which was marked as a โ€œstraight laneโ€ only.

The accident occurred when the left-hand turn signal controlling Arboleda Guapachaโ€™s lane of travel turned green.  He began to make the left-hand turn.  Green, disregarding the middle laneโ€™s red light, along with the lane markings, also began to turn left.  Plaintiff Green claimed that she and other drivers have made left-hand turns onto Route 280 from the middle lane due to traffic in this intersection, despite the traffic markings that only allowed her to proceed straight.

Plaintiff Green told the police that she was in the middle lane, making the left-hand turn onto Route 280, when Arboleda Guapachaโ€™s vehicle sped up and hit her vehicle.ย  She suffered damage to her driverโ€™s side rear fender and claims that she was injured as a result.ย  After discovery concluded, defendants filed for a summary judgment, which the trial court granted.ย  The trial court judge found that there was no evidence that Arboleda Guapacha failed to operate his vehicle in accordance with prevailing law.

This appeal ensued.  The Appellate Division noted that the threshold question was whether Arboleda Guapacha owed a duty of care to Green.  The Court noted that for it to impose a duty of care, โ€œthere must be a foreseeable risk of harm.โ€ 

Here, the parties did not dispute that Greenโ€™s lane was controlled by a red light and that due to the designation of the roadway, only a straight path of travel was permitted from that lane.  Instead of obeying the traffic command, plaintiff turned left from the middle lane.  She elected to disregard the red light and the middle lane markings and drive her vehicle into the lane of travel that she should not have occupied.

The Appellate Division found that while both drivers had a duty to make proper observations, Greenโ€™s presence in the roadway next to Arboleda Guapachaโ€™s lane of travel at the time of impact was not โ€œreasonably foreseeable.โ€  Hence, the Appellate Division concluded that Arboleda Guapacha owed no duty to Green.

The Appellate Division also noted that the trial court judge properly rejected Greenโ€™s argument that she and other drivers had made a left-hand turn onto Route 280 from the middle lane on prior occasions despite the traffic control device and in contravention of the roadway markings, requiring a vehicle in the middle lane of travel to proceed straight.  The Court noted that only vehicles in the left most lane were permitted to turn left at that intersection.  It found that even if other drivers had โ€œpreviously disregarded traffic laws at this intersection, such conduct by others does not exempt Green from the consequences of proceeding in contravention of designated traffic markings.โ€ 

It also rejected the argument that Arboleda Guapacha could be liable for making an improper wide left turn or speeding up as he made the turn.  It noted that there was no evidence that Greenโ€™s vehicle would have been struck had she not been making a prohibited left-hand turn from the middle lane.

Hence, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial courtโ€™s ruling and upheld the summary judgment dismissal as to the defendants.

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