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Plaintiff Cvetanka Neceva was selecting an item from a supermarket shelf when she turned and tripped over the partially outstretched leg of a kneeling employee stocking shelves.  She suffered injuries and sued the supermarket, claiming that the outstretched leg of the employee was a dangerous condition.  The issue in Neceva v. Stop and Shop, 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2794 (App. Div. Dec. 31, 2025) was whether the outstretched leg of a kneeling supermarket employee could constitute a dangerous or hazardous condition.

The plaintiff had been shopping at a Stop and Shop in Ridgewood and had been selecting an item from a refrigerated aisle.  She was aware of a store employee about one foot from her getting boxes and putting “stuff” in the refrigerator.  She knew that the employee was in a kneeling position, stocking shelves.  After retrieving her item, Plaintiff turned to the right and tripped over the employee’s leg, causing injury.  She does not claim that there was any other condition on the premises that caused her injury.

At the close of discovery, the defendant supermarket filed for a summary judgment.  It argued that the store’s stocking practices were consistent with normal business operations and that the employee’s leg did not create a dangerous or hazardous condition.  The plaintiff had produced a report from a human factors expert who opined that the employee’s leg created a trip hazard and that plaintiff would have had no reason to expect such a hazard in her path of travel.  The defendant also argued that his report constituted an inadmissible net opinion. 

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant store.  The trial court judge stated that there was nothing about this situation which could be construed to be outside the normal operation of the supermarket.  The court noted that shoppers could be kneeling down, trying to obtain an item on a lower shelf and moving back and forth.  The judge found that employees moving back and forth and moving things onto shelves and off the shelf would appear to be “nothing outside the normal practice of the supermarket.”  Hence, the trial court judge found that no juror could determine that this situation created a dangerous condition. 

This decision was appealed to the Appellate Division. 

The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court “that the employee’s extended leg did not create a dangerous condition subjecting Stop and Shop to liability because it did not create an unreasonable risk of harm and there was no defect in the property itself.”  The Court further noted that “plaintiff’s failure to heed the presence of the employee who was performing a routine supermarket activity – where there was no visual or lighting impairments – does not create a dangerous condition of the premises.”

Additionally, the Appellate Division held that even if there was a risk of harm, it would have been foreseeable and avoidable by a customer exercising reasonable care.  It found that all conditions were “open and obvious” to a reasonable invitee and, thus, no specific warning was required.  Hence, the Appellate Division agreed that the trial court’s decision was correct in concluding that “the injury suffered was not legally attributable to any breach of duty on the part of Stop and Shop or its employees.”

As for the human factors expert’s opinion, the Appellate Division also agreed with the trial court decision that his testimony was not reliable and that the trial court did not make a mistake in barring his opinion.  The Court noted that the expert referenced “no methodology or scientific materials that were subjected to peer review and publication.”  Further, his conclusions were not supported by “identified standards, scientific data, or industry regulations.”

Finally, the Court held that the trial court was also within its discretion to find that the subject matter – an employee kneeling or extending a leg while stocking shelves in a well-lit open supermarket – was not beyond the common knowledge of lay jurors.”  The Appellate Division stated that “[e]mployees kneeling to stock shelves is a routine, expected sight at supermarkets.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the trial court judge also did not make a mistake in determining that expert testimony was neither necessary nor admissible.

Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff, Harrison JC, LLC, a limited liability company, owned Unit 302 in Harrison Bridge Plaza, a 4-story condominium with commercial units on the first floor and residential units on the remaining floors.  Plaintiff Harrison bought the unit in February 2010 and had leased it to various tenants.  The unit experienced water seepage and leakage from the ceiling of its unit on 11 occasions from April 2014 through March 2021.  Plaintiff sued the unit owners above its unit, as well as the condominium association, HB Association, and Patrician Associates Management, the manager of the condominium association for the damage resulting from the leaks.  The issue in Harrison JC, LLC v. Harrison Bridge Plaza Condominium Association, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1895 (App. Div. Aug. 7, 2024) was whether the plaintiff could pursue its claim for property damage from the water seepage and leakage without the retention of an expert.

The units above the plaintiff’s unit were owned by Claudia Santos and Joel Costas, Unit 401, and Ying Zi Zhu, Unit 403.  Per the Master Deed, unit owners’ responsibilities were limited to the interior of the walls, ceilings, and floor surfaces of their units.  The common elements, including roofs, parking lot and lobby, were owned and controlled by HB Association and were managed and maintained by defendant Patrician under a contract.

Plaintiff Harrison filed a lawsuit, claiming that it suffered property damage, loss of rental income, and out of pocket expenses when its unit experienced water seepage and leakage from the ceiling of its unit.  It is undisputed that the leaks happened and that all but the final leak was repaired.  Plaintiff claimed that the leaks originated in either Unit 401, Unit 403, or the common elements of the building.  It sued HB Association based upon negligence and its duty to maintain and repair the common elements of the building.  It sued Patrician based upon a breach of a contractual obligation to maintain and repair the common elements of the building and, last, it sued the unit owners for negligence for creating or failing to repair the leaks in their units that damaged plaintiff’s unit. 

However, plaintiff failed to retain an expert to offer any opinion with respect to the cause or origin of any of the leaks. At the close of discovery, all defendants filed for a summary judgment.  They argued that plaintiff was unable to establish liability without an expert opinion.  Plaintiff, in opposing the motion, argued that an expert opinion was not necessary under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The trial court granted summary judgment to each of the defendants.  It found that plaintiff was unable to establish liability without an expert report and found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to plaintiff’s claims and that “the jury could not be left to speculate as to the cause and origin of the leaks and whether defendants’ negligence was the cause of damage to plaintiff’s unit.”

This decision was appealed.  Plaintiff argued that the court should have taken judicial notice that water flows downward, and water does not normally come through the ceiling of a residential unit unless there is some defect or negligence in the area above the unit causing the leak and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should have relieved plaintiff of its obligation to produce an expert report to prove negligence as to HB Association and Patrician.

The Appellate Division noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, if properly evoked, would enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facia case of negligence by allowing for the inference of negligence from undisputed facts.  However, the doctrine would only be applicable where “(a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality was within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (c) there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff’s own voluntary act or neglect.”  Finally, the doctrine would not be applicable where the injured party fails to exclude other possible causes of the injury.

The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court decision that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the facts of this case.  The Court found that “it is not within the common knowledge of the average juror that the acts of HB Association and Patrician, as the entities with control of the common elements of the building, were more likely than not the cause of the leakage in plaintiff’s unit.”  The Appellate Division found that without expert testimony to opine as to the origin and cause of the leaks, “jurors would be left to speculate as to whether HB Association and Patrician’s conduct negligently caused damage to plaintiff’s property.”  Finally, the Appellate Division noted that the design and maintenance of this condominium and the origin and cause of leaks in the building would not be matters within the ken of the average juror.

Further, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of the location of the leaks in its unit.  The leaks could have derived from the common areas, the units above Plaintiff’s unit, or from plaintiff’s unit as a result of acts by plaintiff’s tenants.  The Court found that expert testimony was necessary to prove that the leaks originated in an area within the exclusive control of HB Association or Patrician.  Without such expert testimony, a jury could not exclude plaintiff or its tenants as the negligent actors in causing the leaks without engaging in speculation.

Thus, the Appellate Division agreed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claim.  Because the plaintiff did not produce an expert report to offer an opinion as to the cause or origin of the leaks, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Irina Galperin suffered an injury when she fell at Macy’s, located in the Garden State Plaza Shopping Center in Paramus, New Jersey, upon stepping from a tile walkway to a carpeted area.  While she initially claimed that she fell due to liquid on the floor, she later claimed that she fell when her foot got caught on the edge of the carpet which bordered the tile walkway inside the Macy’s store.  The issue in Galperin v. Macy’s, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 589 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2023) was whether plaintiff would be able to maintain a negligence claim against Macy’s in light of her failure to identify the exact dangerous condition which caused her fall and the lack of an expert to identify a breach of duty in the design of the flooring.

In answers to Interrogatories, plaintiff certified “she was caused to slip and fall due to a dangerous condition, namely liquid on the floor.”  However, in her deposition, she disavowed this response and stated that she was unable to identify anything on the floor that caused or contributed to the fall.  She submitted an amended Interrogatory answer, stating that when she fell, the front of her right foot got caught on the edge of the carpet which bordered the tile walkway.  Further, she testified at her deposition that the incident occurred after she stepped off the escalator and walked toward the store’s exit.  She stated that there were too many people in the aisle and, while trying to go around the customers, she fell on the border of tile and carpet and struck a table display with a metal frame.  As for the cause of her fall, she simply stated it was the border between the tile and carpet. 

At the trial court level, Macy’s filed a motion for a summary judgment dismissal, arguing that plaintiff failed to identify a dangerous condition that caused her accident and she did not establish Macy’s possessed actual or constructive notice of any such condition.  Further, to the extent that plaintiff was maintaining that the purported height differential constituted a hazardous condition, Macy’s argued that “any claim was beyond the ken of the average juror thereby requiring expert testimony, which she failed to provide.”

The trial court agreed with Macy’s that plaintiff had failed to offer any proof of a dangerous condition.  The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that “the mere existence of a transition from tile to a carpet, without even some kind of torn or ripped carpet, broken tiles, or misleveled surface, constituted a dangerous condition.”  Further, plaintiff had failed to submit any factual or expert proofs that the flooring violated some code or regulation or standard that a reasonably prudent business owner would meet.  The court agreed that a claim that the border between the tile and the carpet created a defect required expert testimony. 

Hence, the trial court granted the summary judgment as to Macy’s.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff made the same arguments to the Appellate Division that were made to the trial court.  However, the Appellate Division rejected those arguments and agreed with the trial court and noted that the “mere showing of an accident causing the injuries sued upon is not alone sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence.”  The Court noted that the plaintiff had failed to identify anything related to the tile or carpet that caused her to fall.  The vague statements that her foot caught on the edge of the carpet and something between the tiles and the carpet caused her to fall were found to be insufficient to establish a dangerous condition.  Further, the Appellate Division agreed that an expert would be necessary to establish the existence of a dangerous condition that the transition area was dangerous due to a design or installation defect.

Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, stating that “[i]n light of plaintiff’s inability to identify the circumstances of her fall, expert testimony was necessary to establish the area where she fell was in some manner dangerous, if for no other reason than to exclude other potential causes of the accident and avoid pure speculation by the factfinder.” 

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