Federal Court Holds That Employee With Renal Cancer In Remission Is Covered Under The ADA
Michael Norton worked for Defendant ALC in May 2008. The company operated 200 facilities in twenty states involving assisted living services to the elderly. Plaintiff worked at the Sulphur Springs, Texas location as a “Residence Sales Manager.” (more…)
Many employers struggle with situations that develop when an employee voluntarily reveals certain confidential medical information. In Watson v. C.R. England, Inc., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8971, (10 th Cir. 2011), the plaintiff worked as a truck driver for C.R. England. In the course of his employment, he informed C.R. England’s Human Resources Director that he was HIV positive. He conveyed this information not in the context of any post-offer medical examination but because he thought another driver had already advised the company of this medical information.
Problems developed a few months after Watson had been working for the company. He decided to become a driver-trainer for the company and completed a five-day “Train-the Trainer” course in February 2003. The HR Director called Watson into her office to express concerns about his ability to become a trainer in light of his HIV-positive status. Several meetings occurred with legal counsel and eventually an idea was proposed that Watson would disclose his HIV-positive status to potential trainees. Watson agreed to use a form that could be given to potential trainees in which the trainees would acknowledge that they were fully informed of his HIV status.
On February 11, 2003 Watson began his first training assignment. Before he left, he requested “home time” beginning February 16, 2003. That request was denied because Watson had not given two weeks’ notice. On February 12, 2003 Watson and his trainee were dispatched on their first drive together to deliver a load to Omaha, Nebraska.
After they delivered the load, they were sent to pick up a second load in Omaha, but the second load was canceled. They were then assigned to pick up another load, but that too was canceled. The company then advised Watson and his trainee to pick up the first previously canceled load. Watson was stressed about these cancellation occurrences and demanded immediate “home time” stating that he could not wait the two-week notice period. The request was once again refused, whereupon Watson refused to pick up the previously canceled load and said he was “deadheading” (driving an empty truck) to his family home in Florida. His employment was shortly thereafter terminated.
Watson filed a charge with the EEOC stating that C.R. England discriminated against him and retaliated against him due to his illness. The EEOC issued a determination in Watson’s favor, leading to the present law suit. Watson argued that the company violated ADA § 102(d), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) because he disclosed medical information. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument.
On its face, § 102(d) does not apply to or protect information that is voluntarily disclosed by an employee unless it is elicited during an authorized employment-related medical examination or inquiry. . . In sum, if an employer disclosed medical information that was voluntarily offered by an employee – outside of the context of an authorized employment-related medical examination or inquiry – then the employer is not subject to liability under § 102(d).
The court held that since the disclosure of HIV status came directly from Watson to the HR Director and not as part of any sort of examination or inquiry, the information was not protected by the ADA.
Plaintiff also argued that the company discriminated against him by requiring potential trainees to sign an HIV-acknowledgement form before training would take place. The court held that C.R. England did not deny Watson the opportunity to be a trainer, demote him, or reassign him. It disagreed with the position of the EEOC that requiring the use of the form in itself was an adverse action. The court ruled that plaintiff did not prove that the use of the acknowledgement form had any meaningful impact on Watson’s employment opportunities. “Even though some might frown upon C.R. England’s actions in effectively allowing trainees to decline to work with Mr. Watson because he has HIV, ‘not every perceived indignity will rise to the level of an adverse employment action.'”
The case is important because it draws a clear distinction between the use of medical information obtained as part of a medical examination or inquiry and the use of medical information voluntarily disclosed by an employee outside of any such examination
The Pacific Maritime Association had a “one-strike” rule which screened out any applicant who tested positive for drug or alcohol use during the preemployment process. Santiago Lopez, who was addicted to drugs and alcohol, tested positive for marijuana during his preemployment process in 1997 and was therefore disqualified from further consideration.
In 2002 Lopez began to address his addictions. By 2004 he was clean and sober and he reapplied to be a longshoreman with Pacific Maritime Association. His application for employment was rejected because of the one-strike rule. Plaintiff Lopez sued under the ADA and argued that he was discriminated against based on his disability status as a rehabilitated drug addict.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a company one-strike rule is valid. “The ADA prohibits employment decisions made because of a person’s qualifying disability, not decisions made because of factors merely related to a person’s disability.” The Court agreed with prior case law that held that an employer’s policy not to rehire someone who lost his or her job due to drug-related misconduct is a neutral and nondiscriminatory reason for not rehiring. In addition, the Court observed that the Longshore industry has suffered numerous serious accidents including fatalities that were related to use of drugs and alcohol in the workplace, underscoring the need for a one-strike policy.
Plaintiff also argued that this policy impacted more heavily people with drug and alcohol addiction. The Court said that this was purely speculative. “We disagree because, as we have noted, the rule does not necessarily screen out recovering drug addicts disproportionately.” The Court added, “. . . [W]e still do not know how many recovered drug addicts Defendant hires versus how many recovered drug addicts it turns away, nor do we know how many of those turned away are not drug addicts, recovering or otherwise.”
This case can be found at Lopez v. Pacific Maritime Association, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3923 (9th Cir. 2011).
