Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

Discrimination

What if an employer chooses to require its employees to sign an agreement, which states that if the employee wants to sue the employer he/she must agree to abide by a shorter statute of limitations period than is established by law? Would that agreement be enforceable? This was precisely the question that the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed in its recent landmark decision, dated June 15, 2016, wherein it found such agreements to be unenforceable as they relate to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”).

Facts of the Case and Procedural History

The plaintiff applied for a job with the defendant employer and as part of that process, he completed an application for employment.  On the last page of the job application there was a section that applicants were instructed to read very carefully before signing. The relevant section of the document read, in bold and capital letters, that by submitting the job application, the employee agreed that any claim or lawsuit relating to the employee’s service with the employer must be filed no more than six months after the date of the employment action that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit.  The relevant section of the application went on to further state that the employee “waive[s] any statute of limitations to the contrary.”  Plaintiff signed the application, including the section regarding his waiver of any statute of limitations contrary to the agreement language.

Plaintiff worked for the defendant employer for approximately three years before being terminated.  Upon plaintiff’s termination from his employment, plaintiff brought suit against his employer alleging illegal employment discrimination in violation of the LAD.  Plaintiff filed suit seven months after his termination from employment.  Although the statute of limitations for a LAD claim is two years from the discriminatory action, and plaintiff had filed well within two years from the discriminatory action (termination), the employer moved to dismiss the suit.  The employer reasoned that the plaintiff had already signed an agreement that the applicable statute of limitations for any claim would be six months and plaintiff filed his claim after the six month period had already passed. The court agreed with employer and dismissed plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff appealed the court’s decision and the Appellate Division upheld the lower court’s decision to dismiss the case due to the agreement regarding the statute of limitations that plaintiff signed. Plaintiff then requested review by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The Supreme Court overruled the lower courts and found that plaintiff’s discrimination claim was not time barred and should proceed.

Supreme Court Findings

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a private agreement that frustrates the LAD’s public purpose, by shortening two year statute of limitations, cannot be enforced. First, the Court reasoned that if a party were to agree to shorten the statute of limitations regarding a LAD claim, it would “directly impact and undermine the integrated nature of the statutory avenues of relief and the election of remedies that are substantively available to victims of discrimination under the LAD.”  In other words, if the statute of limitations was shorter than two years due to a private agreement, litigants would not have enough time to try to resolve the matter administratively with the Division on Civil Rights, before moving the claim to Superior Court if the administrative process extended too long.

Second, the Court reasoned that a shorter statute of limitations period would deprive litigants of the opportunity to bring suit because a person may not be aware of his/her potential claim(s) within the first six months after the employment action occurs. Third, a privately agreed upon statute of limitations frustrates the public purpose of uniformity and certainty as to a set statute of limitations for LAD claims.  Fourth, a shorter statute of limitations may compel attorneys to file premature LAD claims. Finally, allowing a private agreement shortening the LAD statute of limitations would also deprive an employer of the opportunity to investigate claims and possibly resolve a complaint before suit is filed because the employee would rushed to file claims in court. Thus, a waiver provision in an agreement shortening the LAD statute of limitations is unenforceable.

In order to review the full text of this decision see Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., _____ N.J. _____ (2016).

What Does this Mean to Employers?

The LAD statute of limitations is set in stone (for now) and cannot be changed by private agreement. Employees have two years to file their claims. This time period allows the employee time to analyze whether or not he/she has a claim, allows time for an employee to file with the Division on Civil Rights (if the employee desires to do so) and allows time for an employer to investigate a claim and possibly resolve a matter before a lawsuit is filed.

 

Most employers are aware that they can be held liable for violating Title VII if an employee claims that he/she was discriminated against in the workplace. What happens if a temporary employee (someone assigned to a company by a staffing agency) alleges that he/she was discriminated against while assigned to the employer’s place of business?  Is the assigned company liable? A recent Third Circuit case analyzed this issue in Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., No. 14-1452, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19977 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 2015) and found that in certain circumstances, “temporary employees” can be considered “employees” for purposes of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, leading to liability for the assigned company.

The Facts:

Mathew Faush is an African American employee of Labor Ready, a staffing company that provides temporary employees to businesses. Labor Ready entered into an agreement with Tuesday Morning, Inc. (“Tuesday Morning”) to supply temporary employees and Faush was assigned to one of Tuesday Morning’s stores for a period of 10 days (8 hours a day). Faush never applied for employment with Tuesday Morning and Faush did not have a contract of employment with Tuesday Morning.

Each day that Faush was assigned to Tuesday Morning, a supervisor at Tuesday Morning would sign off on the number of hours that Faush had worked. Labor Ready then billed Tuesday Morning an hourly rate for Faush’s work. The agreement between Labor Ready and Tuesday Morning stated that once a temporary employee was at the store, Tuesday Morning “was responsible for supervising and directing his or her activities.” Tuesday morning was expected to determine the temporary employee’s skills and only assign the employee duties consistent with his/her skills and abilities. Tuesday Morning’s supervisor had supervisory control over the temporary employees, trained them and assigned them to each task. The agreement between Labor Ready and Tuesday Morning also required both companies to comply with all employment laws and both companies pledged to provide a workplace free of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

During the course of his assignment with Tuesday Morning, Faush alleged that his supervisor at Tuesday Morning accused him and another African American employee of stealing.  Moreover, Faush alleged that two days later, the store owner’s mother told Faush and two other African American employees to work in the back of the store with the garbage.  Faush asserted that when he and the African American employees went to speak with the supervisor, a white employee blocked their way and used a racial slur towards them. Faush also alleged that Tuesday Morning’s supervisor ignored his complaints of discrimination.

The Lawsuit:

Faush filed suit against Tuesday Morning alleging violations of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The Court initially dismissed Faush’s case, holding that Faush was not Tuesday Morning’s employee.  Faush appealed and the Third Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Faush was Tuesday Morning’s employee for purposes of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

When analyzing whether or not Faush was Tuesday Morning’s employee, the Court focused on Tuesday Morning’s right to control the manner and means by which Faush’s work was accomplished. The Court held that a rational juror could find that Faush and Tuesday Morning had a common law employment relationship. Although Labor Ready set Faush’s pay rate, Tuesday morning paid for each hour that Faush worked (not per project) and had ultimate control as to whether or not Faush was permitted to work at its store.  Tuesday Morning’s control over Faush’s daily activities also favored the fact that he was an employee.  Finally, Tuesday Morning bore many legal responsibilities of a traditional employer, as set forth in its agreement with Labor Ready, including the duty to comply with Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

What Does This Mean to Me?

Employers must make sure that their workplace is free of discrimination/unlawful practices for all employees, permanent AND temporary.  Although this case is fact specific, it is important to be aware that a company is not shielded from liability for discrimination claims brought by a “temporary employee” just because that employee was not hired directly by the company.

Capehart Blogs

Subscribe to Blog Updates

Categories