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Harassment Intimidation and Bullying

In S.S. v. Woodcliff Lake Board of Education, Plaintiff appealed an order dismissing his complaint for failure to serve a claim notice upon defendant Woodcliff Lake Board of Education (“Board”) pursuant to a provision of the Tort Claims Act (“TCA”), N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. The Appellate Division on March 9, 2026, affirmed in part and remanded in part.

Plaintiff’s son was an elementary student who was disciplined pursuant to the Board’s Harassment, Intimidation, and Bullying (“HIB”) policy. Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Board to contest the principal’s findings. The Board upheld the principal’s findings, and the Plaintiff filed an appeal with the New Jersey Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”). While the appeal was pending, the Plaintiff filed a three-count civil complaint in the Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey alleging (1) negligence, (2) defamation, and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff sought compensatory damages and an order directing the Board to invalidate and remove the HIB finding from his son’s educational record.

The Board filed a motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely notice of claim under the TCA and sought to bar Plaintiff’s request for compensatory damages. The Board maintained the accrual date for Plaintiff’s causes of action was March 8, 2024, the date when the HIB investigation concluded, and Plaintiff was required to file a notice of claim by August 6, 2024.  

Additionally, the Board argued Plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies because Plaintiff’s redress lied solely with the Commissioner of Education. See N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(e). The Board asserted Plaintiff’s requests must first be fully adjudicated before the Office of Administrative Law and the Commissioner of Education.

The court determined Plaintiff was statutorily barred from pursuing monetary claims against the Board due to his failure to file a timely notice of claim under the TCA. The court agreed that May 8, 2024, was the accrual date, and the Plaintiff should have filed a claim notice by August 6, 2024. Additionally, the court concluded Plaintiff’s action was premature and he must first exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. Plaintiff sought reconsideration and requested the court clarify whether dismissal with prejudice precluded him from refiling after administrative exhaustion. He asked the court to amend the dismissal to be “without prejudice.” The court denied the request and Plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff maintained he was only concerned with the “prejudicial designation attached to the exhaustion ruling.” He claimed the lower court’s order prematurely blocked opportunity for future litigation after the administrative exhaustion requirement is met.

The Appellate Division affirmed the court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s tort claims against the Board for failure to comply with the TCA. However, regarding the written order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Appellate Division agreed that the court’s written order dismissing his complaint could be “erroneously interpreted to preclude [P]laintiff’s right to exhaust the administrative process before the Commissioner.” Id. at 13. As such, the Appellate Division remanded and instructed the court to amend its order to provide that dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is without prejudice so that Plaintiff may complete an administrative appeal.

This decision reinforces the procedural protections afforded under the TCA, even in matters arising from student discipline and HIB determinations. School districts should promptly assess potential claims and determine whether compliance with statutory notice deadlines are required by either party.

On March 13, 2026, the New Jersey Appellate Division in J.R. v. Township of Long Hill Board of Education affirmed the New Jersey Commissioner of Education’s (“Commissioner”) decision, upholding the Township of Long Hill Board of Education’s (“Board”) determination that a student’s conduct met the statutory criteria of harassment, intimidation, and bullying (“HIB”) under the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (the “Act”).

An eighth grade student was the subject of HIB investigation following a report that he made demeaning comments about another District student (target) in a Snapchat group chat. The Snapchat group chat was comprised of over two dozen students. The target was not in the Snapchat group chat, but the student made vulgar comments about the target’s appearance, weight, and sexual orientation in the group chat. The student admitted to making the statements regarding the target. As a result of the conduct, the student received a six-day out of school suspension for violations of the middle school’s code of conduct.

The District conducted a HIB investigation and determined that the student’s actions constituted HIB. The District’s finding of HIB was reported to the Board. The student’s parent requested a HIB appeal hearing before the Board. The Board heard the appeal and affirmed the recommendation of the superintendent and upheld the determination that the student committed an act of HIB. The student’s parent then appealed the Board’s decision to the Commissioner, who transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law, which was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). After a two-day hearing, the ALJ upheld the HIB finding and discipline of the student. Thereafter, the Commissioner adopted the ALJ’s decision.

The student’s parent appealed the Commissioner’s final decision to the Appellate Division, which reviewed the Commissioner’s decision under the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard.

On appeal, the student’s parent argued that the Board’s HIB policy ran afoul of the Act by adding the word “or” after subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14, thereby making subsection (a) disjunctive rather than conjunctive. The Appellate Division rejected the parent’s argument, finding that the Act only requires one of the three subsections of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 to be satisfied to establish a finding of HIB.

The Appellate Division also rejected the parent’s argument that the District’s factual findings required the HIB to be overturned. Petitioner relied on a portion of the District’s HIB report that indicated the student was not aware of the potential impact on the target. The Appellate Division noted the language relied on by the parent spoke to the student’s subjective intent, which is not the standard under the Act. The Appellate Division then relied on the ALJ’s analysis finding that a reasonable eighth grader should have known his messages would have the effect of emotionally harming the target.

The Appellate Division held the ALJ correctly determined that the student’s conduct substantially disrupted or interfered with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students. The Court referenced the ALJ’s analysis of the widespread impact of the student’s conduct, including the target expressing fear of attending high school and requiring counseling and the student who reported the conduct fearing retaliation from other students. The Appellate Division rejected the parent’s argument that the target would not have been aware of the Snapchat messages but for administration informing the target, as the target reported to administration that she was informed of the messages by a friend. The Court also noted that the district was statutorily required to inform the parents or guardians of all students involved in alleged HIB incidents. See N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(5).

Finally, the Appellate Division rejected the parent’s argument that the HIB finding violated the student’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech because the student was not aware that his words would cause harm to the target. The Appellate Division reiterated that a reasonable eighth grader should have known the statements would harm the target. Further, the decision noted that to even accept the parent’s argument would require a finding that the Act violates the First Amendment. The parent did not raise that claim in the appeal. Therefore, the Appellate Division did not reach the merits of this claim.

Ultimately, the Appellate Division found that the Commissioner’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and upheld the finding of HIB.

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