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This matter arises from a contractual dispute between Gallen Contracting Inc. (“Gallen”) and Centurion Construction, Inc. (“Construction”).  Construction had hired Gallen to perform concrete work for an automobile dealership in Wayne pursuant to a written agreement.  The agreement required that the parties submit disputes to mediation, followed by binding arbitration if mediation failed.  The issue in Centurion Companies, Inc. v. Gallen Contracting, Inc., 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 861 (App. Div. May 27, 2025) was whether the arbitration award entered against not only Construction but also Centurion Companies, Inc. (“Companies”), a similarly named but separate corporation, was properly entered or whether the award entered against Companies should have been vacated. 

After a dispute arose under the contract, Construction fired Gallen and Gallen sued Construction.  Gallen subsequently amended its complaint and identified defendant as “Centurion Construction Inc., a/k/a Centurion Companies.”  However, Gallen’s amended complaint failed to assert any specific allegations against Companies. 

Construction filed a motion to compel mediation and arbitration, which the trial court judge granted.  Thereafter, Gallen and Construction entered into a June 2018 arbitration agreement delineating plaintiff Gallen Contracting, Inc. and defendants, Centurion Construction, Inc. and Glen Poppee, individually, as the parties participating in the arbitration.  The arbitration agreement specifically provided a signature line for Centurion Construction, Inc. and the individually named defendant.  It did not contain any signature line for Centurion Companies, Inc.

The arbitration hearing took place, and the arbitrator awarded damages to Gallen under the contract in the amount of $408,645.  The arbitrator directed Gallen to prepare a consent order to memorialize the award.  After the issuance of the arbitrator’s letter opinion, Construction objected to the inclusion of “a/k/a Centurion Companies” in any order memorializing the award.  Construction requested that the arbitrator issue a corrected award, reflecting that the entry of the award was against Construction, not Companies.  Construction contended that the arbitrator made an evident mistake in his identification of the parties bound to the award.

The arbitrator rejected that request.  The arbitrator found that Companies played an active part in the work associated with the contract and concluded that he had the discretion to amend Gallen’s pleading under the court rules and rules of evidence. 

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint and order to show cause to vacate the award against Companies.  Plaintiffs argued that the arbitrator exceeded his powers because Companies was not a party to the contract, Companies did not agree to arbitrate, and Companies did not sign the arbitration award.  Plaintiffs argued that the arbitrator made an evident mistake in entering the award against both Companies and Construction.  Further, plaintiffs argued that the arbitrator exceeded his power and lacked authority to issue an award against an entity (not a party) on a claim never submitted.

The trial court determined that the arbitration award was entered in error against Companies because Gallen did not properly advise Companies of the notice of the claim against them and Companies did not have a fair opportunity to defend.  Thus, the trial court judge found that the arbitration award entered in the matter as to Companies was contrary to clearly established public policy.

This order was appealed to the Appellate Division.  Gallen argued that the trial court judge made a mistake in vacating the arbitration award entered against Companies.  The Appellate Division rejected that argument.

The Court noted that the arbitration agreement was clear and unambiguous.  It bound Gallen and Construction only.  Companies was not a party to the agreement, nor did it sign the agreement.  There was nothing in the arbitration agreement that indicated Companies agreed to mediate or arbitrate any disputes under the contract because Companies was not a party to that agreement.

The Appellate Division noted that the general rule is that an action on a contract cannot be maintained against a person who is not a party to it.  While there are some exceptions to that rule, the Appellate Division pointed out that Gallen failed to present any of these exceptions to the arbitrator in support of the entry of the award against Companies as a non-party to the contract and the arbitration agreement.

Further, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by entering the award against Companies.  The arbitrator had acknowledged that Construction and Companies were two separate and distinct entities, as well as recognized that only Gallen and Construction had signed the contract.

Based upon these findings, the Appellate Division ruled that the arbitrator expanded the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract to Companies, a non-party.  The Court also agreed with the trial court judge that Gallen did not provide notice that it was asserting claims against both Companies and Construction.  The Appellate Division pointed out that an arbitrator may not issue an award in the absence of indicia that all parties to the arbitration have reasonable advanced notice of the claim.

Hence, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision to vacate the arbitration award against Centurion Companies, Inc. and affirmed the trial court’s decision. 

Plaintiff John Lahoud entered into a contract with Anthony & Sylvan Corp., t/a Anthony Sylvan Pools (“A&S”) to install a pool at his home.  The contract contained an Alternate Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) provision which required that the parties submit to arbitration any claim arising from the contract, except the contractor reserved the right to file in a civil court to collect monies it claimed were due under the contract.  A dispute arose during the excavation of the pool, upon which the plaintiff declared that the contractor was in material breach of the contract and informed the contractor that he was terminating the contract.  The issue in the published decision of Lahoud v. Anthony & Sylvan Corp., t/a Anthony Sylvan Pools, 2025 N.J. Super. LEXIS 11 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2025) was whether the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it contained a reservation of rights as to the contractor only to sue in court to collect monies it claimed may be due under the agreement.

The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the contractor A&S, claiming a breach of contract, a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and for declaratory relief declaring that the arbitration provision violated the public policy of the State and was not enforceable.  In lieu of filing an Answer, A&S filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint based on the ADR clause.  Plaintiff cross-moved for a declaratory judgment, contending that the arbitration clause violated public policy and that the court should find it unenforceable. 

The trial court granted A&S’s motion to compel arbitration and ordered the parties to abide by the contractually agreed dispute resolution mechanism and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.  The court concluded that the ADR provision did satisfy New Jersey case law and was enforceable.   The court found that the reservation of rights provision that permitted the defendant contractor to bring legal action in the courts of New Jersey for the collection of money, but prohibited plaintiff from doing so, did not violate New Jersey law.

The plaintiff appealed this ruling to the Appellate Division.  He made two arguments, as follows: “1) The ADR language does not advance the public policy supporting enforceability of arbitration provisions; and 2) the motion court erred in upholding the one-sided ADR provision.”

The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the ADR provision met the standard under New Jersey law to be enforceable.  The Court noted that it “clearly and unambiguously evidences a waiver of plaintiff’s right to pursue any claims against A&S in a judicial forum and obligates plaintiff to resolve his claims for remediation in arbitration.”  It found that this contract was not a contract of adhesion.  It was not presented to plaintiff on a take it or leave it basis.  Plaintiff selected A&S to install his pool and had the express right under the contract to retain counsel to review and negotiate contract terms, as well as a three day right of rescission.  Thus, the Appellate Division rejected plaintiff’s contention that the ADR provision made the contract unconscionable. 

However, the Appellate Division did have an issue with the reservation of rights provision.  Based upon the wording of this provision, although A&S could pursue a claim in court for money damages, plaintiff would be precluded from asserting a counterclaim or defense if A&S did exercise its reservation of rights.  The contract was very clear that all of plaintiff’s claims must be brought in arbitration, if mediation was unsuccessful, and not in court.

The Court found that this “grossly unbalanced approach” to the availability of a court of law to the contractor only constituted a harsh and unfair one-sided term that lacked mutuality and, therefore, was not enforceable.  Hence, the Appellate Division found that A&S was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue of unconscionability with regard to the reservation of rights provision. 

However, the Appellate Division continued in its review of the contract and noted that it contained a severability clause which stated that “if a judge or arbitrator finds any provision of this agreement invalid or illegal under applicable law or regulation, the remaining provisions will still be valid and remain in effect.”  The Court further pointed out that this severability clause is only mentioned in the ADR provision in the contract and not elsewhere.

The Appellate Division noted that courts can sever an invalid provision of a contract “unless striking the illegal provision defeats the primary purpose of the contract.”  The purpose of the severability clause would be indicative of the parties’ intent that the agreement as a whole should survive the excision of an unenforceable provision.

The Court found that the one-sided nature of the reservation of rights provision could be cured by striking it from the contract based upon the severability clause.  That would leave the remaining portions of the contract enforceable, including the ADR provision.

In summary, the Appellate Division found: 1) the ADR provision clearly waived plaintiff’s right to bring a civil lawsuit; 2) the reservation of rights provision was unconscionable and unenforceable; and 3) the reservation of rights provision would be severed from the contract.  The Court also ruled that the trial court made a mistake in failing to stay plaintiff’s complaint pending the arbitration.  Thus, it remanded the matter back to the trial court to enter a new order reinstating plaintiff’s complaint and staying the complaint pending the resolution of any mediation and arbitration proceedings. 

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