Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

Litigation

Not surprisingly, due to the COVID-19 surge of cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court has once again suspended jury trials. They had resumed earlier in the fall on a limited basis as a hybrid with virtual jury selection and socially distanced trials. However, with this second wave of new COVID-19 cases, the Court deemed it unsafe to conduct any new in person jury trials. Hence, by order of November 16, 2020, any new in person jury trials are suspended pending further order.

After the court sent out the notice suspending jury trials in New Jersey, on 11/25/20, the court sent out a notice to the bar, which would mandate all cases to be eligible for an entirely virtual jury trial. Having the pleasure of participating in zoom depositions for the past 6 months, conducting trials virtually would present a myriad of problems. The presentation of evidence, securing witness testimony at trial, internet connectivity problems, and the use of evidence for impeachment purposes would be just some of the challenges in a virtual jury trial.

We can only hope that enough members of the bar object so that the court changes this proposal from mandatory to voluntary participation. The goal of the court is to move cases off its docket. While that it is understandable, it should not be done at the expense of adequate representation at trial. I have suggested the increased use of settlement conferences and mediations as an alternative path to resolve cases and move cases off the court’s docket.

We will keep you posted as to whether this proposal is implemented and/or modified before implementation by the court.

 

UPDATE:  Please note that on January 7, 2021, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ordered that virtual jury trials are to proceed, starting on February 1, 2021. They will be implemented in a two phase approach in a limited number of vicinages on a voluntary basis starting February 1, 2021 and on a mandatory basis statewide starting on April 5, 2021. Click here to read more.

 


Betsy G. Ramos, Esq. is a member of the firm’s Executive Committee and Co-Chair of the Litigation Group. She is an experienced litigator with over 25 years’ experience handling diverse matters. Her practice areas include tort defense, insurance coverage, Tort Claims Act and civil rights defense, business litigation, employment litigation, construction litigation, estate litigation and general litigation.

Capehart Scatchard is pleased to announce its “Best Law Firm” ranking in the area of Litigation – Insurance (Metro, Tier 3) on the 2021 list published by U.S. News & World Report and Best Lawyers®.

Law firms included on the list are recognized for professional excellence with consistently impressive ratings from clients and peers. To be eligible for a ranking, a firm must have at least one attorney who has been included in the current edition of Best Lawyers in America, which recognizes the top five percent of practicing lawyers in the United States.  Betsy Ramos (Litigation – Insurance) was recognized for this prestigious award in the 2021 edition.

“Best Law Firms” is published by Best Lawyers in partnership with U.S. News & World Report.  No aspect of this advertisement has been submitted to or approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  For a description of the selection methodology please click here.

No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Client: Southampton Volunteer Fire Dept. and its fire chief

Court: United States District Court, District of New Jersey

Trial Attorney:  Betsy G. Ramos, Esq. and Benjamin Zieman, Esq. (former shareholder)

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

The plaintiff had contended that the fire department violated his constitutional rights for demolishing his home without notice or compensation to him. The home was demolished due to safety concerns and the inability to totally extinguish the fire after it suffered a partial collapse. The federal court judge found that, due to the emergent circumstances, the fire department did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and dismissed the lawsuit on summary judgment as to both the fire department and the fire chief.

Client: School Board Member Defendants

Court: Superior Court, Law Division, Civil Part, Middlesex County

Trial Attorney:  Cameron R. Morgan, Esq.

Brief Attorney: Cameron R. Morgan, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

A member of the South Plainfield Board of Education, Deborah Boyle, and her husband, brought suit against four other current school board members, two former board members, and six other citizens of the South Plainfield community, alleging claims of harassment, gender based discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), terroristic threats, conspiracy, and loss of consortium.  Plaintiffs’ claims were based primarily on her allegations that one of the defendant school board members had attended meetings of the local middle school PTO of which Plaintiff was the president, sought to obtain financial records related to the organization, and expressed views which Plaintiff found harassing.  After being denied access to the PTO financial records, several of the defendants later ran for and were elected to the Board of Education, and the Board lawfully enacted a policy prohibiting current Board members from serving in positions of executive leadership in the local PTO, thereby causing Plaintiff to resign her presidency of that organization.  Plaintiff also alleged that several local citizens had made statements or engaged in conduct which she felt diminished her reputation in the local community.

After permitting Plaintiffs several opportunities to amend, on June 26, 2019, the trial court granted Defendants’ Third Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer, dismissing all six of the seven counts of the complaint applicable to the Board member defendants, in their entirety and with prejudice.  The court held that, even if a cause of action exists in New Jersey for civil harassment, plaintiffs’ claims could not survive a motion to dismiss, as they had failed to plead the necessary elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ NJLAD claims, finding that Plaintiffs had failed to plead facts sufficient to show an “unlawful employment practice” or “unlawful discrimination,” within the meaning of the NJLAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-5d, as there was no employer/employee relationship, and the conduct alleged was not within any of the twenty subsections of the NJLAD setting forth the various categories of unlawful discrimination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.  Claims of harassment against one of the citizens of the community were also dismissed with prejudice.

By way of background, a public entity is only liable for an injury proximately caused by a condition of its property within the limitations of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  To impose liability on a public entity pursuant N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, a Plaintiff must prove the following five elements: (1) a dangerous condition existed at the time of Plaintiff’s injury; (2) Plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by the dangerous condition; (3) the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kinds of injuries that Plaintiff sustained; (4) the public entity created the dangerous condition or had notice of it a sufficient time prior to Plaintiff’s injury to have taken measures to protect against it; and (5) the public entity’s failure to take action to protect against the dangerous condition was palpably unreasonable.  Failure to prove all five elements defeats Plaintiff’s claim.

In order to satisfy the first element, a claimant must show that there was a dangerous condition, defined as a “condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury” when the property is used with due care in a reasonably foreseeable manner.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1a.  Courts interpreting this definition ask whether the condition created a substantial risk of harm to persons, generally, who would use the public property with due care in a foreseeable manner.

In a long line of cases, courts have held that minor imperfections on public travel-ways are not dangerous conditions under the Tort Claims Act because they do not pose a substantial risk of injury to the public.  Courts have so held notwithstanding the fact that the imperfections may directly cause Plaintiffs severe injuries or even death.

For example, in Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J. Super. 497, 504, 507-08 (App. Div. 1978), aff’d o.b. 79 N.J. 547 (1979), a man drove his car over a three-eighths-inch declivity connecting a highway to a bridge, and then drove over a section of pavement that had comparatively less traction than the rest of the road.  As he drove over these two defective conditions, another car cut him off.  The man lost control of his vehicle, ultimately injuring one plaintiff and killing another.  In a subsequent lawsuit against the State, the Plaintiffs’ theory of the case — backed up by expert testimony at trial — was that the defective conditions of the road contributed to the man’s losing control of his car.  The jury agreed, and found the State thirty percent liable for causing the accident.  The Appellate Division (and the Supreme Court, which adopted the Appellate Division’s reasoning in its entirety) concluded that there was no dangerous condition within the Tort Claims Act notwithstanding that the jury reached a contrary conclusion, and notwithstanding that two defects in the road caused the Plaintiffs’ injury and death.  The Court explained that the Tort Claim Act establishes a threshold level of objective severity to make a defect actionable — defects falling below that threshold are not actionable as a matter of law.  The Court additionally held that a baseline number of defects must be tolerated in public property as being consistent with public expectations.

Another case rejecting the dangerousness of a condition that caused severe injuries is Charney v. City of Wildwood, 732 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452-53 (D.N.J. 2010).  There, a woman, while walking on the Wildwood boardwalk, tripped over a hole that was roughly shaped like a right triangle measuring approximately three and three-eighths inches long and one and one-half inch deep.  Even though the woman sustained multiple fractures, and even though there was evidence that the defendant had repaired adjacent wooden boards as well as the subject board in the past, the Court held that there was no dangerous condition as a matter of law.

Yet another example is Cordy v. Sherwin Williams Co., 975 F. Supp. 639, 641, 643 (D.N.J. 1997) where a bicyclist sustained paralysis when his bicycle struck the property owner’s elevated railroad tracks, thereby launching him head-first over the handlebars and on to the street pavement.  The railroad track was raised between 5/8 and 7/8 of an inch above the roadway.  The court granted summary judgment finding that so slight a differential could not possibly be a dangerous condition creating a substantial risk of injury.  The court found that, that would impose an unfair onerous burden on the County to keep roadways free of even the slightest imperfections.  The court found further that even if one assumed that the small differential was a dangerous condition allowing such a difference could not possibly be found to be palpably unreasonable.

These three cases represent but a few of the many that hold that minor imperfections in public travel-ways are not actionable under the Tort Claims Act even if they do happen to cause substantial injuries.

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