Evidence

This matter concerns a challenge to the trial court’s decision to permit the jury to replay surveillance video evidence in slow motion and with intermittent pauses during deliberations in a criminal trial.  Although this case involved a criminal matter, the holding may also be utilized in a civil case.  In the case of State v. Knight, 2024 N.J. LEXIS 1174 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 18, 2024), three men were on trial for robbing a victim behind a deli.  The issue in Knight was whether the trial court properly permitted a surveillance video taken from inside the deli, showing four men walking outside past the deli’s back door, to be played in slow motion during deliberations.

Allegedly, three men robbed a victim behind the deli.  The victim identified defendants as two of the robbers.  However, at trial, defendants disputed the identification and their involvement in the robbery.

During the trial, the State presented a surveillance video taken from inside the deli about six seconds in length, that showed, for about two seconds, four men walking outside past the partially obscured window in the deli’s back door.  In addition to playing the video as part of its case and again several times in closing, the State played the video once in slow motion.

During jury deliberations, the jury requested that the video be replayed several more times in slow motion, at other varying speeds, and with intermittent pauses.  Although the defendants objected, the trial court judge permitted those playbacks under her supervision in the court room.  Ultimately, the jury found defendants guilty of armed robbery and other defenses.

This conviction was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed, finding no reversable error concerning the slow-motion video replays.  The Appellate Division held that relevant “surveillance video evidence may be presented during a trial or closing argument . . . in slow motion or at other varying speeds or with intermittent pauses, if the trial court reasonably finds [it] would assist the juror’s understanding of the pertinent events and help them resolve disputed factual issues.”  Further, the Appellate Division found that “trial courts have the discretion to grant a jury’s request during deliberations to replay surveillance videos in such modes one or more times, provided that the playbacks occur in open court under the judge’s supervision and in the presence of counsel.” 

Further, the Appellate Division ruled that the trial court, in exercising its discretion as to whether to permit the replays of the surveillance videos should consider among other things the following:

A.    Whether the video has a soundtrack that contains recorded statements of the filmed persons;

B.    Whether the video is difficult to discern when played only at a normal speed;

C.   Whether the video can assist in resolving disputed issues of identification;

D.   Whether the video bears upon disputed issues of intentionality; and

E.    Whether the video contains content that is particularly disturbing or inflammatory to watch repeatedly in slow motion.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division and affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division decision.  The Court concurred with the Appellate Division’s list of non-exclusive factors for trial courts to consider in exercising their discretion. 

Further, the Supreme Court noted that watching a video in slow motion is not beyond the ken of an average juror.  It would not require any kind of specialized knowledge.  It would be similar to a case in which the Court had permitted the use of a conventional magnifying glass during deliberations to view a photograph in evidence.  In that case, the Court had determined that the magnifying glass was not new evidence but nearly a commonplace tool familiar to the jury.

Here, the Supreme Court noted that playing in slow motion the same video that was properly admitted into evidence to highlight the action occurring on screen and assist the jury was no different from allowing a jury to use a magnifying glass to inspect a picture.  However, some tools or functions may be so specialized that their usage constitutes an alteration of evidence or creating new evidence.  In those type of situations, the Court noted that an expert may be needed to testify about the modifications.

Thus, the Supreme Court confirmed the Appellate Division and upheld the trial court’s ruling to permit the video to be played back in slow motion.

Plaintiff Hellen Bayer was in an automobile accident with defendant Michael Roman on November 22, 2017.  The parties contested the severity of the accident, but plaintiff alleged to have suffered injuries to her neck and back.  The issue in Bayer v. Roman, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2605 (App. Div. Oct. 25, 2024) was whether plaintiff’s personal injury claim should have been subject to a summary judgment dismissal due to her failure to present medical testimony apportioning her injuries between her preexisting condition, injuries suffered from the 2017 accident, as well as potential injuries suffered in a subsequent April 2018 automobile accident.

At her deposition, the plaintiff claimed that the force of the impact was a 9 out of 10.  However, she acknowledged that the damage to her car was minimal, and it did not require repairs.  It was her testimony at depositions that her head struck the back of the seat twice, really hard, and that she also felt the impact to her left leg.  She was taken by ambulance to a local hospital where she complained of neck pain, radiating into her left arm with numbness and tingling into her left shoulder.  It was noted that three months previously, she had spinal fusion surgery at L4-L5.

As it turned out, back in December 2014, plaintiff had been diagnosed with a disc herniation at L3-L4 with degenerative disc changes at L5-S1.  Plaintiff had underwent lumbar spinal fusion in August 2017 before her auto accident with defendant Roman.

Plaintiff was also in a subsequent automobile accident in April 2018 when a car she was driving was struck from behind by a car traveling about 40-50 miles per hour.  As a result of the impact, plaintiff struck her head on the seat back.  She treated at a hospital with complaints of headache, neck pain, back pain and new right sided pain and tingling.   

Plaintiff received medical treatment for both her neck and back, as well as treatment for TMJ.  Her orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Meese, noted that plaintiff had been treating for her neck and back from a prior motor vehicle accident but that the 2017 accident exacerbated the pain in her neck and back, causing an acute exacerbation of cervical and lumbar radiculopathy. 

Plaintiff also obtained treatment from a dentist, Dr. Robert Federman for TMJ syndrome.  He noted that she had no preexisting history of dental injuries and concluded that the motor vehicle accident of 2017 was the probable cause for all of her injuries to her TMJ and related teeth. 

Finally, plaintiff treated with Dr. Cohen, who summarized her prior medical records and related her problems to her November 2017 accident.  He performed a Polk analysis (a comparison analysis of injuries from successive accidents) and opined that she had an aggravation and worsening of her preexisting lumbar fusion surgery after the 2017 accident and now suffered a new injury at the L4-5 level. 

However, neither of the reports of Drs. Federman or Cohen referenced the April 2018 accident. But, Plaintiff only claimed personal injuries for the November 2017 accident and did not file a lawsuit regarding the April 2018 collision.

Defendant did not retain a medical expert.  However, defendant did obtain an accident reconstruction expert and a biomechanical expert.  The biomechanical expert opined that plaintiff’s “claims of injury or enhancement of any preexisting condition resulting from the November 22, 2017 accident are inconsistent with the minimal severity of this incident.”

At the end of discovery, defendant filed for a summary judgment, claiming that the record was devoid of any credible evidence that he caused the accident.  He argued that his expert reports demonstrated that plaintiff’s injuries could not have occurred based upon the forces resulting from this type of accident.  Further, he argued that plaintiff’s experts failed to apportion the injuries between the present accident and her preexisting condition, or the present accident and subsequent accident.

The trial court judge granted the motion, dismissing the lawsuit.  The court “was persuaded plaintiff was unable to prove the accident was the proximate cause of her injuries.”  The trial court judge relied upon the uncontested opinion of the defendant’s biomechanical expert that plaintiff’s injuries could not have been caused by this accident.  Further, the trial court noted that the plaintiff’s medical experts failed to explain why the injuries could not have been caused by the later accident and it noted that a Polk analysis was required to prove causation at this stage of the litigation.  Hence, the trial court granted summary judgment because “no rational fact finder could find in plaintiff’s favor on the issue of causation.”

The Appellate Division reversed.  It noted that plaintiff bears the burden of proving defendant’s negligence and that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.   It further noted that “a plaintiff seeking recovery for an injury caused by successive accidents must apportion damages between each responsible party.”  The burden to allocate damages is placed on the party in the best position to present evidence.  Hence, the Appellate Division found that “in successive accident cases where a plaintiff seeks to recover from the original tortfeasor, the plaintiff must prove comparative medical evidence ‘to isolate the physician’s diagnosis of the injury or injuries’ attributable to that tortfeasor’s negligent contact.”

But, the Court found that “whether a claimed injury is an aggravation of a preexisting injury, although possibly relevant on the issue of causation at the time of trial, is not an element of proof plaintiff must satisfy at the summary judgment stage.”  The Appellate Division noted that where an aggravation of injuries is claimed, plaintiff’s own testimony may satisfy that burden of establishing sufficient evidence to present a jury question.

Applying these principles, the Appellate Division found that the trial court judge erroneously determined a Polk analysis was required to defeat summary judgment.  Plaintiff had alleged that her injuries were attributable to the November 22, 2017 accident, which did not worsen after the April 2018 collision.  The Court found that plaintiff could testify at trial about the injuries that she allegedly suffered in the November 22, 2017, accident and to the extent to which both accidents, if at all, exacerbated her preexisting condition.  She does retain the burden of proving her injuries were attributable to the first accident.  It would be up to a jury to decide the weight to ascribe the omission of the April 2018 accident from her experts’ reports.

Further, the Appellate Division also found that there were genuine issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment on medical causation.  Plaintiff had testified at deposition as to the severity of the impact which caused her head to strike the seat back.  Although the defendant presented a biomechanical expert that the force was minimal and caused little damage to plaintiff’s vehicle, plaintiff’s failure to proffer a biomechanical or accident reconstruction expert “may be considered by the jury when assessing plaintiff’s proofs, including her testimony.”  However, the Court found that the facts were not so one-sided that defendant was entitled to prevail as a matter of law.

Hence, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Tony Polite was involved in two automobile accidents within thirty days.  The first accident occurred on May 15, 2019, and the second one occurred on June 16, 2019.  Plaintiff claimed to have injured his neck, back, left shoulder, and right knee in the first accident and alleged that those injuries became significantly worse following his second accident.  The issue in Polite v. Kahn, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1699 (App. Div. July 18, 2024) was whether plaintiff had provided sufficient proofs to show that the second accident aggravated his pre-existing injuries from his first accident.

In plaintiff’s May accident, he was t-boned from the driver’s side, causing his vehicle to hit a telephone pole.  He suffered injuries to his cervical spine, lumbar spine, left shoulder, and right knee.  He filed a lawsuit against the driver Estell Norman.  One month later on June 16, 2019, he was in a second car accident in which he was injured by defendant Airshad Kahn’s vehicle.  It caused his chin to strike the steering wheel and his right knee to strike under the steering wheel.  He filed the within lawsuit against defendant Kahn.  These two lawsuits were consolidated and discovery ensued.  He claimed that his symptoms from the first accident became significantly worse following his second accident.

Plaintiff treated with a chiropractor (Dr. Funiciello) who prepared a narrative report.  The chiropractor attributed a direct causal link between plaintiff’s injuries and the May accident.  He also opined that his exacerbations were due solely to the severe injuries to his neck and back following the accident in May 2019.  Thereafter, he settled the Norman matter (the first accident).

Plaintiff then obtained chiropractic treatment with Dr. Wael Elkholy for the injuries suffered in the June accident.  His complaints were of his neck, left shoulder, lower back and right knee.

Following the close of discovery, defendant Kahn filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff had not established his injuries were caused by the June accident or that the June accident exacerbated his injuries from the May accident.   Plaintiff relied on the treatment records from Dr. Elkholy and opposed the motion. 

Before the motion was heard, plaintiff returned to Dr. Elkholy to treat his persistent low back pain.  He obtained a second MRI which now showed a new disc herniation at L4-5 and L5-S1 and a new thecal sac decompression at L4-5 was recommended and was subsequently performed in July 2022.  Plaintiff provided a supplemental certification with these additional medical records.  However, the treatment records from Dr. Elkholy did not causally relate plaintiff’s injuries to the June accident, nor did they state that there was exacerbation of his injuries from the May accident.

The trial court judge granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  The judge found that there was a “complete absence of any report showing either causation or exacerbation from the second accident.”  The injuries from the first accident were severe and the judge found they were still severe when the second accident occurred.  He held that the “lack of any reference to a causal connection between the second accident to the plaintiff’s injuries is fatal to the plaintiff’s case.” 

This decision was appealed.  Plaintiff argued that there should be a reversal because of the inference of fact weighed in his favor, which would permit a jury to find his injuries were caused by the June accident.

The Appellate Division rejected that argument.  It found that there can be no inference drawn from the plaintiff’s treatment records and diagnostic tests related to the June accident.  The progress notes did not state that the June accident was the cause of plaintiff’s injuries.  Further, plaintiff submitted no expert report or proof that the injuries he suffered were caused by the June accident.

Even though there was a lack of proof, plaintiff argued that the June accident aggravated his pre-existing injuries from the May accident.  He pointed to the June 2022 MRI which showed two new disc herniations when compared to the May 2019 MRI.  However, neither Dr. Elkholy’s treatment records, nor Dr. Funiciello’s narrative report attributed any portion of plaintiff’s injuries to the June accident.

 Hence, the Appellate Division found that plaintiff failed to show an aggravation of pre-existing injuries.  The Court further noted that plaintiff failed to produce any comparative evidence regarding his injuries from the May and June accidents.

 In conclusion, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff could not show the causation element of his negligence claim concerning the June accident.  Because plaintiff failed to establish proximate causation, defendant was entitled to summary judgment.  Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Monica Graham was awarded $325,000 in damages in a lawsuit she filed against defendant Carole Venetianer for injuries she suffered in a car accident with defendant.  Plaintiff filed an appeal of this jury verdict, arguing that defense counsel should not have been permitted to cross-examine her using medical records not admitted into evidence.  The issue in Graham v. Venetianer, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 819 (App. Div. May 8, 2024) is whether the trial court made an error in permitting plaintiff to be cross-examined concerning her prior medical history, as well as focusing on her pre-accident admissions in those records during the summation to the jury.

Plaintiff was in an accident with the vehicle driven by the defendant on April 7, 2016.  Following the accident, she treated for spinal injuries, resulting in spinal surgeries performed by a neurosurgeon in 2018 and 2019.  The plaintiff had medical experts testify for her at trial, which did not include her family doctor, Dr. Linda Guirguis.  However, on cross-examination, defense counsel questioned plaintiff about her prior medical history and confronted her with admissions and statements attributed to her about her pain and therapy regimen in Dr. Guirguis’s medical records.  These records were never admitted into evidence.

The trial court found that the defense’s cross-examination of plaintiff regarding her pre-accident medical treatment was proper.  Upon appeal, plaintiff argued that she was unfairly prejudiced by defense counsel’s use during cross-examination of the pre-accident medical records. 

In analyzing the arguments made by the plaintiff, the Appellate Division noted that under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, there were certain exceptions to the hearsay rule which permitted an out of court statement.  One of the exceptions is statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. (N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4)).  Pursuant to this rule, statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis would be admissible when used to show the existence of a medical issue.

The Appellate Division concluded that the scope of plaintiff’s cross-examination, to the extent it focused on her medical condition prior to her 2016 accident, was permissible.  The defense asked plaintiff to confirm her pre-accident statements to Dr. Guirguis about her prior neck and back pain, pain from sitting and standing while on vacation, two visits to her radiologist, continuous follow up on neck and back complaints and a prescription for pain medication.   The statements made by plaintiff were made to Dr. Guirguis for the purpose of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment.

The Appellate Division also found that plaintiff was not unfairly prejudiced by defense counsel’s reference to the same medical records in summation.  First, it noted that plaintiff’s counsel failed to object during the summation.  In the appeal, Plaintiff had targeted that part of defendant’s closing which referenced her visits and physical complaints to her family doctor in 2015.  The Appellate Division found that there was “nothing in defense counsel’s closing that could be characterized as plain error which was clearly capable of leading to an unjust result.”  Thus, the Appellate Division refused to disturb the trial court rulings and the jury verdict. 

Plaintiff Laurence Rothschild claims that he suffered injuries after a slip and fall in a puddle of water at a coin show that was held on a premises owned by the Police Athletic League of Parsippany-Troy Hills (“PAL”).  Plaintiff brought a negligence lawsuit against the Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, PAL and Garden State Coin Stamps Currency Show, Inc. for damages. One of the issues in Rothschild v. Twp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 372 (App. Div. March 8, 2024) was whether the trial court made a mistake in finding that PAL was entitled to charitable immunity against such claims.

The trial court had dismissed plaintiff’s complaint against PAL, holding that PAL was entitled to charitable immunity without conducting an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that: 1) PAL failed to present sufficient evidence as to its revenue and funding sources to be entitled to charitable immunity; 2) the judge failed to follow his own orders and conduct an evidentiary hearing on the disputed facts; and 3) the judge mistakenly considered financial records provided well after the close of discovery and lacked authentication and attestation based on personal knowledge.

The Appellate Division noted that charitable immunity is an affirmative defense and an entity seeking charitable immunity must establish that: “1) it was formed for non-profit purposes; 2) is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and 3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable work.”

When an entity asserts it is organized for charitable purposes, like PAL was in this case, the court must review its funding sources to determine whether a charitable purpose is being fulfilled. The Court further explained that to aid this inquiry, the entity must provide evidence, “to assist in analyzing its [financial records] and determining funds received from charitable contributions” and specify the fee structure for its programs and services and detail its fundraising efforts with specificity.

Here, three days prior to the scheduled hearing to determine whether PAL was entitled to charitable immunity, PAL presented several years of tax returns and other financial documents to support its claim for such immunity.  The Court noted that given these circumstances, Plaintiff lacked sufficient time to review the documents and retain an expert to rebut the information revealed by the financial documents. According to the Appellate Division, the judge should have rescheduled the hearing to give Plaintiffs the chance to do so.

In addition, the Court noted that the judge did not conduct an evidentiary hearing consistent with his own prior orders which robbed Plaintiffs of the opportunity to cross-examine PAL’s witnesses regarding the financial documents. The judge had only heard legal arguments from counsel on the issue of charitable immunity. Lastly, the Court also considered that the documents supplied by PAL were not properly authenticated, as there were no affidavits or certifications based on personal knowledge to authenticate the documents. The Court held that, because Plaintiffs challenged the authenticity and accuracy of these documents, the judge made a mistake in relying upon them to find that PAL was entitled to charitable immunity.

Therefore, the Appellate Division agreed with Plaintiff that the trial court should not have granted PAL charitable immunity based upon the evidence presented and remanded the matter back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the fact disputes about whether PAL was entitled to charitable immunity.

Plaintiff Tameko Sawyer was in a motor vehicle accident with defendant Randy Lucas in which she claimed to have suffered an injury to her neck, lower back, and shoulder.  Defendant Lucas had been driving a tractor-trailer owned by defendant Hicks Paving, LLC and Hicks Septic & Portable Toilets, LLC on Route 78, when he moved his truck into plaintiff’s lane, striking her car and causing it to slam into the guardrail.  At issue in the case of Sawyer v. Lucas, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 53 (App. Div. Jan. 11, 2024) was whether the plaintiff’s Day in the Life video and her recently supplied supplemental medical records should have been barred by the trial court or whether this evidence should have been admitted into evidence and shown to the jury.

A Day in the Life video is a powerful tool of evidence utilized by plaintiffs to show graphically over the course of the day an injured party’s disability and pain and suffering caused by an accident.  This graphic evidence can be more compelling than mere oral testimony describing a person’s medical condition and limitations.

In Sawyer, there was an issue as to the extent of plaintiff’s injuries.  Plaintiff claimed an injury to her neck, lower back, and shoulder.  At the hospital, she was evaluated for head, neck, and back injuries.  Subsequently, she was found to have suffered disc herniations and bulges in her neck and underwent five separate surgeries.  At trial, she did testify about conservative pain management for an older, unrelated back injury.  During the trial, there was disputed testimony about the plaintiff’s back injury and whether it was either caused or exacerbated by the accident.

Prior to trial, the plaintiff had prepared a Day in the Life video.  This video was five minutes long and was recorded about one and a half years after the accident.  However, the video was made just eight days after plaintiff had back surgery, at which time she still required significant assistance with activities of daily living.  Plaintiff contended that the video was relevant “to support her claim for future medical costs and the pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment she endured.”

During trial, the defendants filed a motion to exclude the plaintiff’s Day in the Life video and some recently supplied medical records.  The trial court granted the motions and barred both the video and the recently supplied records from being admissible at trial.

The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. However, Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the amount of the verdict. She moved for a new trial on damages or additur. (Additur is a procedure by which a court may increase the amount of damages awarded by the jury.)  The trial court denied the additur motion, finding that the jury’s verdict did not shock the conscience (which is the standard for increasing or reducing a jury award on damages). 

She then appealed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and the denial of her motion for a new trial on damages or additur. In reviewing these trial court decisions, the Appellate Division applied the “abuse of discretion” standard in determining if the lower court’s decisions should be upheld.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Day in the Life video should have been admitted because it “was necessary to demonstrate her difficulty in day-to-day activities and the inability to present it deprived her the right to show the jury evidence of pain and suffering.” However, the Appellate Division found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the videotape. 

The Appellate Division pointed out that the Sawyer video was taken during her recuperation from her back surgery, instead of day-to-day life post-accident.  Hence, it agreed with the trial court that the focus of the video was her recovery from surgery as opposed to her day-to-day life and that it was not an accurate representation of the continued impact of her injuries.  The Court noted that Plaintiff had testified during her trial regarding the extent of her injuries as a result of the accident and the impact of those injuries upon her.

The Appellate Division also upheld the trial court’s ruling in excluding the recently supplied medical records.  The trial court found that there had been plenty of opportunity to produce the records prior to two weeks before trial.  The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s motion to bar these records at trial.

Further, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion for a new trial or additur.  The plaintiff had argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence such that it constituted “a clear miscarriage of justice.”  Plaintiff argued that based upon her injuries and prolonged treatment, the verdict of $400,000 was “shockingly low.” Plaintiff pointed out that, considering the total medical expenses incurred, more than $600,000, the jury award was disproportionate.

Again, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s rulings on the motion for additur and new trial.  It found that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of either motion.  The Court noted the trial court’s finding that there was contested testimony and that “given the contested testimony, the jury believes some of what each party said.”  The trial court was satisfied that the jury appropriately considered the information and competing arguments and arrived at a “reasoned judgment” based upon the evidence.  Further, the trial court did not find that the damages were so disproportionate “’such to shock the conscience or to be manifestly ‘[u]njust.’” 

Again, the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling to deny the motion for additur and a new trial.  Thus, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s rulings, leaving the jury verdict in place.

In a published Appellate Division decision, Y.H. & K.W.C. v. T.C., 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS 27 (App. Div. Mar. 16, 2023), the Appellate Division was asked to decide whether the plaintiffs, Y.H. and K.W.C. (initials used to keep confidentiality) could utilize the expunged conviction of an Uber driver in a negligent hiring claim against Uber.  The driver, T.C., had been convicted of aggravated assault which under the Transportation Network Companies statute (the TNC), would have barred him from employment as a rideshare driver.  In this case, the Appellate Division had to weigh the protection of the expungement statute versus the laws governing rideshare drivers.

The Court noted the collision of the purposes of the underlying statutes.  The purpose of the expungement statute was “to permit a once-convicted person greater access to work opportunities, and thus second chances in life.”  However the TNC statute’s purpose was “to protect the public from potential danger when using digital rideshare services.” 

The TNC statutory provisions became effective on May 1, 2017 after the rideshare apps had been operating for years.  Essentially, these laws prohibit a TNC from “onboarding” someone with a conviction for aggravated assault as a rideshare driver.  A TNC must run a criminal background check in order to operate in New Jersey.  Pursuant to this statute, however, an applicant or driver convicted of aggravated assault shall not be disqualified as a rideshare applicant if there is a valid certificate of rehabilitation produced.  The TNC statute does not address the effect of expungements. 

The Court noted that the expungement statute was “to eliminate the collateral consequences imposed upon otherwise law-abiding citizens who have had a minor brush with the criminal justice system.”  When a Court grants an expungement, all records of the person’s arrest, conviction and any other proceedings related thereto shall be deemed not to have occurred.  The person who has had their criminal records expunged may answer any questions related to the occurrence accordingly.

There are exceptions to the use of this expungement.  Inspection of expunged files or releasing of information may be permitted by the Superior Court upon motion for good cause shown and compelling need based on specific facts.

The facts in this case are that the plaintiff’s Y.H. & his spouse, K.W.C. and Uber were the parties in this case.  The defendant T.C. was working as an Uber driver.  He picked up a passenger at a supermarket in Elizabeth when Y.H., an employee of the supermarket, confronted him for parking in a no-parking zone.  The dispute escalated and T.C. exited the vehicle and had a resulting physical encounter with Y.H.  It left him with a severed cervical spinal cord, paralyzing him from the neck down, leaving him a quadriplegic. 

Uber was sued by plaintiffs under a theory of negligent hiring or employment.  As it turns out, T.C. had been convicted of simple assault in 1991 and was arrested for aggravated assault and resisting arrest, but not convicted, in 1996.  In April 2006, however, T.C. was convicted of aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer.

On May 1, 2017, Uber authorized T.C. to drive for their platform but did not perform a criminal background check at that time.  Coincidentally, on that same day, May 1, was when the TNC Act went into effect, which required criminal background checks for TNC drivers and specifically barred those with a conviction for aggravated assault from employment as a TNC driver.

Thereafter, on July 7, 2017, and also on November 29, 2017, Uber ran background checks on T.C. which revealed his 2006 conviction.  On December 12, 2017, an amended expungement order was filed for T.C.’s convictions.

The record was unclear as to when and how Uber became aware of this expungement. But, based upon this timeline, it is clear that Uber had knowledge of T.C.’s prior conviction for aggravated assault for some period of time prior to the expungement based upon the two background checks.

Plaintiff sued T.C. for his actions, as well as Uber, claiming theories of respondeat superior and negligent hiring, training and supervision against Uber.  To pursue these claims, plaintiff sought to admit T.C.’s expunged conviction for aggravated assault.

In turn, T.C. moved to delete from the public record all references related to his expunged documentation regarding his criminal history.  Plaintiffs cross-moved to admit the same expunged information for the purposes of their negligent hiring claim against Uber.

At the trial court level, the court denied plaintiff’s motion and ordered that evidence relating to T.C.’s criminal history subject to an order of expungement could not be disclosed or otherwise used for any purpose.  The plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal on this issue to the Appellate Division, which was accepted.

Upon appeal, plaintiffs argued that the expungement statute should only apply to the person whose conviction has been expunged by permitting such person to deny the conviction.  Plaintiffs argued that Uber’s knowledge of T.C.’s conviction for aggravated assault, which was obtained prior to that record being expunged, was vital proof of Uber’s negligence in permitting T.C. to work as a driver on their platform. 

To be able to prove the tort of negligent hiring, the plaintiff must prove that “the employer either knew or should have known that the employee was violent or aggressive, or that the employee might engage in injurious contact toward third persons.”  Plaintiffs claim that their negligent hiring claim was founded upon Uber’s knowledge of T.C.’s criminal history and that the trial court’s barring them from using this evidence effectively prevented them from proving negligent hiring by Uber.

Citing the expungement statute, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court decision that, as to the driver T.C., whose conviction was expunged, he was entitled to the protection of that expungement order.  After the order was granted, T.C. may “rely on the court’s previous assurance he need not disclose the events of his previous conviction except in the narrow circumstances prescribed by our statute.”  Thus, that portion of the trial court’s decision was affirmed.

However, the Court found that Uber’s argument was not the same as T.C.’s argument.  The Appellate Division noted that Uber asked the Court to read the expungement statute to create a third right which would allow third parties to ignore what they already knew about a defendant, prior to the entry of an expungement order, for the purposes of extinguishing liability. 

The Court observed that the expungement statute is naturally in a state of tension with the truth.  It noted that an expungement is a legal fiction but it does not mean that the underlying reality has changed, i.e. those with expunged records were indeed convicted of an underlying offense.  The issue is whether the expungement gave Uber the ability to assert T.C.’s rights so as to imply ignorance of the assault conviction. 

The Court noted that the expungement statute directs courts to permit consideration of expunged records “upon motion for good cause shown and compelling need based on specific facts.”  The Appellate Division found that there was no way plaintiffs could prove Uber’s prior knowledge without disclosing evidence which implicated T.C.’s expunged conviction.  Hence, the Appellate Division found that this was a demonstration of a “compelling need.”

In conclusion, the Appellate Division found that the expungement statute prevented the evidence of an expunged record to be used against the person for whom the expungement is meant to benefit, i.e. the recipient of the expungement but, as for third parties, the expungement statute was less clear.  It found that the expunging statute does not automatically extend to a third party’s prior knowledge of information contained within a subsequent expungement offer.  It held that “[s]o long as the party seeking to introduce the evidence demonstrates good cause and a compelling need, courts cannot categorically bar admission of this evidence when offered to prove a third-party’s knowledge of the underlying facts.”

The Appellate Division remanded the matter back to the trial court to explore what Uber knew about T.C.’s expungement, when they knew it, or whether they knew of it at all.  The Court held that if the record demonstrated Uber was informed of the expungement prior to the events involving the plaintiff, Uber may be entitled to rely on that information as evidence of T.C.’s rehabilitation or lack of a propensity towards violence.  Thus, while the Appellate Division affirmed the order as to T.C., barring the plaintiffs from using the assault conviction against the driver, the trial court’s decision was reversed as to barring its use as to Uber. 

Plaintiff Calise Belin was injured in a two vehicle accident after stopping at a stop sign on Lafayette Road in Voorhees, preparing to turn left on Haddonfield-Berlin Road. Plaintiff looked both ways and not seeing anyone coming, turned left. She collided with a vehicle being driven by Debra Lawless-Gattone who was travelling northbound on Haddonfield-Berlin Road. The issue in Belin v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1400 (App. Div. Aug. 5, 2022), was whether Plaintiff Belin was more than 50% at fault, precluding her from recovering any underinsured motorist benefits from her insurance company, NJM.

Plaintiff had been driving to a basketball game after work in a car owned by her parents. At the time of the accident, it was dark and rainy. The other driver, Lawless-Gattone, was on her way to pick up her son from hockey practice. She was in the left lane of Haddonfield-Berlin Road, deciding whether to move to the right lane when she saw Plaintiff’s car approach the stop sign on Lafayette Road. She was satisfied that Plaintiff would stop and checked her rear view mirror to see if it was safe to move into the right lane. Lawless-Gattone’s path of travel was not controlled by any traffic sign or signal. When she turned back, Plaintiff was coming out of Lafayette Road, turning in front of her. She braked and turned her wheel in an attempt to avoid Plaintiff but did not have sufficient time to stop before colliding with Plaintiff’s driver’s side door.

Plaintiff claimed that she stopped and that the fault of the accident lay with Lawless-Gattone because she hit Plaintiff. She claims that Lawless-Gattone could have paid better attention to avoid the accident. Plaintiff claimed that Lawless-Gattone was speeding or, at least, driving too fast for existing weather conditions. She also alleged that Lawless-Gattone was distracted by looking around to change lanes.

Under New Jersey law, it was the Plaintiff’s burden to establish that Lawless-Gattone was at least 50 percent negligent for the accident to permit Plaintiff to recover against NJM (for underinsured motorist benefits). The trial court judge, Judge Belgard, disagreed with Plaintiff’s claim that Lawless-Gattone was at fault and dismissed the case. Although Lawless-Gattone may have given different statements about the speed limit on Haddonfield-Berlin Road where the accident happened, her testimony was consistent that she was not speeding. Plaintiff offered no contrary testimony. The judge also found no evidence in the record that Lawless-Gattone was distracted.

This decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, which agreed with the trial court judge. Plaintiff had failed to offer evidence “to permit a rational factfinder to conclude Lawless-Gattone was speeding or distracted or that plaintiff who was making a left turn in front of Lawless-Gattone from a side street controlled by a stop sign, had the right of way, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.”  To prevent summary judgment from being granted, a plaintiff must “demonstrate by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of fact existed.”  The Court noted that plaintiff failed to do so and affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of NJM, dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Glenn Hughes allegedly suffered injuries as a result of an October 17, 2017 automobile accident with defendant Jason Worthington.  On that date, defendant Worthington rear ended the plaintiff.  At trial, the defendant stipulated as to liability with the only issue to be decided at trial was whether plaintiff’s injuries were permanent and causally related to the accident.  The issue in Hughes v. Worthington, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2655 (App. Div. Dec. 30, 2022) was whether the plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain sufficed to constitute a permanent injury under the verbal threshold.

The case was tried before a jury and the defendant Worthington moved for a directed verdict based upon plaintiff’s failure to present objective, credible medical evidence to support his claim that he suffered a permanent injury.  That motion was granted and this appeal ensued.

The plaintiff alleged to have suffered injuries to his neck as a result of the accident.  Plaintiff’s doctor, Dr. Norman Stempler, testified that plaintiff lost range of motion in his neck as a result of the accident.  Further, he testified that an MRI taken two months after the accident supported his diagnosis that plaintiff suffered an aggravation of pre-existing degenerative disc disease.  However, upon cross examination, Dr. Stempler admitted that the degenerative disc disease of the plaintiff’s cervical spine pre-dated the accident and he could not observe an aggravation of this pre-existing condition of plaintiff’s MRI.  Further, he conceded that his opinion concerning the aggravation of the degenerative disc disease was derived from plaintiff telling him that he was asymptomatic before the accident but that, after the accident, he experienced a decreased range of motion in his neck.

Moreover, Dr. Stempler admitted that he could not determine if the findings on plaintiff’s MRI were acute or chronic.  He agreed that the range of motion testing had a subjective component.

At trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that plaintiff failed to demonstrate – with objective, credible medical evidence – that he suffered a permanent injury as a result of the accident.  The trial court noted that the plaintiff’s doctor formed his opinion based upon the plaintiff’s subjective complaint and, therefore, determined that Dr. Stempler improperly relied on subjective evidence.  Finally, the trial court concluded that, as a result, the plaintiff failed to establish by objective, credible evidence, a nexus between his alleged injuries and his automobile accident, as required by the New Jersey verbal threshold statute.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff claimed that his subjective complaints, i.e. his restricted range of motion, was sufficient to support Dr. Stempler’s opinion that there was a permanent injury.  The Appellate Division rejected that argument.

The Court noted that under the verbal threshold of the New Jersey automobile law, AICRA, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8, lawsuits are restricted for damages from automobile accidents unless the victim “sustains a bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fracture; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.”  Further, the Court noted that under this statutory provision “an injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ or both has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment.” 

The Appellate Division cited to prior case law that to vault this “threshold,” a physician must certify that the automobile accident victim suffered from a statutorily enumerated injury.  This opinion must be based on “objective clinical evidence.”  Further, the necessary objective evidence must be derived from accepted diagnostic tests and cannot be dependent entirely upon subjective patient response.  Thus, subjective tests alone, such as range of motion tests, will not suffice to meet this standard.

The Court further noted that “plaintiff was required to prove through expert testimony there was objective clinical evidence his injuries were permanent and causally related to the automobile accident.”  The Appellate Division found that his physician’s testimony concerning permanency was based solely on the plaintiff’s subjective claims concerning a diminished range of motion.  Hence, plaintiff failed to provide the requisite objective proofs that were required to meet the threshold. 

Dr. Stempler had based his opinion on plaintiff’s current complaints, which purportedly did not exist prior to the accident, that he had suffered a permanent injury.  However, Dr. Stempler also acknowledged that he was unable to determine if the degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine observed on the MRI was acute or chronic.  Thus, the Appellate Division found that “his testimony was not based on credible, objective evidence obtained from accepted diagnostic tests, and is, therefore insufficient to fault the threshold under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.”  Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that the trial court did properly grant the motion for a directed verdict, dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Katesha Salmond appealed from a summary judgment order granted to a public entity bus company and its driver, dismissing her personal injury complaint.  She was injured on a public bus and incurred substantial medical expenses for her injuries.  One issue in the Salmond case, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1282 (App. Div. July 14, 2022), was whether her medical bills were admissible at the time of trial because the plaintiff had or should have received benefits from her health insurer for payment of these bills.

The plaintiff and her children had been traveling to her children’s school in Newark on a New Jersey public bus.  As the bus approached their stop, she stood up to exit.  She claims that the bus driver suddenly moved the bus forward, slammed on the brakes, causing her to fall to the floor.  As a result of this incident, the plaintiff Salmond claimed that she underwent physical therapy and chiropractic treatments for months due to her pain that she was allegedly experiencing in her neck, back, shoulder, and knee.  She underwent outpatient surgeries on her back and neck, as well as multiple knee injections.

Thereafter, she filed a lawsuit against the bus company and the bus driver for her injuries.  She incurred $554,000 in medical expenses related to her incident.  Although she had health insurance on the date of her fall, her health insurer did not pay any of her medical expenses.  It was unclear from the record whether she submitted her medical bills to her health insurer and whether her insurer would be required to pay her medical claims.

The defendant bus company and driver moved for summary judgment on a substantive basis and also moved to bar the admission of her medical bills at the time of trial.  As for the medical bills, the trial court judge concluded that the collateral source doctrine barred plaintiff from testifying as to her unpaid medical bills because she was entitled to receive benefits from her health insurer but elected not to submit them.  The judge relied upon the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(e), which provided that if a claimant is entitled to benefits from a collateral source, the court must deduct the amount of those benefits from any damage award against a public entity.

Upon appeal, in addition to appealing the substantive ruling, the plaintiff appealed the ruling that the medical bills were not admissible at the time of trial.

The Appellate Division ruled that the trial judge had misconstrued
N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(e) as precluding plaintiff from presenting evidence of or seeking recovery of her unpaid medical bills.  This statutory provision provides that if a claimant receives or is entitled to receive benefits from a policy of insurance, “such benefits shall be disclosed to the court and the amount thereof which duplicates any benefit contained in the award shall be deducted from any award against a public entity or public employee recovered by such claimant.”

Thus, the Appellate Division noted that a public entity may seek credits against a damage award for any payment plaintiffs received or are entitled to receive from collateral sources for their injuries.  The Court explained that the purpose of this provision is to prevent plaintiffs from receiving duplicate benefits.

However, the Appellate Division found that plaintiffs are not precluded from presenting evidence of damages for which payment has been received from collateral sources, even if they chose not to do so for strategic reasons.

Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiff Salmond was not precluded from presenting evidence of her unpaid medical bills to a jury. The Appellate Division ruled that if she received a damages award, “the trial court would then simply deduct any payments she received or is entitled to receive from her health insurer from the final award.”

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