notice

Plaintiff Gabriela Mirtha Tiscornia Sosa was injured when she slipped and fell on a wet floor at a concert at the Prudential Center.  This venue was owned by defendant DAE, which contracted with defendant ABM to provide janitorial services.  The issue in Sosa v. Devils Arena Entertainment, LLC, 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 787 (App. Div. May 15, 2025) was whether the defendants could be liable for the injuries plaintiff suffered from her fall in the translucent puddle on the upper concourse.

Plaintiff and her daughter had upper-level seats but about 10 minutes into the show, a Prudential Center employee offered to move them to seats closer to the stage.  They agreed and went down the steps to the concourse level and entered the concourse.  Plaintiff slipped and fell as she looked for an elevator to take down from the upper level.  She claims she saw a translucent puddle while she was lying on the ground.  Plaintiff claimed that both DAE and ABM were negligent because they allowed a “dangerous condition” to exist, which caused her injury.

At the trial court level, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the case.  This appeal ensued. 

The claim against DAE was that it caused the injury by moving her seat and permitting the service of drinks and open containers.  Plaintiff argued that it was foreseeable that beverages would spill onto the floor and plaintiff did not have to show that DAE had notice.  Plaintiff claimed that the mode-of-operation doctrine applied because of the manner of the beverage service and an inference could be drawn that a drink caused the spill leading to her fall.  Plaintiff also claimed that ABM had constructive notice and was, therefore, liable because it was aware of DAE’s practice of allowing open drink containers.

The trial court judge found that the mode-of-operation doctrine did not apply because there was no information in the record establishing what the liquid that plaintiff fell on was, where the liquid came from, where it was created, or how long the liquid was present on the floor.  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s decision that the mode-of-operation rule would not apply under these circumstances.

Further, the unrebutted evidence showed that DAE had contracted to keep the arena clean and that the ABM representatives’ testimony explained how ABM went about doing so.  Plaintiff failed to establish a nexus between DAE’s mode-of-operation, “mainly, serving drinks in open containers, having a janitorial services company patrol and monitor the area of floors,” and the liquid on the floor.

The Appellate Division further commented that there was no evidence to support the necessary elements of actual or constructive notice to hold either DAE or ABM liable.  Plaintiff did not know what she slipped on or what the liquid was on the floor.  There had been no reports of spills or debris.  Even if there was liquid on the floor, there was no evidence showing how long it was present or that it was caused by an open container beverage.  Hence, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.

On August 16, 2022, plaintiff Kathryn Hutchins claims to have suffered an injury while a passenger on a NJ Transit bus when it collided with a moped.  The Jersey City Police Department investigated the accident and prepared a report containing information regarding the accident and plaintiff’s injuries.  However, plaintiff failed to file with NJ Transit a notice of tort claim, showing her intent to pursue her claim, within the ninety- day time period, as required by the Tort Claims Act.  The issue in Hutchins v. NJ Transit Corp., 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 7 (App. Div. Jan. 2, 2025) was whether the trial court should have granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim, when notice was filed just one day late.

This accident occurred when the bus made a sudden stop, which plaintiff claims caused her to strike the seat in front of her.  She alleges that she suffered injuries to her neck, lower back, right knee, and a small laceration on her lip.

Shortly after the accident, plaintiff did consult with an attorney, who declined to take her case.  However, this attorney did warn her of the strict ninety-day time limit to file her notice of tort claim.  Thereafter, in mid-September, plaintiff consulted with a second attorney.  Because of scheduling conflicts, the plaintiff did not meet with this new attorney until November 3, 2022, when she completed the notice of tort claim.  However, she did not sign the notice of tort claim until a second meeting on November 7, 2022, when she provided her hospital bills to her counsel.  But, her attorney miscalculated the expiration date of the ninety-day time period and did not file the notice of claim until November 15, 2022, which was ninety-one days after her accident.  Thus, the notice of tort claim was filed one day late. 

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit on May 11, 2023, and, on August 9, 2023, she filed a motion with the trial court, seeking leave to file a late notice of tort claim.  The trial court found that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of “extraordinary circumstances” to justify a delay of filing the notice of tort claim and denied her motion, resulting in the dismissal of her lawsuit. 

This order was appealed to the Appellate Division.  Plaintiff argued that the trial court’s decision should be reversed because she was diligent in pursuing her claim and NJ Transit was aware of material information about the accident based upon the police report.  She further argued that the trial court made a mistake in denying her motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim because “the interest of justice” required that a one-day delay be considered a sufficient reason constituting an extraordinary circumstance.

The threshold requirement to be able to sue a public entity for a personal injury in New Jersey is to satisfy the notice requirement, as set forth in the Tort Claims Act. This notice requirement is strictly enforced by the courts. Based upon N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, a claimant who intends to pursue a claim for a personal injury must file a notice of tort claim with the pertinent public entity within ninety days after accrual of the cause of action, i.e., the date of the accident. 

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9, if the claimant fails to file the claim with the public entity within the ninety-day time period, the claim is forever barred.  However, N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 does provide an exception for a claimant who fails to file a notice of tort claim within ninety days, permitting the claimant to seek leave from a judge of the Superior Court within one year after the accrual of the claim, provided that the public entity has not been substantially prejudiced thereby.  The application for permission to file a notice of tort claim must be supported by an affidavit in which the individual must show “sufficient reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances for his failure to file notice of claim within the period of time prescribed by Section 59:8-8.”

Here, plaintiff argued that she did diligently pursue her claim and that the details of the accident were set forth in the Jersey City Police Report and that NJ Transit was aware of the information contained in the police report.  She also noted that her ability was limited after the accident, and she had to use crutches.  Further, plaintiff’s counsel claims that his personal obligations caused a delay in meeting with the plaintiff which, in turn, contributed to the delay in filing the notice of tort claim.  Plaintiff argued that based upon the totality of the unique facts and circumstances presented, and the interests of justice, the trial court decision barring plaintiff’s claim should have been reversed.

However, the Appellate Division pointed out that an attorney’s inattention, or even an attorney’s malpractice, does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance to justify the late filing of a notice of tort claim.  The Court pointed out that plaintiff was able to consult with two attorneys prior to the ninety-day deadline and even executed a notice of tort claim within the ninety-day time period.

Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that he had a signed notice of tort claim by November 7, 2022, well in advance of the November 14, 2022, filing date.  It was the plaintiff’s counsel’s miscalculation of the deadline that led to the late filing.  The Appellate Division noted that neither an attorney’s inattention to a client’s file or even ignorance of the law constituted extraordinary circumstances to justify a late filing of tort claim. 

The Appellate Division further rejected plaintiff’s argument that the defendant was aware of material information related to the accident which put them on notice of claims from injured passengers, including plaintiff.  However, the Appellate Division found that NJ Transit may have received notice of this police report but that did not put it on notice that a particular plaintiff would be contemplating filing a claim against them.  Hence, receipt of a police report would not constitute a timely notice that a tort claim would be filed against the public entity.  As far as the potential prejudice to a public entity, that factor would only be relevant after a court determined that a plaintiff had demonstrated extraordinary circumstances.

Further, the plaintiff argued that a one-day delay in filing a tort claim notice was a “rare, unique circumstance that is a sufficient reason constituting extraordinary circumstances.”  The Appellate Division rejected that argument, finding that the tort claim notice was not mailed within the ninety-day time period but only served after the deadline had passed.  The Court pointed out that a notice of claim which is mailed certified mail within the time specified would satisfy the notice of claim requirement. But the statute did not create a general exception where a defendant could effectuate service beyond the timeframe set forth in this statute.  Because the tort claim notice was not mailed within the ninety-day time period, the Appellate Division found that it was not timely filed.

Hence, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court decision, denying the plaintiff’s application for leave to file a notice of tort claim, resulting in the dismissal of her lawsuit.

By: Uyen Nguyen, Law Clerk
Edited By: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Plaintiff Josef and Stefani Langel filed a complaint against Defendants New Jersey Department of Transportation (DOT), State of New Jersey, county, municipal, and private entities, alleging that Defendants’ failure to provide proper warning and repair a pothole in the roadway caused his injuries when he was thrown off his bike. The issue in Langel v. State DOT, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1490 (App. Div. July 10, 2024) was whether Defendants DOT and the State of New Jersey were liable for the injuries Plaintiff Josef Langel sustained from the pothole.

On March 16, 2019, Josef Langel rode a bicycle on Sylvan Avenue, a section of Route 9 West, in Englewood Cliffs, NJ. He hit a pothole in the roadway, causing him to be thrown off his bike and sustain injuries. Plaintiff and his friends were on a bike trip from New York City to Piermont, NY. Plaintiff claimed that he rode the same route six months before the accident. However, Plaintiff never noticed the pothole before the accident, nor made any complaint about the road conditions to any state entities.

Ronald Gallucci, a DOT crew supervisor who oversaw the maintenance of Route 9 West, testified that he had neither received any complaints, nor seen the pothole that injured the Plaintiff. He stated that his maintenance crew inspected the roadway every other day for potholes. According to Gallucci, if the DOT had received a complaint about the potholes, he or his crew would have inspected the area.

William Falato, a DOT equipment operator, also testified that he was familiar with the area where the accident occurred and had never seen the pothole before. According to this witness, if the pothole had been there for a substantial period, he or his crew would have noticed it due to its large size. He also recounted instances where his crews inspected an area and saw no potholes, but within days later, DOT received a complaint that a pothole had formed.

Englewood Cliffs Patrol Officer Marc Krapels, who responded to Plaintiff’s accident, also testified that he had not seen the pothole before. Krapels stated that from his experience patrolling the area, a pothole could form at any time, since the town is located on a cliff. DOT also provided complaints it received on February 27, 2019 regarding potholes in areas surrounding where Plaintiff hit the pothole. However, the records indicated DOT did not receive any complaint about the pothole that Plaintiff hit.

Meanwhile, Plaintiff obtained a report from expert engineer Richard Balgowan, who indicated that the pothole had been present for at least a year before Plaintiff’s accident. However, Balgowan admitted that he did not inspect the location until April 23, 2021, which was more than two years since Plaintiff’s accident, and the pothole had been repaired by then.

On August 1, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment claiming they were entitled to discretionary immunity under the NJ Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:2-3. Defendants maintained that their conduct in maintaining the roadway was not palpably unreasonable, and Plaintiff’s expert report was a net opinion. On the other hand, Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that defendants were not entitled to discretionary immunity. Plaintiffs claimed Defendants had actual and constructive knowledge of the dangerous conditions, and their actions or omissions were palpably unreasonable. Plaintiff also argued that their expert report was not a net opinion.

The Law Division granted the summary judgment in favor of Defendants DOT and the State of New Jersey, denied Plaintiff’s summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Ultimately, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and reconsideration was denied because they had failed to establish that Defendants had actual or constructive notice of the pothole. On appeal, the Appellate Division reviewed whether the trial judge had abused his discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration.

Under the TCA, a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition if it has actual or constructive notice of its existence. To establish actual notice, Plaintiff must show that the public entity has actual knowledge of the existence of a condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character. Defendants can still be liable, even though they didn’t have actual notice if Plaintiff can establish that they have constructive notice of the dangerous condition. To establish constructive notice, Plaintiffs must show that the dangerous condition had existed for a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that Defendants should have discovered it if they exercised due care.

To show actual knowledge, Plaintiff offered a photograph of the pothole that had been paved over at some point. However, Plaintiff failed to prove that the repair was performed before the accident. Thus, Plaintiff could not prove that Defendants had actual notice or knew about the pothole before his accident. Regarding constructive notice, Defendants’ witnesses all testified that a pothole could have formed within a few days or even overnight. Plaintiff could not show that the pothole had existed for a period of time despite its obvious nature, and DOT failed to exercise due care to discover it. Thus, Plaintiff was also unable to establish Defendants had constructive notice of the pothole.

Furthermore, the Appellate Division held that the expert’s opinion Plaintiff provided was a mere conclusion. Applying the standard established by the NJ Supreme Court in Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp. regarding the admissibility of expert opinions, the Court concluded that the expert’s opinions in this case were a mere conclusion because Plaintiffs’ expert witness could not “give the why and wherefore” to support his opinion. Furthermore, the fact this expert did not inspect the pothole in person two years after the accident did not weigh in favor of Plaintiffs.

Under discretionary immunity, a public entity is not liable for the exercise of discretion unless a court concludes that its procedures or policies are palpably unreasonable. Although the Law Division did not rely on this doctrine as a basis to grant Defendant’s motion, the Appellate Division applied the doctrine in this case and held that the DOT Assistant Commissioner’s decisions in inspecting roadway and repairing potholes were entitled to discretionary immunity. Thus, Defendants are not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries because their conduct in maintaining the roadway and making repairs was not palpably unreasonable.

Hence, the Appellate Division affirmed the summary judgment granted to the Defendants, dismissing the Complaint.

This case involved a tragic accident in which four members of a family were involved in a one-vehicle accident at a toll plaza on the Atlantic City Expressway.  Due to this accident, three of the family members were killed and the fourth member, a 12 year old girl, was severely injured.  To be able to sue the South Jersey Transportation Authority for this accident, the plaintiffs in this case, the Estates of the decedents and guardian of the survivor, sought leave from the court to file a late tort claims notice against the Authority (“SJTA”).  The issue in Estate of Khiev v. South Jersey Transportation Authority, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 226 (App. Div. Feb. 14, 2024) was whether the trial court correctly ruled that a late tort claim notice could be served. 

This accident happened on December 26, 2021 when the decedents’ vehicle crashed at the Egg Harbor Toll Plaza on the Atlantic City Expressway.  The South Jersey Transportation Authority owns and operates the Expressway.  On January 4, 2022, plaintiffs contacted and retained counsel to investigate the crash and also requested the police report and a video of the crash.  A preliminary police report was received on January 19, 2022 but it did not contain a full investigation or video of the accident.  In February 2022, plaintiffs retained two experts to investigate the crash.  Their preliminary investigations did not reveal any obvious roadway defects.

On March 17, 2022, the State Trooper with whom plaintiffs’ counsel had been in contact, advised plaintiffs that he had prepared a supplemental report and, further, plaintiffs could now request the complete report, as well as the video of the crash.  Their request was made that same day.  The final report, however, was not delivered to plaintiffs’ counsel until May 5, 2022 and the video of the accident was not delivered until May 11, 2022.  After plaintiffs’ experts reviewed and discussed the video, they formed the opinion that there was a design defect in the toll plaza that had substantially contributed to plaintiffs’ deaths and injury.  In their opinion, there was a sloped concrete barrier of the toll plaza, and that when plaintiffs’ vehicle travelled up the slope of the barrier, it caused the vehicle to combust and sustain catastrophic damage, which led to the deaths and injury of plaintiffs.

On May 31, 2022, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking leave to file a late notice of tort claim as to the SJTA.  The motion was unopposed and the court granted an order on June 24, 2022, permitting the late notice to be filed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs did file their tort claims notice on June 30, 2022.

However, it was ascertained that defendant Authority had not been properly served with the notice of motion.  Thus, defendant filed a motion to vacate the June 24, 2022 order and now filed opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a late tort claims notice.

Although the trial court did vacate the June 24, 2022 order, it granted plaintiffs’ leave to file a late tort claims notice.  The court granted the application on two bases.  First, the trial court found that the date of accrual of plaintiffs’ claims was not until May 11, 2022 when plaintiffs had sufficient information that a public entity could be responsible for the crash, rather than December 26, 2021, the date of the crash.  Accordingly, the filing of the tort claims notice on June 30, 2022 was considered timely to meet the ninety (90) day notice requirement under the Tort Claims Act.

Second, the trial court found, in the alternative, that there were extraordinary circumstances justifying late notice.  The judge found that plaintiffs had exercised due diligence in investigating the accident but determined that defendant was potentially liable only when they received a video.  Also, the trial court found that the defendant SJTA would not suffer any substantial prejudice if the late claim was permitted.  It had been aware of the accident and witnesses related to the accident were still available.  The toll plaza worker who had been injured in the accident was still available as a witness and the damaged vehicle had been preserved and defendant had access to the video of the accident.

This decision was appealed to the Appellate Division.

Upon appeal, the SJTA made three arguments:  First, it contended that the trial court misapplied the law in finding that the accrual date was the date plaintiffs received the video, rather than the date of the accident. Second, it argued that the trial court abused its discretion “in finding that, even if the claim accrued on the date of the crash, extraordinary circumstances justified allowing plaintiffs to file a late notice.”  Last, defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there would be no substantial prejudice in in permitting plaintiffs the right to file a late notice.  The Appellate Division reviewed these arguments and rejected all of them.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, the failure to serve a notice of claim upon a public entity within the ninety (90) day period following accrual of the claim results in a bar against the claim.  However, the Tort Claims Act permits a claimant to move for leave to file a late notice of tort claim within one year after the claim accrues.  Under N.J.S.A. 59:8-9, a trial court may grant the motion “if there are sufficient reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances for the claimant’s failure to timely file” a notice within that ninety day period and, further, if the public entity is not substantially prejudiced thereby.

The “accrual” of a claim has been determined to be the date on which the underlying tortious act occurred.  However, under the “discovery rule,” the law also allows for a delay of the date of accrual when the victim is unaware of an injury or does not know that a third-party is liable for the injury.  Based upon the “discovery rule,” the accrual date is tolled from the date of the tortious act or injury when the injured party either does not know the injury or does not know that a third-party is responsible for the injury.  Under this rule, the claim will accrue when the claimant knows there has been an injury and there are facts suggesting that a third-party may be responsible. 

Here, the Appellate Division found that the claim did not accrue until May 11, 2022 when their counsel received video footage of the crash.  Until that date, there were no facts suggesting that the South Jersey Transportation Authority may have been responsible for the plaintiffs’ deaths and injuries.  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that just knowing that the defendant owned the roadway and toll plaza was not sufficient for the claim to accrue.  Rather, the claim accrued when plaintiffs’ experts reviewed and analyzed the video and learned that defendant might be responsible for the plaintiffs’ deaths and injuries. 

The Appellate Division also considered the alternative argument that the plaintiffs’ late notice of claim was justified by extraordinary circumstances.  In determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist, the inquiry focuses on whether there has been reasonable diligence of the plaintiff in investigating the claim and determining the identity of the tortfeasor. 

Here, again, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs had shown extraordinary circumstances to justify a late notice of tort claim.  The Court found that the plaintiffs acted with due diligence to retain experts and to obtain the accident report and the video.  However, it was the state police who took some time to approve the final accident report and released the video.  Therefore, the accident report was not received until May 5, 2022 and the video on May 11, 2022.  It was not until the video was reviewed and analyzed by the plaintiffs’ experts, who, for the first time, had a basis to opine that the Authority could be responsible for this accident.  Thus, the Appellate Division agreed that the plaintiffs acted with due diligence and were prevented from serving a timely tort claims notice by extraordinary circumstances.

Finally, the Court considered whether there was substantial prejudice to the Authority by the filing of the late notice of tort claim.  The Appellate Division found that the Authority had not demonstrated any prejudice, much less substantial prejudice. It was well aware of the accident, the car had been preserved, and the witnesses to the accident were still available.  Hence, the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that there was no substantial prejudice to defendant.  Accordingly, the trial court decision to permit the filing of a late notice of claim was affirmed and plaintiffs were allowed to go forward with their lawsuit. 

Plaintiff Linda Emmanoulidis was walking her dog in Enos Park in Jersey City when she tripped and fell on an uneven pavement and sustained injuries. The issue in Emmanoulidis v. City of Jersey City, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 477 (App. Div. Mar. 30, 2023) was whether the City could be liable for a pedestrian accident caused by a trip and fall on an uneven pavement under the Tort Claims Act.

Prior to her fall, Plaintiff had never walked in the area before and did not know how long the condition existed. After her fall, Plaintiff retained an engineering expert who opined that the elevation of the crack where Plaintiff stated she fell was 1/2 – 3/4 inches. In his report, the expert noted that some of the concrete sidewalk slabs showed signs of repairs but not in the specific area where plaintiff fell. The report did not indicate when the repairs were done and who performed the work.

Plaintiff sued the City of Jersey City claiming that the uneven pavement was a dangerous condition which caused her accident. The City moved for summary judgment dismissal, contending that the plaintiff had not established the existence of a dangerous condition of which the City had actual or constructive notice. In addition, the City contended plaintiff did not demonstrate that the City’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  In response to the motion, plaintiff presented a certification from her brother-in-law, a retired Jersey City police officer. He certified that, in course of his job, he had searched evidence in the area where plaintiff fell and the condition of the pavement was exactly as it was on the day she fell for at least four years.

The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated the uneven sidewalk was a dangerous condition and that the City had actual or constructive notice of the “declivity in the walkway.” The Court reviewed the photographs on record and concluded that the condition was not so open and obvious to provide the City of constructive notice of a dangerous condition. 

Upon appeal, plaintiff argued that the court erred in finding: 1) the uneven pavement was not a dangerous condition; 2) the City was aware of the dangerous condition; and 3) the City’s failure to fix the dangerous condition was palpably unreasonable. The Appellate Division noted that under the Tort Claims Act, a dangerous condition exists when there is a defect in the physical condition of the property itself. The Court held that whether the defect in the pavement was a dangerous condition could be left to the jury for determination.

To determine the issue of notice, the Court considered that the plaintiff could not establish: 1) the duration for which the crack was present; 2) there was no evidence to show that the City had actual knowledge of the crack; 3) the City had no record of any complaints regarding the crack; and 4) the certification offered by plaintiff’s brother-in-law did not satisfy the notice to public entity standard. In addition, plaintiff could not show the crack was open and obvious. Thus, the Appellate Division held that plaintiff did not demonstrate that the City had actual or constructive notice of the defect. Therefore, the Court ruled that the plaintiff did not establish that the City was liable under the Tort Claims Act and affirmed the summary judgment dismissal.

Plaintiff Cheryl King was a guest at the defendant Harrah’s Atlantic City Hotel.  While walking through her hotel room, she hit her leg on the corner of the bed frame which caused her to trip and hit her head on the wall.  The issue in King v. Harrah’s Atlantic City Operating Co., LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70806 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2023) was whether the defendant hotel breached any duty owed to plaintiff that caused her injury.

Plaintiff claimed that the bed frame was improperly exposed and, thus, created a dangerous tripping hazard.  However, she had slept in the room at least once and had not reported any issues with the bed or the bed frame until after she fell.  She claimed that the defendant hotel was liable for her injuries and negligence because it knew of the alleged defect in the bed frame prior to her stay but had never sought to correct it.

It was not disputed that the defendant hotel owed plaintiff a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Rather, the issue was whether plaintiff could adequately demonstrate that defendant breached its duty.

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal.  It claimed that it was not liable for her alleged trip and fall incident.

To establish a breach of duty care, plaintiff must prove “that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the accident.”  The dangerous condition of the property must involve an unreasonable risk of harm.  The District Court noted that not every property condition on which persons can hurt themselves is unreasonably dangerous or hazardous.

Based upon the facts of this case, the plaintiff did not claim that the bed frame was broken or damaged, that it blocked her path as she walked around her hotel room, or that the bed frame ever moved from the original position it had presumably always occupied prior to her fall.  Her claim was that it was “defective” because one particular corner extended out beyond the mattress.

The District Court noted the following: “while it is clear that plaintiff tripped over a bed frame, the Court fails to comprehend based on the record before it how the bed frame was defective or otherwise posed an reasonable risk of harm.”  The Court found that the plaintiff had not submitted any evidence suggesting that the danger of this particular bed frame differed from the ordinary risks inherent in any other bed frame.  Further, she offered no expert testimony demonstrating that the bed frame created a dangerous condition or that it was contrary to industry standards.  The Court found that “plaintiff has failed to fully articulate any real defect at all, much less prove the existence of a dangerous one.”

Further, the Court noted that any danger that the bed frame could have posed was “undoubtedly neutralized by its clear and obvious visibility in the room.”    The simple fact that plaintiff tripped and fell does not make the bed frame unreasonably dangerous or hazardous as a matter of law.  Further, the Court found that it did not diminish the bed frame’s plain visibility, the appropriateness of its placement, or lessen the expectation that plaintiff should have taken reasonable care as she walked to avoid this particular injury. 

Based upon the facts, the District Court found that no reasonable jury could find that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the bed frame as a dangerous condition.  Any reasonable prudent person would have observed, in light of the dimensions of the bed, its presence in his or her lane of travel.  Because plaintiff could not prove that defendant breached its duty of care, the District Court found that her negligence claim must fail as a matter of law.  Hence, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted.

Defendant Rock Pile Properties, LLC (“Rock Pile”) owned a building in Garwood, which it leased to Defendant Statewide Fence Contractors, LLC (“Statewide”), a residential, commercial, and industrial fence company.  According to the lease, Statewide was required to make all repairs and maintain the property, including the roof.  Plaintiff John Gudoski (“John”), had prior experience working for his father’s company, Statewide Restoration, Inc., restoring and repairing building cracks. He suffered an injury in the course of inspecting a masonry crack from the defendant’s roof.  The issue in Gudoski v. Rock Pile Properties, LLC., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2031 (App. Div. Nov. 3, 2022) was whether defendant Rock Pile could be liable for the injuries suffered by plaintiff when he fell off the roof to inspect a crack.

The facts are somewhat in dispute as to whether John was present on the property as an independent contractor of the tenant Statewide or a friend doing a favor for another friend.  According to Statewide’s owner, John came to the property to look at the building and offer a friend some advice about a crack in the building.  When he arrived, there was an ongoing Labor Day picnic on the premises.  John observed the building perimeter, and he noticed some large cracks in the masonry in what appeared to be a corner separating from the sidewalk. He told Statewide’s owner that he needed to go on the roof to fully examine the crack.  According to several witnesses, Statewide’s owner told John not to go onto the roof.  However, John went up on the roof and, while inspecting it, stepped onto a skylight and fell through it onto the concrete ground.  As a result, he suffered several injuries, including to his shoulder, hand, and mouth.

Plaintiff sued the property owner Rock Pile, as well as Statewide for negligence damages.  Both defendants filed for summary judgment prior to trial.  The motion judge found that while there was a genuine issue of material facts as to the nature of the relationship between John and Statewide, he did grant the summary judgment motion as to Rock Pile.  He found that the owner did not owe a duty of care to John merely because it owned the building.  This order was appealed to the Appellate Division.

Upon appeal, the Court noted that whether a defendant owes a legal duty to another, and the scope of that duty, are generally questions of law for the court to decide.  To determine the scope of the duty, a court would make an inquiry involving “identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors – the relationship with the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.”

In applying this standard to determine if a duty existed between Rock Pile and plaintiff, the Appellate Division found that none of these factors were met.

The Court found that there was no evidence that John and the defendant owner had a relationship of any type.  The Appellate Division found it was not foreseeable that John would be on the roof and fall through a skylight.  There was no notice, actual, or otherwise to the defendant owner and this defendant neither maintained a presence on the site, nor was it responsible for repairs to the building.  Thus, under these facts, there was no reasonable opportunity for the defendant owner to exercise care.  Finally, the Appellate Division found that they were “unconvinced public policy supports the imposition of liability on defendant, given it was Statewide who brought John onto the property it controlled pursuant to the lease.” 

Thus, based upon the Appellate Division’s review of the facts and the law, it affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as to the defendant owner Rock Pile Properties, LLC.

By: Gabi Aste-Molina, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On October 6, 2023, the Appellate Division of New Jersey affirmed the revocation of the teacher’s certificates in In re Certificates of Rita O’Malley by the State Board of Examiners for repeatedly failing to test and evaluate her students with learning disabilities.

Woodbridge Township School District (“District”) employed the teacher in 2000 as a special education teacher and Learning Disabilities Teacher Consultant. She was responsible for testing and diagnosing learning disabilities, developing individualized education programs, and meeting with parents and teachers to discuss the special education needs of her students. In 2015, the parents of one of her students contacted the District to report that their child had not been tested and evaluated by their teacher. The District decided to conduct a random review of the tests the teacher had given, and this review revealed missing test scores and testing deficiencies. Due to this review, the District certified tenure charges against the teacher, citing her neglectful conduct, amongst other causes. The teacher resigned from her tenured position without contesting the charges.

The teacher appealed the revocation of her teaching certificates several times. First, the State Board of Examiners (“Board”), the educator licensing agency in New Jersey, filed an order to show cause regarding the teaching certificates. She answered the order and requested to transfer the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ recommended that the Board suspend the teacher’s certificates for three years. The matter returned to the Board, which decided to revoke the teacher’s certificates, citing that her repeated failure to test and evaluate her students merited revoking her certificates. The teacher appealed the Board’s decision to the Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”). In a final agency decision, the Commissioner agreed with the Board and held that the record supported its decision to revoke her teaching certificates. The teacher appealed again, this time to the Appellate Division.

The teacher argued that the Board’s revocation was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, citing a lack of credible evidence in the record. The Appellate Division disagreed and held that the record did support the decisions of the Board and Commissioner to revoke her teaching certificates because there was unconverted evidence that she failed to test her students and correctly record the results of the tests she did administer. By failing to perform these obligations, she did not provide adequate educational services to her students with learning disabilities, and these failures made her unfit for her position. Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that the Board had cause to revoke her teaching certificates under N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.4 and that the Commissioner’s decision to uphold the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

By: Ruhani K. Aulakh, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On October 5, 2023, the New Jersey Appellate Division in A.B. v. Board of Education of the City of Hackensack affirmed that the Hackensack School Board (“Board”) was required to disclose information of a former employee’s sexual misconduct to the employee’s future employer under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-76. 

In 2013, while employed by the Board, a teacher used social media to post inappropriate and sexually suggestive content.  The Board began an investigation into the teacher’s misconduct.  Before the conclusion of the Board’s investigation, the teacher and the Board finalized a settlement agreement in which the teacher agreed to submit an irrevocable letter of resignation. 

Six years after her resignation, the teacher was offered a position with the Clifton Board of Education (“Clifton”).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-76, commonly known as the “Pass the Trash” statute, Clifton was required to contact the applicant’s prior employers to obtain information relating to child abuse and sexual misconduct.  Clifton sent the Board a questionnaire in which the Board stated that the teacher was subject of a sexual misconduct investigation by the employer and that the teacher resigned from employment while allegations of sexual misconduct were under investigation.  As a result, Clifton rescinded the teacher’s offer of employment.

In August 2019, the teacher filed a complaint in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, seeking to enforce the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement between her and the Board, compel the Board to rescind and correct its response to the questionnaire, and enjoin the Board from reporting the investigation to any other prospective employer.  The Chancery court dismissed the teacher’s complaint and transferred the matter to the New Jersey Commissioner of Education who then transferred it to the Office of Administrative Law.

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) directed the parties to file simultaneous cross-motions for summary decision.  The ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision and denied the teacher’s motion, ultimately dismissing the petition in its entirety.  In response, the teacher filed exceptions upon which the Commissioner issued a final agency decision that adopted the ALJ’s decision.  The teacher then appealed to the Appellate Division.

In her appeal, the teacher set forth several arguments.  First, the teacher argued that the Commissioner improperly granted summary decision because the record indicated disputed issues of material fact.  The teacher then argued that her due process rights were violated when the Commissioner denied the petitioner’s right to a hearing.  Next, she argued that the Commissioner distorted the Legislature’s plain meaning of “sexual misconduct” as defined in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.6 and that the Commissioner wrongfully concluded an investigation was pending for sexual misconduct at the time of her resignation.  The teacher also contended that the Commissioner erred by finding the settlement agreement was subject to the requirements of the statute because it was executed before the effective date of the statute.  Finally, the teacher argued that the Commissioner wrongfully determined she consented to the disclosure of information by signing the mandatory authorization form provided by Clifton.

In reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, the Appellate Division imposes a presumption of reasonableness upon the agency, only upsetting the agency’s determination if it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Here, the Appellate Division looked to each of the teacher’s arguments individually to determine whether the agency met this standard.

The Court first analyzed the teacher’s assertion that there were facts in dispute.  The teacher specifically argued that certifications from the Board’s former attorney and her former attorney dispute the principal’s certification that the Board launched an investigation into the teacher’s potential sexual misconduct.  The Court held that these certifications did not indicate that there was not an investigation; rather, these certifications simply pointed to the attorneys’ personal knowledge about the investigations.

The Court then turned to the teacher’s contention that she was never given notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding the Board’s decision.  The Court reasoned that not only is there no notice requirement in the Pass the Trash statute, but also that the Board made no factual findings, thus a hearing was not required.

Moving to the teacher’s arguments that there was no allegation of sexual misconduct nor was there a pending investigation, the Court utilized the principal’s certification.  The certification clearly noted an allegation that prompted the Board to begin an investigation.  The Court held that although the Prosecutor’s office did not press criminal charges, that did not indicate that the Board did not investigate.

Finally, the Court addressed the argument that the Legislature intended to preserve employment settlement agreements entered prior to the enactment of the statute.  To determine whether applying a statute retroactively is appropriate, the Court must look to the legislature’s intent, whether it is explicit or implicit.  Here, the statutory language required that all applicants provide all former employers within the last twenty years that were schools.  The Court held that the language clearly indicates a retroactive application of the statute.  Further, the Court reasoned that even if the language was not clear, the goal of the statute was to ensure the safety of the children and as such, the Legislature would not exempt certain teachers due to a confidentiality clause.

Upon reviewing each of the teacher’s arguments, the Court held that the administrative agency’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Thus, the Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

The New Jersey Tort Claims Act provides that “a public entity is not liable for an injury” caused by an act or omission “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this act.” Under the Act, immunity is the rule and liability is the exception. Posey ex rel. v. Bordentown Sewerage Auth., 171 N.J. 172 (2002). One exception to this immunity under the Tort Claims Act is the provision in N.J.S.A. 59:4-4, which places a duty on a public entity for damages proximately caused by its failure to provide warning of a dangerous condition which “endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.”

A public entity is responsible for warning the public of a dangerous condition on its property. However, the Appellate Division has held that a public entity cannot be held liable under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 for a condition of a property it does not own, control, or maintain absent actual notice of that specific condition. See DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co., 233 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1989) (emphasis added). The important question in DeBonis was whether a public entity could be held liable simply because an accident occurred within its boundaries. The Appellate Division ultimately upheld the trial court’s ruling that failure of a public entity to warn of a dangerous condition that merely lies within its boundaries is not sufficient to impose liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 absent actual notice.

In DeBonis, the plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident caused by the presence of many small stones in the roadway that allegedly came from the Orange Quarry Company. The plaintiff sued Orange Quarry Company and H.B. Mellot Estate, Inc. who were involved in crushing and transporting the stones. The plaintiff also sued Essex County as the owner of the roadway and West Orange Township, arguing the Township failed to warn of the stones in the roadway.

The trial court construed the Tort Claims Act to require proof the public entity had actual notice of the dangerous condition where the public entity was not the owner of the property to impose liability. Constructive notice was not sufficient. The Appellate Division affirmed the ruling, holding that West Orange Township did not have actual notice of the stones in the roadway and could not be held liable under the Act.

The Burlington County Superior Court recently granted a motion for summary judgment, submitted by Capehart & Scatchard on behalf of Evesham Township, in a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the estate of a woman who was tragically struck and killed by a vehicle while crossing Route 70 at its intersection with Troth Road in Evesham Township.

The accident occurred at night and Plaintiff (the estate) alleged that the overhead streetlights at the intersection were inoperable, making the intersection too dark for vehicular and pedestrian traffic and thereby creating a dangerous condition under the Act. Numerous entities were sued in addition to Evesham Township.

The State of New Jersey owned and maintained Route 70. The State also owned and maintained the overhead streetlights that were alleged to have been inoperable at the time of the accident. The accident occurred within the boundaries of Evesham Township, but Evesham Township did not own, control, or maintain either Route 70 or the overhead streetlights.

Plaintiff argued that Evesham Township police officers would travel through the intersection where the accident occurred numerous times a shift and would have had countless opportunities to see that the overhead lights were inoperable. However, the trial court held that there was no evidence of actual notice – only constructive notice. The record was devoid of any evidence that any officer, or anyone from Evesham Township, was aware that the overheard streetlights were inoperable before the accident. The only argument made was that the officers should have known the lights were out by the number of times they would have travelled through the intersection. The Court ruled that this “constructive notice” was insufficient. As such, Evesham Township could not be held liable for failing to warn of a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 and was dismissed from the lawsuit.

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