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What constitutes good cause for compelling a student to attend an independent medical exam (“IME”)? The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently issued an unpublished ruling in the case A.T. v. Freehold Reg’l High School. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 24-822, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59410 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2026) that limited a school district’s right to request such an exam during litigation.

The parents of a minor student, A.T., alleged their child was discriminated against under the Americans with Disabilities Act because the school district failed to implement the student’s IEP. The student was diagnosed with a spinal-cord malformation and immune disfunction. The parents alleged that the student was frequently reprimanded by school staff for not completing his schoolwork when he experienced pain due to his conditions. The parents, both Albanian immigrants, separately alleged discrimination based on national origin.

During litigation, the school district filed a motion to compel HIPAA releases and to compel the student to attend two independent medical examinations with an orthopedic surgeon and an immunologist. These motions proceeded from the parents’ refusal to provide HIPAA releases to the school district or consent to the IMEs. The Court granted the school district’s motion regarding the HIPAA authorizations, finding that the medical records were relevant given the allegations.

However, the Court denied the school district’s motion to compel attendance at the two IMEs. The school district argued that the IMEs were necessary to assess the student’s medical conditions, and relevant because the plaintiffs sought damages for pain, suffering, and past and future medical expenses. The parents objected, arguing there was no good cause because the student had never seen an orthopedic surgeon or immunologist, the IMEs do not address the conditions at issue, and the request for IMEs was made in bad faith.

The Court denied the motion to compel the IMEs because it was unpersuaded that the IMEs were relevant. The IMEs were found to be of little relevance because the student had never seen an immunologist or orthopedic surgeon. Further the IMEs were premature because the school district had yet to review the student’s medical records, to which the Court had just granted them access. Thus, the Court denied the motion without prejudice.

Typically, a court may compel an IME when a party places their mental or physical condition at issue and upon a showing of good cause. In this case, the Court added an extra requirement that the party sought to be compelled must have previously seen a doctor of the same expertise as the examining physician, and the requesting party must review the available medical documents prior to making the request. Neither condition is found within Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a). Thus, the ruling creates a difficult standard, especially when parents refuse to provide medical records in the first instance. This decision signals that a court may place extra scrutiny on discovery demands when a minor student is involved, even when the student’s medical conditions are directly relevant to the case and the parents have refused to grant access to medical records. School districts and their attorneys may need to take greater care than is typical when selecting physicians for IMEs and drafting discovery requests.  

By: Victoria M. Adeleke, Law Clerk
Edited by: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On August 7, 2024, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a student who was granted a state issued diploma (GED) was allowed to re-enroll at his public high school and was still entitled to access a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) in the case Board of Education of the Township of Sparta v. M.N. The Court determined a New Jersey State-issued diploma awarded based on passing the GED is not considered a “regular high school diploma” under 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(iv) and that a student who receives such a State-issued diploma was not precluded from special education services under the IDEA.

A student who received a State-issued diploma and who obtained a GED attempted to re-enroll in school within the Sparta Board of Education (“Board”). The Board denied the request contending that the student was no longer entitled to special education services under the IDEA because he had received his GED. The parent challenged this assertion and filed for due process. The Board filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling, seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to re-enroll the student. The New Jersey Commissioner of Education denied this request and transferred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of the Board, stating that the student’s diploma was a “regular high school diploma” and not merely a GED. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that the student was no longer entitled to FAPE. The parent appealed the ALJ’s decision to the New Jersey Appellate Division, arguing that the ALJ and NJDOE had erred in their interpretation of federal regulations regarding special education eligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed. The parent further appealed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted her petition for certification.

The primary legal question for the Supreme Court was whether the student’s receipt of a State-issued diploma precluded the right to receive special education services under the IDEA and New Jersey state law (N.J.S.A. 18A:46-1.1 et seq.). The Supreme Court closely examined the federal regulations under the IDEA, specifically 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3). This regulation outlines the eligibility for FAPE and distinguishes between students who have graduated with a “regular high school diploma” and those who have not. The Court noted that the regulation defines a “regular high school diploma” as the standard diploma awarded to the majority of students in the state, which must be fully aligned with state standards. Importantly, it specifies that a regular high school diploma does not include a recognized equivalent, such as a General Educational Development (GED) diploma. The Court considered New Jersey state law, particularly N.J.A.C. 6A:8-5.2(c), which governs the issuance of diplomas. The Court recognized that while New Jersey allows for the issuance of diplomas based on passing the GED, this does not equate to a “regular high school diploma” as defined by federal law. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind the distinction between State-issued diplomas and State-endorsed diplomas, arguing that the New Jersey Legislature did not intend for a GED to confer the same rights and privileges as a traditional high school diploma.

Ultimately, the Court held that a New Jersey State-issued diploma awarded based on passing the GED is not considered a “regular high school diploma” under 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(iv). Consequently, the Court determined that a student who receives such a State-issued diploma remains entitled to receive a FAPE under the IDEA. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, affirming that the student was still eligible for special education services despite having received a GED-based diploma.

By: Lindsay S. Romeo, Esq.
Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On June 5, 2024, Governor Phil Murphy signed legislation (S-2930) which amends New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act, commonly known as OPRA. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq. OPRA permits requests to government entities to gain access to public records. The changes to OPRA will take effect on September 3, 2024. While the bill made changes to many aspects of OPRA, several amendments will directly impact public school districts.

One notable change to OPRA is an expanded definition of “personal identifying information.” The amendment now protects birth dates, email addresses, and home addresses. Custodians should carefully analyze documents prior to production to ensure any identifying information has been redacted.

In addition, when an agency assesses a special service fee, now the presumption is that the fees or charges presented by the custodian are reasonable. If a requestor objects to the fees or charges, the requestor carries the burden of demonstrating that the fees or charges are unreasonable.

If a requestor demands records that are over 24 months old, the custodian need not provide immediate access. OPRA also entitles custodians to reasonable extensions to any response deadlines so long as they notify the requestor within seven business days.

OPRA also tightened requirements for requestors that seek email, text message, and social media correspondence. The requestor must now specify individuals by name or job title, specify the subject matter, and specify a reasonable time period for the custodian to conduct the search. This provision prevents requestors from making overly broad and burdensome demands.

OPRA now requires agencies to make records publicly available, in their unabridged form, on the agency’s website. When a requestor demands records that are available on their website, the agency is required to direct the requestor to their website. The agency must provide the requestor with instructions to obtain the requested records from their website.

Finally, OPRA strikes down on requestors that harass public agencies or seek records with the intent to substantially interrupt the performance of government function. The Court may issue protective orders limiting the number and scope of requests the requestor may make.

By: Angela Reading, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On September 29, 2022, the New Jersey Appellate Division in L.R. o/b/o J.R. v. Cherry Hill Board of Education issued a published decision affirming a ruling by the Superior Court of New Jersey, which held that a district could redact all parent and student information, including initials, when providing settlement agreements in response to an Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) request.

In this case, the plaintiff, the mother of a student with a disability, made an OPRA request to the defendant Cherry Hill Board of Education (“Board”) for all settlement agreements in which the Board was named as a defendant and a student and/or their parent was named as a plaintiff. The Board provided the records sought but redacted all parent and student information, including initials. The plaintiff sued, asserting that the Board violated OPRA and improperly withheld information by redacting all personally identifiable information (“PII”).

In January 2015, the trial court granted the Board’s cross-motion for summary judgment, finding the initials were exempt from disclosure under the Family Educational Records and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) and the New Jersey Pupil Records Act (“NJPRA”). The plaintiff appealed and the matter was stayed pending the resolution of L.R. I and L.R. II. Following L.R. II, a special master adjudicated the Board’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and recommended the court grant the motion. Plaintiff appealed the recommendation, and the trial judge affirmed, adopting the master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The discrete issue raised on appeal was whether the Board should have redacted the PII altogether as opposed to leaving the initials intact. The plaintiff asserted the trial court erred by relying on the 2015 summary judgment decision and misunderstood the holdings of L.R. I and L.R. II.

The Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision, finding that using students’ initials is insufficient to protect identity as required by FERPA and NJPRA. The Court further held that just because the information may ordinarily be available to and accessible by the public — as legal submissions filed with the court — that does not “ipso facto mean that no legitimate privacy interest predominates.”

Special education cases can be quite expensive for school districts to litigate. This is especially so when parents are prevailing parties and the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) requires the school district to reimburse the parents for attorneys’ fees. Typically, parents are only entitled to attorneys’ fees if they are successful on the underlying merits of the case, not when they succeed on procedural or interlocutory issues. However, on October 11, 2017, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter School held that parents can recover attorneys’ fees involving procedural issues if they vindicate a procedural right under the IDEA that is not “temporary forward-looking injunctive relief.”

In this case, the parents enrolled their three children with disabilities in the Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter School (“Charter School”) located in Pennsylvania. The students were eligible for services under the IDEA. The parents alleged that the Charter School failed to meet its obligations to provide a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to the students. In 2014, the parents and the Charter School entered into a settlement agreement resolving all of the parents’ claims regarding the children. The settlement agreement called for the Charter School to fund compensatory education hours for each student and to contribute towards the parents’ attorneys’ fees. The Charter School permanently closed in December 2014 and never fulfilled its obligations under the agreement.

As a result, the parents filed for due process against the Charter School and the Pennsylvania Department of Education (“PDE”) alleging that the agreement with the Charter School was voidable and that PDE should provide compensatory education to their children due to the Charter School’s previous failure to provide them with a FAPE. The hearing officer dismissed the parents’ administrative due process complaint reasoning that the parents were required to initiate an enforcement action against the Charter School through the settlement-of-claims process.

The parents appealed the hearing officer’s decision to District Court, which reversed and remanded the case. The District Court reasoned that the parents’ complaint sought enforcement of the settlement agreement, which could be heard by way of a due process complaint. The District Court instructed the hearing officer to render a substantive decision regarding the parents’ FAPE claims.

The parents filed a motion in District Court seeking attorneys’ fees as prevailing parties for their victory in reversing the hearing officer’s initial decision dismissing their administrative due process petition. The District Court denied the parents’ request for attorneys’ fees, reasoning that they were not prevailing parties under the IDEA because they were only successful in a procedural issue and not a substantive one on the merits.

The parents appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the District Court and agreed with the parents. The Third Circuit held that if a parent vindicates a procedural right under the IDEA which is not “temporary forward-looking injunctive relief,” that parent is considered a prevailing party and entitled to attorneys’ fees. In this case, the Third Circuit found that when the parents were successful in reversing the hearing officer’s dismissal, they vindicated a permanent procedural right that cannot be nullified later and therefore the relief obtained is not considered “temporary forward-looking injunctive relief.”

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