Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff Linda Emmanoulidis was walking her dog in Enos Park in Jersey City when she tripped and fell on an uneven pavement and sustained injuries. The issue in Emmanoulidis v. City of Jersey City, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 477 (App. Div. Mar. 30, 2023) was whether the City could be liable for a pedestrian accident caused by a trip and fall on an uneven pavement under the Tort Claims Act.

Prior to her fall, Plaintiff had never walked in the area before and did not know how long the condition existed. After her fall, Plaintiff retained an engineering expert who opined that the elevation of the crack where Plaintiff stated she fell was 1/2 – 3/4 inches. In his report, the expert noted that some of the concrete sidewalk slabs showed signs of repairs but not in the specific area where plaintiff fell. The report did not indicate when the repairs were done and who performed the work.

Plaintiff sued the City of Jersey City claiming that the uneven pavement was a dangerous condition which caused her accident. The City moved for summary judgment dismissal, contending that the plaintiff had not established the existence of a dangerous condition of which the City had actual or constructive notice. In addition, the City contended plaintiff did not demonstrate that the City’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  In response to the motion, plaintiff presented a certification from her brother-in-law, a retired Jersey City police officer. He certified that, in course of his job, he had searched evidence in the area where plaintiff fell and the condition of the pavement was exactly as it was on the day she fell for at least four years.

The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated the uneven sidewalk was a dangerous condition and that the City had actual or constructive notice of the “declivity in the walkway.” The Court reviewed the photographs on record and concluded that the condition was not so open and obvious to provide the City of constructive notice of a dangerous condition. 

Upon appeal, plaintiff argued that the court erred in finding: 1) the uneven pavement was not a dangerous condition; 2) the City was aware of the dangerous condition; and 3) the City’s failure to fix the dangerous condition was palpably unreasonable. The Appellate Division noted that under the Tort Claims Act, a dangerous condition exists when there is a defect in the physical condition of the property itself. The Court held that whether the defect in the pavement was a dangerous condition could be left to the jury for determination.

To determine the issue of notice, the Court considered that the plaintiff could not establish: 1) the duration for which the crack was present; 2) there was no evidence to show that the City had actual knowledge of the crack; 3) the City had no record of any complaints regarding the crack; and 4) the certification offered by plaintiff’s brother-in-law did not satisfy the notice to public entity standard. In addition, plaintiff could not show the crack was open and obvious. Thus, the Appellate Division held that plaintiff did not demonstrate that the City had actual or constructive notice of the defect. Therefore, the Court ruled that the plaintiff did not establish that the City was liable under the Tort Claims Act and affirmed the summary judgment dismissal.

Plaintiff Berta Abreu Flores was injured as a result of a collision by the defendant North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue Department’s fire engine.  During a training exercise, the fire engine crossed the road and struck the front of her residence opposite the fire house where plaintiff was working on the first floor.  She claimed an injury from the accident, including a hearing loss, shoulder injury, and a loss of balance.   The issue in Flores v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1928 (App. Div. Oct. 27, 2023) was whether the plaintiff’s injuries satisfied the substantiality and permanency of the Tort Claims Act verbal threshold under N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d).

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was operating a tax preparation business out of the first floor of the residence.  While she was working, the defendant fire company was conducting a training exercise at a fire station.  The fire engine crossed the road, struck the front of the residence where she was working, and the impact damaged the building’s support columns.  While plaintiff was speaking with one of her employees, the employee saw the wall coming down.  She yanked plaintiff from her chair by her right arm. 

After plaintiff was pulled from her desk, she immediately began to have pain on the left side of her head.  She noted fragments of glass that were in her hair and a lump in her head.  She was taken to a local emergency room where she reported pain in her left side, head, and shoulder and dizziness.

She continued to experience pain in the weeks following the accident but did continue to work until the end of the tax season.  She has not worked since that time. 

About four months after the accident, plaintiff went to an audiologist with complaints of “hearing loss, dizziness, nasal congestion, and difficulty maintaining her balance.”  The audiologist tested her and found that plaintiff had decreased hearing in both ears and injury to her brain stem.  He further diagnosed her with a loss of balance.  He attributed the hearing deficits and loss of balance to the incident.  Plaintiff tried to take Lasix for the dizziness but the drug’s side effects caused kidney damage and it had to be discontinued.  After that drug was discontinued, plaintiff’s loss of balance worsened.  Although her hearing problems persisted to some extent, she did not obtain hearing aids. 

She also sustained injury to her right shoulder and treated with an orthopedist who diagnosed her with a tear of the supraspinatus tendon.  After physical therapy failed to resolve her shoulder symptoms, she underwent an arthroscopic rotator cuff repair.  She continued to have post-surgery about a 10% loss of full function in her right shoulder.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the fire department and two of its employees as a result of the accident.  She claims that the defendants were negligent in causing the accident. 

Following the completion of discovery, defendants filed for a summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims of pain and suffering.  Defendants argued that her post-accident medical problems were not substantial and permanent, as required under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), to pursue a claim for pain and suffering.  In the opposition to the motion, the plaintiff attested to her balance and hearing problems.  In particular, she noted that she was losing her balance at least twice each day on average and had fallen recently. 

Nevertheless, the trial court judge granted summary judgment to the defendants.  He found that the plaintiff’s medical experts did not show that the damage to her hearing loss was substantial.  He found that she did not require a hearing aid and she was still able to return to work.  She was also able to finish the tax season.  As for her right shoulder, the trial court judge found that plaintiff had not shown by objective medical evidence that the injuries resulted in a loss of bodily function that was substantial.  However, he did not comment on her imbalance problems.

This summary judgment dismissal was appealed to the Appellate Division.  The Court noted that under the Tort Claims Act verbal threshold provision, for the plaintiff to obtain a monetary award, plaintiff must prove a “permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment.”  Under New Jersey case law, the courts have construed this provision to require that the claimant suffer an “objective” permanent injury or disfigurement that is “substantial.” 

Thus, the courts have set up a 2-prong standard in evaluating whether the plaintiff’s injuries constitute a permanent loss of bodily function.  First, the plaintiff must prove that there is an objective medical evidence of a permanent injury and then, second, plaintiff must prove that there is a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial.

In reviewing the record, the Appellate Division agreed that the plaintiff’s shoulder injury and hearing loss claim did not vault the verbal threshold.  The trial court judge found from the medical evidence that plaintiff’s shoulder injury had been effectively resolved through surgery.  The 10% estimated residual limitation on her shoulder functions was not sufficiently “substantial” to qualify to the statute.  Further, she had not prevented sufficient evidence that her post-surgery shoulder condition had substantially restricted her daily life activities. 

The Appellate Division found that a closer question was whether the plaintiff’s hearing loss claims vaulted the threshold.  Again, however, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that it was not sufficient.  It noted that none of the plaintiff’s expert had expressed a numerical value as to the plaintiff’s diminution of hearing.  Further, it did not rise to the level to be a substantial limitation on her daily life activities.  It was not severe enough for plaintiff to obtain the aid of a hearing device.  Further, plaintiff admitted that, with attentiveness, she was able to engage in normal conversation with others. 

However, the Appellate Division reached a different conclusion with respect to the plaintiff’s ongoing deficits of balance.  Her medical documentation did establish that she has suffered significant problems with her balance, as often as twice per day.  The Court concluded that plaintiff’s frequent and persistent loss of balance post-Lasix presented a genuine issue of material fact under the Tort Claims Act.  Thus, it reversed the summary judgment.

When the case is tried, the Court noted that the jury verdict’s form should contain a specific inquiry concerning the loss of balance.  If that loss is found by the jury to surmount the threshold, then plaintiff’s other injuries caused by the accident could also be compensated.

Hence, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded it back for further proceedings.

Plaintiff T.R.C. through his guardian ad litem Ada Cardenas filed a personal injury complaint against defendants, Harrison Board of Education, Harrison In District Day School, and the Town of Harrison due to an injury in the preschool program at the Harrison In District Day School.  The minor plaintiff, while playing on the playground equipment, fell and fractured his left elbow.  The issue in Child T.R.C. v. Harrison In District Day School, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1797 (App. Div. Oct. 18, 2023) was whether the minor’s injury qualified as a “permanent loss of bodily injury function,” as required by the Tort Claims Act to be able to sue for pain and suffering.

The injury happened while the minor and his classmates were at a playground near the school during recess.  The minor fell from a platform, landed on his left arm and suffered a left elbow injury.  He underwent surgery to repair a displaced lateral condyle fracture in his left elbow which required the placement of two pins.  After the surgery, his arm was in a long arm cast for five weeks, after which the pins were removed.  He then underwent a year of physical therapy.

At the conclusion of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the minor had not suffered a permanent loss of bodily function.  The trial court agreed with the argument and dismissed the complaint.  This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division noted that under New Jersey law, to recover for pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act, “a plaintiff must show (1) an objective permanent injury and (2) a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial.”  For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the trial court had assumed that the minor plaintiff had presented objective medical evidence of a permanent bodily injury under the first prong.  The issue was the second prong and whether the plaintiff’s injuries were considered “substantial.”

Here, the testimony was that the minor plaintiff could no longer participate in gym class because of this injury.  He could no longer write using his left arm.  He was unable to partake in his favorite pastimes such as playing sports, playing with his friends and playing at the playground.  He is unable to dress himself.  Further, the minor’s father testified that he was embarrassed about his scars and that he now eats with his right hand instead of his left.

The plaintiff provided expert testimony that concluded more likely than not that the minor had sustained a permanent injury that will have a permanent residual sequelae. The minor also presented a plastic surgery expert, reporting that the minor’s left elbow had several scars, including the larger one which was 5 cm. by 1 cm.  He also had three smaller scars that were all hypopigmented.  The plaintiff’s plastic surgeon expert opined that the scars were permanent in nature.

The defendants presented an orthopedic defense expert who opined that the plaintiff did have some permanent losses, including scars about the lateral elbow with a loss of range of motion of about 10% and a loss of grip strength.

Based upon these facts, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he sustained a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial.  It was undisputed by the defendant’s orthopedic expert that the plaintiff still had a 10 degree decreased range of motion in his elbow, along with reduced grip strength in his left hand.  This limitation along with his alleged inability to dress himself, participate in gym class, participate in sports and write with his left hand created a legitimate fact issue as to whether the plaintiff had met the permanency threshold.  Given the plaintiff’s young age, his significant life expectancy, and the genuine prospect that he may face a lifetime of limitations for these permanent residuals, the Court held that “a jury could find plaintiff demonstrated a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial.”

Further, the Appellate Division noted that the trial court had not sufficiently addressed the plaintiff’s scarring.  The plaintiff had argued that the scars constituted a permanent disfigurement.  However, there was no indication as to whether plaintiff provided the court with photos of the scar or have plaintiff appear before the court so as to give the judge an opportunity to observe the scars.

The Appellate Division noted that a permanent disfigurement could qualify as a permanent injury under the Tort Claims Act but the scar “must impair or injure the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person, rendering the bearer unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, or deforming them in some manner.”  Thus, the Court held that, upon remand, the plaintiff shall brief the issue and provide the trial court with photos or an opportunity to view the scars in person so the record may be properly developed.  The trial court would then be in a position to perform the requisite analysis under the applicable case law to determine whether the minor plaintiff’s scars constituted a permanent disfigurement.

Based upon all the facts, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court decision and remanded it back to the trial court.  The Court found that, for purposes of summary judgment, plaintiff had demonstrated a material factual dispute as to whether his elbow injuries met the requirements of the Tort Claims Act so as to permit him to pursue a pain and suffering claim.

By: Ruhani K. Aulakh, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Priscilla Godoy was standing in between two parked cars in a line of several cars on May 5, 2018.  As she was standing in between these cars, a Jeep Cherokee involved in a police chase crashed into a parked car several feet away from Godoy.  The crash caused all the parked cars to collide, crushing Godoy.  As a result of this collision, Godoy sustained fatal injuries.  The issues in Godoy v. Washington, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1170 (App. Div. July 13, 2023) were whether the police officers pursuing the Cherokee were negligent and reckless in their pursuit and whether the police officers engaged in willful misconduct in the apprehension of the Cherokee.

On May 5, 2018, defendant police officers Paul Hamilton and Vanessa Lorenzo were on duty in Newark.  The officers spotted a Jeep Cherokee that was stolen during an armed carjacking earlier that night for which the Newark Police Department had issued a Be on the Lookout Order (“BOLO”).  Hamilton and Lorenzo attempted to stop the car; however, the Cherokee did not stop, so the defendants began a pursuit with Hamilton driving. 

During the pursuit, the police officer’s vehicle traveled at around forty-five miles per hour, while the Cherokee traveled at approximately fifty-five miles per hour.  The pursuit was monitored by a Communications Division Officer and a field supervisor; however, officers Hamilton and Lorenzo did not inform their supervisor of the speed of the Cherokee.

The pursuit lasted approximately ninety-five seconds.  After sixty seconds, the driver of the Cherokee veered off road into a park where the driver went over a speed bump and lost control of the vehicle.  This caused a chain reaction which involved three additional vehicles, pinning Godoy between two of these vehicles.  After Godoy was injured, the driver of the Cherokee fled the scene, but officers Hamilton and Lorenzo did not pursue him.

Godoy’s estate filed suit against the two defendant police officers, arguing that the defendants were negligent and reckless in their pursuit of the Cherokee.  Further, the plaintiff argued that the defendants acted with willful misconduct in not complying with policies while continuing the pursuit.

In deciding to pursue the Cherokee, the defendants were governed by procedures set forth both in the Newark Police Division General Order and the New Jersey Attorney General’s Policy.  Both policies authorize officers to pursue a vehicle when they reasonably believe that a violator has committed an offense and they believe that violator poses an immediate threat to the safety of the public.  Once the officers choose to pursue the vehicle, they must immediately notify the Communications Division of pertinent information, such as the reason for the pursuit, the direction of travel, identifying factors of the vehicle, and the speed of the pursued vehicle. 

The plaintiff conceded that the defendants were justified in their pursuit of the vehicle; however, the plaintiff argued that the officers were in violation of policy when they did not report the speed of the pursued vehicle.  The defendant police officers moved for summary judgment, claiming that under the Tort Claims Act, they were immune from liability.  The trial court granted summary judgment on all counts, holding that the defendants were immune from liability unless there was evidence of willful misconduct.  The lower court further reasoned that there was no evidence of willful misconduct because reporting the speed of the pursued vehicle was not a requirement; rather, it was up to the discretion of the police officers.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of the defendants’ willful misconduct.  The plaintiff further argued that the trial court erred in determining that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on good faith immunity.

In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Appellate Division first analyzed good faith immunity.  The court upheld that the officers were immunized, looking to state Supreme Court precedent from Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 367 (1993).  There, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 59:5-2 immunizes absolutely all negligence of a public employee when the negligence, combined with the conduct of the escaping person, leads to injury.  The Court set forth a narrow exception in that decision, holding that immunity does not exonerate a public officer from liability if their conduct was outside of the scope of employment or constituted willful misconduct.

To determine whether the narrow willful misconduct exception applied in this case, the Appellate Division again looked to state Supreme Court precedent in Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 123-30 (1995), which defined willful misconduct in the context of a police pursuit.  There, the Court established a two part test for willful misconduct which required that the public employee disobey a specific lawful command or standing order and that the public employee intended to violate it.

Here, the Appellate Division applied the Fielder test and held that in order for the plaintiff to establish willful misconduct, the plaintiff must have demonstrated that the defendants disobeyed a standing order that required them to report the speed of the Cherokee to Communications and that the defendants knew of the standing order, knew that they were violating it, and intended to violate it.  The Court held that because there was no standing order requiring the defendant officers to report the speed of the Cherokee, there was no willful misconduct on their behalf.  Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The New Jersey Tort Claims Act provides that “a public entity is not liable for an injury” caused by an act or omission “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this act.” Under the Act, immunity is the rule and liability is the exception. Posey ex rel. v. Bordentown Sewerage Auth., 171 N.J. 172 (2002). One exception to this immunity under the Tort Claims Act is the provision in N.J.S.A. 59:4-4, which places a duty on a public entity for damages proximately caused by its failure to provide warning of a dangerous condition which “endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.”

A public entity is responsible for warning the public of a dangerous condition on its property. However, the Appellate Division has held that a public entity cannot be held liable under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 for a condition of a property it does not own, control, or maintain absent actual notice of that specific condition. See DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co., 233 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1989) (emphasis added). The important question in DeBonis was whether a public entity could be held liable simply because an accident occurred within its boundaries. The Appellate Division ultimately upheld the trial court’s ruling that failure of a public entity to warn of a dangerous condition that merely lies within its boundaries is not sufficient to impose liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 absent actual notice.

In DeBonis, the plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident caused by the presence of many small stones in the roadway that allegedly came from the Orange Quarry Company. The plaintiff sued Orange Quarry Company and H.B. Mellot Estate, Inc. who were involved in crushing and transporting the stones. The plaintiff also sued Essex County as the owner of the roadway and West Orange Township, arguing the Township failed to warn of the stones in the roadway.

The trial court construed the Tort Claims Act to require proof the public entity had actual notice of the dangerous condition where the public entity was not the owner of the property to impose liability. Constructive notice was not sufficient. The Appellate Division affirmed the ruling, holding that West Orange Township did not have actual notice of the stones in the roadway and could not be held liable under the Act.

The Burlington County Superior Court recently granted a motion for summary judgment, submitted by Capehart & Scatchard on behalf of Evesham Township, in a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the estate of a woman who was tragically struck and killed by a vehicle while crossing Route 70 at its intersection with Troth Road in Evesham Township.

The accident occurred at night and Plaintiff (the estate) alleged that the overhead streetlights at the intersection were inoperable, making the intersection too dark for vehicular and pedestrian traffic and thereby creating a dangerous condition under the Act. Numerous entities were sued in addition to Evesham Township.

The State of New Jersey owned and maintained Route 70. The State also owned and maintained the overhead streetlights that were alleged to have been inoperable at the time of the accident. The accident occurred within the boundaries of Evesham Township, but Evesham Township did not own, control, or maintain either Route 70 or the overhead streetlights.

Plaintiff argued that Evesham Township police officers would travel through the intersection where the accident occurred numerous times a shift and would have had countless opportunities to see that the overhead lights were inoperable. However, the trial court held that there was no evidence of actual notice – only constructive notice. The record was devoid of any evidence that any officer, or anyone from Evesham Township, was aware that the overheard streetlights were inoperable before the accident. The only argument made was that the officers should have known the lights were out by the number of times they would have travelled through the intersection. The Court ruled that this “constructive notice” was insufficient. As such, Evesham Township could not be held liable for failing to warn of a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 and was dismissed from the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Alyssa Molcho was riding her bicycle on Heath Avenue in Ocean Township when she swerved to avoid a car and claimed that her rear tire went into a pothole.  That caused her to fall off her bike and onto the curb, resulting in injuries. The issue in Molcho v. Township of Ocean, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1401 (App. Div. August 11, 2023) was whether the Township could be liable for the condition of its roadway in allegedly causing the plaintiff’s accident.

Prior to the date of the accident, plaintiff had sent an e-mail to the Township’s Director of Public Works, complaining generally about the condition of Heath Avenue.  She sent him a few photographs of potholes in the road but not of the area where her accident occurred.  According to her e-mail, she had contacted public works several times since she moved to the area regarding repaving of the street.

The Director of Public Works responded to plaintiff’s complaint.  He noted that he was aware of the area to which she was referring.  He advised that this area was slated for milling and paving under the Township’s road improvement program.

Ocean Township had a road improvement program for which it would select roads for repaving to be funded out of its budget for capital improvements.  The Township’s engineer would prepare an annual list, based upon inspections performed by the Department of Public Works, grading the Township’s roads on a scale from 0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect road and 0 being the worst road.  This list would then be presented to the Township Manager with a recommendation of the roads to repave, along with the cost estimates for doing so.  In turn, the Township Manager would include the estimates in the Township’s proposed annual budget.  Once the budget was approved, the Township would put the work out for bid.  After the contracts were awarded, the contractor would schedule the work.  This entire process took about two years from inspection to repaving.  This particular road was not repaved until two months after plaintiff’s accident.

At the trial court level, the Township filed a motion for a summary judgment.  That motion was granted by the trial court judge.  The judge found that plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence about this specific pothole that she claims caused her to fall off her bike.  Plaintiff had failed to identify the specific pothole, produced no photos of it, no measurements and any person who saw the pothole in question either before or after plaintiff’s accident. 

The trial court judge held that the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of a dangerous condition.  For purposes of the motion, however, the judge found that even if the court assumed that plaintiff had presented evidence that the road was in a dangerous condition, she was unable to establish either actual or constructive notice on the part of the Township of the alleged pothole that caused her fall based upon her failure to have ever identified the specific pothole that caused her accident.

The trial court judge rejected plaintiff’s argument that her complaints to the Township about the general condition of her street was sufficient to put the Township on notice. Because she was never able to describe the specific pothole or present evidence describing it, the trial court judge found that “she could not establish the pothole was of such an obvious nature and had existed for a sufficient time to have allowed the Township exercising due care, to have discovered and corrected the dangerous condition.” Without actual or constructive notice of the pothole, the judge found that plaintiff could not establish that the Township’s failure to have patched the pothole and repaved the road sooner was “palpably unreasonable.”

This decision was appealed to the Appellate Division.   The plaintiff argued that the Township had actual or constructive notice of the pothole that caused her fall because it had notice of the general deteriorated condition of the roadway in which plaintiff fell, which was necessitating it being repaved.  Plaintiff argued that the Township “can hardly argue simultaneously that it had no notice of a dangerous condition but nevertheless responded reasonably to it.”

Pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (N.J.S.A. 59:4-2), for a public entity to be liable for an injury caused by a condition of its property, a plaintiff must establish “that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred.”  Further, the plaintiff must prove that either an employee of the public entity created that condition or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition with “a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”  Further, this statute states that nothing in this provision shall “impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonably.”

The Appellate Division considered the provisions of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 and upheld the trial court’s decision.  The Court agreed with the trial court judge “that it is difficult to see how a plaintiff could prove a public entity’s property was in a dangerous condition without identifying specifically the property – here, the pothole that caused plaintiff to fall off a bicycle.”  While in prior case law, complaints of neighborhood residents about a dangerous condition may serve to establish actual or constructive notice to a municipality of that condition, one neighbor’s complaint about a dangerous condition in a particular location does not serve as notice of the same or similar dangerous condition at a different location on the street.

Hence, applying this case law, the Court noted that the plaintiff complained about the condition of another area of the street prior to the accident.  Plaintiff’s complaint putting the Township on notice of an alleged dangerous condition of other parts of her street “did not serve as notice of a dangerous condition of the place where she fell.”

The plaintiff attempted to argue that the Township should have notice of the dangerous condition of its street when it is so full of potholes that any of them may cause an injury.  While the Court accepted for argument’s sake “that a residential street would be in a dangerous condition if it had so many potholes that a bicycle rider trying to avoid one would be dashed into another, plaintiff did not establish that Heath Avenue was riddled with potholes or that a crowd of them littered the street at the time of her fall.”

The Court noted that there was not a description or any pictures of the area where plaintiff claims she fell. Hence, the Court found that she failed to establish the existence of an issue of material fact regarding whether there was a dangerous condition of Heath Avenue and the place where she fell. 

Further, the Appellate Division found that even if it was assumed that she had established a dangerous condition and that the public entity was on notice, she “failed utterly to establish that Ocean Township’s act of selecting parts of Heath Avenue for repaving through its road improvement program or its failure to have repaved those parts sooner was palpably unreasonable.”  Under the palpably unreasonable standard, plaintiff would need to supply proof that the Township’s action was “manifest and obvious that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction.”  The Appellate Division found that the plaintiff had failed to meet this standard as well. 

Hence, the trial court decision was affirmed, upholding the summary judgment order granted to the Township.

Client: Township of Evesham

Court: Superior Court of New Jersey – Burlington County 

Brief Attorney: Edward F. Kuhn III, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

On September 28, 2019,  Tori Gerstenacker was a pedestrian crossing Route 70 at its intersection with Troth Road in Evesham Township when she was struck and killed by a car driven by Clay Erickson. Mr. Erickson alleges that he was traveling eastbound on Route 70 and had a green light as he was about to enter the intersection at Troth Road. He did not see Ms. Gerstenacker who was crossing Route 70 in the crosswalk but crossing against a red light.

Plaintiff’s counsel alleges that there were three overhead streetlights at the intersection that were inoperable at the time of the accident making the intersection extremely dark and creating a dangerous condition for motorists and pedestrians. Plaintiff sued numerous entities including Evesham Township and the State of New Jersey.

Route 70 is a state-owned and maintained road. The state also owned and maintained the overhead streetlights. We moved for summary judgment on behalf of Evesham Township arguing that it did not own or control either Route 70 or the overhead streetlights. Plaintiff argued that Evesham Township should have been on notice of the inoperable streetlights because of the number of times its police officers travel through that intersection daily.

The court granted our summary judgment holding that Evesham Township cannot be held liable under the Tort Claims Act when it does not own or control any of the property in question unless it had actual notice of the inoperable streetlights and failed to provide proper warnings. There was no evidence that Eveshsam Township had any notice of the inoperable streetlights and summary judgment was granted.

This matter arose from a tragic fire that occurred on April 8, 2021, at the three-story single-family residence owned by the defendant Newark Housing Authority and occupied by plaintiff Kadisha Jones Richardson and her five children.  Plaintiff Tyron Hartfield, the biological father of four of the five children, was also present at the time of the fire.  During the fire, plaintiffs’ seven-year-old son, Saahir, passed away.  Further family tragedies happened after the fire.  The issue in Richardson v. Newark Housing Authority, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1119 (App. Div. July 5, 2023) was whether the trial court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim to permit plaintiff to sue the Newark Housing Authority for losses suffered from the fire.  No tort claim notice had been filed in the required ninety (90) day time period following the loss.

In addition to the trauma of suffering the death of their son, Hartfield suffered a broken ankle in his attempt to rescue his son and the entirety of the family’s possessions were destroyed.  Plaintiffs and their family were forced to move in with Richardson’s mother.  During this time, Richardson was also caring for her mother, whose physical health was declining.  Less than three months after the fire, Richardson’s mother suffered a stroke and was hospitalized and ultimately passed away.  Further, Richardson was injured in a serious car accident.

In their motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim, plaintiffs certified that in the months following the fire, they suffered from depression and anxiety from the loss of their son and their stress was further compounded by attending to the mental well being of their other children who had lost their brother and then Richardson’s mother.  Although plaintiffs received a death certificate on April 16, 2021, they still did not have the official cause of death or cause of the fire until November 2021.  On October 29, 2021, the plaintiffs had consulted a law firm for the first time.  However, on December 2, 2021, that law firm declined representation.

Plaintiffs retained their current counsel in March 2022.  Once counsel was retained, counsel promptly filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim on April 6, 2022, just two days shy of the one-year anniversary of the fire.  The trial court found that though plaintiffs did not file within the notice of tort claim within the required ninety (90) days of the accrual date, they did demonstrate extraordinary circumstances which permitted a late filing.  Specifically, the trial court found that there was excusable neglect on the part of the plaintiffs due to the extraordinary circumstances present.  The court found that the plaintiffs had suffered life-altering events and resulting psychological traumas which continued well beyond the ninety (90) days to file following the April 8, 2021 fire.  Thus, the trial court granted the motion to permit the late filing of the tort claim notice to permit the plaintiffs to pursue the Newark Housing Authority in a lawsuit.

The Newark Housing Authority appealed that order, arguing that there were no extraordinary circumstances present.  The Housing Authority argued that plaintiffs were physically capable of contacting an attorney in a timely fashion and should have done so at the earliest opportunity, irrespective of their constructive or actual knowledge of the ninety (90) day window for filing the notice of tort claim.

Upon appeal, the Appellate Division noted that for a claimant to pursue a claim against a public entity for personal injuries, it must file a notice of tort claim not later than the nineth (90th) day after accrual of the cause of action, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.  The date of accrual of a cause of action in tort is typically the date of the incident.  The penalty for failing to file a timely notice of tort claim is that the claimant is forever barred from bringing their claim against the public entity. 

However, the Court noted that the Act provides an exception to plaintiffs where the ninety (90) day period has lapsed and allows prospective claimants to file a motion within one year from the accrual of the cause of action “where they demonstrate extraordinary circumstances” to justify filing a late notice of tort claim.  Pursuant to the statute, the claimant must also demonstrate that the public entity has not been substantially prejudiced by the late notice.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court judge exercised “appropriate discretion” in determining extraordinary circumstances existed in the present facts.  The Court disagreed with the defendant’s argument that extraordinary circumstances equated to physical incapacity.  The Appellate Division noted that there was nothing in the statute or case law that required a plaintiff be physically unable to contact an attorney.  Although physical incapability may be sufficient to prove extraordinary circumstances, it is not a necessary pre-condition for a finding of extraordinary circumstances.  The Appellate Division noted that the trial judges are afforded a wide latitude in determining extraordinary circumstances.

Thus, the Court agreed with the trial court findings that extraordinary circumstances were present based upon the facts of the case.  Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, permitting the claim to move forward, based upon the strong public policy in favor of resolving the application on the merits. 

Plaintiff Nancy Valdez was at a multi-story parking garage in Union City, owned by the Union City Parking Authority (UCPA), on December 11, 2017.  She was at the garage to renew her residential parking pass.  Due to a prior snowstorm, snow piled on an upper deck melted and re-froze on the downhill parking ramp.  As she walked on the parking ramp, she slipped and fell.  The issue in Valdez v. Union City Parking Authority, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 954 (App. Div. June 13, 2023) was whether the UCPA was immune from liability for injuries resulting from snow removal by a public entity.

The snowstorm, two days earlier, had left about four inches of snow on the ground.  UCPA employees removed the snow and, on the top floor, where the UCPA Administrative Offices were located, they piled it on the sloped deck uphill from the incident site. 

In the days following the storm, due to temperature fluctuations, melt/refreeze conditions occurred.  Because the top floor of the garage had no roof, the snow piled by the UCPA employees melted and the resulting water subsequently froze. 

On the day of the accident, Nancy was there to renew her residential parking pass.  She parked her car on the street and took an elevator to the top floor offices. 

She left the offices of the UCPA and walked along the top floor downhill parking ramp, attempting to exit the garage.  As she walked down the ramp, she slipped and fell on ice and suffered physical injuries.

Thereafter, she sued the Union City Parking Authority to recover for her injuries.  She claimed that the UCPA’s negligence resulted in a dangerous condition at the parking garage. 

After discovery concluded, UCPA filed for a summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the common law immunity from liability for injuries resulting from snow removal by a public entity.  The trial court granted the UCPA’s motion, dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division and argued that the exception to the common law snow removal immunity established for public housing authorities in Bligen v. Jersey City Housing Authority should be applied to the facts in this case.  However, the Appellate Division rejected that argument.

The Court noted that the common law snow removal activities immunity survived the passage of the Tort Claims Act.  The rationale behind this immunity was that: “if liability were to be imposed on a public entity for injuries caused by its snow removal, it would be required to broom sweep the areas from which it removed snow.”  Further, the Court noted that the high cost of such an undertaking could make the expense of any extensive program of snow removal prohibitive.  Because “the public is greatly benefitted even by snow removal which does not attain the acme of perfection of “broom swept streets,” a public entity would not be held liable for injuries arising from its snow removal activities.”

The Bligen decision, dealt with a slip and fall at the Jersey City Housing Authority, when the plaintiff slipped on ice and fell as she stepped off curb into the parking lot of the complex.  In the Bligen case, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to extend common law snow removal immunity to the Housing Authority.

However, the Appellate Division noted that the Bligen case was a narrow exception to the snow removal immunity. The rationale of the Supreme Court, in not applying the immunity in the Bligen case, was that municipal landlords should be responsible for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions.

Here, the Bligen case did not apply because the Parking Authority was not found to be the equivalent of a public housing authority.  Absent a contrary holding by the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division declined to extend the holding in Bligen to claims raised against any entity other than a public housing authority.

Hence, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit against the Union City Parking Authority.

Plaintiff Patrice Powers-Feigel was walking on the shoulder of Nosenzo Pond Road in West Milford when she slipped on gravel and her foot got caught on the edge of a pothole or uneven pavement.  She tripped and fell into the street, resulting in serious injuries.  The issue in Powers-Feigel v. Township of West Milford, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 495 (App. Div. Apr. 3, 2023), was whether the Township could be responsible for a pedestrian accident caused by a trip in a pothole located in the shoulder of a road.

Prior to her fall, plaintiff had walked in the same area about 25 times before without incident.  On that date, she had to walk around the base ring of a construction barrel on the shoulder before she fell.  The parking lot across the street from where she fell was under construction.  There was no walkway or sidewalk in the area where she was walking.

After her fall, plaintiff retained an engineering expert who opined that the crack in which she caught her foot measured 2½ inches wide by 1¼ deep.  He stated that the pavement surface was uneven and lacked a physical border to the pavement at the edge of the roadway, causing a tripping hazard.  He relied upon standards pertaining to walkways and sidewalks in concluding the shoulder was a dangerous condition.  He did not cite to any standards for roadway shoulder lanes in his report.

Plaintiff sued the Township of West Milford claiming that there was a dangerous condition that caused her accident.  During discovery, the supervisor of the Department of Public Works testified that the roadway was inspected weekly and cracks over ½ inch would require repair.  Plaintiff contended that this area of the shoulder could be construed as a bicycle path and further because three schools were located nearby, plaintiff asserted that recreational activity was not only the shoulder lane’s foreseeable use but it’s “intended and encouraged” use.

The defendant moved for a summary judgment dismissal, finding that the defendant was not liable to plaintiff under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  The court noted that the plaintiff “failed to establish the following necessary dangerous condition elements: (1) that the shoulder lane created a substantial risk of injury when it was used with due care in a reasonably foreseeable manner; and (2) that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the shoulder’s condition.”

With regard to plaintiff’s expert, the court rejected his opinion that the shoulder of a rural roadway must comply with the standards for walkways and sidewalks.  Further, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that a public entity must maintain shoulder lanes used by pedestrians to the same degree that they would maintain a sidewalk.  The court found no evidence that demonstrated the shoulder on this road was considered a “pedestrian walkway” by defendant.  The court concluded that the shoulder lane was not dedicated or intended for pedestrian traffic and no dangerous condition existed on the roadway.  This appeal followed that decision.

Upon appeal, the plaintiffs advanced the same argument that the shoulder’s condition created a substantial risk of injury and was a dangerous condition.  Further, that the defendant Township had actual or constructive knowledge of the shoulder’s condition.

The Appellate Division noted the well settled principle of the Tort Claims Act is that “immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception.”  Further, that “the mere happening of an accident on public property is insufficient to impose liability upon a public entity.”

More specifically, the Court noted that for the condition to be considered a “dangerous condition,” the “property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in the manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.”  It must be considered that the condition of the property cannot be minor and it must be considered together with the anticipated use of the property.

Case law has defined the term “used with due care” to mean an “objectively reasonable” use. 

Based upon the facts and the legal principles in this case, the Appellate Division found that the trial court properly granted summary judgment and affirmed that decision.  The Appellate Division reasoned that cracks in a highway may constitute a dangerous condition when the highway’s roadway or shoulder are used in a foreseeable manner.  However, the term “roadway” constitutes the portion of a highway ordinarily used for a vehicular travel and the “shoulder” is “that portion of the highway, exclusive of and bordering the roadway, designed for emergency use but not ordinarily to be used for vehicular travel.”

The Appellate Division concluded that based upon the facts of this case, “that no reasonable jury could find the pothole or long depression cracks or divots gave rise to a substantial risk of injury” to plaintiff.  Essentially, the Court found that the use of a shoulder was not intended for an exercising pedestrian.

Further, the plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition of the shoulder prior to her fall.  Plaintiff admitted to walking there 25 times before without noticing anything dangerous or hazardous about the shoulder surface.  The roadway was inspected weekly for defects.  There was no proof of similar accidents in the vicinity.  The Appellate Division was satisfied that the trial court correctly found that defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition that caused plaintiff’s fall and the Township’s inspection scheme was not “palpably unreasonable.”

Thus, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment and affirmed that decision, dismissing the lawsuit. 

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