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Compensability

On December 15, 2016, a decision following trial in New Jersey was handed down on the question of whether medical marijuana can be ordered under workers’ compensation.  Petitioner Andrew Watson worked for 84 Lumber and was injured on November 6, 2008.  He received an award of one third of partial total in 2012 apportioned 50% of the hand and 12.5% for complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS).  The terms of the settlement required respondent to approve ongoing pain management treatment with Dr. Peter Corda.  Petitioner received prescriptions on a monthly basis, including 120 Endocet/Oxycodone tablets as well as other pain medications such as Ibuprofen 800mg and lidocaine patches.

In late 2013 petitioner consulted with Dr. Corda about participating in New Jersey’s medicinal marijuana program (MMP).  Dr. Corda referred petitioner to his partner, Dr. Jeffrey Drew Polcer, who possessed the required credentials to do medical marijuana evaluations.  Petitioner saw Dr. Polcer and complained of burning pain and swelling in his left hand with extreme sensitivity to light touch.  He said that his narcotic medications were not providing him with sufficient relief.  Petitioner admitted to Dr. Polcer that he had experimented with marijuana and obtained a significant reduction in pain.

Dr. Polcer diagnosed petitioner with neuropathic and complex regional pain syndrome of the left hand and recommended petitioner for medicinal marijuana.  He noted that neuropathic pain is one of the better indications for medicinal marijuana.  He further said that if successful with medicinal marijuana, petitioner should lower his use of narcotics.

The New Jersey Department of Health issued an Attending Physician Statement to the Petitioner which authorized petitioner to register for the MMP and purchase one ounce of marijuana per month for three consecutive months. Petitioner received his Patient Registration Card and then used the card to purchase medicinal marijuana at authorized dispensaries, making his first purchase on March 28, 2014.  Petitioner submitted the invoices and proof of cash payments to the respondent’s carrier for reimbursement, but the carrier denied reimbursement.

Petitioner filed an Emergent Motion to Enforce the terms of the Order Approving Settlement from 2012.  The respondent disputed Dr. Corda’s referral to his partner and contended Dr. Polcer was not an authorized physician.  Respondent also withdrew authorization of Dr. Corda in favor of Dr. Morris Antebi, who was asked to perform an IME of petitioner.

The Judge of Compensation, the Honorable Ingrid L. French, A.S.J.W.C., preliminarily entered an order requiring respondent to reinstate authorization of Dr. Peter Corda for pain management.  Trial then ensued on the central issue regarding medical marijuana as curative treatment.

Drs. Corda and Polcer refused to testify at trial because they had ongoing business relationships with the respondent’s third party administrator. Instead, petitioner offered the testimony of Dr.  Edward Tobe, Board Certified in Neurology and Psychiatry.  Respondent had petitioner examined by Dr. Morris Antebi, whose report supported the position of respondent.  However, Dr. Antebi also refused to testify and therefore his report was excluded from evidence.  Respondent tried to offer into evidence three explanatory letters written by Dr. Corda to the third party administrator in response to a request for explanation on his initial referral and Dr. Polcer’s recommendations. These three letters were written subsequent to Dr. Corda’s initial referral to Dr. Polcer for the MMP and tended to undercut Dr. Corda’s initial position in the case, but the trial judge would not allow these reports to go into evidence without Dr. Corda’s testimony, which he refused to provide.

Dr. Tobe testified that Dr. Polcer’s plan to begin a course of medicinal marijuana was medically appropriate.  He added that this plan made particular sense since it would lead to a reduction in the use of opiates. Dr. Tobe discussed the risks in using Percocet (oxycodone) in respect to kidney and liver function.  He said narcotics impact alertness, concentration, memory, and cognitive function, potentially causing emotional detachment.  In addition, possible side effects are loss of teeth, blurred vision, constipation, urinary retention and cardiac problems.

Concerning medical marijuana, Dr. Tobe said that the medicinal version is not tainted with contaminants that street marijuana might contain.  He said that one is less likely to have cravings with the medicinal product.  He did not agree that medicinal marijuana is a gateway drug, although he did admit that marijuana can have similar side effects as opiates in respect to withdrawal, impaired concentration and loss of memory. In his view, medicinal marijuana offers promising prospects as a pain management modality.

Based primarily on the testimony of Dr. Tobe, Judge French found that petitioner’s trial use of medical marijuana was medically warranted.  She concluded, “While the Court is sensitive to the controversy surrounding the medicinal use of marijuana, whether or not it should be prescribed for a patient in a state where it is legal to prescribe it, is a medical decision that is within the boundaries of the laws in the State of New Jersey.  In this case, there is no dispute that all of the credible evidence presented confirms that this Petitioner is an appropriate candidate for New Jersey’s medical marijuana program.”

An equally significant aspect of this case had to do with respondent’s challenge to the referral by Dr. Corda to Dr. Polcer.  The judge focused on the issue of whether a respondent has a right to object to a referral from the authorized doctor to another physician.  “Whether it is a second opinion directed by a Respondent/Carrier or a referral to an alternative specialty directed by an authorized doctor, this Court interprets the statutory language as requiring an analysis that focuses on whether the referral is in the best interest of the injured worker.”

The Court acknowledged that Dr. Corda failed to discuss his recommendation of Dr. Polcer with the respondent/carrier or obtain pre-approval for the referral.  “Medical experts must be given sufficient latitude in directing the care of an injured worker.  Here, the Court will not allow the respondent to deny authorization of a treatment, which has now proven to be beneficial to the Petitioner, simply because the doctor did not allow the Respondent an opportunity to second guess his medical opinion.” 

The Judge entered an order requiring respondent to pay for the costs of the medical marijuana program and prescriptions and ordered respondent to authorize either Dr. Corda (who since became licensed to participate in the MMP) or Dr. Polcer for petitioner’s ongoing participation in New Jersey’s MMP.

This case is not binding on other courts because it is a Division level decision.  Nonetheless, this decision will be studied by other judges and practitioners given that there are few trial decisions in New Jersey on the use of medicinal marijuana for workers’ compensation treatment.  Respondent could not prevail in this case because defense counsel never offered any expert testimony to rebut the opinions of Dr. Tobe.  The failure to produce expert testimony put respondent at an impossible disadvantage and all but guaranteed that Dr. Tobe’s testimony would carry the day on the issue of the reasonableness and necessity of medical marijuana.  Based on the evidence presented, the Judge of Compensation made the only decision she could make.  The most compelling evidence in favor of petitioner was that the use of medical marijuana would decrease the use of narcotics.

This case is also extremely useful in dealing with an often litigated issue of whether respondent is bound by a referral from the authorized doctor to another physician.  The 2012 court order in this case only referred to treatment by Dr. Corda.  Interestingly, the Court did not focus on the basic rule of agency, namely that a principal is bound by the actions of his or her agent.  Rather, the Court addressed the rule in Benson v. Coca Cola to the effect that the Court can make a retroactive analysis of the alleged “unauthorized treatment” to determine whether the treatment should be ordered.  The rule under Benson is that if the treatment proves helpful, that fact would strongly favor a conclusion that respondent must pay for it.  In this case, the only evidence presented at trial (Dr. Tobe’s testimony) supported petitioner’s position that medical marijuana helped relieve petitioner’s pain levels.

 

There are a number of misconceptions about the rules on independent medical examinations.  Several provisions in the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act are helpful in clarifying these misconceptions:

  • Misconception One: An employer must set up an IME in the county where the employee resides.  Section 19 states that an IME may be arranged at any reasonable location within the state.  There is no limitation to the employee’s county of residence.
  • Misconception Two: An employee may have his lawyer present during the examination. Section 19 states than an employee only has the right to have his or her personal physician present.
  • Misconception Three: An employee may apply for mileage for travel to an IME. There is no statute or rule in New Jersey which requires that employers pay mileage for IMEs, even to those who travel from out of state back to New Jersey.
  • Misconception Four: An employee cannot object to an IME performed by a physician of the opposite sex. Section 68 states that where a physical examination is taking place, an employee may request an exam by a physician of the same sex. If such a request is made, the statute says that the employer “shall” comply.
  • Misconception Five: An employer is limited to only one IME during the case. Section 19 states that an employee may be required to attend an examination “as often as may be reasonably requested.”
  • Misconception Six: An employee is entitled to one missed IME before benefits are stopped. Section 19 states that during the period that the employee refuses to participate in attending examinations, the employer can terminate all workers’ compensation benefits.
  • Misconception Seven: An employer can make a voluntary offer within 26 weeks of MMI or return to work but the percentage of the offer must correspond to the estimate of the defense IME. Case law makes clear that an employer is not required to limit the bona fide or voluntary offer to the same percentage as respondent’s IME.  In fact, there is no requirement at all that an IME be done for an employer to make a voluntary offer of partial permanent disability.
  • Misconception Eight: After an IME, the physician must provide a copy of the report to the injured worker. The rules of the New Jersey Medical Society make clear that there is a difference between a patient and an examinee.  An independent medical examination occurs when there is no expectation of treatment and therefore no doctor/patient relationship. In that case, the injured worker is an examinee, not a patient, and has no right to a copy of the report that the defense IME expert prepares for the employer or carrier.  The report is the property of the employer/carrier.  During litigation of a formal claim petition, the parties must exchange independent medical exams at the pretrial stage of the case.

Diana Vernacchia worked as a housekeeper for Warren Hospital performing vacuuming and cleaning duties in the radiology department and hallways, dusting and cleaning the x-ray machines and diagnostic devices, and lifting and discarding biohazardous waste and linen bags weighing an average of 50 pounds each.  She filed an occupational disease claim alleging that she developed neurological problems with her left ankle, ganglion cysts, plantar fasciitis in both feet, lower back pain and fibromyalgia from her work duties.  Vernacchia also filed a claim saying that she was shocked while using the vacuum cleaner, which caused and aggravated similar injuries.

Petitioner produced two doctors on her behalf.  Dr. Maio, an expert in general surgery, testified that she examined petitioner four times.  She diagnosed various injuries including ankle sprains, disc bulges in her low back, and sprains of her knees and ankles. She said that repetitive micro-trauma and movements caused her injuries.

Dr. Waller, a primary care internal medicine practitioner, testified that her ongoing work activities caused burning sensations in her feet, stiffness in her neck and back, and tendonitis in her extremities.  He diagnosed petitioner with fibromyalgia which was aggravated by work activities and by the one incident involving electric shocks from the vacuum.  Both doctors conceded that petitioner had bilateral ankle pain and edema well before her employment but they contended that work duties aggravated her condition.

Respondent did not produce any medical experts.  Rather, respondent made a motion to dismiss the claims based on lack of proof.  The Judge of Compensation granted the hospital’s motion and entered an order of dismissal stating as follows:

Neither Dr. Maio nor Dr. Waller referred to any demonstrable objective medical evidence to support their assertions.  The medical witnesses merely asserted a probable contributory work connection without medical support.  I find the petitioner has failed to set forth one iota of proof regarding the compensability of her claim.  I find there was no competent evidence submitted relating multiple medical problems to her employment with Warren Hospital. 

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s case even without testimony from respondent’s medical witnesses.  It said that it is not enough for a medical witness to simply say something is work related without providing medical support or medical literature.  The Appellate Division relied on a line of cases from the 1990s which emphasizes the importance of offering medical literature in occupational disease claims or scientific evidence establishing causation.  The Court added, “Also, in this case before us, neither expert witness explained which of petitioner’s work responsibilities may have resulted in her injuries, choosing, instead, to rely upon broad and conclusory averments untethered to the facts in the case. While petitioner testified about the walking, standing, lifting and pushing associated with her employment with respondent, her expert witnesses failed to show that her injuries were a consequence of her work based upon qualitative medical support.” 

There are many cases currently in the Division that contain similar vague allegations and vague diagnoses.  Several firms representing claimants file claims directly along the very same lines of this case. The rationale employed by the Judge of Compensation and Appellate Division in dismissing this case is pertinent to many other similar claims in the Division. Employers can defeat such claims by arguing the well established case law in New Jersey requiring proof in an occupational claim of scientific evidence or medical literature to establish a causal link to work.  For a medical expert to testify simply that a condition is work related is completely insufficient.  It is always the medical and scientific explanation that is more important than the mere conclusion on causation. This case can be found at Vernacchia v. Warren Hospital, A-4634-14T1, (App. Div. October 19, 2016).

One of the most anachronistic aspects of New Jersey workers’ compensation law is that employers pay workers’ compensation benefits even when intoxication is a substantial cause of injury.  In Diaz v. National Retail Transportation, Inc., A-3927-14T2 (App. Div. November 9, 2016), Antonio Diaz was injured moving a heavy lift which fell over on him.  He admitted that prior to work on January 28, 2014, he drank at least two eight-ounce glasses of half whisky and half ice and water.  Respondent’s toxicologist testified at trial that petitioner had a blood alcohol level of at least .173 percent.  Had petitioner been driving, that percentage would have been more than double the legal limit.

Respondent denied the workers’ compensation claim on the basis that petitioner’s intoxication was the cause of the injury based on the expert testimony of respondent’s toxicologist.  Petitioner argued that there was another factor which contributed to the injury, namely a flat tire on the lift.  He said that the lift fell over when it “tilted to one side at the same moment” that he was pulling the lift.  He noted that one of the tires on the lift was flat.

Respondent produced a forensic engineering expert, who testified that “a flat tire didn’t contribute in any way to this accident.” The expert did concede that a flat tire on the lift could have caused the lift to tilt to one side or the other.  The expert conceded that if someone pulled the lift backwards and it had a flat tire, the lift could fall backwards “cockeyed.” The expert said, however, that the lift with a flat tire would tilt only a very small amount, only the one inch that the equipment is off the ground.

Petitioner did not offer expert testimony. Instead, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the intoxication defense on the basis that under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, respondent must prove that intoxication is the sole cause in order to defeat a claim.  In this case the Judge of Compensation believed that both the petitioner’s intoxication and the flat tire contributed to the cause.  Therefore the intoxication was not the sole cause, and petitioner prevailed.

Respondent appealed the dismissal of its intoxication defense.  The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the intoxication defense on the grounds that respondent failed to prove that intoxication alone caused the accident.  Even if the flat tire contributed in just a small degree, that was enough to permit petitioner to recover workers’ compensation benefits.

The case underscores the onerous burden that employers must meet in New Jersey to defeat a workers’ compensation claim on the intoxication defense.  In most states, if intoxication is found to be a substantial cause, that is enough to defeat the claim.  In some states, merely a contributory case is enough.  But in New Jersey the legislature requires the employer to prove that there was no other factor which contributed to the happening of the accident.  Sole cause means sole cause, which is why there have only been a couple of reported cases over many decades where the intoxication defense succeeded.

In Giordano v. High Point Insurance Company, No. A-4971-14T3 (App. Div. October 11, 2016), Michelle Giordano, an employee of High Point Insurance Company, was injured in a parking lot adjacent to a multi-tenant office building.  After parking in the lot, she fell on twigs and debris, injuring her right shoulder.  Her employer denied the claim based on the premises rule arguing that she was not at work until she got to the floor where her insurance company did business.

Giordano contended that High Point had 10 assigned parking spots in the lot in addition to another 12 parking spots for directors, management, and employees who won awards.  There were other tenants in the building who also assigned marked parking spots to their employees.  The key fact in this case was that the lease made High Point partially responsible for maintenance costs of the parking lot.

Giordano testified that High Point instructed other employees, like herself, to park in the spots that were “not marked.”  High Point did enforce the marked parking spots in the parking lot.  Giordano observed that there was no other on-street or off-street parking for a mile.

The Judge of Compensation found for petitioner, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  The Judge also awarded petitioner 15% permanent partial disability.  High Point appealed and argued that the premises rule barred recovery.  The court recited the main principle in parking lot cases.  “The pivotal questions under the premises rule are (1) where was the situs of the accident, and (2) did the employer have control of the property on which the accident occurred.”  The Judge of Compensation noted that High Point instructed employees where to park and where not to park, and it could do so because of its responsibility under its lease.

The Appellate Division reviewed a number of leading cases in recent years on parking lot injuries.  The court said that there was substantial proof that High Point had control over the parking lot.  The company leased parking area in the parking lot from the landlord and for its employees and invitees. The court said that this set of facts is quite different from the Hersh v. County of Morris case where the Supreme Court found a county employee not covered for workers’ compensation purposes on the way from the parking lot to work.  Here High Point controlled a fairly large number of parking spaces.  The court said, “Although High Point here did not add any special hazards by having employees park in the lot, it did control where employees parked by directing them to park in the spots that were not marked.”

The only way to square this decision with the decision in Hersh, which went against the petitioner, is to focus on the partial responsibility of the employer High Point for the parking lot.  The claimant here was actually not parking in the designated parking spaces but was still found to be covered for workers’ compensation purposes.  The claimant in Hersh did in fact park in the designated parking space that the County provided, but the county did not own or maintain the lot in question.  It just leased certain spaces for its employees.   The court seems to be saying that one does not use the “special hazard” test in the Hersh case where the employer has partial responsibility for maintenance of the parking lot.

 

 

 

The case that generates more questions than any other in this practitioner’s experience is George v. Great Eastern Food Products, Inc., 44 N.J. 44 (1965) regarding idiopathic claims.  This case comes into play any time that an employee falls for reasons unknown and suffers an injury caused by the fall itself.  Countless employers have had situations where employees fall at work for no work-related reason, and the question is whether or not such a fall is compensable.  The George case was decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court, and it has been the leading case on this particular type of claim since 1965.

The facts are very simple.  Mr. George worked for Great Eastern and became dizzy at work probably related to some personal cardiovascular condition.  That led him to fall to the concrete floor and fracture his skull.  He died from the skull fracture, and his widow filed a dependency claim.  Mr. George did not strike any object while falling, and he did not trip on anything.  He simply fell onto a concrete floor from a standing position.

The lower courts found that this accident was not compensable based on a number of very old workers’ compensation decisions.  But the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed in favor of the widow’s dependency claim.  The Supreme Court said that an employer takes the employee as he finds him.  The Court added that an accident under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act occurs “if either the circumstance causing the injury or the result on the employee’s person was unlooked for, regardless of whether the inception or the underlying reason for the circumstance or result was personal or work connected.”

 The Court viewed both the circumstance causing the injury in this case (striking the floor) and the consequence upon the employee’s person as unexpected events.  Since an accident is by definition an unexpected event, the case was found compensable. The Court said, “We also completely endorse the second necessary element . . . that such an unlooked-for mishap arises ‘out of’ the employment when it is due to a condition of the employment – i.e., a risk of this employment, and that the impact with the concrete floor here clearly meets that test.”

The Supreme Court concluded with this comment; “Of course, we do not mean to intimate that an employee is entitled to compensation for some idiopathic incident in and of itself, as, for example, where one suffers a none-work connected heart attack or convulsion at work and simply dies at his desk or machine or falls to the floor and suffers no injury from the impact.” Thus the general rule that we do not pay for the underlying condition which caused the fall, but we do pay for the effects of the fall under the rule in George.

 

 

 

 

Consider this situation:  Company A voluntarily pays approximately $172,000 in medical and temporary disability benefits to Worker.  Company A demands reimbursement from Company B believing that Company B is the true employer.  Worker never files a claim petition against Company A or B.  Can Company A file a claim petition in the name of Worker and recover from Company B all $172,000 that Company A voluntarily paid?            

That is the issue in Diocese of Metuchen, a/s/o/ Elissa Martinez v. Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, A-1441-14T4 (App. Div. Sept. 6, 2016).  It is the most interesting decision in many decades to come out of New Jersey on the right of a company to seek reimbursement from another company in a non-PIP situation through the Division of Workers’ Compensation.

Elissa Martinez was severely burned in the face, neck and torso while working as a cook at the convent of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (IHM).  The convent, a high school, and an elementary school are part of the Immaculate Conception Church, all owned by the Diocese of Metuchen.  Martinez was hired by the Mother Superior of IHM to cook for a net wage of $175 per week by checks issued by IHM.  The Mother Superior directed the activities of Martinez.  IHM issued a W-2 tax form to Martinez but clearly believed that Martinez was an employee of the Diocese.

The financial relationship of the Sisters at IHM and the Diocese is unusual because the sisters take a vow of poverty.  Hence, no individual sister receives a check.  However, the Diocese pays a stipend for each sister to IHM, which then allocates an amount per month to the sisters of the convent for their living expenses.  An extra stipend of $600 per month also was paid to IHM by the high school and the elementary school.  This stipend, however, was stopped after the accident to Martinez.

After Martinez’s accident, IHM notified its workers’ compensation carrier and the Diocese.  The Diocese paid Martinez’s medical and temporary disability benefits on a “charitable basis.”  Thereafter the Diocese demanded that IHM’s workers’ compensation carrier immediately assume responsibility for making all payments.  When that did not happen, the Diocese filed a workers’ compensation claim on Martinez’s behalf under N.J.S.A. 34:15-15.1  The Diocese denied that Martinez was its employee, and IHM also denied that Martinez was its employee.

As part of the claim petition which the Diocese filed, a motion was also filed to require IHM’s carrier to accept the claim and pay benefits.  The medical provider, St. Barnabas Medical Center, also intervened seeking repayment of $399,017 for in-patient hospital services paid to Martinez.  The Judge of Compensation heard testimony and ordered IHM’s carrier to reimburse the Diocese and pay outstanding medical bills, as well as make payment of $50,000 for counsel fees and pay permanent disability benefits to Martinez.  It is important to note that Martinez herself never filed a claim petition in this case.

The first issue which IHM raised was jurisdiction of the court to hear this case.  The Appellate Division agreed with the Judge of Compensation that the Division had jurisdiction to handle a claim filed by one entity on behalf of a petitioner for reimbursement of benefits.  That conclusion flowed from N.J.S.A. 34:15-15.1 which allows claims for reimbursement to be filed when benefits “have been paid by any person, organization or corporation on behalf of such petitioner.”  This provision is a little known part of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act:

Whenever the expenses of medical, surgical or hospital services, to which the petitioner would be entitled to reimbursement, if such petitioner had paid the same as provided in section 34:15-15 of the Revised Statutes, shall have been paid by any insurance company or other organization by virtue of any insurance policy, contract or agreement which may have been procured by or on behalf of such petitioner, or shall have been paid by any person, organization or corporation on behalf of such petitioner, the deputy directors or referees of the Division of Workmen’s Compensation are authorized to incorporate in any award, order or approval of settlement, an order requiring the employer or his insurance carrier to reimburse such insurance company, corporation, person or organization in the amount of such medical, surgical or hospital services so paid on behalf of such petitioner.

The Appellate Division distinguished this sort of petition for reimbursement from a claim for contribution by one employer against the other, saying contribution claims like this are prohibited under the case of Conway v. Mr. Softee, Inc., 51 N.J. 254, 258 (1968).  The difference in this case was, according to the Appellate Division, that “the Diocese did not file a claim on its own behalf, but rather, as permitted by the statute, filed the claim on behalf of Martinez.” The Court said, “The claim in Conway was for contribution from the other employer, where the present claim is on behalf of the employee for reimbursement.”  In Conway, one employer tried to file a claim against another employer, and the Court said that cannot be done in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.

The next issue that the Appellate Division decided concerned employment by IHM.   It recited the two tests for employment, namely the “control” test, and the “relative nature of the work” test, and under both tests the Court found Martinez was an employee of IHM.   The decision does not make clear whether IHM argued that the Diocese was a “joint employer.”  Presumably that argument was advanced, but one cannot tell from the Appellate Division decision.  Control was established by the Mother Superior providing direction to Martinez.  The relative nature of the work test was met because Martinez cooked daily meals for the sisters in the convent and worked exclusively for the sisters in the convent.  She had no written agreement with the Diocese.

IHM also challenged the counsel fee award of $50,000.  For one thing, IHM argued that $50,000 constituted more than 20% of the award.  The Court noted that the Diocese had paid $172,182 as of January 13, 2015, and St. Barnabas had a claim for $399,017.  The Court said, that an award of $50,000 was far less than twenty percent of the combined amount paid by the Diocese and the amount owed to St. Barnabas.

Interestingly, the Appellate Division reversed an award of permanency to Martinez because Martinez never filed a claim petition and the Judge never explained the basis for the award.

This case is one of a kind, and there are really no other non-PIP cases like it that have been reported.  It is somewhat astonishing because the Diocese volunteered initially to pay medical bills without any court order or claim petition having been filed.  Yet the Diocese managed to obtain full reimbursement after paying $172,182 on a charitable basis by resort to filing a claim petition on behalf of the petitioner pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-15.1.   The language that the court focused on would suggest that employers can utilize this procedure rather easily: the standard set forth in the statute is  whether the petitioner would have been entitled to reimbursement had petitioner made the payments herself.  

Until this case, this particular statute has been used almost exclusively by PIP carriers to obtain reimbursement for medical bills and temporary disability benefits that PIP is required to pay under contract with rights over against the workers’ compensation carrier for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. Based on this case, this statute now has a much wider potential use than just PIP reimbursement actions.

 

 

Just because an employer accepts an injury to a body member as part of an award does not mean that all future treatment to that body member will be found work related.  That is the rule in Daniel v. United Airlines, No. A-1252-14, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1816 (App. Div. August 2, 2016).

Petitioner, Ancelot Daniel, injured his neck and shoulder in November 2006 which led to a settlement of 22.5% for the neck. The award was increased to 30% credit 22.5% in 2010 for the neck along with a sprain and strain with labral tear of the right shoulder.  Petitioner then filed a second reopener seeking surgery to the shoulder for the alleged labral tear. Petitioner next filed a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits leading to testimony by petitioner and two experts.

Petitioner, age 59 at the time of trial, described his job, which was quite physical.  He loaded and unloaded passengers’ bags at a conveyor belt where the bags are stored in the airplane.  He would go inside the aircraft, get on his knees, pick up bags and put them on a belt. He said his shoulder kept getting more painful as time went on.  He also experienced numbness and tingling, which had not existed at the settlement of the first reopener in 2010.  He said that he could no longer throw bags using his right hand and took over-the-counter medication daily.  He kept working because no doctor recommended that he stop working.

Dr. Theodora Maio testified for petitioner that petitioner’s pain was more severe and persistent than the last time she saw petitioner.  He had numbness radiating down the arm into his fingers. She agreed with Dr. Jaffe, petitioner’s treating surgeon, that shoulder surgery was necessary.  Dr. Maio thought petitioner had a tear of the labrum and related it to the original 2006 accident.  On cross examination she admitted that without an EMG she could not say whether the tingling and numbness were coming from petitioner’s neck or shoulder. She further admitted that shoulder surgery would not be indicated for the numbness and tingling.

The key to respondent’s case was the fact that United’s expert, Dr. Arthur Canario, performed an x-ray showing that petitioner had bursitis in the shoulder.  When asked about bursitis, Dr. Maio conceded that petitioner might have bursitis, but she did not back off her opinion that he also had a tear.  Dr. Canario testified that petitioner’s range of motion in the right shoulder was the same as in the left.  He said that the shoulder MRI showed only a possible tear, but he maintained that all petitioner really had was a sprain of the shoulder and bursitis.  His clinical examination found no evidence of a labral tear, notwithstanding the MRI showing a possible tear. Dr. Canario confirmed the bursitis diagnosis with x-rays done in his office, showing “a calcific bursitis.”  He said that injections would be a first step but that bursitis generally happens spontaneously and idiopathically.  There was no known cause in this case, and the bursitis was not related to the 2006 work injury.

The Judge of Compensation denied petitioner’s motion for medical and temporary disability benefits.  The judge found that petitioner’s likely diagnosis was bursitis, not a tear, and that the bursitis was not work related.  The judge also noted that the numbness and tingling were not from the shoulder, and more likely from the neck.  It was significant that petitioner’s expert never saw the x-ray films done by Dr. Canario as it put Dr. Maio at a major disadvantage.

On appeal petitioner argued that the judge should have disregarded Dr. Canario’s opinion because he did not make a comparison between petitioner’s complaints in 2010 versus 2014.  The Appellate Division rejected this argument because Dr. Canario was not testifying about whether there was an increase in disability, but only whether the need for surgery was work related.  The court said those are two different issues.  “That said, we point out the issue before us does not involve a determination on petitioner’s application for modification of the OAS; rather, the issue before us involves the denial of petitioner’s motion for medical and temporary benefits.  Significantly, the motion was limited to petitioner’s attempt to obtain medical treatment for his right shoulder; it was not a claim for modification of the previous OAS based on increased incapacity caused by the compensable injuries to both his shoulder and cervical spine.”

This decision is a useful one for practitioners.  The result could have been vastly different had petitioner brought in the actual surgeon who was treating the petitioner’s shoulder. The opinion of a treating doctor is given more weight than that of an examining doctor.  Without the opinion of the treating doctor, the Judge of Compensation was left with an opinion from an IME physician who never saw the x-rays which revealed bursitis.

The case also underscores that a motion for surgery on a reopener may involve different issues than simply an application on a reopener to obtain a higher award.   In this case, petitioner apparently thought he lost the right to proceed for a modification of his award when he lost the motion.  “We note there appears to be some confusion among the parties as to whether the denial of petitioner’s motion for medical and temporary benefits somehow disposes of his application under N.J.S.A. 34:15-27 for the modification of a previous OAS.  Absent considerations not apparent from the record before us, we fail to discern how that could be so.”  The court clearly suggested that petitioner still had the right to proceed with a request for modification of his prior award, even though he lost the motion for treatment.

Workers’ compensation retaliation claims are rare birds in New Jersey, and the case of Robinson v. Armadillo Automation, Inc. explains the standard for proving such cases.  Spencer Robinson worked as a valve technician from May 2005 until August 2011.  He alleged that when he was hired, he disclosed a prior low back condition, and he requested a stool to work while seated, a request which he said the company obliged.  The defendant disputed almost everything Robinson asserted, including that Robinson disclosed a prior condition.  The company asserted that in March 2011 it noticed Robinson was having problems standing and gave him a stool to use but not in 2005.

On April 29, 2011, Robinson felt pain in his neck while assembling a valve.  He said he reported the injury to the company vice president.  Robinson alleged that the VP refused to consider this an injury and would not take him to a doctor. So Robinson got treatment from two doctors on his own and presented a full release from his doctor effective May 12, 2011. Company records did show that the work injury was reported to the carrier.

Defendants denied ever refusing to take him to the hospital, saying the company approved plaintiff’s seeing the family doctor.  The company also maintained that when Robinson returned to work in June 2011, he was having great difficulty standing and working on incoming valve orders.  The President of the company asked Robinson to get an evaluation with his primary care doctor as to his fitness for duty.  The company claimed that Robinson never produced the family doctor clearance note.   The company also claimed that plaintiff’s production was dropping sharply.

For his part Robinson said that the company threatened for the first time to take away his stool when plaintiff tried to return to work after his work incident.    Plaintiff also argued that after his work injury, the company president and vice president complimented him on how hard-working he was.  He further averred that the company president and vice president spoke with him about retirement possibilities for the first time after his injury.  Plaintiff further claimed that he got a note from the family doctor which the company refused to honor because they wanted to speak with the doctor.  Robinson said he then signed a release permitting the company to speak directly to the family doctor, but that never happened. One fact that does not appear to be disputed in this case is that Robinson had not been written up during his employment until he failed to clock out in June 2011.  The company advised plaintiff that his production had fallen off and that the company was observing Robinson’s problems on the job.  The company also maintained that Robinson failed to clock out at lunch time six times.  For his part, Robinson said that the clock out rule was not strictly maintained and the clock was not even working well.  He admitted to not clocking out at lunch only one time.

Although virtually every statement in this case was disputed, one thing not in dispute was that the company did not give Robinson a raise on his anniversary date of May 28, 2011; he was suspended for five days on August 1, 2011; and then fired for declining productivity, failing to punch out at lunch, and failure to get a medical clearance note.

Robinson sued alleging that he was retaliated against due to filing a workers’ compensation claim.   The trial court granted the employer summary judgment but the Appellate Division reversed.  The Court adopted the McDonnell Douglas rule in a retaliation law suit requiring plaintiff to prove 1) membership in a protected class; 2) actual performance prior to termination; 3) termination from employment; and 4) the employer’s pursuit of someone to perform the same work after his termination. On the last point, plaintiff alleged that the company hired two people after he was terminated.

The employer gave non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Robinson, including poor performance, lack of productivity, failure to clock out and failure to get medical clearance.  Robinson in turn argued that these were all pretextual.  He argued that his production never dropped after he returned to work even though the company tried to take away his stool.  He pointed out that he had never been disciplined until after he filed the workers’ compensation claim.  He claimed he had gotten a note from his family physician and had not repeatedly failed to clock out at lunch.  His contention was that the company simply retaliated against him for filing a workers’ compensation claim.

Given the dispute in facts, the Court held that plaintiff had offered sufficient proofs to get to a jury.  “If plaintiff’s proofs are believed at trial, reasonable jurors can readily disbelieve defendants’ stated reasons for the adverse employment actions.” The case shows how problematic retaliation cases can be where the employer has no documentation or record of discipline before the work injury.  Further, the company could have easily gotten its own fitness-for-duty examination in this case rather than debate whether the family doctor would approve plaintiff’s return to work.  This was a small company with 30 employees and perhaps that explains why so little of what took place was documented in memoranda or letters, but clearly the absence of any documentation hurt the employer.

This case can be found at Robinson v. Armadillo Automation, Inc., A05927-13T3 (App. Div. July 20, 2016).

 

 

In Pulejo v. Middlesex County Consumer Affairs, A-3133-14T4 (App. Div. July 14, 2016), the petitioner, an investigator for the County, alleged that he worked along side a chain smoker four to five hours per day, five days per week, from 1976 to 1997. Mr. Pulejo was diagnosed in 2000 with lung cancer and underwent a bilobectomy.  Mr. Pulejo did not file a workers’ compensation claim for years after his bilobectomy.  Before working for the County, Mr. Pulejo received an award of 10% permanent partial disability against Johnson and Johnson for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).

In 2010, nine years after his lung cancer surgery, when petitioner was 84 years old, he ultimately filed an occupational disease claim petition in the Division of Workers’ Compensation alleging that his cancer had been caused by second hand smoke at work.  He said he himself had never smoked cigarettes, but he argued that the constant exposure to cigarette smoke caused his cancer to develop. In testimony at trial he admitted that he had engaged in conversations with his treating doctors about his cancer, and his oncologist had told him back in 2000 or 2001 that the likely cause of his cancer was cigarette smoke.  Petitioner also recalled telling his doctors at the time of his lung surgery that he had been exposed to second hand smoke at work.

The experts retained by the parties disagreed on the cause of petitioner’s lung cancer.  Petitioner’s expert said the cancer was work related due to second hand smoke, while respondent’s pulmonary doctor said there was no known cause.  Both parties submitted legal briefs without addressing the statute of limitations issue.  The trial judge, who is now the Chief Judge and Director of the Division, the Honorable Russell Wojtenko, asked for supplemental legal briefs addressing the occupational statute of limitations issue.  After receiving supplemental legal briefs, the judge dismissed the petitioner’s claim on the basis of N.J.S.A. 34:15-34.

This statute provides that “where a claimant knew the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment, all claims for compensation for compensable occupational disease except as herein provided shall be barred unless a petition is filed . . . within two years after the date on which the claimant first knew the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment.”

The Judge of Compensation rejected petitioner’s argument that he did not know his lung cancer was work related until he was examined by his expert, Dr. Hermele, in 2012.  That made no sense since the claim petition alleging work-related cancer had been filed in 2010 two years before petitioner saw Dr. Hermele. Additionally, petitioner had spoken with his doctors in 2000-2001 regarding the link between smoking and lung cancer.  The Judge held that petitioner should have filed his claim petition no later than January 2003, two years after portions of his lung had been removed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Judge of Compensation. The Court rejected the argument of petitioner that the defense waived the statute of limitations defense by not raising it until well after trial.  This was  a pivotal aspect of the case and addressed a central question:  can an employer waive the statute of limitations? The answer is no.  The Appellate Division ruled that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional.  The word “jurisdictional” means that filing a claim on time relates to the power of the Division of Workers’ Compensation to hear the claim.   If a claim is not filed on time, the Court has no power to hear it.  Even if the defense wants to waive the statute, it does not matter:  the court cannot hear an untimely filed claim.

The Appellate Division also agreed with the Judge of Compensation that petitioner could not switch the nature of his claim petition at trial to argue for the first time that that his COPD condition had been worsened as a result of working for the County.  Counsel for petitioner argued that even if the cancer claim is barred, his client ought to receive an award for aggravation of the prior COPD condition.  The Court noted that this was a new argument and that “Dr. Hermele (petitioner’s expert) never quantified the proportion of lung disability attributable to the exacerbation of Pulejo’s pre-existing COPD.”

This case is important for New Jersey practitioners because it focuses on a little understood provision of the law, namely the time limits for filing occupational disease claims.  New Jersey really has a “discovery” rule for filing an occupational disease claim petition, and it is focused on the knowledge of the claimant as to the nature of his or her illness and relationship to work.

 

 

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