School Ethics Act

Do board of education members have standing to challenge the enforcement of the School Ethics Act on First Amendment grounds? In the case of Nazarene v. Dehmer, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115888 (May 26, 2026), the District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a board memberโ€™s request to enjoin enforcement of the School Ethics Act against her related to her use of social media, and issued an order to show cause as to why her complaint should not be dismissed with prejudice.

In this case, the plaintiff was a board member for a term beginning in February 2025 and ending in December 2027. Prior to the election, the plaintiff created and used a Facebook page to promote her campaign. Once elected, she continued to use her Facebook page to engage constituents about public school matters to solicit feedback. Some, but not all, of these posts included disclaimers indicating that the opinions expressed were her personal opinions. Plaintiffโ€™s fellow board members grew concerned that her social media activity was violating several provisions of the School Ethics Act, particularly those sections that prevent Board members from taking action to compromise the board. Plaintiffโ€™s fellow board members filed a school ethics complaint regarding the Facebook posts. Plaintiff responded to the complaint asserting that her communications with constituents were protected by the First Amendment. Instead of defending against the school ethics complaint, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in federal court against the Commissioner of Education and the complainants, which stayed the school ethics action.

Plaintiff alleged โ€œDefendantsโ€™ past interpretation and enforcement of the Act have forced her to choose between self-censorship and the risk of formal discipline, and that this chill on her speech violates her First Amendment rights.โ€ Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction along with the complaint, asking the court to prevent enforcement of the act to prevent plaintiff from speaking on matters of public concern. The Court found that it could not grant plaintiffโ€™s motion without analyzing whether she had standing to bring a First Amendment Claim.

The Court concluded the plaintiff failed to demonstrate standing for the purposes of her motion. Thus, the Court denied the preliminary injunction and issued an order to show cause why the Complaint should not be dismissed for lack of standing. The Court focused on the fourth element of First Amendment standing, which is whether the threat of enforcement of the challenged law is credible and substantial. Crucial to the Courtโ€™s analysis was the finding that prior Commission decisions reflect a fact-specific and uneven enforcement history, rather than a clear pattern of sanctioning personal-capacity speech. Moreover, the School Ethics Actโ€™s screening mechanism, the absence of a probable cause finding by the Commission, the stay on enforcement during the civil suit, and the purely civil nature of any sanction made the alleged threat too attenuated to establish standing.

This case is meaningful because it indicates that a board member does not have standing to preemptively challenge enforcement of the School Ethics Act on free speech grounds.

By: Eric Richwine, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On November 9, 2023, the New Jersey Appellate Division issued a published decision in Board of Education of the Borough of Kinnelon v. Dโ€™Amico in which it reversed the final decision of the New Jersey Commissioner of Education (โ€œCommissionerโ€) to remove a parent from her duly elected school board position for a purported conflict of interest following the submission of a ten-day letter on behalf of her special education child.

In January of 2021, Ms. Karen Dโ€™Amico (โ€œDโ€™Amicoโ€) was sworn in as a member of the Board of Education of the Borough of Kinnelon (โ€œBoardโ€).  Dโ€™Amico was noted as having a history of filing a series of ten-day letters on behalf of her child with special needs enrolled in private education and several due process requests primarily for tuition reimbursement purposes throughout 2018 to 2020.  Ten-day letters are used in special education cases to preserve a parentโ€™s right to reimbursement for private school placements for special education students. Following her election to the Board, on February 1, Dโ€™Amicoโ€™s husband re-filed a prior due process petition seeking tuition reimbursement; Dโ€™Amico withdrew the petition within an hour after her husband filed it.

Soon after, in April, the Board filed an amended verified petition with the Commissioner asking for a declaratory ruling that Dโ€™Amico was disqualified from serving on the Board, reasoning that she had a direct or indirect interest in substantial financial claim against it.  The Board also moved for a summary judgment decision against Dโ€™Amico.  The Commissioner denied the Boardโ€™s request for declaratory relief and transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law, where Dโ€™Amico filed a cross-motion for summary decision.  While her cross-motion was pending, Dโ€™Amico submitted a ten-day letter on August 13, 2021, notifying the Board of her intent to unilaterally place her child in a private school for the following school year and reserving the right to seek reimbursement for the placement costs.

The Administrative Law Judge (โ€œALJโ€) issued an initial decision in favor of Dโ€™Amico, finding that after her husband re-filed the due process petition, she quickly remedied the violation by immediately withdrawing it.  The ALJ also found that, as no due process petition was filed relative to Dโ€™Amicoโ€™s ten-day letter dated August 13, 2021, the letter served as a notice, not a claim, and it therefore was permissible under the School Ethics Act.  The Board filed exceptions, and on December 2, 2021, the Commissioner adopted the ALJโ€™s decision with respect to the due process petition but found that the ten-day letter constituted a claim for monetary relief against the Board that precluded her continued service as a member; as a result, Dโ€™Amico was removed from the Board.  This appeal followed.

The issue before the Appellate Division was whether the submission of a ten-day letter raises a substantial conflict of interest as to warrant the removal of a school board member.  In making its determination, the Appellate Division referred to the New Jersey Supreme Courtโ€™s holding in Bd. of Ed. of City of Sea Isle City v. Kennedy, where the Court determined a due process claim that included a request for specific monetary relief to be a substantial conflict between a board member and the board, requiring removal.  However, the Appellate Division determined that, in contrast to Kennedy, the letter here did not assert a โ€œrequest for monetary relief.โ€  Rather, the language used by the Dโ€™Amicos, as evidenced by the ten-day letters submitted prior to Dโ€™Amicoโ€™s appointment to the Board, only served to alert the Board that the Dโ€™Amicos intended to โ€œseek reimbursement from the Districtโ€ in the future. 

The Board argued that the ten-day letter โ€œportends the likelihood of protracted, and intractable, litigation between the parties,โ€ per the Kennedy decision, but the Appellate Division disagreed, finding there was no evidence to suggest that the Dโ€™Amicos signaled an intention to commence litigation against the Board.  Although the Appellate Division contended that if the Dโ€™Amicos filed a timely due process request for tuition reimbursement, then Dโ€™Amicoโ€™s removal from the Board would be proper under Kennedy โ€“ but this โ€œline had not yet been reachedโ€.  As such, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded.  

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