Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

Litigation

Client: Justin Villalobos (Safe Auto Insurance Company/National General Insurance Company

Court: New York Supreme Court, Kings County

Trial Attorney: Alyson L. Knipe, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

This case involved a motor vehicle accident that occurred at the intersection of Meserole Ave and McGuiness Blvd in Brooklyn, NY on September 21, 2018.  Our client, Mr. Villalobos, was the host vehicle with Plaintiff Jamie Ortiz as his front seat passenger. The Villalobos vehicle was involved in an accident with Codefendant Cimino’s vehicle who was traveling on a cross street.  Each driver claimed to have had the green light.

In a verdict rendered on October 23, 2023, a unanimous jury found that Mr. Villalobos was not negligent for this accident, and found that Co-Defendant Cimino was 100% at fault.

Client: American European Insurance Group

Court: Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Norristown, PA

Trial Attorney: Christopher J. Hoare, Esq.

Brief Attorney: Christina M. Dewland, Esq. 

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

This matter arises out of an alleged insurance coverage issue. Plaintiff, Francesco Satiro was the owner of a building located in Pottstown, PA (the “Property”).  In February 2015, Plaintiff claims that the Property suffered water damage due to “frozen pipes.” Plaintiff’s insurance company, American European Insurance Group (“AEIG”) subsequently paid Plaintiff for his property damage claim due to the frozen pipes.  AEIG informed Plaintiff in writing that it required additional documentation from Plaintiff in order to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims for lost rent and depreciation. For over 8+ years, Plaintiff had failed to provide the missing documentation necessary for any further payments to Plaintiff, despite numerous requests from AEIG and its defense counsel.  Plaintiff’s Complaint had alleged that AEIG was in breach of contract (the Policy) in regards to non-payment for Plaintiff’s depreciation/lost rental claims, as well as Plaintiff’s claims of bad faith against AEIG.

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and bad faith claim were bifurcated. A jury trial was held for Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. A bench trial on Plaintiff’s remaining bad faith claim will be held later this month.

After a three day jury trial on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, the jury had delivered a verdict in favor of AEIG. The jury found that AEIG did not breach the terms of its insurance policy with respect to handling, payment and communications with Plaintiff. Verdict for the Defense!

Client: Wawa

Court: Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County

Brief/Oral Argument Attorney: Voris M. Tejada, Jr., Esq. 

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Plaintiff Hicks sued Wawa for negligence arising out of a slip and fall which occurred in a Berlin Wawa store on December 14, 2019. Both parties acknowledged that on the date of Plaintiff’s fall, it was rainy. Video surveillance footage showed that from the exterior of the store, Plaintiff first entered into a vestibule, and from there passed through another door to the store interior. Plaintiff’s fall occurred as she was stepping into the store interior from the vestibule, approximately one step into the store. Notably, the door Plaintiff utilized to enter the store from the vestibule displayed a red, octagon-shaped sign which read “CAUTION! Floor May Be Slippery. Your Safety is Important to Wawa.” While Plaintiff acknowledged the sign was there, she testified she never saw the sign. Although Plaintiff saw no water on the ground prior to her fall, she testified that after her fall, she observed water on the ground and felt that her clothing was wet.

Capehart Scatchard, on behalf of Wawa, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that by placing the above-referenced sign on the very door Plaintiff used to enter the store, Wawa provided a sufficient warning of the alleged dangerous condition (water), thus satisfying any duty owed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that because the door contained other signage, in the form of Wawa promotional material, which might have distracted Plaintiff from seeing the CAUTION sign, it was up to a jury to determine whether the warning given by Wawa was sufficient. In response, Wawa noted that per Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony, she was not paying attention to anything on the door, or elsewhere in her surroundings, as she entered the store. As such, there was no evidence Plaintiff was distracted by other signage on the door. After oral argument, the Court found that there was no evidence Wawa had been negligent in any manner or breached any duty owed to Plaintiff. The Court thus granted Wawa’s Motion, dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.

Plaintiff Morgan Dennehy, a 17 year old high school senior, filed a lawsuit against her hockey team coach, defendant Dezarae Fillmyer, when struck by a stray soccer ball during practice.  The issue in Dennehy v. East Windsor Regional Board of Education, 2022 N.J. LEXIS 978 (October 26, 2022) was whether the coach’s acts and omissions would be governed by a simple negligence standard or the heightened standard of recklessness (a more difficult standard to prove).

Plaintiff Dennehy was a member of Hightstown High School’s Girls’ field hockey team coached by defendant Fillmyer.  On the day of the accident, the afternoon sport’s practices were arranged so that the field hockey team’s practice would begin when the boys’ soccer team’s use of the turf field ended.  Coach Fillmyer instructed the offensive players on her field hockey team to begin warming up in “the D-zone,” which was an area between the continuous athletic fields and the turf fields.

A few years earlier, a 20 foot high ball stopper net had been installed at the ends of the turf field to prevent ball interference in other areas.  During the field hockey team warmup, at least two soccer balls from the soccer practice landed within the D-zone near the field hockey players.  Plaintiff played the position of goalie and had not been participating in the informal activities in the D-zone.  She asked her coach if she could take a shot on goal and the coach approved.  As Plaintiff was taking a shot, another errant soccer ball cleared the ball stopper and struck the base of her skull, allegedly causing her injuries.

Plaintiff sued Fillmyer, the Board of Education, the school, its athletic director and others. She claimed that her injuries resulted through, among other basis, defendants’ alleged failures to supervise and provide appropriate safeguards and post suitable warnings of potentially dangerous conditions.

After discovery was completed the defendants filed for summary judgment.  Plaintiff argued in opposition that defendants owed her a duty of reasonable supervisory care.  The trial judge found that the plaintiff was required to show that defendants’ acts or omissions rose at least to the degree of recklessness, as described in prior Supreme Court cases.  The trial court judge applied this heightened standard and determined that the allegations could not support a claim of intentional or reckless conduct.

The plaintiff filed an appeal, challenging only the judge’s determination that a recklessness standard applied to her coach’s alleged acts and omissions.  The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the prior recklessness standard was inapplicable because the coach was not a co-participant. It held that a simple negligence standard applied because plaintiff’s claim was that Coach Fillmyer failed to properly supervise and oversee the participants of the sport assigned to her for instruction.

The matter was further appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certification. The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff and the Appellate Division.  It rejected the defendant Fillmyer’s contention that she was entitled to the application of a recklessness standard (which would be a more difficult standard to meet to pursue a claim for injuries).  Instead, the Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that her claims should be governed by a simple negligence standard.

The Court explained that the recklessness standard did not apply because Fillmyer was not actively participating in the recreational activity at issue.  Rather, her conduct was “her choice of the location of the impromptu workout prior to the scheduled practice and her failure to supervise her players as they waited their turn on the turf field.”

Defendant Fillmyer argued that the recklessness standard should be extended to apply to the acts and omissions of instructors and coaches like herself regardless of the circumstances.  The Supreme Court limited its holding to defendant Fillmyer under the allegations presented by plaintiff.  The Supreme Court stated that “we leave for another time the fixing of appropriate standards to govern the myriad ways in which the multi-faceted roles played by coaches and instructors may cause an injury to a participant.”

The Supreme Court noted that the essence of plaintiff’s theory of liability was that Fillmyer chose the wrong place and an unpropitious time to commence practice.  The Court noted that “parents have the right to expect that teachers and coaches will exercise reasonable care when in charge of their children and that courts will not immunize a teacher’s negligence by imposing a higher standard of care.”

The Supreme Court, however, did not intimate that a factfinder should find Fillmyer was negligent.  It merely held that the recklessness standard did not apply under the circumstances. Hence, the Supreme Court substantially agreed with the Appellate Division’s decision and upheld the reversal of the entry of summary judgment in Fillmyer’s favor.

Client: Hamilton Township and 16 Hamilton Township police officers 

Court: USDC, District of New Jersey 

Brief Attorney: Charles F. Holmgren, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Plaintiff Ronald Saintil sued Hamilton Township and several of its police officers for an illegal search and seizure, excessive use of force, and several other claims because, at the request of outside local law enforcement and a search warrant, Hamilton activated its SWAT team to secure Saintil and his apartment to assist in a criminal investigation. On behalf of Hamilton Township and its police officers, we successfully presented a motion for summary judgment arguing that Hamilton and its officers conducted a lawful search of Saintil’s apartment and that the force used by Hamilton’s officers was reasonable under the circumstances.

Client: Insured homeowner in Garfield, NJ

Court: Bergen County Superior Court, Hackensack, NJ.

Trial Attorney: Christopher J. Hoare, Esq.

Brief Attorney: Christina M. Dewland, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Plaintiff Miller was a former neighbor who returned to the insured’s neighborhood for a surprise visit, after moving away approximately six (6) months prior. Plaintiff and the insured were not friends, never socialized, nor did any activities together. They were just acquaintance neighbors.  Plaintiff did not have the insured’s phone number, so she did not call him to make him aware of her visit. The insured who had no idea that Plaintiff was coming over, had no interactions with Plaintiff in the last six (6) months since she had moved. It is noteworthy that Plaintiff had never been in the insured’s home, had never been invited over to the insured’s home, and was never told she could come over unannounced. Plaintiff was familiar with the insured’s Pitbull and believed the dog to be unfriendly.

On the date of the accident, Plaintiff went to the insured’s home unannounced and knocked loudly on his front door. Getting no answer, Plaintiff alleges she then commenced banging on the front window and vinyl siding of the insured’s home yelling his name in a loud voice as she made her way to the rear gate to the backyard.  The insured’s entire Property was fenced with a chain link fence and a secured front gate.  In addition, the backyard was surrounded by a 6 foot high white vinyl privacy fence with a locked gate and warning signs saying “WARNING. GUARD DOG. NO TRESPASSING.” In addition, on the date of accident, there were locks and chains on both gates and fences.  The insured’s warning sign on the gate to the rear yard measured 18” by 20” and included a large red typeface. On the date of the accident, both gates to the insured’s Property were closed, latched, and secured by chains.

Plaintiff proceeded into the insured’s backyard, ignoring warning signs, lifted a safety chain, unlatched the lock securing the gate in its closed position, and entered the back yard without knowing where the insured’s dog was located.   The insured’s Pitbull subsequently bit Plaintiff’s forearm, knocking her to the ground and breaking her teeth. Plaintiff sued the insured under the New Jersey Dog-Bite Statute [NJSA 4:19-16].  Under this statute, a dog owner is strictly liable to any person his/her dog bites, regardless of the viciousness of the dog (if all elements are met).

After a four day trial, the jury unanimously determined that Plaintiff was a trespasser in the insured’s backyard and therefore, the Dog Bite Statute didn’t apply.  Verdict in favor of the Defense.

Client: New Hope & Ivyland Railroad and Bucks County Railroad and Restoration Corp.

Court: Bucks County Court of Common Pleas

Trial Attorney: Christopher J. Hoare, Esq. and Christina M. Dewland, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Plaintiff was a 46 year old passenger who injured her left ankle, lower back, and knees while exiting the New Hope & Ivyland Railroad’s Halloween excursion train which was discharging its passengers at the station platform in New Hope, PA in 2017.  Plaintiff claimed  she sustained severe internal derangement of her left ankle, lumbar pain, and knee pain.  She underwent an open reduction and internal fixation surgery with hardware at Penn Medicine.  Plaintiff was seeking past and future medical care, economic loss, and pain and suffering.

Plaintiff claimed that the design and construction of the client’s train and station platform construction were unsafe and that there was no handicap ramp over the gap in the platform.  She also claimed that the defendant did not warn her that she was nearing the end of the train car.  The defense presented evidence that the client’s train, platform, and passenger operations complied with all ADA and railroad safety regulations including handicap ramps.  The defense also argued that Plaintiff failed to observe and step over the open and obvious gap between the platform and the train.

A jury of 8 jurors deliberated for 45 minutes before reaching a unanimous verdict that our client, New Hope & Ivyland Railroad and Bucks County Railroad and Restoration Corp., were not negligent.

 

Client: New Jersey Food Council (amicus curiae in support of Sam’s Club)

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Trial Attorney: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq. (prepared and argued our amici arguments before the NJ Supreme Court)

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Supreme Court affirmed the lower court rulings in favor of Sam’s Club, ruling that sale of grapes in closed, sealed clamshell container not subject to Mode of Operation rule; rather, injured plaintiff who fell on grape on the floor would need to prove that Sam’s Club had actual or constructive notice of the grape on the floor to be able to pursue a claim for her injuries. Without such notice, the lawsuit was dismissed.

To view the case, please click here.

On April 9, 2017, plaintiff Jonathan Jeffrey was involved in a one vehicle motorcycle accident, resulting in complete quadriplegia.  Approximately six months after the accident, he consulted counsel, at which point, he learned that his injuries may have been caused or significantly aggravated by the emergency medical technicians who placed him in the ambulance.  In the published decision of Jeffrey v. State, 2021 N.J. Super. LEXIS 65 (App. Div. May 18, 2021), the plaintiff appealed an order of the Law Division denying his motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim.

Plaintiff’s injuries resulted in several surgeries, including spinal decompression and fusion surgery. He suffered a complete spinal cord transection at the C6-C7 level of his spinal cord, resulting in complete quadriplegia.

Plaintiff was released from the hospital on April 17, 2017 and transferred to a rehabilitation center for two months.  He continued to receive rehabilitation therapy on an out-patient basis for approximately four more months.

However, plaintiff remained completely disabled and unable to perform rudimentary movements, let alone to work.  He had an inability to voluntarily move the upper and lower parts of his body.

Plaintiff retained counsel on November 15, 2017.  At that time, plaintiff was using a wheelchair for mobility and had minimum movement of his upper body.  His decision to consult counsel was, in large part, due to a collection notice dated October 24, 2017 from the hospital.

Plaintiff filed a certification that the first time that he understood that he had a potential claim against the emergency medical services and/or other persons that provided medical care to him immediately after the April 2017 motorcycle accident was when he consulted counsel.  Thereafter, on March 20, 2018, his counsel filed a motion for leave to file a late tort claims act notice.  The lawyer certified that it was not until September 28, 2017 that she finally received sufficient information from a representative of the hospital to conclude that plaintiff’s permanent disabilities may have been caused by some or all of the medical care and treatment he received at the scene of the accident.  She sent in Tort Claims Act notices to the relevant public entities and thereafter filed a motion to seek leave to file a late notice of tort claim.

Pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff must file a notice of claim within ninety (90) days of its accrual (N.J.S.A. 59:8-8).  The Law Division judge has the discretion to grant a claimant leave to file a notice of claim beyond that ninety (90) day time frame, if he or she provides by Affidavit:

(1)        Extraordinary circumstances for his or her failure to file a timely notice of claim; and

(2)        The public entity or employees involved have not been substantially prejudiced by the plaintiff’s tardiness.

The plaintiff argued to the trial court judge that the gravity of his injuries made it “impossible or impractical to view this delay as a failure to exercise due diligence.”  The defendant argued that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion to find plaintiff did not show extraordinary circumstances to justify relief.

The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court judge mistakenly exercised his discretionary authority and reversed.  The Court found that the motion judge “failed to duly appreciate the magnitude of plaintiff’s injuries and their life-altering ramifications.”

In the appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Law Division made a mistake in finding that the accrual date was April 9, 2017, the actual date of his accident.  The trial court judge justified his decision in finding that, while it was difficult for the plaintiff to function in his daily life, there was insufficient evidence in the records to show that the plaintiff was not able to file a timely claim due to the severity of his injuries and his medical care.  The court had noted that the plaintiff was released for treatment by in-patient rehab and that there was nothing to indicate that plaintiff through a family member, friend or individual, was prevented from contacting or retaining legal counsel.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court judge “grossly misapprehended the magnitude of plaintiff’s injuries.  Plaintiff was 25 years old at the time of the accident.  In one catastrophic event, he lost complete movement and sensation of his body.”

The Court further pointed out that after completing two months of in-patient rehabilitation, it would “be beyond insensitive to impose a duty on plaintiff to seek legal advice through surrogates composed of family members or friends, during this life-altering adjustment period.”  The Appellate Division concluded that: “we are certain the Legislature did not intend for the judiciary to construe the term ‘accrual’ in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 in a manner that abandons all vestiges of basic human empathy.”

Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that November 15, 2017 was the accrual date for his claim.  Thus, plaintiff’s motion to seek leave of the court to accept the TCA notice of claim was only thirty-five (35) days beyond the ninety (90) day statutory requirement.

The Appellate Division noted that after plaintiff completed his two month in-patient rehabilitation program, plaintiff was then required to confront and adjust to his physical limitations.  Further, the Court noted that plaintiff’s inherent difficulties associated with shifting from a motorcyclist to a quadriplegic wheelchair user “cannot be viewed as a barrier to deny plaintiff access to our civil courts.”

Thus, the Appellate Division found that the facts were sufficient to constitute “extraordinary circumstances” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 which permits the filing of a late notice of tort claim.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s request to file a late notice of tort claims against the public entities that the plaintiff believed may have exacerbated his injuries.

 


Betsy G. Ramos, Esq. is a member of the firm’s Executive Committee and Co-Chair of the Litigation Group. She is an experienced litigator with over 30 years’ experience handling diverse matters. Her practice areas include tort defense, insurance coverage, Tort Claims Act and civil rights defense, business litigation, employment litigation, construction litigation, estate litigation and general litigation.

Plaintiff Rose Bengel was allegedly injured as a result of medical assistance provided by defendant Holiday City at Berkeley First Aid Squad, Inc. (“the Squad”). The Squad had responded to a 9-1-1 call for medical assistance and transported her to the hospital. The issue in Bengel v. Holiday City at Berkeley First Aid Squad Inc., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2374 (App. Div. Dec. 11, 2020) was whether the defendant Squad and its first responder members were immune from liability pursuant to statute.

In response to a 9-1-1 call, the Squad arrived at the Bengels’ home to assist Rose Bengel (“Rose”), then 86 years old. The Squad members were advised by her home health aide that she had been wheezing and had pink eye since recently arriving home from a nursing home. Rose was non-ambulatory, being confined to a wheelchair from muscular dystrophy for decades. They had to lift her from her wheelchair to a stretcher to transport her to the hospital.

The plaintiff alleges that the Squad members negligently injured Rose in the process of lifting her, causing her to suffer a rotator cuff tear in her left shoulder. Due to her age, surgery was not recommended and it was contended that Rose’s use of her left hand and arm became more limited after this incident.

The Squad disputed that they caused any injury to Rose in the process of transferring her to the stretcher. They claim that they gently lifted her from her wheelchair, wrapping their arms around her abdomen and feet and sat her on the stretcher.

The Squad moved for summary judgment, arguing that they had statutory immunity against claims of negligence. The Plaintiff argued that the statutory immunity did not apply because it was not an emergent situation and the Squad failed to demonstrate their actions were in good faith.

The trial court judge granted the Squad and its member responders a summary judgment dismissal. He noted that the Squad was one of the 4 volunteer first aid squads in Berkeley Township and its members were first responders certified to provide Basic Lift Support Services. The judge applied the statutes, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-13, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-13.1, and N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29, which “immunized volunteer rescue squads and members from civil liability when providing emergency public first aid or intermediate life support services in good faith.”

The judge found that the Squad members were engaged in public first aid rescue services as they were responding to a 9-1-1 medical emergency call. Although Rose’s condition may not have been life threatening, that did not make the call “non-emergent.” Further, the judge held that there was no evidence that any such injury suffered by Rose was with intent or bad faith of the Squad members.

The plaintiff appealed this summary judgment dismissal to the Appellate Division. The appeals court agreed with the trial judge that the Squad and its members who transported plaintiff qualified for statutory immunity from civil liability. More than negligent conduct would need to be proven to find that the Squad members failed to act in “good faith” or acted in a “willful or wanton” manner.

Thus, even if the Squad members were negligent in lifting Rose and caused her shoulder injury, the Appellate Division found that such actions did not strip the Squad and its members from their statutory immunity. Finding that, at worst, the Squad members were negligent, the Court upheld the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the Squad and its members.

 


Betsy G. Ramos, Esq. is a member of the firm’s Executive Committee and Co-Chair of the Litigation Group. She is an experienced litigator with over 25 years’ experience handling diverse matters. Her practice areas include tort defense, insurance coverage, Tort Claims Act and civil rights defense, business litigation, employment litigation, construction litigation, estate litigation and general litigation.

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