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Plaintiff Walter Cabezas, as administrator of the Estate of Aldemar Cabezas, filed a wrongful death lawsuit following the death of Aldemar Cabezas who was struck by a vehicle owned by defendant Penske Truck Leasing Co. on September 7, 2021.  Medicare issued a conditional payment letter to plaintiff, stating that Medicare had identified $62,100.82 in conditional payments related to the claim.  The issue in Cabezas v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P., 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2034 (App. Div. Oct. 28, 2025) was whether defendants (Penske Truck Leasing and Nehal Selim) were entitled to pay the lien directly or whether they were required to pay the entire settlement amount to plaintiff, who had agreed to satisfy any outstanding medical bills and liens, as well as indemnify and hold defendants harmless as to such liens.

The case settled for the amount of $500,000 and, in the settlement agreement, it indicated that plaintiff would release all claims and be solely responsible for satisfying any and all outstanding medical bills and liens.  However, despite the language in the agreement, defendants paid the Medicare lien directly and then remitted the remainder of the settlement amount to plaintiff.

After the case settled, plaintiff sent the defendants an executed release.  Thereafter, CMS issued a final demand letter setting the finalized Medicare lien at $39,365.09.  That final demand letter was supplied to defendants and plaintiff’s counsel again asserted plaintiff’s sole responsibility for the lien and pressed for immediate payment of the $500,000 settlement.

However, defendants notified plaintiff that it had issued a check for $460,634.91 and paid the Medicare lien directly.  Plaintiff objected and immediately demanded the full $500,000.

Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.  Defendants argued that plaintiff suffered no damages and would be provided a “windfall” if they now had to pay the full amount. 

At the oral argument, plaintiff made the argument that by the defendants paying the Medicare lien directly, it removed from them the ability to resolve the Medicare lien and potentially compromise the lien.  Hence, plaintiff argued that there was potential harm by defendants paying the lien directly. 

The trial court granted the motion and enforced the settlement agreement as written. The court awarded plaintiff counsel fees and costs incurred with bringing the motion and entered an order to enforce the settlement agreement, which required the defendants to pay plaintiff the full $500,000 settlement, despite having already satisfied the Medicare lien.

Defendants moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court’s decision provided plaintiff with a “double recovery” or a windfall.  The court denied reconsideration and found that the parties had a contract that they had agreed to $500,000 as a settlement.  The trial court found that the Medicare payment made by the defendants fell outside of the agreement and did not excuse the obligation to plaintiff. 

This decision was appealed.  Unfortunately for the defendants, it was upheld by the Appellate Division. 

The Appellate Division found that the parties had entered into a valid settlement agreement that defendants breached.  The language in the agreement was explicit in assigning the responsibility for satisfying any Medicare lien to plaintiff.  The Court found the language of the agreement to be clear and unambiguous.  Defendants were to pay plaintiff $500,000 in exchange for plaintiff releasing all claims and plaintiff was solely responsible for the Medicare lien.  Thus, the Court found that the trial court correctly enforced the settlement agreement as written when it ordered defendants to pay the entire $500,000.

The takeaway from this case is, if a defendant desires to pay the Medicare lien directly to avoid any future liability if the plaintiff’s counsel fails to satisfy this lien, this requirement must be part of the settlement agreement.  It cannot be done unilaterally or brought up after the settlement is reached.  Otherwise, a defendant may be forced to face the potential consequence of Penske Truck Leasing in this case in which, after paying the lien, it still was required to pay the full amount of the settlement to plaintiff.

On May 12, 2020, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed whether an employer can maintain a subrogation action to recoup workers’ compensation benefits paid for economic loss where (1) its employee is barred from maintaining an action against the tortfeasors due to his election of the limitation-on-lawsuit option in his personal automobile policy; (2) the employee’s losses were covered by workers’ compensation benefits; and (3) the employee neither sought nor received personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits.  In N.J. Transit Corp. v. Sanchez, 2020 N.J. LEXIS 520 (N.J. May 12, 2020), an equally divided Court answered that question in the affirmative.

On December 2, 2014, David Mercogliano, while acting in the course of his employment, was driving a vehicle owned by his employer, New Jersey Transit (“NJT”), when he was rear-ended by a vehicle being driven by Sandra Sanchez and owned by Chad Smith.  Mercogliano sustained minor injuries for which he received treatment, and was medically cleared to return to work without restriction two months after the accident.

At the time of the accident, Mercogliano was insured under an automobile policy for which he had elected the limitation-on-lawsuit option provided for under the Auto Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“AICRA”).  Under AICRA, when the limitation-on-lawsuit option has been selected, a person injured in a car accident cannot recover noneconomic damages against the person legally responsible for the accident, unless his injury falls into one of the categories specifically enumerated in AICRA.  Here, there was no dispute that Mercogliano’s injury did not fall within any of the specified categories, and that he thus could not recover for noneconomic injury against Sanchez or Smith.

NJT’s workers’ compensation carrier paid Mercogliano $33,625.70 in workers’ compensation benefits, including medical benefits, temporary indemnity benefits, and permanent indemnity benefits.  With his losses covered by workers’ compensation benefits, Mercogliano neither sought nor received PIP benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy.

In its capacity as Mercogliano’s employer and subrogee, NJT filed a complaint against Sanchez and Smith seeking to recoup the workers’ compensation benefits it paid to Mercogliano.  NJT relied on N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f), a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act which authorizes employers who have paid workers’ compensation benefits to injured employees to assert subrogation claims against the persons legally responsible for those injuries.  Here, NJT alleged Mercogliano’s injuries resulted from the negligence of Sanchez in causing the accident, and also asserted a vicarious liability claim against Smith as the owner of the vehicle and as Sanchez’s employer.

Sanchez and Smith moved for summary judgment dismissing NJT’s complaint. They claimed that NJT could not assert a subrogation claim because AICRA prevented Mercogliano from pursuing a third-party action against them, given his election of the limitation-on-lawsuit option in his personal insurance policy.  Sanchez and Smith further argued that because Mercogliano would have been eligible for PIP benefits had he not qualified for workers’ compensation benefits, AICRA barred NJT’s claim for reimbursement. 

In response, NJT argued that because its subrogation claim was based entirely on workers’ compensation benefits paid for economic losses (medical expenses and lost wages), and because Mercogliano received no PIP benefits, AICRA did not bar its suit against Sanchez and Smith.

Analyzing the legislative history of AICRA, along with the collateral source rule set forth therein, the Court found that the Legislature intended to allocate the burden for injuries incurred during the course of employment to employers and their workers’ compensation carriers.  As such, where an injury is compensable under both the Workers’ Compensation Act and AICRA (via PIP benefits), the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the primary source of recovery of medical expenses and lost wages.  In this scenario, the PIP carrier is relieved of the obligation to pay those benefits, such that PIP benefits are neither collectible nor paid.

Here, NJT paid workers’ compensation benefits for Mercogliano’s economic losses.  As a result, Mercogliano neither pursued nor received PIP benefits.  Under these circumstances, AICRA’s prohibition on the admission of evidence of PIP benefits “collectible or paid” was not implicated, as PIP benefits were neither collectible nor paid.

The Supreme Court found that the Workers’ Compensation Act reflects the Legislature’s clear intent to allow employers and carriers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits to assert subrogation rights against third-party tortfeasors.  The Court found no evidence that when the Legislature enacted AICRA, it intended to bar employers and insurers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits for economic loss from seeking reimbursement from third-party tortfeasors where the employee’s losses were covered by workers’ compensation benefits and he neither sought nor received PIP benefits.  An equally divided Court thus affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to allow NJT to pursue its subrogation claim against Sanchez and Smith.

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