Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

FMLA

On December 22, 2025, the New Jersey State Senate passed a pivotal bill that could drastically reshape employee leave rights and employer obligations in the state. It is essential for employers to start assessing the potential impact of this legislation, which now moves to the Assembly for review before it is presented to the governor for final signature.

Currently, New Jersey’s Family Leave Act (“NJFLA”) provides employees working at companies with 30 or more employees up to 12 weeks of leave to bond with a new child, care for a sick family member, or for other qualifying reasons, with guaranteed job reinstatement after the leave. To qualify, employees must have worked for their employer for at least 12 months and must have worked a minimum of 1,000 hours in the previous year.

The proposed bill, however, significantly eases these requirements. If passed, employees would only need to have worked for their employer for 6 months and have logged 500 hours in the past year to qualify for leave and job protection. Furthermore, the bill reduces the threshold for employers, meaning businesses with as few as 15 employees (down from the current 30) would be subject to these provisions. Since employees of public entities are already eligible for NJFLA leave regardless of the size of their employer, the only change affecting public entities would be the shortened eligibility period, six months of employment and 500 hours worked in the past year.

It is important to note that the bill does not alter the fact that employees who take NJFLA leave are eligible to receive up to 85% of their average weekly wages, subject to the maximum weekly benefit cap, while on leave through the New Jersey Family Leave Insurance (“NJ-FLI”) program.

For businesses, this legislation represents a major shift. With fewer eligibility requirements, a wider range of employees would be able to take leave with guarantees of job protection.  This could result in increased administrative responsibilities for employers, who would need to ensure compliance with these new provisions.

While a limited number of states already provide job protection for employees outside the scope of the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), New Jersey’s approach would position it as a leader in this area. As the bill edges closer to final approval, it is essential for businesses to start preparing for its potential passage and assess how these changes may impact their policies.

In my practice, I often get questions regarding the interplay between the leave rights available under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the New Jersey Family Leave Law (“FLA”). The most frequent question I get is: how do you coordinate the two sets of leave in the case of childbirth and a mother’s child bonding leave. Unfortunately, most employers do this wrong, and it is important that employers understand how these separate leave laws interact so that your administration of such leaves is done in a legally correct way.

The chief difference between the FMLA and FLA is that the FMLA provides leave rights for an employee’s own serious health condition which is something that is not afforded by the FLA. This difference comes into play in childbirth/bonding leave situations.

When you combine the leave available to a new mother under both the FMLA and FLA the employee could technically be out for as long as 24 weeks. Likely because of the potential length of time that an employee can be out in these situations, employers often make the mistake of running FLA bonding leave immediately when the employee’s child is born. In such circumstances, it is often the case that the mother’s doctor will prescribe a period of recovery after childbirth for the mother. Depending upon the manner of the childbirth, the period prescribed often is different. For example, most doctors will prescribe a 6-week recovery period after a caesarian birth and 4 weeks for a regular delivery. When that occurs, significantly, the mother’s time out of work counts against that employee’s FMLA leave, not FLA leave. Why? Because there is a New Jersey FLA regulation that requires that child bonding leave cannot start until after the mother has exhausted any leave time she has under the FMLA. Most employers are not aware of this requirement, and it results in the employer’s mistaken administration of such coordinated leave periods. Many employers run the time concurrently, but this is not proper because the two leaves are not for the same qualifying reason.

Let’s consider an example that illustrates how this leave coordination is done correctly. It is not unusual that here in New Jersey an expectant mother will be taken out on a disability related leave 6 weeks before her expected delivery date. Then let’s suppose that mom delivers by way of a caesarian delivery and the doctor then prescribes 6 weeks of recovery. The temptation for many employers is to start the bonding time leave immediately upon birth, but with the mother in my example still having a doctor prescribed leave for her recovery from giving birth, those 6 weeks of leave must be exhausted before bonding leave can be run under the FLA; if of course, the new mother actually wants to take her bonding leave at that time. Another fun fact about the FLA: bonding leave can be taken anytime within 1 year of the actual birth, so employers cannot assume that bonding leave will be taken immediately after birth.

Therefore, be careful in how you as an employer run leave in these situations to ensure that you follow these unique coordination rules for leave for new parent employees. Before starting to run any leave in this situation, get information from your employee. Find out what the new parent’s intentions are about using her FLA bonding leave and determine how long of a recovery period her doctor has prescribed post-birth. With such information, you as an employer will be better equipped to meet your dual leave law responsibilities correctly

Most employers today know what the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) requires, i.e. job protected leave for employees working for employers with 50 or more employees. But most employers know very little about what the law prohibits, namely both interference with and protection against retaliation when an employee exercises FMLA rights. As part of my practice, a client recently posed a very interesting question about possible FMLA interference: when an employee is out on FMLA leave, can the employer require an employee to periodically check in to update the employer on their medical status or does having that sort of interaction with the employee constitute wrongful FMLA interference? The answer to this question, like many in this area of the law, requires an employer to proceed with some caution.

Legally, an employee on FMLA leave is neither entitled to be “left alone,” nor is completely relieved from responding to an employer’s discrete inquiries. Fielding occasional calls about one’s job while on leave is deemed a professional courtesy that does not abrogate or interfere with the exercise of an employee’s FMLA rights. When limited to the scope of passing on institutional knowledge to new staff, or providing closure on completed assignments, or even giving a quick update on the employee’s on-going medical status, employers do not violate the FMLA by making such calls or expecting employees to keep them updated on such topics. Moreover, if the employer has designated call in procedures or policies that an employee must follow while on FMLA, the employee is expected to follow them if they do not conflict with the leave rights granted under the FMLA. A big legal “no-no,” however, is assigning any work to or expecting that the employee will perform any job services while on leave. That is a sure invitation for an interference claim.

While contacts with an employee are allowed while on FMLA, the real legal difficulty is that there is no legal standard or consensus on the amount of potential contacts an employer can have with an employee while out on FMLA leave. The cases talk about “de minimis” contacts not interfering with FMLA use without stating how many of those kinds of contacts can happen. So, what exactly is a sufficiently small enough number to not get the employer into trouble? Over 12 weeks of leave, once a month would seem fine, especially if the employer has a valid reason for the contact, such as a quick question about a work file or confirming an expected return to work date. More than that would likely depend on the presenting circumstances for the required contact. In this area, when all is said and done, seemingly less is better-the fewer times you need to speak to your employee, the better.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, employees who need to reach out to an employee on FMLA leave are best served by doing so only sparingly and when the contact is supported by a legitimate business reason. And, most importantly, do not demand that an employee perform any sort of work during their FMLA time. Even when the employee volunteers to do so, it is best for the employer to say no to ensure that there is no chance of any misunderstanding by the employee that working on FMLA leave is an expectation of the employer.  

Robert Stein worked for Atlas Industries.  He tore his meniscus at work and ten weeks into his recovery he saw the treating surgeon, who allegedly said that Stein would not be released from work until August 10th.  Stein admitted that the surgeon gave him a release slip to return to work on July 20th but to do only office work until August 10th.  Stein actually gave that release slip to his employer.  Around the same time, the treating surgeon advised Atlas Industries that Stein could return to work with light duty restrictions in two days.  Atlas thought that Stein would return to work on the following Monday.

For his part, Stein thought that he had two more weeks of FMLA leave coming to him.  He did not show up for work on Monday, nor the next few days, nor did he call in.  On Thursday Atlas fired him for violating company policy in missing three workdays without calling in or providing notification.

Stein sued alleging violations of his rights under the FMLA because he was still within two weeks of the 12 weeks he was permitted under the FMLA.  The district court ruled for Atlas, noting that while an employee is out on FMLA, he must comply with the employer’s notice and call-in policies.  Stein appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Atlas policy required employees to either return to work or call in once their doctor released them with light-duty restrictions.  The handbook said that someone who was absent three consecutive days without permission or call in would be automatically discharged.

Stein argued that an employer may not require an employee to return to work once cleared for light duty if the employee still has not exhausted FMLA leave, citing to 29 C.F.R. 825.702(d)(2).  The Court agreed with this principle but noted that Atlas’s policy required either return to work or call in, and Stein did not call in to report his intentions.

The Court of Appeals held that once Stein’s doctor verified that he was physically able to work, Stein had to call in at a bare minimum.  “The fact that he ultimately could have turned down a light-duty assignment does not change this requirement.”  The Court added, “Indeed, the handbook is unequivocal; it provides that ‘it is the employee’s responsibility to be on the job and keep Atlas advised when you are unable to work, whatever the reason.’”

The Court also rejected Stein’s argument that the company retaliated against him for using FMLA leave.  It noted that Stein was not fired right after he sought FMLA leave.  This did not happen until 10 weeks later when Stein had two weeks of FMLA leave left.  Interestingly, however, the Court did allow Stein to go to the jury on another legal basis, namely retaliation and interference under ERISA.  Stein had a son who suffered from a rare neurological condition and for whom the company had spent over $500,000 on medical expenses the year before Stein was fired.  The Court noted that both before and after Stein’s firing, the company had publicly expressed worries about “skyrocketing” health-care costs in a series of employer notices.

The Court noted that Stein had worked for Atlas for nearly 20 years, had worked overtime when asked, and won a perfect attendance award in the past.  The Court said, “In combination with Atlas’s documented concerns about skyrocketing health-care costs and its managers’ purported comments about Jordan (the son’s) claims, this evidence permits an inference that Atlas was motivated at least in part by its desire to be free from a medical-cost albatross.”  The Court therefore allowed the ERISA claim to go to a jury.

The case can be found at Stein v. Atlas Industries, 2018 WL 1719097 (6th Cir. April 9, 2018).

The post Employer Did Not Violate FMLA in Firing Employee Recovering From Workers’ Comp Injury appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

Federal courts have upheld a defense to a Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) retaliation claim called the “honest belief” defense. The “honest belief” defense means that “where an employer provides evidence that the reason for the adverse employment action taken by the employer was an honest belief that the employee was misusing FMLA leave, that is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the discharge.” Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2017). The “honest belief” defense, if proven, is a total defense to a retaliation claim, even if it later turns out that the employer was wrong and the employee did not in fact misuse the FMLA leave.

The Third Circuit recently issued a decision dealing with the “honest belief” defense. In Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2017), the Third Circuit upheld the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the employer, Mondelez Global, LLC, on the grounds that the company had an “honest belief” that the employee had violated company policy with regard to taking FMLA leave.

Plaintiff, Capps, was initially hired in November 1989. He was employed as a “mixer,” which required him to operate a mixing machine that made dough. The Defendant, Mondelez, had a personnel policy that entitled an employee to FMLA leave for a “serious health condition of the employee that makes the employee unable to perform one or more of the essential functions of his/her position” and allowed for the use of intermittent FMLA leave when it was a medical necessity. The policy also required that the employee provide notice of the leave “as soon as practicable.” As part of the process of obtaining FMLA leave for the employee’s own serious health condition, Mondelez required a certification from the employee’s health care provider and noted, “As with all communications with the Company, the submission of false information to the Company regarding the need for FMLA leave, or the fraudulent use of FMLA leave, may result in discipline, up to and including termination.” Mondelez also had a policy entitled “Dishonest Acts on the Part of Employees,” which was considered a “Major Rule.” Violations of “Major Rules” were considered inexcusable offenses that would result in immediate suspension pending an investigation, which could lead to termination. Mondelez’s Dishonest Acts on the Part of Employees policy includes the warning that:

THE COMPANY WILL NOT TOLERATE DISHONESTY ON THE PART OF ITS EMPLOYEES, WHETHER IT BE COMMITTED AGAINST THE COMPANY, ANOTHER EMPLOYEE, ITS CUSTOMERS, OR OTHERS EITHER DURING OR AFTER WORKING HOURS” and that “ANY EMPLOYEE FOUND GUILTY OF A DISHONEST ACT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL.” (emphasis in original).

Capps’ suffered from a condition in which there is a loss of blood flow, severely limiting oxygen and nutrient delivery to the bone and tissues, essentially suffocating and causing death of those cells. He experienced severe pain at times in the pelvic region, thighs and hips, which sometimes lasts for days or weeks at a time. As a result, he requested intermittent time off from work when flare-ups occurred. Capps’ intermittent leave request was approved and stated that he may need one to two days off per month for a duration of up to fourteen days per episode due to incapacity and treatment appointments. On Monday, February 11 and Tuesday, February 12, 2013, Capps took FMLA leave due to leg pain, and he returned to work for a full shift on Wednesday, February 13, 2013. Capps was scheduled to work on Thursday, February 14, 2013, but he called in stating he would be late to work because of leg pain. Later that day, he again called in and stated that he would be taking a full day of FMLA leave since the pain had not subsided. His doctor also signed Capps’ FMLA certification form dated February 14th. That evening, Capps drove to a local pub to get something to eat. According to Capps, at the pub he also drank three beers and three shots of alcohol with his friends, and he spent approximately two and a half to three hours at the pub. Afterwards, despite feeling too intoxicated to drive, Capps attempted to drive home. While driving home he was stopped by the police and was found to have a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.339%. Capps was released from jail the morning of February 15, 2013. He was scheduled to begin his shift at Mondelez at 1 p.m. on February 15, 2013, but called out on FMLA leave due to leg pain.

Capps returned to work on Monday, February 18, 2013. He did not report his arrest to anyone at Mondelez; nor was he required to under Mondelez’s policies. In the meantime, Capps was recertified and approved for additional intermittent FMLA leave from July 31, 2013 through January 30, 2014. Capps was eventually convicted of a DUI and sentenced to 72 hours in jail. In early 2014, a Human Resources Manager at Mondelez became aware of Capps’ DUI conviction and sentence by finding in his company mailbox a newspaper article reporting the conviction. Upon reviewing the criminal court docket related to Capps’ conviction, human resources representatives noticed that Capps’ arrest date and “court dates” appeared to coincide with days on which Capps had taken FMLA leave. Capps was eventually terminated for what the company believed was Capps’ violation of the Dishonest Acts on the Part of Employees policy.

Capps subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging retaliation and interference in violation of the FMLA. Capps was able to provide evidence that he had in fact properly used his intermittent FMLA leave and that there was no dishonesty on Capps’ part. At the conclusion of the discovery process, Mondelez filed for summary judgment claiming that it had demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for discharging Capps, namely that they thought they had evidence that Capps’ had lied about the use of his intermittent FMLA. The district court granted Mondelez’s motion for summary judgment and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Third Circuit explained that FMLA retaliation claims require proof that the employer had an “intent” to retaliate against the employee for use of FMLA. The Court clarified that where an employer provides evidence that the reason for the adverse employment action taken by the employer was an honest belief that the employee was misusing FMLA leave (as happened here), that is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the discharge (even when that belief turns out to be wrong). Mondelez was able to show that Capps was continuously provided with intermittent FMLA and was re-certified for FMLA leave approximately every six months from 2002 through early 2014. It was not until human resources representatives received the newspaper article in 2014 alerting Mondelez to Capps’ DUI arrest and conviction, that an investigation began into Capps’ attendance record to determine if any of his FMLA leave coincided with the dates related to his arrest and conviction (and it was undisputed in the records that it appeared as if some of the dates on the court docket coincided with his intermittent FMLA use).

Therefore, an honest belief that an employee is misusing FMLA leave can be a valid defense to a FMLA retaliation claim. However, the employer must be cautioned that this defense requires evidence to back up the honest belief and the employer must be cautioned not to act in any way that will be seen as interfering with the employee’s FMLA leave in an attempt to gather evidence to support the honest belief defense. If an employer does believe that an employee is misusing FMLA leave, it is a good idea to get your company’s labor and employment attorney involved to make sure that the employer complies with all state and federal laws and does not inadvertently violate an employee’s rights under state and/or federal law.

While the ADA does not require an employer to inquire whether an employee needs reasonable accommodation, the FMLA does require an employer to reasonably determine whether the FMLA may apply to a leave request which does not even mention the FMLA.  This burden can be very onerous on an employer as one can see in a recent New York case, Coutard v. Mun. Credit Union, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2322 (2nd Cir. February 9, 2017).

The facts were very simple.  The plaintiff worked for MCU, a financial institution, and on January 22, 2013, plaintiff took leave from MCU to care for his 82-year-old grandfather, who had been taken to a hospital on January 22, 2013.   Mr. Coutard’s grandfather was discharged from the hospital on January 23, 2013 with bronchitis, but Coutard believed his grandfather, Mr. Dumond, was seriously ill and should not be left unattended.  He sought leave until he could obtain the assistance of a home health aide.

When Mr. Coutard requested leave, he did not mention that he had been raised by Dumond beginning at age four when Coutard’s father died, until age 14.  MCU advised Coutard that the FMLA did not apply to grandparents and declined the request for leave.  It is undisputed that the term “parent” includes not only a biological parent but also “an individual who stood in loco parentis to an employee when the employee was a son or daughter.” 29 U.S.C. 2613.

MCU also suggested that Coutard apply for a short-term leave of absence under a separate MCU personnel policy.  Coutard did not make any such application and was terminated on February 4, 2013.  Coutard later sued for interference with his FMLA rights.

The federal district court ruled in favor of MCU but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed based on the following language:

[W]e conclude that the obligation of an employee to give notice of his need for FMLA leave is not the obligation, imposed by the district court on Coutard, to provide the employer with all of the necessary details to permit a definitive determination of the FMLA’s applicability at or before the time of the request.  Rather, in the absence of a request for additional information, an employee has provided sufficient notice to his employer if that notice indicates reasonably that the FMLA may apply.

Translation:  the employer had to ask Coutard whether his grandfather raised him.  In making this ruling the Court of Appeals distinguished an identical case which went the other way in favor of the employer, Sherrod v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 57 F. App’x 68 (3d. Circuit 2003).  The Court distinguished the Sherrod case, which also involved leave to care for a grandparent, by saying that the Department of Labor changed regulatory language in 2009.  The regulation used to say that an employee had to “explain the reasons for the needed leave so as to allow the employer to determine that the leave qualifies under the Act.”  In 2009 the regulation at issue was changed to state that an employee need only provide sufficient information to indicate that the FMLA may apply. 29 C.F.R. 825.303.

While the new language seems very similar to the old language, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the change was significant.  The Court concluded that this ever-so-subtle change in language shifted the obligation to the employer to ask further into the relationship between the employee and the grandfather.  For these reasons, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed judgment for MCU and remanded the case for trial.

The decision will come as a surprise to many employers.  When an employee asks for leave to care for a grandparent and never mentions that the grandparent raised the employee, an employer will have no way to know any of this history. Only the employee knows this information.  According to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the employer now can be held liable for violating the FMLA, as in this case, if the employer does not know the law well enough to ask further about the past relationship between the employee and his or her grandparent. The case imposes no burden on the employee to volunteer this information initially.

The reality is that this was a situation where neither party really did anything wrong.  No violation should have been found.  It would be unreasonable to expect the plaintiff in this case to know the in loco parentis definition of a parent under the FMLA, but the plaintiff did certainly know that his grandfather raised him for 10 years and never mentioned this. In response to the leave request, MCU offered plaintiff a leave of absence under another policy but the plaintiff never pursued that option.   Yet MCU was held potentially liable for an FMLA violation for not asking detailed historical questions about the employee’s relationship with his grandparent.

The short answer is “NO.”  A recent Federal District Court decision suggests that employers are cautioned to “pay attention to” and ask questions about any mention by an employee of a serious health condition before they make the decision to take any negative employment action (firing, demoting, suspending, etc.)

The Result:

A Federal Court in New Jersey (Van Allen v. Print Art, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55019 (D.N.J. April 11, 2017)) refused to rule that the employer did not have sufficient notice of a potential serious health condition protected under the Family and Medical Leave Act and instead, sent the notice issue to a jury to decide even though the employee’s complaints were vague and inconsistent.

Why is this Something for Employers to “Pay Attention To?”

This is important because (a) like many employers, Print Art, Inc. had a clear discipline policy for excessive unscheduled absences; (b) Mr. Van Allen’s communications to the employer were inconsistent and unclear (e.g., “My son has off…for the MLK holiday…I’m going to take the day….I had a family emergency last night and got no sleep…I broke out in rashes all over my arms, eyes, neck….[which] caused me to lose sleep”);(c) the employer, under its excessive absenteeism  policy, terminated Mr. Van Allen after it had notice of these issues; and (d) while the Court agreed that Van Allen’s complaints were vague, it refused to rule in the employer’s favor as a matter of law.

What’s an Employer to Do When the Employee’s Condition is Unclear?

 The short answer: obtain more information before taking action.  In Van Allen, the Court cited the FMLA and held that while employees must provide “sufficient information for an employer to reasonably determine whether the FMLA may apply…..this is not a stringent standard.”

Rather, “where the employer does not have sufficient information about the reason for an employee’s use of leave, the employer should inquire further of the employee…to ascertain whether leave is potentially FMLA qualifying.” As a result, even though the Court indicated that Van Allen’s complaints were vague and sometimes not suggestive of any request for FMLA leave, the Court concluded that the interpretation of “all of the communications” (including those about the rash) might lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer had sufficient notice of an FMLA-qualifying condition.

What’s the “Take-a-Way” Here?

When an employee makes any complaint about a health condition which might result in prolonged or intermittent absences from work or continuing medical treatment, engage in a dialogue with the employee to attempt to determine whether their absences may be considered to be protected leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Once that information is gathered, take appropriate action (medical certifications, etc.) to either grant or deny leave under the FMLA. And, as always, and because each and every employee’s situation is unique, if you have any questions about how to address the issue or whether the employee might be requesting or entitled to an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, consult your labor and employment attorney as soon as possible.

The Fraternal Order of Police and certain police officers challenged the City of Camden Police Department for allegedly retaliating against certain officers who complained about city policies.  One of the allegations involved the Family and Medical Leave Act.  The city initiated a policy called “directed patrols” in 2008.  That policy required officers to engage with city residents who were not suspected of any wrongdoing with the goal of obtaining information about the community and becoming more visible in the community.  Contact with individuals on directed patrols was tracked and recorded.

Several officers complained about the policy and alleged that they were then placed on a low-performer list for failure to comply with the policy.  Some were allegedly reassigned to regular patrol duty with a resultant pay decrease.  The City responded that it expected a minimum of 27 directed patrols per shift for officers on supplemental patrol and 18 for officers on regular patrol.  The City argued that it did not require an impermissible quota of arrests or citations, just a permissible quota for interactions with the public.

One officer whose performance lagged in the directed patrol policy claimed that he was approved for FMLA leave to care for his seriously ill mother in May 2009 but reprimanded for using too much time on May 27th . Then on June 17th he received a letter from a Lieutenant stating that he was being placed in the “Chronic Sick Category.”  The officer also complained that Camden staff visited him at home while on leave.  He argued that the City was interfering with his rights to use FMLA leave.

The City conceded that there was an internal miscommunication between one branch of the department, which knew the officer had approved FMLA leave, and another branch which did not.  The City contended that it was not trying to deter the officer from using his FMLA rights.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, “Camden officials only visited Officer Holland once while he was on leave, and we agree that this was minimally intrusive.” The Court added, “Although we are sympathetic to Officer Holland’s family situation, there is no right in the FMLA to be ‘left alone.’”   It added, “Camden’s actions may have been insensitive, but they were not beyond the limitations the FMLA places on employers attempting to manage their workplaces.”

The Court went on to state that it found no particular harm done to Officer Holland.  It cited the case of Shtab v. Greate Bay Hotel, 173 F. Supp. 2d 255 (D.N.J. 2001).  “Shtab does not support Officer Holland’s claim that reprimands such as those he alleges can, on their own, support relief under the FMLA.  Rather, they must occur in tandem with actual harm.  Officer Holland does not allege he was actually denied FMLA leave.  In fact, he concedes that he was able to take time off to care for his mother.” The Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the FMLA claim.

This case can be found at FOP v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. November 17, 2016).  The holding is consistent with other federal cases that have held that while someone is on FMLA, the employer has a right to require that employees call in and follow employer policies.  The Court here found that one visit to the employee probably to make sure the employee was not abusing FMLA leave was certainly not intrusive.

The Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) is one of the laws about which employment lawyers get the most questions.  The FMLA can be complicated to apply to factual situations and employers are justifiably concerned that if they take disciplinary action against an employee after he/she returns from FMLA leave, even if the discipline is based upon clearly documented performance problems, that the employee will bring suit claiming FMLA retaliation.  In a recent case, the United States District Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania analyzed whether or not an employee made a valid retaliation claim when she alleged that upon her return to work from FMLA leave, co-workers were discourteous towards her and her employer chose to enforce her resignation, even after she had rescinded it.

Facts of the Case

In Checa v. Drexel University, No. 16-08, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83524 (E.D.Pa June 28, 2016), the plaintiff, Debra Checa (“Checa”), was employed by Drexel University College of Medicine (“Drexel”) as a program manager and fellowship coordinator.  In June 2014, Checa took three months of FMLA qualifying leave of absence from Drexel in order to undergo carpel tunnel surgery.  While Checa was on leave, her mother passed away. Checa asked Drexel to extend her leave for a short period of time due to her mother’s passing.  Drexel approved the extended leave.

On the day that Checa returned to work, her co-workers allegedly did not give her a warm welcome and failed to offer condolences for her mother’s passing.  Also, on her first day back, Checa was called into a meeting with two co-workers, Christina Zervoudakes, the employee that had been performing Checa’s work while she was on leave and Kathy Lally, the employee who provided administrative support to Checa’s department, to discuss Checa’s transition back to work.  During the meeting, Ms. Zervoudakes presented Checa with a list of incomplete tasks which Checa had failed to complete before her leave, despite promising to do so.  Moreover, during the meeting, neither Ms. Zervoudakes nor Ms. Lally offered condolences to Checa regarding her mother’s passing. Checa became upset and told Ms. Zervoudakes and Ms. Lally that she was quitting.  Checa then returned to her office and called her supervisor and advised her supervisor that she quit. Later the same day, Checa emailed her supervisor to confirm that she had quit.  The next morning, Checa met with her supervisor and attempted to rescind her resignation.  Drexel did not allow Checa to rescind her resignation.  Thereafter, Checa brought suit in Federal Court against Drexel claiming FMLA retaliation/constructive discharge. Drexel filed for summary judgment.

In order to prevail on a FMLA retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove that she 1) invoked her right to FMLA qualifying leave 2) she suffered an adverse employment action and 3) the adverse action was causally related to her invocation of rights.  The Court found in this case that Checa had not established a prima facie case of retaliation because she could not show that she suffered an adverse employment action.

Analysis

The Court held that the meeting between Checa and her co-workers was not an adverse employment action because it did not alter her terms or conditions of employment.  Moreover, attending the meeting did not significantly impact Checa’s ability to work or advance her career.  Checa’s co-workers, Ms. Zervoudakes and Ms. Lally, were providing Checa with performance feedback at the meeting related to Checa’s transition back to work.  This meeting was perfectly acceptable and lawful.  The Court also held that Ms. Zervoudakes and Ms. Lally’s failure to exchange pleasantries with Checa was not an adverse employment action under the law.

In regards to Checa’s constructive discharge claim, although the meeting upset Checa, the Court held that a reasonable employee in her position would not have found one meeting so intolerable that she had to resign.  This is supported by the fact that the day after the meeting, Checa attempted to rescind her resignation.

The Court also analyzed Drexel’s refusal to allow Checa to rescind her resignation and found that this refusal was not an adverse employment action. Checa’s resignation was completely voluntary and Drexel’s decision not to allow Checa to rescind her resignation did not alter her privileges of employment, deprive her of employment opportunities, or adversely affect her status as an employee because she had already resigned. Checa’s resignation was unprofessional and validated Drexel’s decision not to let her return to work.

Drexel’s motion for summary judgment was granted and Checa’s case was dismissed.

What does this mean for employers?

This case clarifies the meaning of “adverse employment” action as it relates to a retaliation case.  Employers have the right to hold meetings upon an employee’s return to work to discuss performance issues from before the employee left for leave.  Moreover, if co-workers are discourteous to an employee when she returns from leave, this does not automatically amount to retaliation or constructive discharge.  This case also clarifies that if an employee resigns from employment and then attempts to rescind that resignation, it is lawful for the employer to enforce the resignation.  If the resignation was unprofessional and unwarranted in the first place, employers are not required to allow employees to return to work.

Terrence Preddie was employed from 2010-2011 as a fifth-grade teacher at Columbus Signature-Codrea Elementary School in Indiana.  Dr. Diane Clancy assessed Preddie’s job performance in the first school term as effective in some areas and needing improvement in others.  One specific area where improvement was needed was in leaving organized lesson plans for substitute teachers.  Another concern was Preddie’s missing time from school in part to care of his son, who had Sickle Cell Disease. Preddie claimed that Dr. Clancy told him that he was missing too much time and asked whether there was anyone else who could pick up his son from the hospital or care for his son.

During the 2010-2011 school year, Preddie recorded 23 days of absence, five of which were for “family illness,” and seven of which were for “sick days.”  Two days were missed for his own problems with diabetes and six were missed for his own hypertension and kidney failure.  The Board recorded three of the absences as “personal days” and the other three as “leave without pay” because Preddie had already exhausted his allotment of paid sick days.

After Peddie used all his sick days, he spoke with Dr. Clancy, who said that he could apply for leave under the FMLA but he would need to make a written application for that leave.  Preddie never requested leave under the FMLA.

At the time of Preddie’s second semester review, Preddie said that Clancy advised he could not take any more time off for his son because it was affecting his classroom.  On one occasion, Preddie called his wife to come down from Indianapolis to pick up their son since he was worried about his job. Preddie’s second semester review received lower grades as “needing improvement” in all categories.  Dr. Clancy recommended non-renewal of Preddie’s contract, and the Board followed that recommendation.

Preddie sued under the ADA and FMLA.  First he argued that the non-renewal violated his rights under the ADA.  The federal court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument for two reasons.  The Court pointed out that attendance is an essential job function, and the ADA does not protect persons with erratic attendance.  Additionally, Preddie was not entitled to reasonable accommodation because his sporadic attendance rendered him not a qualified individual under the law.

On the FMLA issue, Preddie argued that the Board interfered with his rights. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the federal court, which had ruled for the Board.  The Court said that an individual need not mention rights under the FMLA or specifically ask for FMLA leave.  The burden is on the employer to provide information about the FMLA once the employee provides enough information that he or she needs FMLA qualifying leave.  The Court found sufficient evidence that Preddie had provided detailed information to the Board about his son’s Sickle Cell Disease and his need to care for him.  That information should have caused the Board to provide Preddie with FMLA paperwork.

Of extreme importance was the Court’s comment that the Board may have used protected leave under the FMLA as a negative factor in evaluating Preddie’s performance.  The conversation about Preddie’s need to spend less time caring for his son, if believed by a jury, could be sufficient for Preddie to establish interference with his rights under the FMLA.  An employer cannot discourage an employee from using federally protected FMLA rights.  The Court therefore permitted Preddie to bring his case before a jury on the FMLA interference issue.

Most employers know that they must provide information about the FMLA when an employee provides information that should lead the employer to realize FMLA rights have been triggered.  However, some employers continue to misunderstand the difference between the ADA and FMLA.  Under the ADA, the burden is on the employee to request an accommodation, but the employee under the FMLA does not have to specifically reference the FMLA.  If an employee has provided sufficient information to the employer that a leave may be needed for FMLA reasons, the employer must provide FMLA information.  This case can be found at Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp. 31 AD Cases 1761 (7th Cir. 2015).

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