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Determining what constitutes a “hostile work environment” is rarely straightforward. If a coworker makes a single offensive comment based on an employee’s membership in a protected class, and the employee is deeply offended, does that rise to the level of a hostile work environment? What about two comments? Three? As attorneys often say, it depends.

Summary of the Case:

In the case Charles v. County of Lycoming, Pennsylvania et al., No. 4:21-CV-00883 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025), the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania addressed this question and concluded that a single offensive remark, standing alone, was not enough.

The plaintiff, Ruth Charles, is Asian and had been employed as a clerk in the Lycoming County District Attorney’s Office since 2013. On April 6, 2020, a coworker made a comment that included the racial slur “chinks.” The remark was loud enough for Charles and another employee to hear. Both employees reported the incident to a supervisor. Charles reported the incident by e-mail stating: “I am Asian and that word is one of the most racist/demeaning words you could use towards an Asian person. I understand it’s not about me, but it was very inappropriate to hear.”

The supervisor reported the incident to Human Resources and the District Attorney and met with both Charles and the coworker who made the comment. After that meeting, there were no further reports of racially offensive remarks in the workplace.

Later that month, on April 30, an assistant district attorney sent an email to the District Attorney identifying four instances in which Charles failed to perform tasks and acted inappropriately. On May 1, the assistant district attorney reported additional performance issues related to Charles. Also on May 1, Charles’ supervisor sent an email to the District Attorney describing Charles as extremely hostile during a meeting and noted her use of inappropriate language. A paralegal separately documented concerns about Charles’ work performance via email. Specifically, that Charles was sending her work to be completed elsewhere and was questioning her responsibilities. That same day, Charles was informed that her employment was terminated due to insubordination.

Charles subsequently filed suit, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). She claimed she was subjected to a race-based hostile work environment and that her termination was the result of discrimination and retaliation for complaining about the racial slur.

The Court dismissed Charles’ hostile work environment claim, finding that she failed to establish that she was subjected to harassment that was severe or pervasive, which is a required element of such claims. While the court acknowledged that a single incident can be sufficient to create a hostile work environment in rare cases, it emphasized that the incident must be “extreme enough to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” In this case, there was no evidence that the comment interfered with Charles’ work performance or injected ongoing hostility into the workplace. As the court summarized, this was “the unfortunate case of an isolated offensive comment over an employee’s seven years of employment that does not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment.”

Charles’ discrimination and retaliation claims also failed. The court found no evidence that her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination or that it was retaliatory in nature. The employer articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination, namely, repeated incidents of insubordination, and Charles failed to show those reasons were pretextual.

Key Takeaways for Employers:

While offensive language has no place in the workplace, it is a rare and extreme case in which a single incident, without more, will rise to the level of a hostile work environment under Title VII or similar state laws.

Thanks to the internet, employers have access to more and more information about their employees and prospective employees than ever before. And most employers love that so much information is now available to them to guide their hiring practices.

Recently, I have gotten multiple questions from clients asking whether it is a smart thing for them to incorporate social media searches into the scope of their usual background checks on employees and prospective employees. My repeated advice is that employers must proceed with caution in this area that, for a variety of reasons, is fraught with the potential for legal peril.

Initially, if planning to look at social media sites, employers must be aware that New Jersey has a law which prohibits employers from demanding from employees or prospective employees that they supply their passwords so that the employer/prospective employer can access password protected private social media areas. While such private social media areas are protected and off limits, publically accessible information on the internet is not, and the law says that employers/prospective employers can consider what is publically accessible in areas where password access is unnecessary. But, as discussed below, there are looming legal dangers lurking even in those publically accessible areas of the world wide-web.

Moreover, employers who do any sort of a background check on employees and /or prospective employees must also ensure that they comply with the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).  Under the FCRA, an employer seeking to do a background check on an employee/prospective employment candidate must meet certain consent and disclosure requirements if the employer will be using an outside consumer reporting agency to conduct the search. Thus, if the employer uses an outside company to conduct the social media search, then compliance with the written consent and disclosure obligations of the FCRA will need to be followed. The outside consumer reporting agency will typically supply those necessary forms for the employer’s use to give to an employee/prospective employee before the search occurs, but I would recommend that a quick legal review of the paperwork be done by counsel to make sure the supplied documents are compliant with the FCRA.

Alternatively, if an employer plans to do a search of social media sites itself, it need not meet the requirements of the FCRA.

Nevertheless, whether utilizing either of the above referenced methods, doing searches of an employee/candidate’s social media sites can place an employer in a precarious situation.  For one thing, there is a lot of maliciously planted information about persons on the internet so the searcher must be very careful in sifting through what is truthful (and what is not truthful) information about a candidate.  Moreover, sometimes, the employer will learn things about a candidate on the internet that it is legally prohibited from knowing during the interview process, and this could lead to unexpected trouble for the employer.

For example, under the law, you cannot ask prospective employment candidates whether they either have a disability, or to disclose their age. By searching social media sites, the prospective employer can, even if not explicitly seeking such information, unwittingly gain knowledge of such prohibited information that should legally have no bearing on the hiring decision. The danger in that scenario lies in the following: if the prospective employee is ultimately denied employment, and learns that the employer found out things about him/her by doing a social media search that reveals legally off limits information like the above, the prospective employee might conclude that consideration of the prohibited information led to the adverse employment decision, even when it did not, and now the employer is embroiled in an unwanted failure to hire lawsuit. No employer would want to find itself in that type of situation ever.

Similarly, here is another common example of an employer web search that could also cause unexpected legal problems. While legally it might be appropriate for the employer to search for current and past civil law cases involving the candidate in a public area of the internet, if the employer decides to not hire the candidate because of a previous lawsuit filed under, say the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), the employer now could be sued for retaliation for withholding a job offer because the prospective employee exercised a protected right to file suit under the NJLAD. Again, another unwanted (and unexpected) situation for an employer.

As these examples therefore show, any employer doing social media searches must do them carefully to avoid the possibility of this kind of unwanted legal peril. If an employer still wants to do social media searches despite knowledge of the above risks, here are some recommended guidelines.

First, access social media sites only after the candidate is interviewed and only if truly interested in that candidate.  Second, the employer must be consistent in conducting such searches-if you do it for one candidate, they have to be done for all candidates. Inconsistent and selective use of searches could otherwise give rise to discrimination claims.  Third, document what is considered (and by implication what was not considered.)  Fourth, the employer must verify the information obtained before using it, especially where the information comes from a third party site as opposed to the candidate’s own site. Finally, the search function itself should be centralized and performed as an integrated part of the overall background check.  In this regard, HR is the best positioned in the company to oversee such search activities. Furthermore, just as critically important, there should likewise be no searches conducted independently by hiring managers or anyone else so the employer has centralized control over the process.

Following the above guidelines should help in controlling the potential problems that could arise from the use of social media search efforts.  But, in the end, and as counterintuitive as it may seem, the most legally effective way of avoiding unwanted problems in this area may actually be fighting the employer’s pressing urge to want to  learn too much about a potential employee/prospective employee’s background.

 


Ralph R. Smith, 3rd is Co-Chair of the Employment and Labor Practice Group. He practices in employment litigation and preventative employment practices, including counseling employers on the creation of employment policies, non-compete and trade secret agreements, and training employers to avoid employment-related litigation. He represents both companies and individuals in related complex commercial litigation before federal states courts and administrative agencies in labor and employment cases including race, gender, age, national origin, disability and workplace harassment and discrimination matters, wage-and-hour disputes, restrictive covenants, grievances, arbitration, drug testing, and employment related contract issues.

By: Gabi Aste-Molina, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On October 6, 2023, the Appellate Division of New Jersey affirmed the revocation of the teacher’s certificates in In re Certificates of Rita O’Malley by the State Board of Examiners for repeatedly failing to test and evaluate her students with learning disabilities.

Woodbridge Township School District (“District”) employed the teacher in 2000 as a special education teacher and Learning Disabilities Teacher Consultant. She was responsible for testing and diagnosing learning disabilities, developing individualized education programs, and meeting with parents and teachers to discuss the special education needs of her students. In 2015, the parents of one of her students contacted the District to report that their child had not been tested and evaluated by their teacher. The District decided to conduct a random review of the tests the teacher had given, and this review revealed missing test scores and testing deficiencies. Due to this review, the District certified tenure charges against the teacher, citing her neglectful conduct, amongst other causes. The teacher resigned from her tenured position without contesting the charges.

The teacher appealed the revocation of her teaching certificates several times. First, the State Board of Examiners (“Board”), the educator licensing agency in New Jersey, filed an order to show cause regarding the teaching certificates. She answered the order and requested to transfer the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ recommended that the Board suspend the teacher’s certificates for three years. The matter returned to the Board, which decided to revoke the teacher’s certificates, citing that her repeated failure to test and evaluate her students merited revoking her certificates. The teacher appealed the Board’s decision to the Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”). In a final agency decision, the Commissioner agreed with the Board and held that the record supported its decision to revoke her teaching certificates. The teacher appealed again, this time to the Appellate Division.

The teacher argued that the Board’s revocation was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, citing a lack of credible evidence in the record. The Appellate Division disagreed and held that the record did support the decisions of the Board and Commissioner to revoke her teaching certificates because there was unconverted evidence that she failed to test her students and correctly record the results of the tests she did administer. By failing to perform these obligations, she did not provide adequate educational services to her students with learning disabilities, and these failures made her unfit for her position. Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that the Board had cause to revoke her teaching certificates under N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.4 and that the Commissioner’s decision to uphold the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

By: Ruhani K. Aulakh, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On October 5, 2023, the New Jersey Appellate Division in A.B. v. Board of Education of the City of Hackensack affirmed that the Hackensack School Board (“Board”) was required to disclose information of a former employee’s sexual misconduct to the employee’s future employer under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-76. 

In 2013, while employed by the Board, a teacher used social media to post inappropriate and sexually suggestive content.  The Board began an investigation into the teacher’s misconduct.  Before the conclusion of the Board’s investigation, the teacher and the Board finalized a settlement agreement in which the teacher agreed to submit an irrevocable letter of resignation. 

Six years after her resignation, the teacher was offered a position with the Clifton Board of Education (“Clifton”).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-76, commonly known as the “Pass the Trash” statute, Clifton was required to contact the applicant’s prior employers to obtain information relating to child abuse and sexual misconduct.  Clifton sent the Board a questionnaire in which the Board stated that the teacher was subject of a sexual misconduct investigation by the employer and that the teacher resigned from employment while allegations of sexual misconduct were under investigation.  As a result, Clifton rescinded the teacher’s offer of employment.

In August 2019, the teacher filed a complaint in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, seeking to enforce the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement between her and the Board, compel the Board to rescind and correct its response to the questionnaire, and enjoin the Board from reporting the investigation to any other prospective employer.  The Chancery court dismissed the teacher’s complaint and transferred the matter to the New Jersey Commissioner of Education who then transferred it to the Office of Administrative Law.

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) directed the parties to file simultaneous cross-motions for summary decision.  The ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision and denied the teacher’s motion, ultimately dismissing the petition in its entirety.  In response, the teacher filed exceptions upon which the Commissioner issued a final agency decision that adopted the ALJ’s decision.  The teacher then appealed to the Appellate Division.

In her appeal, the teacher set forth several arguments.  First, the teacher argued that the Commissioner improperly granted summary decision because the record indicated disputed issues of material fact.  The teacher then argued that her due process rights were violated when the Commissioner denied the petitioner’s right to a hearing.  Next, she argued that the Commissioner distorted the Legislature’s plain meaning of “sexual misconduct” as defined in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.6 and that the Commissioner wrongfully concluded an investigation was pending for sexual misconduct at the time of her resignation.  The teacher also contended that the Commissioner erred by finding the settlement agreement was subject to the requirements of the statute because it was executed before the effective date of the statute.  Finally, the teacher argued that the Commissioner wrongfully determined she consented to the disclosure of information by signing the mandatory authorization form provided by Clifton.

In reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, the Appellate Division imposes a presumption of reasonableness upon the agency, only upsetting the agency’s determination if it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Here, the Appellate Division looked to each of the teacher’s arguments individually to determine whether the agency met this standard.

The Court first analyzed the teacher’s assertion that there were facts in dispute.  The teacher specifically argued that certifications from the Board’s former attorney and her former attorney dispute the principal’s certification that the Board launched an investigation into the teacher’s potential sexual misconduct.  The Court held that these certifications did not indicate that there was not an investigation; rather, these certifications simply pointed to the attorneys’ personal knowledge about the investigations.

The Court then turned to the teacher’s contention that she was never given notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding the Board’s decision.  The Court reasoned that not only is there no notice requirement in the Pass the Trash statute, but also that the Board made no factual findings, thus a hearing was not required.

Moving to the teacher’s arguments that there was no allegation of sexual misconduct nor was there a pending investigation, the Court utilized the principal’s certification.  The certification clearly noted an allegation that prompted the Board to begin an investigation.  The Court held that although the Prosecutor’s office did not press criminal charges, that did not indicate that the Board did not investigate.

Finally, the Court addressed the argument that the Legislature intended to preserve employment settlement agreements entered prior to the enactment of the statute.  To determine whether applying a statute retroactively is appropriate, the Court must look to the legislature’s intent, whether it is explicit or implicit.  Here, the statutory language required that all applicants provide all former employers within the last twenty years that were schools.  The Court held that the language clearly indicates a retroactive application of the statute.  Further, the Court reasoned that even if the language was not clear, the goal of the statute was to ensure the safety of the children and as such, the Legislature would not exempt certain teachers due to a confidentiality clause.

Upon reviewing each of the teacher’s arguments, the Court held that the administrative agency’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Thus, the Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

By: Gabi Aste-Molina, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On July 3, 2023, Governor Murphy signed legislation that expands sick leave for school district employees. Bill A5060/S3440 amends the law by allowing school district employees to use their sick leave for preventative care, care of a family member, recovery from domestic or sexual violence or that of a family member, bereavement of a family member, to attend their child’s school-related conference or meeting, and when their child’s school or place of care is closed. Previously, school district employees could only use sick leave for a personal disability due to an illness or injury or when an employee or someone in their immediate household was exposed to a contagious disease or quarantined for it. This bill does not supersede any collective bargaining rights for school district employees and does not “reduce, diminish, or adversely affect” those rights either.

The new legislation also states that a board of education may require an employee to file a physician’s certificate with its secretary only for sick leave due to a personal injury or illness (and not the new eligible uses). Finally, the bill explains when a board of education may request advance notice or reasonable documentation for sick leave use.

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

Below is an article written by my colleague, Ralph R. Smith, Esq., Co-Chair of our firm’s Labor & Employment Group. If you wish to view additional articles and/or be kept up-to-date with labor & employment issues, visit our HR Resource blog by clicking here.

On Tuesday, June 27, 2023, a new federal law that expands the rights of pregnant (and postpartum) workers went into effect nationally. The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”) provides several new rights and protections for pregnant workers and imposes new obligations on employers. It applies to all employers who employ 15 or more employees.   

Here are some critical provisions of the Act that all employers must know who are covered by this new law:

1.         Reasonable Accommodations: The PWFA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant employees. This includes things such as modifications to tasks, work schedules, or other workplace adjustments that allow pregnant individuals to continue working safely and without jeopardizing their health or the health of their unborn child. Examples of reasonable accommodations may include providing extra breaks, allowing for more frequent restroom visits, or allowing a temporary transfer to less physically demanding tasks.

2.         Protection against Discrimination: The PWFA likewise prohibits employers from discriminating against pregnant workers. It ensures that pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions are protected characteristics under employment anti-discrimination laws. Employers cannot refuse to hire, fire, demote, or take adverse actions against an employee due to pregnancy or its related medical conditions.

3.         Notice and Training Requirements: The PWFA also requires employers to notify their employees of their rights under the Act. Employers must inform workers about their right to reasonable accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions and the prohibition of discrimination based on pregnancy. Additionally, the Act encourages employers to provide training to managers and supervisors to ensure compliance with the law and promote a supportive and inclusive work environment.

As most employers are aware, there were already existing laws that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces that make it illegal to fire or otherwise discriminate against workers on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and/or related medical conditions already. For example, the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”) has long banned such practices; this new law reiterates such prohibitions and expands upon an employer’s duties by actively imposing an accommodation requirement that was not expressly required by the PDA.  

The PWFA does not replace federal, state, or local laws that offer more protection to workers affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. More than 30 states and cities have laws that require the provision of accommodations for pregnant workers. New Jersey happens to be one such state, which has had a reasonable accommodation mandate as part of its Law Against Discrimination since that law was amended to add the requirements in 2014, meaning that these new requirements of the federal PWFA will just impose obligations that have already existed in New Jersey since the Law Against Discrimination was modified. Moreover, like the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, employers will be able to opt out of providing accommodations to pregnant workers under the PWFA if they can show that doing so presents an “undue hardship” on their business operations.

If you have not brought your policies in line with the modified Law Against Discrimination, the new federal law gives you a second chance to update your anti-pregnancy discrimination policies to meet these new federal requirements that largely mirror those already existing under New Jersey law.    

By: Eric M. Richwine, Law Clerk
Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On June 12, 2023, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Parsells v. Board of Education of the Borough of Somerville held that a New Jersey teacher did not knowingly waive her tenured right to a full-time teaching position under the Tenure Act when she voluntarily moved to a part-time position, unaware that she had no right to return to her full-time role.   

Catherine Parsells, a full-time, tenured teacher employed by the Somerville Board of Education (“Board”), requested a transfer from full-time teaching to an available in-district, part-time teaching position with benefits. The Board approved the request but did not advise her in advance that she would not have a right to return to a full-time position if she voluntarily took the part-time position. When Parsells eventually wished to return to full-time work, she was informed that she had no automatic entitlement to a full-time teaching position and that if one were to become available, she would be required to apply for it. Parsells eventually applied for a full-time teaching position but was not selected.

Parsells appealed to the New Jersey Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”), arguing that she did not waive her tenure rights by accepting a part-time position and that the Board violated her rights by hiring out-of-district teachers with no tenure for full-time positions instead of herself. The Administrative Law Judge rendered an initial decision in favor of the Board; however, the Commissioner ultimately reversed, reasoning that Parsells did not waive any rights to her full-time position and that the Board had a duty to inform Parsells of the consequences of switching to part-time employment, i.e., the loss of her right to return to full-time job status before she voluntarily switched to part-time employment.  

The Board appealed to the New Jersey Appellate Division, arguing that the Commissioner erred in finding that it was required to give notice of the impact of Parsells’ switch to a part-time role and that there was no valid waiver by Parsells. The Appellate Division extended the holding of Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association v. Board of Education of Bridgewater-Raritan School District, 221 N.J. 349 (2015) to impose a duty to notify full-time teachers who consider voluntarily transferring to part-time teaching that they may not have the right to return to their full-time position and therefore affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.

The Board challenged the Appellate Division’s decision, but the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the holding. The Court reasoned that Parsells did not knowingly waive her tenured right to returning to a full-time teaching position as required under the Tenure Act. However, the Court rejected the Appellate Division’s extension of Bridgewater-Raritan to impose a duty of notification on school boards in this instance. Instead, the Court held that Parsells did not abandon her right to her full-time position knowingly and unequivocally as required by the Court’s decision interpreting the Tenure Act in Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003). As such, the Court affirmed as modified.

Moving forward, despite the Court holding that there was no legal basis for a duty to notify in this instance, the Court encouraged school boards to address whether a tenured teacher is voluntarily and knowingly waiving their right to a full-time position: any waiver of a teacher’s tenure rights must be “clear, knowing, and unequivocal.”

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

Below is an article written by my colleague, Ralph R. Smith, Esq., Co-Chair of our firm’s Labor & Employment Group. If you wish to view additional articles and/or be kept up-to-date with labor & employment issues, visit our HR Resource blog by clicking here.

It seems like every day, I get some very unique questions in my practice. This one was a doozy. A client calls and tells me that an employee who is out of work on a medical leave of absence is posting pictures of herself on Facebook while on a wonderful vacation in the Bahamas. Needless to say, the client is irate and wants to take immediate disciplinary action against the employee, believing that the employee is not really sick and is engaged in some type of fraud under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). So, what can an employer do in such a circumstance?

Believe it or not, a lot.

Despite what some may think, being on FMLA leave does not shield an employee from possible disciplinary action, either for conduct that was committed before the leave or even during the leave. Employers can even fire an employee for misconduct when an employee is on an FMLA leave. The FMLA specifically states that if an employee would be subject to a possible job loss if they were physically present at work and not on a leave, the employee can lose their job even if they are taking FMLA. So, the statute itself provides an employer with some latitude in these types of situations. Obviously, any time such disciplinary action is taken there are risks, so the employer must make sure that it has solid documentation and proof to support its discipline in case the employee brings suit and claims either retaliation or interference with the ability to take FMLA leave. These are both possible claims that could be brought in such circumstances, so employers must proceed with some caution in navigating these types of factual scenarios.

In my client’s situation, the employer has every right to concern itself with possible FMLA fraud. It is real and happens much more frequently than you would think. There are a number of reported cases where courts have given employers the ability to address such situations, going as far as allowing terminations in the very scenario on which my client sought legal advice. In one such case, an employee who was on an FMLA leave for a mental condition was discovered on a vacation in Florida. The employer learned about it when the employee posted pictures of himself on the internet. After the employee was fired for FMLA fraud, he brought suit claiming retaliation and interference with his FMLA rights. In defense of his actions, the employee claimed that his doctor directed that he needed to relax more to deal with his stress condition, and that was why he took a vacation in Florida. The court rejected the claim, declaring that the point of FMLA leave is to allow an employee to recuperate from a serious medical condition and did not give an employee license to take an unauthorized surreptitious vacation from work. Thus, the employee’s termination while on FMLA leave was declared a valid disciplinary action by the employer.

Therefore, employers you do have tools available to you when you sense possible FMLA fraud. Proceed with caution, but don’t let those possible risks prevent you from imposing discipline against employees who are truly attempting to abuse the FMLA and harm your workplace.

By: Erika Vasant, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On August 25, 2022, in Sanjuan v. School District of West New York, the New Jersey Appellate Division in a published decision addressed the scope of an arbitrator’s authority under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 regarding tenure charges against a teacher. The Appellate Division held that an arbitrator may uphold a suspension without pay if a teaching staff member’s conduct was unbecoming. However, arbitrators lack the authority to demote teaching staff members from their positions.

In this case, the West New York Board of Education (“Board”) demoted plaintiff Sanjuan from assistant principal to fourth-grade teacher for inappropriate conduct. Sanjuan attended a high school activity and fell down a flight of stairs. After the fall, she reached into her purse, removed a piece of paper, and walked halfway up the stairway to place it on one of the steps. She then returned to the bottom of the stairs. The incident was caught on camera. The next morning, the benefits coordinator contacted her, and she confirmed that she fell after seeing the piece of paper on the stairs. The school district found that she manipulated the scene, allowed a false incident report to be made, and engaged in insurance fraud. 

The Board approved tenure charges against Sanjuan in accordance with the Tenure Employees Hearing Law (“TEHL”), suspending her for 120 days without pay. After reviewing Sanjuan’s response, the Commissioner of Education found that Sanjuan’s conduct warranted “dismissal or reduction in salary” and referred the case to an arbitrator in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1. The arbitrator found that Sanjuan’s conduct warranted retention of her tenure but as a fourth grade teacher (instead of assistant principal) without back pay. Sanjuan sought to vacate the arbitration reward, be reinstated as assistant principal, and receive the lost wages. The trial court then denied her relief, and affirmed the entire arbitration award. Sanjuan appealed.

On appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division, Sanjuan argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and that since her tenure was not terminated, she should receive back pay during her suspension. The Appellate Division disagreed and noted that the trial court upheld the Board’s determination of Sanjuan’s conduct as unbecoming. Accordingly, under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-14, the arbitrator’s determination that Sanjuan was not permitted to receive back pay was authorized. However, the Appellate Division found that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in demoting Sanjuan, because it deviated from the disciplinary action specified in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10. The statute provides that tenure charges against a teaching staff member may only include either termination or depriving him or her of salary – not demotion.

As a result, the Appellate Division vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the arbitrator to “reconsider the penalty of termination.”

By: Angela Reading, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

In New Jersey, spring brings critical deadlines related to renewal decisions for teachers. N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10 mandates that by May 15 of each year, the chief school administrator provide non-tenured teachers with either a new employment contract or written notice of non-renewal of the employee’s contract. If a non-tenured teacher does not receive an employment contract or written notice by the May 15 deadline, under N.J.S.A. 18A:27-11, the employee is presumed to have received an offer of employment for the upcoming school year under the same terms and conditions of employment.

On April 29, 2022, the New Jersey Appellate Division in Vakulchik v. Board of Education of the Borough of Dunellen issued an unpublished decision affirming a ruling by the New Jersey Commissioner of Education, which held that a recommendation for non-renewal in a summative evaluation did not comply with the “written notice from the chief school administrator” requirement of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10. 

The controversy started on May 1, 2020, when Vakulchik, a non-tenured speech pathologist, received a summative evaluation from the district’s director of special services that included a recommendation that her contract not be renewed for the 2020-2021 school year. Based on this recommendation, Vakulchik emailed the superintendent on May 4, 2020, requesting a statement of reasons for the non-renewal.  On May 5, 2020, the Board voted to accept the superintendent’s recommendations for renewal, which did not include Vakulchik. 

Thereafter, Vakulchik did not receive a written notice from the superintendent that she was not being renewed by the May 15 deadline.  On May 18, 2020, she emailed the superintendent and members of the Board stating that since she had not received notice of non-renewal in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10; 27-11, she accepted the offer of employment. The superintendent responded that she was not renewed and did not have a contract for the following year.  This was the superintendent’s first communication to Vakulchik about her non-renewal. After a Donaldson hearing, the Board non-renewed Vakulchik, thus terminating her employment.  

Vakulchik challenged the Board’s action.  An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) recommended upholding the non-renewal despite the Board’s failure to meet the notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10. The ALJ relied on Bernstein v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund and concluded the Board substantially complied with the statute. The ALJ explained that Vakulchik did not suffer any prejudice, and the Board “was in general compliance with the purpose of the statute.” The ALJ further found that Vakulchik’s May 4, 2020, email established that she understood her contract would not be renewed, and this amounted to sufficient notice under Nissman v. Board of Education.

Vakulchik appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Commissioner of Education, who rejected the ALJ’s recommendation and found that the recommendation for non-renewal contained in the summative evaluation did not comply with the statutory demands of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10, as that statute clearly requires “written notice from the superintendent,” which the Board did not provide. The Commissioner ordered that Vakulchik be reinstated with back pay.

The Board appealed to the Appellate Division, which upheld the Commissioner’s decision finding that the Board undisputedly did not meet the requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10. Therefore, N.J.S.A. 18A:27-11 required Vakulchik to be given a contract for the next year. The Court also rejected the Board’s argument that it substantially complied with N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10’s requirements.  Substantial compliance will sometimes excuse failure to strictly comply with a law’s requirements, but only if the other party was not prejudiced and there is a reasonable explanation why there was not strict compliance with the statute. The Court found that the Board did not explain why it couldn’t comply, and clearly, Vakulchik was prejudiced. 

The takeaway is that boards of education must strictly comply with the requirements of section N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10 – otherwise N.J.S.A. 18A:27-11 will require them to reemploy the employee the next school year, which might confer tenure.

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