By: Ruhani K. Aulakh, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.
Priscilla Godoy was standing in between two parked cars in a line of several cars on May 5, 2018. As she was standing in between these cars, a Jeep Cherokee involved in a police chase crashed into a parked car several feet away from Godoy. The crash caused all the parked cars to collide, crushing Godoy. As a result of this collision, Godoy sustained fatal injuries. The issues in Godoy v. Washington, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1170 (App. Div. July 13, 2023) were whether the police officers pursuing the Cherokee were negligent and reckless in their pursuit and whether the police officers engaged in willful misconduct in the apprehension of the Cherokee.
On May 5, 2018, defendant police officers Paul Hamilton and Vanessa Lorenzo were on duty in Newark. The officers spotted a Jeep Cherokee that was stolen during an armed carjacking earlier that night for which the Newark Police Department had issued a Be on the Lookout Order (“BOLO”). Hamilton and Lorenzo attempted to stop the car; however, the Cherokee did not stop, so the defendants began a pursuit with Hamilton driving.
During the pursuit, the police officer’s vehicle traveled at around forty-five miles per hour, while the Cherokee traveled at approximately fifty-five miles per hour. The pursuit was monitored by a Communications Division Officer and a field supervisor; however, officers Hamilton and Lorenzo did not inform their supervisor of the speed of the Cherokee.
The pursuit lasted approximately ninety-five seconds. After sixty seconds, the driver of the Cherokee veered off road into a park where the driver went over a speed bump and lost control of the vehicle. This caused a chain reaction which involved three additional vehicles, pinning Godoy between two of these vehicles. After Godoy was injured, the driver of the Cherokee fled the scene, but officers Hamilton and Lorenzo did not pursue him.
Godoy’s estate filed suit against the two defendant police officers, arguing that the defendants were negligent and reckless in their pursuit of the Cherokee. Further, the plaintiff argued that the defendants acted with willful misconduct in not complying with policies while continuing the pursuit.
In deciding to pursue the Cherokee, the defendants were governed by procedures set forth both in the Newark Police Division General Order and the New Jersey Attorney General’s Policy. Both policies authorize officers to pursue a vehicle when they reasonably believe that a violator has committed an offense and they believe that violator poses an immediate threat to the safety of the public. Once the officers choose to pursue the vehicle, they must immediately notify the Communications Division of pertinent information, such as the reason for the pursuit, the direction of travel, identifying factors of the vehicle, and the speed of the pursued vehicle.
The plaintiff conceded that the defendants were justified in their pursuit of the vehicle; however, the plaintiff argued that the officers were in violation of policy when they did not report the speed of the pursued vehicle. The defendant police officers moved for summary judgment, claiming that under the Tort Claims Act, they were immune from liability. The trial court granted summary judgment on all counts, holding that the defendants were immune from liability unless there was evidence of willful misconduct. The lower court further reasoned that there was no evidence of willful misconduct because reporting the speed of the pursued vehicle was not a requirement; rather, it was up to the discretion of the police officers.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of the defendants’ willful misconduct. The plaintiff further argued that the trial court erred in determining that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on good faith immunity.
In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Appellate Division first analyzed good faith immunity. The court upheld that the officers were immunized, looking to state Supreme Court precedent from Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 367 (1993). There, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 59:5-2 immunizes absolutely all negligence of a public employee when the negligence, combined with the conduct of the escaping person, leads to injury. The Court set forth a narrow exception in that decision, holding that immunity does not exonerate a public officer from liability if their conduct was outside of the scope of employment or constituted willful misconduct.
To determine whether the narrow willful misconduct exception applied in this case, the Appellate Division again looked to state Supreme Court precedent in Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 123-30 (1995), which defined willful misconduct in the context of a police pursuit. There, the Court established a two part test for willful misconduct which required that the public employee disobey a specific lawful command or standing order and that the public employee intended to violate it.
Here, the Appellate Division applied the Fielder test and held that in order for the plaintiff to establish willful misconduct, the plaintiff must have demonstrated that the defendants disobeyed a standing order that required them to report the speed of the Cherokee to Communications and that the defendants knew of the standing order, knew that they were violating it, and intended to violate it. The Court held that because there was no standing order requiring the defendant officers to report the speed of the Cherokee, there was no willful misconduct on their behalf. Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
