Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

premises liability

Plaintiff Akhilesh Parasher was visiting his elderly mother, defendant Maya Etvir Sharma, when he tripped on a three step outdoor staircase leading from her back door. He had been there for Mother’s Day and helped her with some chores and errands. The issue in Parasher v. Sharma, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1076 (App. Div. May 26, 2026), was whether Plaintiff qualified as a business invitee versus a social guest, for which a lesser degree of care would be owed by the landowner.

Sharma was an elderly woman with dementia and is now deceased. She had lived in this home for over 50 years. After Plaintiff’s father died, he lived in the house for two years. In the year before the accident, Plaintiff visited his mother almost every day and would take her grocery shopping and run errands. While unloading the groceries, he would use the back door. He did not notice any defects in the steps leading up to the back door.

On the day of the accident, Sharma called Plaintiff and asked him to come over on Mother’s Day to have some “family fun.” He did come over and helped her with house cleaning and then took her to the store to buy groceries. They used the back door to carry in the groceries.

When he was leaving that day, he also used the back door. He made it down the first step but fell backwards when he reached the second step. These steps had handrails but only on the highest step and, on one side, the railing was dislodged from its anchor point.

Plaintiff retained a liability expert who concluded that the steps were in a dangerous condition. He opined that the staircase was dangerous because of “the lack of dimensional uniformity, a defective guardrail and handrailing system and the absence [o]f visual clues.”

Plaintiff sued Defendant (his mother Sharma), alleging negligence as to the condition of her property. Following the completion of discovery, Sharma filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court judge granted the motion, dismissing the lawsuit. This appeal ensued.

As part of the trial court’s decision, the judge concluded that Plaintiff was a social guest, not a business invitee. On appeal, Plaintiff made the argument that he was misclassified and because he was conferring “essential household benefits,” he should have been classified as a business invitee, with the higher duty of care imposed upon the Defendant, as the landowner.

The Appellate Division pointed out that the duty of care owed to an injured party is dependent upon their status – whether they are a business invitee, social guest, or trespasser. A business invitee is someone who is “invited on the premises for purposes of the owner that often are commercial or business related.”  If a business invitee, the landowner would owe “a duty of reasonable care to guard against any dangerous conditions to his or her property that the owner either knows about or should have discovered.”

However, a lesser degree of care is owed to a social guest or licensee. Such a person would be someone who is on the premises for personal purposes. As a social guest/licensee, the owner would only be liable for that person’s injury if the owner knew or had reason to know of the condition (that caused the injury) and should realize that it involved an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensee and should expect that they would not discover or realize the danger. Further, the owner would not be liable unless the licensee did not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.

The Appellate Division noted that a person would generally remain as a “social guest,” even if they performed some services beneficial to their host. The rationale is that the main purpose of their visit was social and not to render services. The Court cited to prior case law that the “nature of the relationship should be governed by throughout by that purpose and not by the fact that the guest may during a small portion of the stay assist in preparing food for a meal or perform some other minor chore of benefit to the hostess at the latter’s request.”

Here, Plaintiff came to his mother’s house for a social purpose. He was coming at his mother’s request for “family fun” on Mother’s Day. While Plaintiff did help clean and run errands, the Court found that these actions did not convert his status from a social guest to a business invitee. His social interaction was concurrent with the performance of household chores.

And regardless of his status, the Appellate Division noted that there would be no liability because the hazard posed by the staircase was obvious. As either a social guest or an invitee, there would be no liability to an injured party from a hazard which is apparent or known to the injured party.

The Court noted that the “defects” in the staircase pointed out by Plaintiff’s expert were obvious to Plaintiff. He had lived in the house and visited his mother regularly. Thus, the Appellate Division found that Plaintiff should have been aware of them. Hence, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, granting summary judgment as to Defendant Sharma.

The Pro Se plaintiff Tannia Winston tried her personal injury case on her own against 7-Eleven.  She claimed that she was injured due to a slip and trip at defendant’s convenience store.  The issue in Winston v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1705 (App. Div. Sept. 18, 2025) was whether the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for an involuntary dismissal at the end of plaintiff’s case at trial.

Plaintiff commenced her lawsuit with counsel.  However, her attorney was relieved as counsel before the trial.  Therefore, plaintiff represented herself at the trial of this matter.

Plaintiff’s injury occurred when she entered a 7-Eleven in Jersey City on a rainy day to purchase a cup of coffee.  She claimed that, as she entered the store, her foot was caught under a large “object on the floor.”  She testified that she fell forward, stiffened up, and locked her knee to avoid falling.  She also claimed that an employee “quickly grabbed the object and ran it [sic] out of the building.”  Plaintiff further testified that she limped out of the store, boarded a bus to the emergency room, where a cast was placed on her leg.  She did admit upon cross-examination that it was actually a knee immobilizer.

At the conclusion of her testimony, plaintiff rested her case and 7-Eleven moved for an involuntary dismissal.  The defendant argued that plaintiff had failed to satisfy her burden of proving liability.  In particular, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to demonstrate “there was a condition in the store that was unreasonably dangerous” or that the defendant’s store was on notice of “whatever condition” plaintiff claimed caused her to trip.  Further, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the accident was the proximate cause of her alleged damages.

Plaintiff argued that defendant knew the object was on the floor because an employee grabbed it and commented to her about its improper placement at the entrance.  Plaintiff did not present any witnesses to testify about the object’s placement or duration at the entry.  She claimed that the judge forbade her from explicitly testifying she tripped on “cardboard” because she was unable to present expert testimony concluding that the object was cardboard.

The trial court judge granted the defendant’s motion for a dismissal.  The trial court judge found that plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendant 7-Eleven “knew or should have known of this alleged dangerous condition and failed to use a reasonable degree of diligence and care with respect to whatever the object was.” 

The trial court commented that the plaintiff was unable to tell the jury what object caused her to slip and there was no testimony about how long it was there or who put it there. Even though someone from 7-Eleven may have removed it after her incident, the trial court judge found that it did not establish that 7-Eleven was responsible for the placement of that object, how long it had been there or that they knew it was there and “they were not exercising reasonable care in their failure to remove it.”

Upon appeal, the Appellate Division noted that to prove a negligence claim in the context of a business invitee’s fall at a defendant’s premises, the plaintiff “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) defendant’s actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition; (2) lack of reasonable care by defendant; (3) proximate causation of plaintiff’s injury; and (4) damages.”

The Appellate Division further noted that owners of premises were generally not liable for injuries caused by defects for which they had no actual or constructive  notice and no reasonable opportunity to discover them.  The Court stated that the absence of notice would be fatal to a plaintiff’s claims of premises liability.  Further, the Appellate Division noted that the “mere occurrence of an incident causing an injury is not alone sufficient to impose liability.”

Here, the Court found that the record supported the judge’s decision that plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence demonstrating that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition that allegedly caused her to trip.  The Appellate Division also rejected the plaintiff’s claims that the trial court had refused to grant a continuance to allow her to produce witnesses and found that she failed to produce any evidence that the trial court judge instructed her what words were allowed for her to state and what she could not state during the trial. 

Hence, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Chris Williams filed a lawsuit against defendant QuickChek Corp. when his right hand was burned as a result of hot water melting a Styrofoam cup.  Although the plaintiff pled a premises liability cause of action, the complaint did not include a claim against QuickChek based upon the Products Liability Act (“PLA”).  The issue in Williams v. QuickChek Corp., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3238 (App. Div. Dec. 30, 2024) was whether the complaint should be dismissed based upon the plaintiff’s failure to plead a claim under the Products Liability Act.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against QuickChek based upon an incident that occurred in December 2021 at the QuickChek in Wayne, New Jersey.  He claimed that his right hand was burned as a result of hot water melting a Styrofoam cup which caused him injury and disability.  Almost two years later, on January 9, 2023, he filed a lawsuit against QuickChek, asserting that defendant was responsible for the care and maintenance of the premises and that it negligently maintained, repaired and/or controlled the premises so as to permit a hazard, a nuisance and a trap for persons lawfully on the premises.  Plaintiff further claimed that as a result of the carelessness, recklessness and/or negligence of defendant, he suffered a burn when the Styrofoam cup melted.

After the lawsuit was filed, QuickChek moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.  The defendant argued that this case was not a premises liability case.  Rather, it was a product liability action and plaintiff failed to plead a claim under the PLA and that, under New Jersey law, all common law claims were subsumed by the PLA.  The trial court judge agreed with the defendant’s argument and dismissed the lawsuit. 

The judge also held that, because the two year statute of limitations had run under the PLA, it would be futile to permit the plaintiff to amend the complaint.  This dismissal was appealed to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division noted that the PLA is the exclusive remedy for personal injury claims arising out of product use.  This statute “is intended to protect users from harm caused by defective products by ‘establishing clear rules’ in actions for damages for harm caused by products.”  The Court noted that the PLA “imposes liability upon the manufacturer or seller for a products’ manufacturing defects, warning defects, and design defects.”  Further, the Appellate Division pointed out that the Legislature “established a unified theory of recovery for harm caused by products.”  Thus, the PLA subsumes claims for a defective product under the Consumer Fraud Act, as well as any alternative remedy for injuries such as negligence and breach of implied warranty.

Thus, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court judge in dismissing the complaint.  The focus of plaintiff’s claim was clearly on a defective Styrofoam cup that melted when hot water was poured into it.  The Appellate Division found that the plaintiff should have brought the claim pursuant to the PLA which was the “exclusive remedy” for personal injuries arising out of the use of a product.  Instead, plaintiff asserted a claim as a premises liability negligence claim which claim is subsumed under the PLA.  Further, the Appellate Division noted that claiming that a party negligently maintained its premises “is not the same thing – not even close – as alleging it sold a defective product.”  Thus, the trial court’s decision was affirmed, dismissing the complaint.

By: Eric Richwine, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Plaintiff Michael Racine slipped and fell while walking inside defendant Rite Aid’s Irvington, New Jersey, store.  He suffered a fractured left tibia, resulting in him filing a complaint against the defendant, in which he alleged negligent maintenance of and failure to conduct reasonable inspections of the premises.  The trial judge had granted summary judgment to the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of any “dangerous condition” on the premises.  The issue on appeal in Racine v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 959 (App. Div. June 14, 2023) was whether constructive notice can be inferred by the presence of dirt in a condition.

Plaintiff testified that he had not noticed anything on the floor as he entered the store looking to purchase hair gel, which was on a shelf close to the entrance.  He reported that he soon after fell, and after which, he noticed a “dark greasy spot” on the floor which he believed to be a mixture of dirt with either hair gel or grease.

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial judge “drew all inferences against plaintiff rather than the reverse” and that he sufficiently established that defendant had “constructive notice of the condition that caused [plaintiff] to slip.”  The Appellate Division first considered whether the plaintiff was relieved of the burden to prove constructive notice via the mode of operation exception, i.e., by demonstrating that the dirty substance here was likely to occur as the result of the nature of Rite Aid’s business.  The Court quickly determined that this was not the case.

The Appellate Division then turned to whether or not a jury could find that defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition.  Plaintiff contended that, because “the substance appeared dirty,” the factfinder could logically infer that “the substance had been on the floor for a significant time.”  Plaintiff supported this argument by citing the Court’s decision in Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Stores, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1957), in which a plaintiff slipped and fell just inside an entrance of a store on an “all wet” and “all dirt” floor, which the Court declared was sufficient to put the defendant store on constructive notice.  

However, the Appellate Division distinguished the facts in Parmenter to those before the Court here; namely, the dirty, wet floor in the defendant store of Parmenter was the result of an all-morning rainstorm that was continuously tracking in dirt and rain into the store upon the opening and closing of its doors.

Here, there was no such storm.  The Court emphasized that, unlike in Parmenter, the plaintiff here could not identify the cause or duration of the “dangerous condition” of the dirty substance on the floor of the store.  Further, the Court rejected the contention that the presence of “dirt” permitted a speculative inference that the substance had been on the floor for an adequate period of time as to place the defendant on constructive notice.

As such, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that defendant was put on constructive notice of the dirty substance on its store’s floor, nor was he able to successfully argue that a jury could infer such. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Stephanie Ugaro was injured at work when a ceiling tile fell on her while she was in the bathroom. She sued the defendants who owned, managed and maintained the building where she worked under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  The issue in Ugaro v. Livingston Circle Associates, L.P., 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 381 (App. Div. Mar. 16, 2023) was whether the elements of res ipsa loquitur had been established so as to create a presumption of negligence by defendants.

Plaintiff had been employed by Verizon to work at a call center located in Livingston, New Jersey which was owned by defendant Livingston Circle Associates (“Livingston”) and managed by Eastman Management Corporation (“Eastman”).  Pursuant to the lease between Verizon and Livingston, Livingston had the obligation to maintain all parts of the building which included replacing all plumbing in bathrooms.

One evening, plaintiff went into the women’s restroom on the third floor of the building.  After she entered one of the stalls, the ceiling tile above the stall collapsed and struck her.

She sued the defendants, alleging that they were negligent in failing to provide safe premises to her as an employee of a tenant – a business invitee.  The defendants certified that their investigation of the incident disclosed that the cause of the ceiling collapse was water leaking from a broken pipe.  They determined that the water had leaked from the pipe, had accumulated on the ceiling tile above the third floor bathroom, which caused the tile to become saturated with water and collapse. 

At the trial court level, defendants filed for a summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff could not show that they had been negligent because they had no notice that the broken pipe was leaking water.  In opposition, the plaintiff argued the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur created a presumption of negligence and a jury should decide if defendants can rebut that presumption. 

The trial court considered plaintiff’s argument and determined that the plaintiff had established two of the three elements necessary to establish res ipsa loquitur, i.e. that the building and its components, including the ceiling tile and pipes, were under the exclusive control of defendants and plaintiff’s injury was not the result of her own voluntary act or neglect.  The third prong, however, was the issue, which was whether the occurrence “bespoke negligence.” 

The trial court reasoned that plaintiff was unable to establish the third prong because the root cause of the ceiling collapse was not visible or accessible for purposes of inspection or repair without breaching a wall or floor.  Plaintiff had failed to proffer any evidence as to the specific cause of the plumbing failure.  She also did not offer an expert as to the “proper protocols, policies or procedures for inspection, testing or maintenance of a plumbing system in a commercial building of this character, including of piping that is obscured by walls, floors and ceilings.”  Hence, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants.

The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order and contended that she did establish all three elements for the application of the res ipsa loquitur presumption and that the case should have been decided by a jury whether defendants were liable.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court decision.  It agreed with the plaintiff that the three elements triggering the res ipsa loquitur inference were established.  Thus, the question of whether defendants can rebut their presumption of negligence must be presented to a jury.

The Court pointed out that res ipsa loquitur “is an equitable doctrine that allows, in appropriate circumstances, a permissive inference of negligence to be drawn against a party who exercises control of premises with an unsafe condition that causes injury to another.”  If this inference applies, it will ordinarily allow the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and survive a motion to dismiss at the summary judgment stage.  If the case goes to trial, and the jury is instructed on the res ipsa loquitur inference, the jury may accept or reject the inference.

The Appellate Division agreed that there was no dispute that plaintiff established two of the elements of the res ipsa loquitur inference.  It was undisputed that defendants maintained exclusive control over the maintenance and upkeep of the building.  Further, it was undisputed that plaintiff’s injuries were not the result of her own voluntary act or neglect.  The remaining issue was whether “the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence.”

The Court found that the focus of the defendants and the trial court was misplaced.  It noted that plaintiff was injured by a falling ceiling tile and that a ceiling tile does not ordinarily fall, and if it does, that occurrence “bespeaks negligence.”  The defendants’ proofs concerning the leaking pipe were not “so overwhelming that they destroy any reasonable inference of negligence.”  The Appellate Division pointed out that the jury need not accept plaintiff’s inference that defendants were negligent and need not accept defendants’ contention that it would be unreasonable to inspect pipes which were within a wall.

The Court noted that once a res ipsa loquitur inference was established, the burden shifts to defendants to present countervailing proofs that were so overwhelming that they destroy any reasonable inference of negligence.  Here, the defendants never offered any explanation as to why the pipe broke, nor were there any proofs in the record as to how long the pipe was leaking before sufficient water accumulated on the ceiling tile and caused the tile to fall on plaintiff.  Plus, the Appellate Division found that “a reasonable jury could accept plaintiff’s inference of negligence and reject defendants’ arguments that it would be unreasonable for them to conduct an inspection of pipes in bathrooms, even pipes enclosed in walls.”

The Appellate Division also rejected the idea that an expert report was essential to plaintiff’s case.  It noted that the facility manager testified that there was an access panel in one of the fourth floor bathrooms, which was easily opened and, at that point, one could see indications that water was leaking behind the wall.  The facility manager explained that he would need to break through the wall to see the pipe itself, but that water damage could be seen before he broke the wall.   Hence, the Court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants were negligent in not conducting at least periodic inspections to look through the access panel.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s decision.  The Court found that the res ipsa loquitur inference should be charged to the jury “and the jury can determine whether it accepts the inference or accepts defendants’ explanation for why they were not negligent.”  Therefore, the Court reversed the summary judgment order in favor of the defendants and remanded the matter for trial.

Plaintiff Thomas Seltzer, an employee of Bloomingdale’s, was injured when he fell on a staircase used solely for Bloomingdale employees in the store.  He sued the mall owner Riverside Square for negligence, claiming that it had some degree of control over the staircase which allegedly had irregular steps.  The issue in Seltzer v. Riverside Square Limited Partnership, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 453 (App. Div. Mar. 27, 2023) was whether the defendant mall owner owed a duty to plaintiff if it did not own or maintain Bloomingdale’s or the interior staircase.

Bloomingdale’s, which was built as a stand-alone department store in 1959, was now part of a 2-level enclosed shopping mall constructed around it.  The mall was owned and operated by Riverside Square.  Under the terms of an agreement with Bloomingdale’s, Riverside Square had no authority to modify Bloomingdale’s or the staircase.

The defendant Riverside Square moved for a summary judgment dismissal, contending that it owed no duty to Seltzer because it did not own or maintain Bloomingdale’s or the staircase.  The trial court judge denied summary judgment.  The court found that “there are genuine issues of material fact relative to both the subject accident and the issue of control and the degree thereof, regarding the overall area where [Seltzer] had his trip and fall accident is a disputed fact.”  The court felt that it had to accept Seltzer’s version of facts, and as such grant him the benefit of all inferences that such facts support. 

Riverside Square filed an application before the Appellate Division on an interlocutory basis, seeking leave to appeal.  The Appellate Division agreed to accept the interlocutory appeal. [“Interlocutory” means the appeal is filed before the final conclusion of the case.]

The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s decision.  The Court found that the trial court was incorrect in finding that there were genuine issues of material fact.  The Appellate Division pointed out that there was no question that there was a valid agreement concerning Riverside Square’s responsibility and obligations toward Bloomingdale’s property.

The Court further held that Riverside Square did not owe a duty to Seltzer.  It pointed out that the staircase where Seltzer was injured was part of Bloomingdale’s premises when the department store was built, long before the mall was built.  The Court noted that there was no support in the record for Seltzer’s contention that Riverside Square “retains some degree of control and responsibility over issues such as repairs and maintenance, even on property of its admitted tenant Bloomingdale’s.”  Additionally, the Appellate Division held that under the clear terms of the agreement with Bloomindale’s, Riverside Square had no obligation to maintain any aspect of Bloomingdale’s premises.  Further, there were no facts indicating Riverside Square exercised any control or maintenance over the staircase that would contradict its interpretation of the agreement.

Thus, Seltzer’s liability expert’s opinion concerning the construction and maintenance of the staircase was “of no import” because Riverside Square did not construct the staircase and had no duty to ensure it could be safely traversed.

Thus, the Appellate Division found that there were no genuine issues of material facts in dispute and that Riverside Square was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  Therefore, it reversed the trial court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for an entry of an order granting summary judgment dismissal of Seltzer’s action.

Client: Ameritrust Group

Court: New York Supreme Court, Westchester County 

Brief Attorney:  Alyson L. Knipe, Esq. 

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Plaintiff alleged personal injuries from exposure to carbon monoxide in her apartment and commenced a law suit against the superintendent of the building.  In a decision dated November 18, 2021, Hon. Alexandra D. Murphy, J.S.C. found that the defendant established, as matter of law, that he did not cause the plaintiff’s juries, was not on actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition in the apartment, and that plaintiff’s medical records did not show any evidence of carbon monoxide toxicity.

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