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Testimony

After testifying at her deposition that she had no intention to undergo surgery, Plaintiff Yvonne Terrell changed her mind and testified at trial that she would have the surgery, causing the Appellate Division in Terrell v. Chitra, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 84 (Jan. 16, 2026), to consider whether that changed testimony would allow her to claim future medical costs from the surgery.

After a motor vehicle accident in 2018, Terrell sued Defendant Penafranc Chitra for injuries to her neck, back, and right shoulder. Noting the acute, traumatic herniated disc in her spinal column, Terrell’s primary treating doctor, an orthopedic surgeon, recommended she have a cervical discectomy and fusion. He explained the significant risks of the surgery to Terrell, which included paralysis and death. Terrell, a nurse and primary care-giver for a disabled son, worried about how a surgery would affect her and did not have the surgery in 2019 or 2020. Even after several other doctors’ opinions, she testified at her deposition that she felt the risks were too great to have the surgery. In his report in mid-2022, her medical expert stated Terrell, though still in pain, chose not to have the recommended surgery. Prior to trial she never amended any of her discovery responses to indicate any intention to have the neck surgery.

Ahead of trial, Chitra conceded that the accident was her fault, allowing the case to proceed on the issue damages alone. Working off of Terrell’s choice not to have surgery, Chitra’s attorneys asked the court to bar any evidence Terrell intended to introduce regarding the future medical costs of her surgery. The court agreed, and prevented her medical expert from offering an opinion as to those future medical costs.

At trial in the Fall of 2023, Terrell changed her story. She said her son had recently passed away and, since she intended to retire shortly and she did not want to have pain for the rest of her life, stated “surgery may help,” and she wanted to have the surgery – but made no firm decision to do so. In light of that testimony, Terrell, over the defense’s objection, asked the court to reconsider it’s decision on barring evidence of her future medical costs. The trial court agreed, and allowed her to introduce her medical expert’s testimony as to both her need for the surgery and its cost, $250,000. Upon hearing this testimony, the jury returned a verdict of $1,300,000; $1,000,000 for pain and suffering and $300,000 for future medical costs, including the surgery.

Chitra appealed. Critically, she claimed that Terrell’s future medical costs were inadmissible due to both her failure to disclose her intention to have the surgery prior to trial and because the introduction of the cost of the claimed surgery tainted the jury’s award on pain and suffering.

The Appellate Division agreed. It found that Terrell’s failure to amend her discovery responses at any time before trial to show any intention to have the surgery prejudiced defendant’s ability to defend against her claims that the surgery may occur. At no time from her deposition until she testified, including a lengthy pre-trial process and Chitra’s motion to strike evidence of future medical costs, did Terrell provide any suggestion she considered surgery; if she had done so, the defense could have prepared their defense accordingly. Because she did not, the Court determined, she prejudiced Chitra’s defense. The Court also noted she never made a definitive statement that she would have the surgery and, as her attorney admitted at oral argument before them, she still had not had it by late 2025.

Finally, the Court determined that because the trial court improperly allowed Terrell to present her expert’s opinion of her future medical costs related to the surgery, that evidence tainted  the jury as to the value of her injuries and affected their decision on pain and suffering. As a result, the Court vacated the full $1,300,000 judgment and sent the entire case back to the trial court for a new trial on damages, barring Terrell from introducing any of the contested evidence as to the purported surgery or its costs.

Of note, affecting the Court’s determination of prejudice, the Court found that had Terrell made a definitive statement as to surgery before the close of discovery in 2021, or if she had the surgery, that surgery would have been covered by her Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits available through her auto insurance. But, because of her indecision and failure to have the surgery, the PIP statute of limitations may have expired, barring Chitra to seek reimbursement from the insurer.  The Court found that Terrell must bear the consequences of failing to choose to have surgery when PIP benefits would have been available to pay for it. Moreover, by rule, PIP-payable future medical costs are not admissible at trial and should not have been presented to the jury.

The small details matter.  A petitioner will always have problems at trial when there is very little congruence between the allegations contained on the claim petition and the statements which petitioner gave to the employer and treating doctors at the time of the accident. That is the message in the case of Makins v. Palace Rehab & Care Center and Premier Cadbury, LLC, A-2263-23, A-2276-23 (App. Div. April 24, 2025).

Petitioner was a certified nursing assistant (CNA) who provided essential care to patients. She injured her back in 2013 while working for Palace Rehab with pain and numbness into her right leg. She received an award in that case and reopened that award on June 12, 2018.

On June 19, 2018, petitioner, who was then working for Premier Cadbury, filed two additional claim petitions.  The first claim petition alleged an injury on February 11, 2018, which aggravated her low back with pain into her legs while “picking up a resident.”  In the second claim petition, she alleged that she injured her back, left knee and left hip picking up a patient on June 8, 2018. Cadbury denied both claims, and the case proceeded to trial. The parties agreed to a bifurcated trial.  That meant that the case would be tried on the issue of the occurrence of an accident and causal relationship without medical experts necessarily testifying. 

During the first date of trial, petitioner said she did not remember whom she reported the first incident to but later she said she told her supervisor, whose name she did not recall.  She said she was lifting a patient when something happened to her low back.  She admitted to finishing work the day of the alleged injury on February 11, 2018.  She worked the next two days.  She then went to a hospital on February 14, 2018, and stayed home two days, returning to work on light duty before resuming full duty.

The petitioner’s version of the second alleged incident on June 8, 2018 was similar.  She said she was lifting a patient, putting her on a toilet, when she felt sharp pain in her back.  She also said that she bent down to pick up a box of tissues that the patient dropped but then she fell to the floor, striking her back and left hips.  She said she told a nurse who entered the room what had occurred. She recalled signing an incident report but claimed she had not read the incident report because she was in too much pain.  She said Susan, who completed the incident report, told her to see her family doctor.  She was referred to an orthopedist, who gave her an injection.  She was then referred to Dr. Kepler, a surgeon.  She also had two visits with Concentra, which were arranged through her employer.

Cadbury’s counsel focused heavily during trial on numerous inconsistencies in this case:

1)  The incident report of February 16, 2018, which was signed by a supervisor but not by petitioner, contained a handwritten response to the question about how the incident happened: it read “overall strain on back – did not occur with just [one] resident.” Defense counsel asked petitioner to comment on this description.  The judge observed that during her response,  “petitioner’s head went down, she would not make eye contact with respondent attorney, she did not speak for a period that was uncomfortable, shrugging with [a] lack of expression.”  She then said she did not recall making that statement.

2)  Regarding the alleged incident on June 8, 2018, petitioner admitted that she signed the incident report but said that she had not read it. She denied ever saying the words contained in the report: “Employee was simply walking, passing out trays and performing routine duties when she felt sharp pain in her left hip like a dislocation – now has radiated to lower back.”  Petitioner testified, “This didn’t happen like this.”

3)  Petitioner was shown a document entitled “Workers’ Compensation – First Report of Injury or Illness.”  She said she did not agree with the description on that document, namely: “Employee was simply walking, passing out trays and performing routine care when she felt a sharp pain in her left hip/lower back.”

4)  Petitioner was also shown notes from a physician’s assistant in the orthopedic practice for her June 13, 2018 appointment. She did not agree with the description: “[The patient] states that she has been having low back pain for approximately a month. She states that a few [sic] last week at work when she was in a standing position, her leg gave out and she did not fall.  She states that her knee has been feeling painful as well.”

5)  Petitioner also disagreed with a statement contained in a June 14, 2018 appointment at Concentra: “Patient states that as she was walking her left leg gave out, she was able to prevent herself from falling, she states she sat down and rested and later in the day the same thing happened again. She reports since then she has been experiencing lower back pain, left knee and left hip pain.  She states that her left knee appears to slip out of place and she is unable to resume regular activity until it returns to a normal position.  She reports a history of arthritis to the back.  She denies slipping, tripping or other mechanics of injury.”

6)  Petitioner also disagreed with the note from a Concentra doctor in her June 18, 2018 appointment where the physician described her as having a “preexisting condition.”

7)  Petitioner also was shown a note from her orthopedic physician at her July 2, 2018 appointment.  The doctor wrote that petitioner had “a history of chronic recurrent lower back pain for many years” and “severe osteoarthritis of her left knee.”  The doctor also wrote that petitioner denied any specific injury and admitted that her symptoms began “insidiously.”  Petitioner did admit that she had preexisting problems but did not recall this specific discussion.

8)  Petitioner also did not recall the history contained in an IME performed at Cadbury’s request which referenced a prior August 8, 2017 incident when petitioner felt pain while helping a 200-pound patient get off a toilet. Petitioner did not recall being examined by the doctor and did not recall that particular history.  In fact, she disagreed with that description of a 2017 injury.

On examination by the attorney for Palace, (the first employer), petitioner did agree with a statement by Dr. Kepler in his May 21, 2019 report that she suffered two injuries at Cadbury on February 11, 2018 and June 8, 2018, both of which aggravated her back and leg pain.

Cadbury produced two witnesses:  a Director of Nursing in 2018 and an Executive Assistant and Supervisor for the front desk. These witnesses testified to the procedures that Cadbury followed for reporting an injury at work.  The first witness testified that the information on the First Report of Injury Form came from the information on the Incident Report. The second witness testified that she created the incident report for the alleged February 11, 2018 accident based on what petitioner had reported to her.

The Judge of Compensation admitted into evidence over objection from petitioner’s attorney the incident reports and the Workers’ Compensation First Report under the Business Records exception to hearsay.  The Judge permitted the petitioner on the final day of trial to bring in a doctor to challenge impeachment evidence but petitioner declined to do so.  Certain documents were introduced into evidence by all parties, and the Judge of Compensation rendered a decision finding that … “petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her injuries were causally related to the alleged accidents at Cadbury.”  The Judge dismissed both claim petitions with prejudice.  The Judge also noted that he did not give the First Report of Injury Form any weight in arriving at his decision.  He specifically stated that he found petitioner not to be credible.

Petitioner appealed and raised several issues.  The first issue pertained to petitioner’s competence to testify.  Petitioner was asked by the judge at the outset of testimony whether she was under the influence of anything that would interfere with her ability to testify.  She said no.  Then her own attorney asked her if she was under the influence of medications.  She said yes, that she was taking oxycodone and muscle relaxers which affected her memory.  She also said she was suffering from memory issues related to Long Covid.  The Appellate Division commented, “The problem with that argument is that petitioner and her counsel chose to have her testify, fully aware of what medication she had taken and her Long Covid condition and their potential effects on her memory.  Nothing in the record indicates petitioner or her counsel asked the judge for an adjournment…”  The Court also noted that petitioner initially told the Judge of Compensation that she was not under the influence of anything that would cloud her judgment. Furthermore, the Appellate Court noted that the Judge of Compensation focused more on “the differences in her demeanor when she testified about facts that were in her favor and when she testified about facts that were not in her favor.”

The next issue on appeal was the decision to bifurcate the trial.  Counsel for petitioner challenged the trial judge’s decision to bifurcate the trial because it contended that this may have prevented petitioner from producing testimony from her treating physicians.   The Appellate Court said there was no error in bifurcating the trial because neither party objected to this approach.  The Court also noted that the Judge of Compensation allowed petitioner to bring in medical testimony on the final date of trial but petitioner’s counsel declined. The Appellate Court commented that in this case the judge found that petitioner was not credible in her claims that work accidents happened.

The last argument on appeal was that the Cadbury incident and first reports should not have been admitted into evidence because they did not meet the test of a business record under N.J.R.E. 803 (c)(6).  Counsel also argued that petitioner was denied due process when Cadbury did not produce the author of the incident report. The Appellate Court noted that the Judge of Compensation gave no weight to the First Report of Injury Form.  The Court also noted, “… [A] Judge of Compensation is not bound strictly by the Rules of Evidence, see N.J.S.A. 34:15-56, and may admit documents into evidence without authentication testimony,” citing Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dept., 175 N.J. 244 (2003). The Court also observed that petitioner did admit that she signed the first page of the June 8, 2018 incident report, “which contained a description of the purported accident that did not match the description petitioner gave on her claim form or in her testimony.” Finally, the Court commented that all counsel in the case consented to the admission of certain documents into evidence; hence there was no due process violation.

The dilemma for petitioner in this case was the inability to overcome the inconsistency between the allegations in her claim petitions and the contrary statements in the incident reports and doctors’ notes close in time to the alleged accidents.

Plaintiff Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. sued J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. over a shipment it claimed was damaged while in the possession of J.B. Hunt.  Because the seal on the food-grade shipment was broken, the customer had rejected the shipment.  The issue in Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 990 (App. Div. May 30, 2024) was whether Mecca’s employee of 40 years could offer an opinion on the standard of care for transporting a sealed container of a food-grade substance across the country.

Mecca had been hired by ADM Logistics to transport and deliver 20 sacks of Fibersol, which is a soluble dietary fiber used in foods, drinks, and supplements, in a sealed container from New Jersey to Illinois.  The sacks of Fibersol were made of polyurethane and tied at the top so the Fibersol would not fall out.  Further, the Fibersol was packed inside a shipping container sealed with an exterior lock.  The seal has a specific lock to stop unauthorized personnel from accessing the load and attached to the seal is a number that corresponds to a pickup number.  Mecca’s employee testified that “seals are common in the industry and are not to be broken under any circumstances by another other than the receiver at the time of delivery, and if the seal is broken, the load was tampered with.”

When the defendant J.B. Hunt took possession of the shipment it received, it received a bill of lading and acknowledged receipt of the shipment at the point of origin in good order.  The bill of lading referenced the seal number.   J.B. Hunt transported the sealed container via train from New Jersey to Landers, Illinois where it arrived still sealed.  An inspection of the container in Landers showed that the seal remained intact.  The container remained in J.B. Hunt’s possession for 4-5 days in its yard in Landers before another entity who was not a party, F&S Logistics, attempted to deliver the shipment to its final destination.

When the container arrived at its final destination, the customer, Parke Toll, rejected the delivery because the container seal was broken, although none of the 20 sacks of Fibersol were examined or determined to have been opened or compromised, nor were their contents tested for damage or adulteration.  Although the bill of lading did not contain express language that the seal must be intact upon delivery, according to the customer, it was its policy, as an entity that deals with food products to attempt to always maintain a good seal record and reject shipments that arrive with a broken seal.  Therefore, the truck was resealed and returned to defendant’s truck yard.  The entire shipment of Fibersol was deemed unusable and eventually destroyed. 

Plaintiff Mecca filed a claim with J.B. Hunt’s cargo claims office “for product integrity compromised” due to the broken seal on the shipment which had precipitated a complete loss of the Fibersol.  J.B. Hunt denied the claim. 

Mecca filed this lawsuit against J.B. Hunt, claiming breach of contract and negligence for the cargo loss and damage.  At the trial court level, J.B. Hunt filed for a summary judgment and the contract claim was dismissed but the negligence claim was not dismissed. 

The trial court found that the negligence claim was based upon J.B. Hunt’s failure to deliver the Fibersol with an intact seal.  Further, the trial court noted that the record contained evidence indicating that if the seal was broken upon delivery, that goes against the industry standard. 

To establish the industry standard, plaintiff Mecca presented the testimony of its employee Andre Zielinski with 40 years’ experience in the industry to establish the requisite standard of care.  He testified that the seal was a lock and you place a specific lock on a load from stopping an unauthorized personnel to enter into the load.  The seal is common in the industry and, if it is broken, that means the load was tampered with.  At that point, the receiver can choose to either accept the load or refuse the load because it is not intact.  His opinion was based upon his many years in the shipping industry in which he worked as a traffic manager or variations of that title.

On the eve of trial, the defendant made a motion in limine to bar Zielinski’s deposition testimony on the standard of care because he had not been named as an expert witness.  The court granted that motion, ruling that he could not provide an opinion on the standard of care because plaintiff had failed to name him as an expert.  However, the court ruled that Zielinski could testify as a fact witness based on his personal observations about the seal.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial and the court did find that the seal was intact when that Fibersol arrived in Landers.  It further found that, while the container was in the defendant’s yard for 4-5 days, the seal had been broken by a J.B. Hunt driver prior to the receipt of the delivery to the customer. 

However, the court found that the negligence claim was predicated on a standard of care owed by J.B. Hunt as a transport company, which standard was too complex to be determined without expert testimony.  The trial court judge found that plaintiff was required to establish the appropriate standard of care through an expert. Because the plaintiff had failed to establish the standard of care owed by J.B. Hunt, the Court dismissed the complaint.

This appeal ensued.  Plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake in prohibiting its longtime employee, with his many years of experience in the shipping industry, from opining on the standard of care.  Further, plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake by determining expert proof was required to establish damages.  The Appellate Division agreed with both of these arguments. 

Initially, the Court noted as follows: “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence generally is entitled to deference absent a showing that the court abused its discretion such that the decision was so wide off the mark as to constitute a manifest in justice.”

Further, the Appellate Division stated that the courts “have required expert testimony to establish the standard of care in negligence actions or the underlying facts concern scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  Under the lay opinion evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 701, “a party to an action with expertise gained through such personal experience may express an opinion of the sort ordinarily provided by an expert.”

The Appellate Division noted that Zielinski’s testimony was admitted by the court but that the trial court did not accept it to establish the appropriate standard of care.  The Court found that this decision was an error by the trial court.  Because Zielinski’s undisputed testimony that he had been in the shipping industry for about 40 years, had been an employee by a few companies, mostly major freight forwarding companies, where he worked as a traffic manager or the like, his testimony about the seal was based on facts known to him in his professional role as plaintiff’s employee.  Because of his extensive professional experience and personal knowledge about the facts of the case, the Appellate Division found that Zielinski was qualified to opine on the requisite standard of care on this negligence claim.  Further, the Court found that Zielinski was not required to be designated as an expert witness or to prepare a report to testify as to the standard of care.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division remanded the matter back to the trial court for reconsideration of the trial evidence consistent with its opinion.

The case of Hernandez v. La Fortaleza, Inc., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 22 (App. Div. Jan. 5, 2024) is a lesson as to why counsel should not coach their witness during trial.  This case involved a slip and fall accident in which the plaintiff Hernandez claimed that she fell on an uneven raised defect on the property of defendant La Fortaleza.  The case proceeded to trial via a virtual trial where, on a lunch break, the plaintiff’s attorney coached the witness as to her testimony. 

Plaintiff Hernandez was the first witness at the virtual trial.  The trial court judge told her that she had to be alone and on her own while she testified, except that her husband could be in the room.  During her direct testimony, her attorney showed her a photograph of the defendant restaurant and the area where the fall occurred.  She was trying to explain in her testimony where the fall occurred in the photograph.   The plaintiff’s husband was in the room but the judge admonished him that he had to remain quiet while she was testifying.  The plaintiff’s attorney explained to the Court that the plaintiff was having trouble manipulating the curser on the screen.  Therefore, the Court recessed the trial for lunch and instructed Mrs. Hernandez’s attorney to straighten out issues with the exhibits and utilization of the curser.

Defense counsel objected and claimed that, on the critical issue of liability, no coaching would be tolerable.  The trial judge restated her point to the plaintiff’s attorney that no one else can be in the room but plaintiff’s husband and that her husband must be visible behind her but cannot speak until it is his opportunity to testify.

Unfortunately for the plaintiff, during the recess, the conversation between the plaintiff, her husband, and her attorney was recorded.  In this recorded conversation, the attorney coached the plaintiff as to her testimony, telling her how she should respond to his questions and how she should testify as to where she fell.  After the recess, defense counsel continued the objection about coaching and advised the Court that plaintiff’s attorney’s microphone was on during recess and he listened to the attorney coaching the witness with the witness’s husband.  Defense counsel requested that the Court grant a mistrial. 

The judge polled the jurors and made certain that they had not overheard the recess conversation.  She concluded that the jury itself was not tainted.

The next day, defense counsel renewed his request for a mistrial or a dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.  The trial judge listened to the recording and concluded that the plaintiff’s attorney, despite being warned about coaching, had coached the plaintiff and directed her to testify as to where the slip and fall occurred.  Hence, the trial court judge felt that she was compelled to declare a mistrial.  The trial court judge ordered that plaintiff and/or their counsel reimburse the Court for the cost of the interpreter and court services.  The judge also permitted defendant to file a motion for dismissal with prejudice.

The defendant did file such a motion and the judge entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.  She based it in part on the transcript of the conversation, as well as the certification of two bilingual paralegals from defense counsel’s office who heard the recess conversation.  One of them heard plaintiff state that it had been so long she didn’t remember where she fell.

In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, the judge found as follows:

“The conduct of the attorney here to invite a client to state that an accident occurred in a particular place when she had no independent recollection to resolve the issues of liability where she was the only witness to the fall itself introduces prejudice too great to present to the finder of fact.”

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal.  Plaintiff argued that the trial judge made a mistake in the exercise of her discretion because there was no fraud on the Court and the sanction of dismissal was too severe.  However, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s decision.

The Appellate Division noted that plaintiff’s husband failed to comply with the judge’s instruction on coaching Hernandez and, further, the plaintiff’s attorney after indicating he would not talk to plaintiff about her testimony at any time during the testimony, even during a lunch break, proceeded “to perpetuate a falsity” by directing the plaintiff to create an issue of liability by “stating that an accident occurred in a particular place when she had no independent recollection.”

While the Appellate Division found that a dismissal with prejudice was a drastic remedy, to be employed “only sparingly,” it found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this lawsuit.  The Court found that the plaintiffs shared the blame and the fraud because they received instructions from the judge concerning coaching.  Instead of listening to the judge, the plaintiffs willingly participated in a scheme to provide false testimony in an ongoing trial.  Based upon this falsified testimony, the Appellate Division found that the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice was merited. 

Further, the Court found that the public interest was served by a dismissal with prejudice.  It noted that “[a] misrepresentation to a tribunal is a most serious breach of ethics because it affects directly the administration of justice.”  This dismissal warns plaintiffs and their attorneys that “their behavior will not be tolerated and that their conduct was so egregious as to cause them to suffer a drastic remedy – the loss of their cause of action.”  The Appellate Division further noted that “it informs other litigants that they risk dismissal if they commit a fraud on a court.”

Thus, the trial court’s decision was affirmed and the dismissal was upheld by the Appellate Division.

By: Eric Richwine, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

The issue before the New Jersey Appellate Division in Rodriguez v. Cano, No. A-1561-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1733 (App. Div. Oct. 12, 2023) was whether plaintiff Lenny Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) was denied a fair trial following a no-cause verdict in a damages-only auto negligence case in favor of defendant-driver Stephanie Cano.  Plaintiff contended that defense counsel went too far in cross-examining Plaintiff’s treating physician about a fraudulent medical services action pending against the physician.

In the trial court proceedings, Defendant Cano did not contest liability; rather, the sole issue for the jury to determine was the amount of damages to be awarded to Rodriguez. During trial, Rodriguez’s treating physician testified to his injuries following the accident. The defense counsel soon after cross-examined the physician, focusing on the fact that a major insurance company had a pending fraudulent medical services action against him. During this cross-examination, the defense counsel also noted that Mr. Rodriguez’s treatment was explicitly included in the insurance fraud complaint to provide an example of the physician’s fraud. The defense counsel reasoned that this line of questioning was for the purpose of establishing the physician’s credibility.

The trial court judge realized only after the cross-examination that this line of questioning, which ultimately implied that Rodriguez’s treatment was unnecessary (or even fraudulent), was inadmissible, and, as such, the court instructed the jurors to disregard the testimony. The judge also allowed Rodriguez’s counsel to engage in re-direct to provide the physician the opportunity to rebut and elaborate on the defense counsel’s accusations. During re-direct, Rodriguez’s physician became irate and made several allegations against the insurer for false allegations and bad faith.

Plaintiff’s Rodriguez’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The jury returned a no-cause verdict. Rodriguez’s counsel then moved for a new trial, which the trial court also denied. The judge reasoned that any errors were “harmless.” The judge further reasoned that the jury surely “didn’t consider the evidence that I told them … to disregard,” citing the amount of time the jury took to deliberate; because the jury “didn’t come back in five minutes,” the judge purported that the jury did not think of Mr. Rodriguez and the physician as “criminals” or “fraudsters.” Plaintiff Rodriguez appealed.

The Appellate Division first addressed the defense’s cross-examination of the physician and the timing of the trial court judge’s instruction to the jury to disregard the testimony. The Court cited Rule 608 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, which prohibits the use of specific instances of conduct through cross-examination in a civil action to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness. The Court quickly determined that defense counsel’s line of questioning was “patently improper” per Rule 608 and that the trial court’s verdict “cannot stand.”

The Court found that, despite the defense counsel’s purported reason for its cross-examination questioning, it was inadmissible and ergo the trial court did correctly instruct the jury to disregard the testimony. The Court further noted that, although the trial court was well-intentioned in allowing the physician the opportunity for re-direct following the defense counsel’s ambush, this decision was ultimately misguided and backfired, as evidenced by the physician’s outburst.

Stating that “the prejudice to [Mr. Rodriguez] … cannot be overstated,” the Appellate Division ultimately determined that the trial court’s denial of Mr. Rodriguez’s mistrial motion and motion for a new trial was improper; as such, the Court held that Plaintiff was denied a fair trial and reversed the trial court’s decisions and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings.

What happens when an employee is treating for one injury and during the course of treatment he or she develops a brand new injury? There are precious few cases on this set of facts, and the latest decision in Robinson v. United Airlines is extremely important to practitioners in analyzing how to approach derivative injury cases.  Prudence Higbee, partner with Capehart Scatchard, won the case for United Airlines at trial and on appeal.

Priscilla Robinson, a flight attendant, suffered a
work-related wrist fracture, requiring her to perform physical therapy.  She claimed that on the first day of PT,
namely June 15, 2016, the physical therapist had her lift a bar approximately
to eye level multiple times.  She said
she did not feel well and experienced shortness of breath and heart
palpitations while in therapy. Petitioner admitted that she did not complain of
shoulder pain at therapy, but when she got home she said she felt shoulder
pain.  She saw her family doctor the next
day, who ordered an MRI on June 22, 2016, which showed a rotator cuff tear.  Petitioner eventually filed a claim petition
contending that physical therapy for her wrist caused or aggravated the rotator
cuff tear in her shoulder.

Respondent produced testimony from the physical therapist.  She contradicted the critical element of petitioner’s testimony about exercising with a bar.  She brought her contemporaneous notes to court, which made clear that all petitioner did on June 15, 2016 was stretching exercises. She said that she makes entries in notes covering all activities, and no bar movement occurred. The notes also made clear that petitioner never complained of shoulder pain, although she did report heart palpitations and a feeling of weight on her chest.  The therapist offered to call 9-1-1 and take petitioner’s vital signs, but petitioner declined.  Petitioner did return two days later saying she had shoulder pain.  The therapist modified activities, and petitioner did not complain of any pain that day.

Petitioner returned on June 20, 2016 and had no complaints
at all.  She did several exercises that day,
including a push-pull cart, which simulated pushing a beverage cart for 200
feet.  She did other exercises with her
right hand only.

Petitioner relied on the testimony of Dr. Craig Rosen, a
surgeon, who saw petitioner on January 11, 2018.  He recommended arthroscopic surgery to repair
the torn rotator cuff.  He opined that it
was hard to say whether the tear was old or new but he did not feel it was a
“longstanding chronic tear.”  He felt it
was caused by a lifting movement of a bar or doing some kind of swimming motion
that petitioner mentioned.  Dr. Rosen was
emphatic that petitioner reported lifting some type of bar and going through a
swimming type of motion on day one.  He
said that this movement could have caused a tear.

Respondent produced Dr. Kenneth Levitsky, also an orthopedic
surgeon, who said that the most likely mechanism of injury for a rotator cuff
tear would be an extension or abduction stretch-type injury with the arm
overhead.  He said a very forceful twisting
injury could also cause such a tear.  He
examined the list of exercises that the therapist recorded.  Dr. Levitsky said none of these exercises
would cause a rotator cuff tear because they were not forceful enough and did
not fit the classic mechanism of injury. 
He said, “There’s no exercise here
that demonstrates or would cause a significant twisting force on the shoulder
with the arm in an unusual position
.” 
He concluded that the tear was likely preexisting.  He had no evidence of petitioner having a
prior rotator cuff tear, but he did note that petitioner had some degenerative
changes that preexisted her PT.

The Judge of Compensation considered all the evidence and
found in favor of United Airlines.  The
Judge held that petitioner did not carry her burden of proof that her rotator
cuff tear was caused or exacerbated by her physical therapy for the wrist. He
credited the daily activity logs maintained by the physical therapist.  The Judge also noted that petitioner did not tell
her own family doctor that she had suffered a traumatic accident on June 15,
2016.  Further, the Judge found Dr.
Levitsky’s testimony to be more persuasive than that of Dr. Rosen.

On appeal petitioner contended that the Judge of
Compensation should have shifted the burden of proof to respondent to show that
petitioner’s accident was caused by a prior, personal condition.  Counsel for petitioner argued that
respondent’s defense was that this incident was idiopathic, and that the burden
shifts on idiopathic claims to the defense. 
The Court said, “We disagree. In
our view, petitioner confuses those cases in which an employee’s idiopathic
condition causes a work accident or event that results in injury, with a work
accident or event that aggravates a pre-existing condition or injury.”

The Appellate Division found that this was not a case in
which respondent was contending that petitioner’s rotator cuff tear was
preexisting and personal.  All respondent
was saying was that petitioner never proved a work accident.  The Court said, “… the dispute focused on whether petitioner’s shoulder injury was
occasioned or aggravated by her therapy, or whether it represented the
progression of a pre-existing injury. 
Stated differently, the dispute was whether any event had occurred at
work and caused or aggravated petitioner’s injury.  Consequently, the burden of proof did not
shift to the employer and the JOC did not err by finding petitioner did not
sustain her burden.”

In affirming the denial of the petitioner’s claim for the shoulder, the Court made an important distinction.  When an employer is aware of a prior medical condition and believes that a new injury derives entirely from a personal condition, this triggers the idiopathic defense.  In such cases, it is the employer’s burden to prove the condition is from personal causes. On the other hand, when a worker is arguing that he or she suffered a work incident but there is no evidence of any preexisting condition, the burden of proof remains on the petitioner to establish that a work injury occurred.  The problem petitioner had in this case is that her doctor felt that the mechanism of injury was raising a bar to eye level; but petitioner could not show that she performed such a maneuver on the day of the injury.

This case can be found at Robinson v. United Airlines, A-5917-17T2 (App. Div. September 18, 2019).   The winning tactic in this case for United Airlines was bringing in the physical therapist to rebut the testimony of petitioner as to the mechanism of alleged injury.  That testimony, more than any other factor, led to victory for the employer.

The post Appellate Court Holds That Employee Failed to Prove That United Airlines Was Responsible for Injury to Worker’s Shoulder Related To Physical Therapy Performed On Her Work-Related Wrist Injury appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

Plaintiff Jason Rodriguez was injured in a rear end collision and sued the other driver, defendant Faith Sheppard.  Liability was conceded and a jury trial was held as to damages only.  The issue in Rodriguez v. Mueller, 2019 N.J. Super Unpub LEXIS 1783 (App. Div. August 15, 2019), was whether the plaintiff had suffered sufficient injuries to meet the verbal threshold.  At trial, an issue arose as to whether the defense orthopedist was qualified to testify as to whether the plaintiff suffered a fracture of the coccyx as a result of the rear end collision (which could be sufficient to satisfy the verbal threshold requirements).

The case arose when the plaintiff was stopped in the drive through lane of a McDonalds.  Defendant was in the drive through lane, when her foot became stuck between the brake and the gas pedal, causing her vehicle to move forward and rear end the plaintiff’s vehicle.  The plaintiff’s treating physicians certified that the plaintiff had suffered a fractured coccyx in the accident.

However, Rodriguez was examined by the defense orthopedist, Dr. Michael Okin, who opined that the plaintiff had suffered a lumbosacral spine strain which had resolved and had an old fracture of the coccyx, not related to his accident.  Dr. Okin issued several reports in this case.  In his third and final report, he addressed whether he had missed a fracture of the sacrum/coccyx on plaintiff’s emergency room x-ray.  Dr. Okin opined that the nature of the accident was a rear end collision, which would cause a forward and backward mechanism of injury with the plaintiff sitting on the car seat.  He stated in his report that a fracture of the coccyx first of all does not occur with that mechanism of injury and, further, the fracture is old.  He also stated in his report that what was seen on the x-ray was a dislocation through the disc space of the coccyx and was not a fracture.  Finally, he stated that there was no mechanism of injury for a coccygeal fracture.

His deposition was taken before trial through a videotaped de bene esse.  During his testimony, the defense counsel elicited his opinion concerning the mechanism of injury.  Dr. Okin testified, over the plaintiff’s attorney’s immediate objection, that the mechanism would not be the cause of the fracture.  The plaintiff’s attorney objected because Dr. Okin had been qualified as an orthopedic surgeon, not an accident reconstruction expert.  The mechanism of injury would go to accident reconstruction and biomechanical engineering and he argued that Dr. Okin was not qualified to make an opinion in that regard.

At trial, the plaintiff’s attorney filed an in limine motion to bar that testimony.  The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and concluded that Dr. Okin was not testifying as an accident reconstructionist, but as a doctor who knows how a coccyx is generally injured and who found that there was no evidence that it was injured that way in this case.  Thus, the jury was permitted to view the video of Dr. Okin’s de bene esse deposition with no redactions. 

The jury returned its verdict, finding that the plaintiff did not suffer a fracture of the coccyx in the accident.  Thus, there was a verdict entered in favor of the defendant. 

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that there was not a proper foundation for Dr. Okin’s opinion.  Plaintiff argued that he was only qualified in orthopedic surgery and not as an accident reconstruction expert or biomechanical engineer.  Thus, he was not competent to testify that the degree of trauma plaintiff suffered in the accident could not have caused him to suffer a fractured coccyx.

The Appellate Division agreed with the plaintiff that Dr. Okin was not qualified to render this opinion. The Court found that Dr. Okin was not a biomechanical expert qualified to comment on physical forces.  There was nothing in the record that showed that Dr. Okin had any background, training, or experience in biomechanics or accident reconstruction.  Further, the defendant did not offer him as an expert in the fields.

Also, the record lacked any credible information regarding relevant details of the accident such as the damage to the vehicle, the size of each vehicle, the speed, as well as any information regarding the interior of the plaintiff’s vehicle.  The plaintiff argued that, without those facts in evidence, that there was lack of an evidential foundation for Dr. Okin to render an opinion on this issue. Without this foundation, his opinion would be considered a net opinion and inadmissible testimony.

The Appellate Division found that the trial judge should have ruled in the plaintiff’s favor and ordered redaction of his testimony concerning the mechanism of injury.  The Appellate Division held that it was impermissible to allow Dr. Okin to testify regarding the mechanism of injury because he both lacked the qualifications and the relevant facts to offer anything but a net opinion to the jury on this subject.            

The Court found that the jury likely accepted Dr. Okin’s conclusions regarding the mechanism of injury because they came from a medical expert.  Hence, the Appellate Division concluded that the failure of the trial court to exclude these improper net opinions unfairly prejudiced the plaintiff.  As a result, the Court ordered a new trial.  The Appellate Division reversed the no cause for judgment and remanded the matter for a new trial.

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