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In the published case of Gottsleben v. Annese, 2025 N.J. Super. LEXIS 52 (App. Div. July 3, 2025), the plaintiff Debra Gottsleben unsuccessfully attempted to expand the principles of public sidewalk liability for commercial properties to a residential property that was unoccupied and undergoing renovations.  The plaintiff had slipped and fell on the sidewalk in front of the defendants’ house on the morning of February 18, 2021, due to an accumulation of snow and ice. She sued the defendants for her injuries suffered.

Plaintiff argued that because the property was vacant at the time of the fall and undergoing construction that could enhance the property value, the defendants, as a matter of public policy, should be governed by the same sidewalk law principles as commercial owners.  In the alternative, the plaintiff contended that the defendants were nonetheless liable as residential owners for allegedly worsening the sidewalk’s condition due to the poor shoveling and treatment of the sidewalk. 

At the trial court level, the defendants filed for a summary judgment.  They argued that as residential property owners, their duty was distinct from commercial owners and that New Jersey case law did not impose on them a duty to maintain the safety of a public sidewalk in front of their premises.  Further, they argued that there was no proof that they worsened the natural condition of the sidewalk.  They argued that the plaintiff’s proofs failed to substantiate her claims of negligent worsening and causation, and that her theory of liability was speculative and inadequate to present to a jury.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the complaint.  The trial court judge found that defendants’ property could not be fairly treated as commercial under sidewalk liability principles.  The trial court judge pointed out that the property was not used for investment nor to generate profit, that defendants always intended to live at the property, and that the ongoing renovations at the time of the plaintiff’s fall did not alter the property’s residential status. Thus, the trial court applied residential sidewalk liability standards to the facts and ruled that defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 

This appeal ensued.  First, the plaintiff renewed her novel policy argument for treating defendants’ unoccupied property the same as commercial premises under the sidewalk law; second, she argued that there were genuine material issues of facts as to whether defendants worsened the sidewalk’s natural condition through poor shoveling and treatment. 

The Appellate Division noted the longstanding New Jersey law that an abutting property owner owed no duty to maintain the street or sidewalk in front of his house or premises.  New Jersey courts have declined “to impose civil liability upon homeowners for non-compliance with municipal ordinances that require them to remove accumulations of snow and ice on sidewalks abutting their residences.” Id. at *10.

These principles of sidewalk law have evolved through state case law, leading to the emergence of a “bright-line” between commercial and residential property owners. Under this “bright-line” test, residential property owners in New Jersey are not civilly liable for failing to comply with the municipal ordinances requiring them to clear snow and ice from adjoining sidewalks. 

The Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff’s novel argument that the principles of sidewalk liability for commercial properties should be applied to a residential property during a period when the premises are unoccupied and undergoing renovation or construction.  The Court noted that the defendants’ intention was to move into the house after the renovations were complete, despite the plaintiff’s argument that the renovations to the property would likely increase its market value and that the defendants might profit if they sold the property in the future. Whether it was profitable or not, the renovation of the property did not change its residential character.

Writing on behalf of the court, Judge Sabatino noted that the law “should not deter New Jersians from renovating their homes out of the concern that vacating the premises to enable such improvements will transform residents into commercial owners for purposes of sidewalk liability.” Id. at *15.

Hence, the Appellate Division stated that it was not its role to create new exceptions to the sidewalk law principles that have been repeatedly enunciated and modified by the Supreme Court.  The Court ultimately found that the trial court had properly applied the principles of residential sidewalk law to the facts of this case, rather than the commercial standards advocated by the plaintiff. 

There are circumstances under which an abutting residential owner can be liable for an injury caused by the condition of the public sidewalk.  However, under New Jersey law, a residential owner is not civilly liable for a hazardous condition of the public sidewalk abutting the owner’s property unless the owner’s conduct made the natural condition of the sidewalk more dangerous.

Here, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff failed to present proofs that demonstrated how defendants’ conduct had worsened the natural condition of the sidewalk.  Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court decision granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint. 

Defendant Hillside Estates, Inc. owned and managed Winding Woods Apartments in Sayreville, New Jersey.  Plaintiff, Hsi Rung Niu-Wang, was a tenant in the complex.  After plaintiff left her apartment to go to work, she walked towards her car and fell on black ice in the parking lot. The issue in Niu-Wang v. Hillside Estates, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1436 (App. Div. July 3, 2024) was whether defendant apartment complex owner could be liable for plaintiff’s injuries because they failed to pre-treat the apartment complex’s walkways and parking lots in light of the knowledge of an impending storm.    

This apartment complex consisted of over 130 buildings with separate parking lots for most of the buildings. Plaintiff was a resident in one of the buildings. The day before her accident, the National Weather Service issued a winter weather advisory for Middlesex County, warning the residents about a freezing rain “with the potential to cause ice accumulation on sidewalks, roads, and bridges in affected areas.”

In the early morning hours of the day of her accident, freezing rain coated parts of the complex’s exposed walkways and parking lots with a thin layer of ice. Defendant apartment complex conceded that they did nothing to prepare the walkways and parking lots for the storm beforehand.  Furthermore, they did not take any steps to address the icy conditions of their walkways and parking lots after the freezing rain began.

At about 7:45 a.m. on the morning of her accident, as the freezing rain continued to fall, plaintiff left her apartment to go to work.  She walked towards her car with one foot on the grass and another on the walkway.  When she eventually stepped onto the parking lot, she slipped on a patch of black ice, falling and breaking her left ankle. There was no dispute that the black ice that caused plaintiff’s fall was formed that morning when the drizzle froze as it hit the ground.  There was also no dispute that plaintiff’s injury occurred during the freezing rainstorm.

The defendant apartment complex filed for a summary judgment dismissal, which was granted.  The trial court judge found that there was “no independent duty that should be imposed upon commercial landlords to anticipate weather events and plan against them.”  The trial court judge ruled that the issue was dealt with in the Pareja v. Princeton International Properties case where the NJ Supreme Court specifically rejected a duty to pre-treat when it adopted the ongoing storm rule.

Nevertheless, plaintiff appealed the trial court decision and contended that defendant owed her a duty of reasonable care to maintain the parking lot in a reasonably safe condition.  She argued that the trial court judge misapplied Pareja because “the ongoing storm rule does not preclude the imposition of liability based upon defendant’s lack of action prior to a storm.”  Plaintiff contends that the ongoing storm rule in Pareja did not address whether defendant had a duty to have salted or sanded the parking lot before the storm began.

The Appellate Division rejected this argument. It noted that the NJ Supreme Court, in adopting the ongoing storm rule, concluded that a commercial tenant had a duty to address snow and ice accumulations in the parking lots and pathways only after a reasonable time following a storm. Moreover, the Appellate Division noted that the Pareja court specifically rejected “the notion that all a landlord needed to do to avoid liability was spread salt.”

In the case within, the facts were not disputed, such as that there was no ice or precipitation present before the storm. On the contrary, it was conceded that the ice formed during the storm. 

The Appellate Division found that it was bound by the NJ Supreme Court’s Pareja precedent that “commercial landowners do not have the absolute duty, and the impossible burden, to keep sidewalks on the property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm.”  More specifically, the Appellate Division noted that in adopting the ongoing storm rule, “the Supreme Court specifically declined to exclude liability where landowners had actual or constructive knowledge of an impending storm.”  Hence, the Court affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Linda Emmanoulidis was walking her dog in Enos Park in Jersey City when she tripped and fell on an uneven pavement and sustained injuries. The issue in Emmanoulidis v. City of Jersey City, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 477 (App. Div. Mar. 30, 2023) was whether the City could be liable for a pedestrian accident caused by a trip and fall on an uneven pavement under the Tort Claims Act.

Prior to her fall, Plaintiff had never walked in the area before and did not know how long the condition existed. After her fall, Plaintiff retained an engineering expert who opined that the elevation of the crack where Plaintiff stated she fell was 1/2 – 3/4 inches. In his report, the expert noted that some of the concrete sidewalk slabs showed signs of repairs but not in the specific area where plaintiff fell. The report did not indicate when the repairs were done and who performed the work.

Plaintiff sued the City of Jersey City claiming that the uneven pavement was a dangerous condition which caused her accident. The City moved for summary judgment dismissal, contending that the plaintiff had not established the existence of a dangerous condition of which the City had actual or constructive notice. In addition, the City contended plaintiff did not demonstrate that the City’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  In response to the motion, plaintiff presented a certification from her brother-in-law, a retired Jersey City police officer. He certified that, in course of his job, he had searched evidence in the area where plaintiff fell and the condition of the pavement was exactly as it was on the day she fell for at least four years.

The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated the uneven sidewalk was a dangerous condition and that the City had actual or constructive notice of the “declivity in the walkway.” The Court reviewed the photographs on record and concluded that the condition was not so open and obvious to provide the City of constructive notice of a dangerous condition. 

Upon appeal, plaintiff argued that the court erred in finding: 1) the uneven pavement was not a dangerous condition; 2) the City was aware of the dangerous condition; and 3) the City’s failure to fix the dangerous condition was palpably unreasonable. The Appellate Division noted that under the Tort Claims Act, a dangerous condition exists when there is a defect in the physical condition of the property itself. The Court held that whether the defect in the pavement was a dangerous condition could be left to the jury for determination.

To determine the issue of notice, the Court considered that the plaintiff could not establish: 1) the duration for which the crack was present; 2) there was no evidence to show that the City had actual knowledge of the crack; 3) the City had no record of any complaints regarding the crack; and 4) the certification offered by plaintiff’s brother-in-law did not satisfy the notice to public entity standard. In addition, plaintiff could not show the crack was open and obvious. Thus, the Appellate Division held that plaintiff did not demonstrate that the City had actual or constructive notice of the defect. Therefore, the Court ruled that the plaintiff did not establish that the City was liable under the Tort Claims Act and affirmed the summary judgment dismissal.

Plaintiff Shneequa Easterling had been walking on a public sidewalk abutting defendant’s home when she slipped and fell on ice, injuring her neck and back, as well as her right ankle.  She filed a lawsuit against the defendant homeowner, George Johnson, who owned the two-family home abutting the public sidewalk.  The issue in Easterling v. Johnson, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 905 (App. Div. June 9, 2023) was whether the defendant homeowner could be liable to the plaintiff for the injuries incurred while walking on the public sidewalk abutting his two-family home. 

Plaintiff contended that the defendant was operating a multi-family rental property and was negligent in failing to warn pedestrians about the ice that existed on the sidewalk next to his property.  She claimed that he failed to keep the premises in a safe condition.

At the trial court level, the defendant moved for a summary judgment, arguing that as a residential homeowner, he had no duty to clear snow and ice from the sidewalk abutting his property.  The trial court judge agreed with the defendant and found that his property was residential in nature and, thus, he had no duty to remove snow or ice on the public sidewalk.

This order was appealed to the Appellate Division.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the order granting summary judgment should be reversed because defendant could be held liable for the icy condition of the sidewalk abutting his property, even if it was residential.  She contended that he could be liable if, in clearing the ice and snow from the sidewalk next to his property, he increased the hazard by introducing some element of danger.

The Appellate Division noted prior case law that “absent negligent construction or repair,” the residential property owner “does not owe a duty of care to a pedestrian injured as a result of the condition of the sidewalk abutting the landowner’s property.”  On the other hand, commercial property owners do have such a duty to maintain the sidewalk.

The Court found that there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had made any repairs or otherwise created a dangerous condition on the sidewalk next to his home prior to plaintiff’s fall.  There was also no proof that the defendant’s property was primarily commercial in nature.  The record was devoid of evidence that the defendant had utilized his property for any purpose in the past 40 years as other than his own residence.  There was no evidence that he had rented or generated a profit from any portion of the property.  Thus, the record fairly established that the nature and purpose of defendant’s owner occupied property was primarily residential and not commercial.

Thus, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and affirmed the decision. 

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