Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

evidence

In a published Appellate Division decision, Y.H. & K.W.C. v. T.C., 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS 27 (App. Div. Mar. 16, 2023), the Appellate Division was asked to decide whether the plaintiffs, Y.H. and K.W.C. (initials used to keep confidentiality) could utilize the expunged conviction of an Uber driver in a negligent hiring claim against Uber.  The driver, T.C., had been convicted of aggravated assault which under the Transportation Network Companies statute (the TNC), would have barred him from employment as a rideshare driver.  In this case, the Appellate Division had to weigh the protection of the expungement statute versus the laws governing rideshare drivers.

The Court noted the collision of the purposes of the underlying statutes.  The purpose of the expungement statute was “to permit a once-convicted person greater access to work opportunities, and thus second chances in life.”  However the TNC statute’s purpose was “to protect the public from potential danger when using digital rideshare services.” 

The TNC statutory provisions became effective on May 1, 2017 after the rideshare apps had been operating for years.  Essentially, these laws prohibit a TNC from “onboarding” someone with a conviction for aggravated assault as a rideshare driver.  A TNC must run a criminal background check in order to operate in New Jersey.  Pursuant to this statute, however, an applicant or driver convicted of aggravated assault shall not be disqualified as a rideshare applicant if there is a valid certificate of rehabilitation produced.  The TNC statute does not address the effect of expungements. 

The Court noted that the expungement statute was “to eliminate the collateral consequences imposed upon otherwise law-abiding citizens who have had a minor brush with the criminal justice system.”  When a Court grants an expungement, all records of the person’s arrest, conviction and any other proceedings related thereto shall be deemed not to have occurred.  The person who has had their criminal records expunged may answer any questions related to the occurrence accordingly.

There are exceptions to the use of this expungement.  Inspection of expunged files or releasing of information may be permitted by the Superior Court upon motion for good cause shown and compelling need based on specific facts.

The facts in this case are that the plaintiff’s Y.H. & his spouse, K.W.C. and Uber were the parties in this case.  The defendant T.C. was working as an Uber driver.  He picked up a passenger at a supermarket in Elizabeth when Y.H., an employee of the supermarket, confronted him for parking in a no-parking zone.  The dispute escalated and T.C. exited the vehicle and had a resulting physical encounter with Y.H.  It left him with a severed cervical spinal cord, paralyzing him from the neck down, leaving him a quadriplegic. 

Uber was sued by plaintiffs under a theory of negligent hiring or employment.  As it turns out, T.C. had been convicted of simple assault in 1991 and was arrested for aggravated assault and resisting arrest, but not convicted, in 1996.  In April 2006, however, T.C. was convicted of aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer.

On May 1, 2017, Uber authorized T.C. to drive for their platform but did not perform a criminal background check at that time.  Coincidentally, on that same day, May 1, was when the TNC Act went into effect, which required criminal background checks for TNC drivers and specifically barred those with a conviction for aggravated assault from employment as a TNC driver.

Thereafter, on July 7, 2017, and also on November 29, 2017, Uber ran background checks on T.C. which revealed his 2006 conviction.  On December 12, 2017, an amended expungement order was filed for T.C.’s convictions.

The record was unclear as to when and how Uber became aware of this expungement. But, based upon this timeline, it is clear that Uber had knowledge of T.C.’s prior conviction for aggravated assault for some period of time prior to the expungement based upon the two background checks.

Plaintiff sued T.C. for his actions, as well as Uber, claiming theories of respondeat superior and negligent hiring, training and supervision against Uber.  To pursue these claims, plaintiff sought to admit T.C.’s expunged conviction for aggravated assault.

In turn, T.C. moved to delete from the public record all references related to his expunged documentation regarding his criminal history.  Plaintiffs cross-moved to admit the same expunged information for the purposes of their negligent hiring claim against Uber.

At the trial court level, the court denied plaintiff’s motion and ordered that evidence relating to T.C.’s criminal history subject to an order of expungement could not be disclosed or otherwise used for any purpose.  The plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal on this issue to the Appellate Division, which was accepted.

Upon appeal, plaintiffs argued that the expungement statute should only apply to the person whose conviction has been expunged by permitting such person to deny the conviction.  Plaintiffs argued that Uber’s knowledge of T.C.’s conviction for aggravated assault, which was obtained prior to that record being expunged, was vital proof of Uber’s negligence in permitting T.C. to work as a driver on their platform. 

To be able to prove the tort of negligent hiring, the plaintiff must prove that “the employer either knew or should have known that the employee was violent or aggressive, or that the employee might engage in injurious contact toward third persons.”  Plaintiffs claim that their negligent hiring claim was founded upon Uber’s knowledge of T.C.’s criminal history and that the trial court’s barring them from using this evidence effectively prevented them from proving negligent hiring by Uber.

Citing the expungement statute, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court decision that, as to the driver T.C., whose conviction was expunged, he was entitled to the protection of that expungement order.  After the order was granted, T.C. may “rely on the court’s previous assurance he need not disclose the events of his previous conviction except in the narrow circumstances prescribed by our statute.”  Thus, that portion of the trial court’s decision was affirmed.

However, the Court found that Uber’s argument was not the same as T.C.’s argument.  The Appellate Division noted that Uber asked the Court to read the expungement statute to create a third right which would allow third parties to ignore what they already knew about a defendant, prior to the entry of an expungement order, for the purposes of extinguishing liability. 

The Court observed that the expungement statute is naturally in a state of tension with the truth.  It noted that an expungement is a legal fiction but it does not mean that the underlying reality has changed, i.e. those with expunged records were indeed convicted of an underlying offense.  The issue is whether the expungement gave Uber the ability to assert T.C.’s rights so as to imply ignorance of the assault conviction. 

The Court noted that the expungement statute directs courts to permit consideration of expunged records “upon motion for good cause shown and compelling need based on specific facts.”  The Appellate Division found that there was no way plaintiffs could prove Uber’s prior knowledge without disclosing evidence which implicated T.C.’s expunged conviction.  Hence, the Appellate Division found that this was a demonstration of a “compelling need.”

In conclusion, the Appellate Division found that the expungement statute prevented the evidence of an expunged record to be used against the person for whom the expungement is meant to benefit, i.e. the recipient of the expungement but, as for third parties, the expungement statute was less clear.  It found that the expunging statute does not automatically extend to a third party’s prior knowledge of information contained within a subsequent expungement offer.  It held that “[s]o long as the party seeking to introduce the evidence demonstrates good cause and a compelling need, courts cannot categorically bar admission of this evidence when offered to prove a third-party’s knowledge of the underlying facts.”

The Appellate Division remanded the matter back to the trial court to explore what Uber knew about T.C.’s expungement, when they knew it, or whether they knew of it at all.  The Court held that if the record demonstrated Uber was informed of the expungement prior to the events involving the plaintiff, Uber may be entitled to rely on that information as evidence of T.C.’s rehabilitation or lack of a propensity towards violence.  Thus, while the Appellate Division affirmed the order as to T.C., barring the plaintiffs from using the assault conviction against the driver, the trial court’s decision was reversed as to barring its use as to Uber. 

Plaintiff Calise Belin was injured in a two vehicle accident after stopping at a stop sign on Lafayette Road in Voorhees, preparing to turn left on Haddonfield-Berlin Road. Plaintiff looked both ways and not seeing anyone coming, turned left. She collided with a vehicle being driven by Debra Lawless-Gattone who was travelling northbound on Haddonfield-Berlin Road. The issue in Belin v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1400 (App. Div. Aug. 5, 2022), was whether Plaintiff Belin was more than 50% at fault, precluding her from recovering any underinsured motorist benefits from her insurance company, NJM.

Plaintiff had been driving to a basketball game after work in a car owned by her parents. At the time of the accident, it was dark and rainy. The other driver, Lawless-Gattone, was on her way to pick up her son from hockey practice. She was in the left lane of Haddonfield-Berlin Road, deciding whether to move to the right lane when she saw Plaintiff’s car approach the stop sign on Lafayette Road. She was satisfied that Plaintiff would stop and checked her rear view mirror to see if it was safe to move into the right lane. Lawless-Gattone’s path of travel was not controlled by any traffic sign or signal. When she turned back, Plaintiff was coming out of Lafayette Road, turning in front of her. She braked and turned her wheel in an attempt to avoid Plaintiff but did not have sufficient time to stop before colliding with Plaintiff’s driver’s side door.

Plaintiff claimed that she stopped and that the fault of the accident lay with Lawless-Gattone because she hit Plaintiff. She claims that Lawless-Gattone could have paid better attention to avoid the accident. Plaintiff claimed that Lawless-Gattone was speeding or, at least, driving too fast for existing weather conditions. She also alleged that Lawless-Gattone was distracted by looking around to change lanes.

Under New Jersey law, it was the Plaintiff’s burden to establish that Lawless-Gattone was at least 50 percent negligent for the accident to permit Plaintiff to recover against NJM (for underinsured motorist benefits). The trial court judge, Judge Belgard, disagreed with Plaintiff’s claim that Lawless-Gattone was at fault and dismissed the case. Although Lawless-Gattone may have given different statements about the speed limit on Haddonfield-Berlin Road where the accident happened, her testimony was consistent that she was not speeding. Plaintiff offered no contrary testimony. The judge also found no evidence in the record that Lawless-Gattone was distracted.

This decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, which agreed with the trial court judge. Plaintiff had failed to offer evidence “to permit a rational factfinder to conclude Lawless-Gattone was speeding or distracted or that plaintiff who was making a left turn in front of Lawless-Gattone from a side street controlled by a stop sign, had the right of way, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.”  To prevent summary judgment from being granted, a plaintiff must “demonstrate by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of fact existed.”  The Court noted that plaintiff failed to do so and affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of NJM, dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Glenn Hughes allegedly suffered injuries as a result of an October 17, 2017 automobile accident with defendant Jason Worthington.  On that date, defendant Worthington rear ended the plaintiff.  At trial, the defendant stipulated as to liability with the only issue to be decided at trial was whether plaintiff’s injuries were permanent and causally related to the accident.  The issue in Hughes v. Worthington, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2655 (App. Div. Dec. 30, 2022) was whether the plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain sufficed to constitute a permanent injury under the verbal threshold.

The case was tried before a jury and the defendant Worthington moved for a directed verdict based upon plaintiff’s failure to present objective, credible medical evidence to support his claim that he suffered a permanent injury.  That motion was granted and this appeal ensued.

The plaintiff alleged to have suffered injuries to his neck as a result of the accident.  Plaintiff’s doctor, Dr. Norman Stempler, testified that plaintiff lost range of motion in his neck as a result of the accident.  Further, he testified that an MRI taken two months after the accident supported his diagnosis that plaintiff suffered an aggravation of pre-existing degenerative disc disease.  However, upon cross examination, Dr. Stempler admitted that the degenerative disc disease of the plaintiff’s cervical spine pre-dated the accident and he could not observe an aggravation of this pre-existing condition of plaintiff’s MRI.  Further, he conceded that his opinion concerning the aggravation of the degenerative disc disease was derived from plaintiff telling him that he was asymptomatic before the accident but that, after the accident, he experienced a decreased range of motion in his neck.

Moreover, Dr. Stempler admitted that he could not determine if the findings on plaintiff’s MRI were acute or chronic.  He agreed that the range of motion testing had a subjective component.

At trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that plaintiff failed to demonstrate – with objective, credible medical evidence – that he suffered a permanent injury as a result of the accident.  The trial court noted that the plaintiff’s doctor formed his opinion based upon the plaintiff’s subjective complaint and, therefore, determined that Dr. Stempler improperly relied on subjective evidence.  Finally, the trial court concluded that, as a result, the plaintiff failed to establish by objective, credible evidence, a nexus between his alleged injuries and his automobile accident, as required by the New Jersey verbal threshold statute.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff claimed that his subjective complaints, i.e. his restricted range of motion, was sufficient to support Dr. Stempler’s opinion that there was a permanent injury.  The Appellate Division rejected that argument.

The Court noted that under the verbal threshold of the New Jersey automobile law, AICRA, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8, lawsuits are restricted for damages from automobile accidents unless the victim “sustains a bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fracture; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.”  Further, the Court noted that under this statutory provision “an injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ or both has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment.” 

The Appellate Division cited to prior case law that to vault this “threshold,” a physician must certify that the automobile accident victim suffered from a statutorily enumerated injury.  This opinion must be based on “objective clinical evidence.”  Further, the necessary objective evidence must be derived from accepted diagnostic tests and cannot be dependent entirely upon subjective patient response.  Thus, subjective tests alone, such as range of motion tests, will not suffice to meet this standard.

The Court further noted that “plaintiff was required to prove through expert testimony there was objective clinical evidence his injuries were permanent and causally related to the automobile accident.”  The Appellate Division found that his physician’s testimony concerning permanency was based solely on the plaintiff’s subjective claims concerning a diminished range of motion.  Hence, plaintiff failed to provide the requisite objective proofs that were required to meet the threshold. 

Dr. Stempler had based his opinion on plaintiff’s current complaints, which purportedly did not exist prior to the accident, that he had suffered a permanent injury.  However, Dr. Stempler also acknowledged that he was unable to determine if the degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine observed on the MRI was acute or chronic.  Thus, the Appellate Division found that “his testimony was not based on credible, objective evidence obtained from accepted diagnostic tests, and is, therefore insufficient to fault the threshold under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.”  Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that the trial court did properly grant the motion for a directed verdict, dismissing the lawsuit.

Capehart Blogs

Subscribe to Blog Updates

Categories