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emotional distress

This case involved an emotional distress claim filed by plaintiff Richard Sperazza in waking up to find the body of his murdered friend and co-worker in the hotel room they were sharing during a work assignment.  Plaintiff and his deceased friend and co-worker were sharing a hotel room during an out of town work assignment.  The issue in Strayer v. Wingate at Wyndham, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 90 (App. Div. Jan. 19, 2024) was whether the plaintiff had a claim for a negligent infliction of emotional distress against the defendant Wingate at Wyndham for the emotional harm he suffered on waking up to find the body of his murdered friend and co-worker in their hotel room.

Plaintiff Sperazza had been employed by Osmose Utilities Services, Inc. as a technician who worked with his friend and roommate, Ivan Scott Strayer.  Plaintiff, Strayer, and other utility workers were assigned to work crews which travelled to various locations around the country and lived together in hotels while on assignment.  Plaintiff and Strayer had been hotel roommates on other work assignments and also socialized frequently outside of work.  Plaintiff was the best man at Strayer’s wedding and plaintiff considered Strayer family and attended his family functions.

Plaintiff and other members of the Osmose work crew had been staying at the Wingate Hotel in Vineland.  The crew consisted of five crew members including plaintiff, Strayer and two brothers, Charles Pulcine and his brother Larry Pulcine, and the crew leader, Mark Knowles.  Larry Pulcine had recently joined the crew.  Knowles made the hotel reservations and advised the front desk clerk who was staying in which room.  The crew members were assigned to three rooms in which plaintiff and Strayer were assigned to Room 404, the Pulcine brothers were assigned to Room 405 and Knowles was assigned to Room 406.

On the evening of the murder, plaintiff ate at a restaurant located in front of the hotel.  Strayer eventually met him at the restaurant but returned to the hotel room.  When plaintiff returned later to their hotel room around 10:00, he observed the television was on and Strayer appeared to be sleeping.  Thereafter, he received a text message from Chuck Pulcine, inviting him to hang out and drink some beers in his room.  At about 10:05 p.m., plaintiff went to Pulcine’s room, although he briefly returned to his room to grab a few beers while Strayer stayed in their hotel room.  He then returned to the Pulcines’ room where he stayed until about 11:30 p.m.

While plaintiff was in the Pulcines’ room, Larry had left for about 30 minutes, stating he was going to do laundry and when he returned, Larry was “shooting his mouth off.” Therefore, plaintiff returned to his hotel room and went to sleep.

When plaintiff woke up around 5:00 to 5:15 a.m. and Strayer was still in bed, plaintiff went over to look at him.  He noticed that “his eyes were open” but “nothing really going on.”  He grabbed his foot which was ice cold, checked his pulse twice and panicked and ran out of the room.  He felt shock at finding his friend’s body and feared for his own safety.  He later learned that Strayer had been shot with a handgun.  However, plaintiff did not witness the murder and did not encounter the murderer in his hotel room and, further, was not physically harmed himself.

It was later learned that Larry had obtained a key card from the front desk to the plaintiff’s room and shot Strayer sometime between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m. while plaintiff was across the hall in the Pulcines’ hotel room. 

Strayer’s wife brought a wrongful death and survivorship action against the defendant hotel, among other defendants.  Plaintiff brought a separate action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for discovering the body of his murdered friend.

Plaintiff obtained a hotel management operations expert who opined that the Wingate Hotel “was aware of its safety obligations and deviated from the industry standard of care that created a foreseeable risk of harm to the hotel’s guests.”  Further, the expert opined that “Larry’s criminal acts were the type of criminal activity that adequate safety and security measures are intended to prevent and were, therefore foreseeable.”  According to the expert, the failure to identify or properly register the Osmose crew was inconsistent with proper keycard control “and resulted in a foreseeable risk of harm to guests.”  The expert opined “that the implementation and enforcement of a proper keycard controlled protocol system could have prevented Larry’s unauthorized entry into plaintiff’s and Strayer’s room.”

At the trial court level, the defendants moved for a summary judgment, which was granted.  The trial court judge found that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that defendant hotel’s actions proximately caused plaintiff’s emotional injuries.  He found that the injuries were not based upon the handing of a keycard and that neither defendants nor their employees caused any of the emotional distress being suffered by plaintiff.  While acknowledging that defendant’s employee should not have given the keycard to Larry Pulcine, he noted that the crew members were all friends and he had seen them together and it was not as if he was giving a keycard to a stranger.

This appeal ensued.  Plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake in granting defendant’s summary judgment because he has a direct claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon defendants’ breach of duty it owed directly to him.  Plaintiff relied on the case of Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559 (1965) in support of his claim for emotional distress.  The Appellate Division rejected this argument.

For a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress for witnessing harm suffered by others, the individual must be able to allege that they were “fearful of immediate injury.”  The Appellate Division found that, under these facts, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.  While he may have felt fear when he discovered his roommate’s dead body, there was no evidence in the record that he had a “reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.”  To the contrary, plaintiff did not even realize at the time that Strayer had been murdered and he thought that Strayer had died from natural causes.  He did not encounter the murderer in his hotel room and was not present when Strayer was murdered.  Because of his failure to present any evidence that he suffered a reasonable fear of personal injury, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff was unable to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Hence, it upheld the trial court decision, granting summary judgment and dismissing the case.

By: Erika Vasant, Law Clerk
Editor: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

In August 2017, intoxicated, twenty-six year old Raniel Hernandez attended a party, where he subsequently drowned after jumping into a pool. Earlier this week, the New Jersey Appellate Division, addressed the tort claims arising from the tragic accident. Plaintiffs Silvana Lansigan Delvalle and Ralph Hernandez, parents of the deceased Raniel Hernandez, sued with claims of common law negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as a Portee claim regarding their son’s death. The issued on appeal in Delvalle v. Trino, 2022 N.J. Super. LEXIS 139 (App. Div. Dec. 6, 2022) was whether the defendant homeowners, Henry and Charlene Trino, and their son, Airel Trino, (and some of the guests) were liable as social hosts for Raniel’s death.  

Airel Trino hosted a party at his parents’ house, and allowed attendees to use the swimming pool if they wished to. He purchased alcohol for guests, and about 60 people attended, including Raniel. During the party, a visibly intoxicated Raniel entered the pool, after Wendy, another attendee, agreed to let him throw her into the pool – an activity he had planned weeks before.  Afterwards, Wendy was exiting the pool when she noticed that Raniel was not getting out. She tried to pull Raniel out, but was unsuccessful. Kevin Garcia, another attendee, jumped in and tried to rescue Raniel, but all efforts to save him were ineffective. After about 25 minutes, 9-1-1 was called. The autopsy report showed that Raniel’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was significantly high, causing the accidental drowning and cardiac arrest.

At the close of discovery, the defendants filed for a summary judgment dismissal, which was denied at the trial court level. However, leave to appeal was granted and, in a published decision, the Appellate Division reversed those decisions.

In addressing the defendants’ appeal, the Appellate Division found that there was nothing in the record that indicated that Garcia had any influence on Raniel’s decision to jump into the pool. More specifically, Garcia owed no statutory duty to save Raniel, and the Social Host Liability Act (SHLA), did not apply either, because Garcia was not a host. Even though Garcia attempted to rescue Raniel, his rescue efforts were protected by the Good Samaritan Act. The plaintiffs failed to allege any evidence of roughhousing or altercations between Garcia and Raniel. Although Garcia left the party after attempting to rescue Raniel, he was not fleeing. Instead he left the premises to escort his underage girlfriend away to avoid being cited for underage drinking. In consideration of all of these facts, Garcia was entitled to summary judgment, and the Appellate Division reversed the denial of summary judgment for this defendant.

In regards to the Trinos defendants the Appellate Division came to the same conclusion: that there was no genuine issue of fact that would justify the denial of a grant of summary judgment. SHLA did not apply to the Trinos because that statute is exclusive to injuries related to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. SHLA is not triggered simply because a social host decided to serve alcohol. Furthermore, the Trinos did not owe a duty to Raniel since there was no public safety concern of him ever operating a motor vehicle in the situation.  Nonetheless, the Court noted that the plaintiffs may have a potential claim regarding a failure to warn. However, there was no case law suggesting that socials hosts have a duty to “prevent a voluntarily intoxicated adult guest from going swimming to safeguard the guest’s own well-being.” Although the plaintiffs contend that the Trinos should have had a lifeguard at the pool party, there was no regulation or case law suggesting it was required. Underage drinking at the party, although a concern, was not at issue in this case, because Raniel was a twenty-six-year-old ex-Marine.

The Appellate Division also found summary judgment should have been granted for the claims regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs allege that there was a deliberate attempt to cover up Raniel’s death since no one told them about what happened to their son after they arrived. This behavior does not, however, amount to extreme and outrageous as defined by case law. The plaintiffs also failed to allege sufficient facts for a Portee claim, because Ralph was not present when his son drowned.

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