In Plonski v. Amador-Hodgson, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 48 (App. Div. Jan. 12, 2026), Allan Amador-Hodgson, a bus driver for New Jersey Transit (NJT), was driving a NJT bus up the New Jersey Turnpike, just below the speed limit of 65 m.p.h. Ahead of him he saw a box truck, operated by Adam Plonski (with the two plaintiffs, his relatives, as passengers), traveling between 30 to 33 m.p.h. Unable to change lanes to the left lane due to a tractor trailer (itself traveling above 70 m.p.h.), Amador-Hodgson attempted to slow down and change lanes as the tractor trailer passed, but failed to do so in time, causing the right-front portion of the bus to strike the left-rear portion of the box truck, injuring the plaintiffs.
After the plaintiffs filed suit against Amador-Hodgson and NJT (Defendants) for their negligence in causing the accident, the Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Plonski and his employer, alleging Plonski himself was negligent for driving the box truck too slowly and contributed to cause of the accident. Before the case went to the jury, Plonski (along with his employer and the plaintiffs) filed motions for summary judgment based on the dash-cam video from the bus and Amador-Hodgson’s testimony (in which he lied, saying the box truck cut him off) claiming Amador-Hodgson alone was 100% liable for the accident. The trial court agreed, finding that no additional discovery could affect the issue of liability. Amador-Hodgson filed a motion for reconsideration which included expert testimony describing a “looming crash,” a crash that arises when a vehicle traveling with the flow of traffic rear-ends a vehicle ahead traveling far below the flow of traffic due to the difficulty inherent in the trailing driver’s ability to judge that vehicle’s speed. Though denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court acknowledged New Jersey Administrative Code (NJAC) itself established a minimum speed for the turnpike at 35 m.p.h. Nevertheless, the trial court still found the Defendant could not establish Plonski’s speed caused the accident because “no reasonable fact-finder could conclude Plonski driving too slowly makes him at all liable for this accident,” and his speed, at best, was trivial factor in the accident. The court concluded that the “evidential record is so one sided” that the Defendants must be deemed 100% liable as a matter of law.
On appeal, the Appellate Division disagreed, reversed, and sent the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. The appellate court found that the trial court improperly stepped into the shoes of the jury in determining that Plonski’s driving the box truck at 30 m.p.h. played no role in the causing the accident. Indeed, the appellate court specifically noted that the trial court referred to the NJAC which itself established Plonski could share in some liability for the accident. It determined that, particularly at the summary judgment stage, when a juror could conclude Plonski breached his duty to drive the box truck as a reasonable driver would under the circumstances, it was not the court’s role to weigh evidence and determine truth, but only to determine whether there were any genuine issues of material fact for trial. Since there was a genuine issue as to whether Plonski’s speed was a causal factor in the accident, it was up to the jury, not the court, to make that determination.
Conventional wisdom often suggests liability is all but a foregone conclusion in rear-end accidents. However, the Appellate Division’s affirmation here undermines that belief. Knowing that, under certain circumstances, the operator of a vehicle travelling unsafely below the speed limit or flow of traffic may be the legal cause of a rear-end accident and create liability for the operator, a similarly-situated defendant may have an avenue of inquiry and legal argument for shared liability.