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This blog, written by Litigation Department Shareholder and Hiring Shareholder Charles F. Holmgren, Esq., focuses on liability litigation cases decided in New Jersey courts.

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Personal Injury Complaint Dismissed Against County Due to Failure to Comply with Notice Provisions of Tort Claims Act

On August 26, 2020, Plaintiff Rachel Kasuch was injured while riding her bicycle in Middlesex County Greenway, owned and operated by Defendant County of Middlesex. As she rode on a path, her foot caught on a stabilizer leg of a front end loader being operated by a County employee. This contact caused her to fall over her handlebars and suffer injuries. The issue in Kasuch v. County of Middlesex, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 790 (App. Div. Apr. 20, 2026), was whether the lawsuit should be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to provide proper notice of her claim to the County, as required by the Tort Claims Act (“TCA”).

To be able to sue a New Jersey public entity for an injury, the injured party must first provide written notice of the claim to that public entity within 90 days of the incident. This notice is a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit against that entity. N.J.S.A. 59:8-3 recites the basic information which must be included in that notice of claim. If the individual fails to meet the strict requirements of this law, the claimant could argue that there was “substantial compliance” with the notice requirement. That was the argument made by plaintiff in this case.

At the time of the accident, a County employee was clearing brush from a creek along a paved County path. The employee was using a yellow loader with a backhoe and front bucket parallel to the creek. One of the loader’s tires was on the stone along the path and the other tire was on the paved path, partially obstructing it. The employee extended the loader’s two stabilizer legs, which were low to the ground.

According to Plaintiff, she saw the yellow loader but did not see the stabilizer leg on the path. She assumed she could ride past it. As she rode past the loader, the pedal of her bicycle caught on the extended stabilizer leg. That caused her to fall over her handlebars and fall to the ground.

A County employee filled out an operations report which described the accident, her name, address, and driver’s license number. It mentioned that plaintiff suffered a cut chin and dizziness. There was also a police report prepared which included Plaintiff’s name, address, date of birth, and home telephone number.

After the accident, the defendant’s third party administrator’s adjustor reached out to Plaintiff to obtain personal information, asking for her social security number, gender, and date of birth for purposes of fulfilling Medicare reporting requirements. Plaintiff refused to provide this information. Thereafter, the adjustor received a letter of representation from Plaintiff’s attorney advising of his representation and providing a copy of the police report, which the adjustor already had. But, the letter failed to describe Plaintiff’s injuries, demand a specific amount of damages, or set forth a theory of defendant’s liability for plaintiff’s injuries.

After the expiration of the 90 day notice of claim period, not receiving a notice of claim, the adjustor closed his file. In response to a February 17, 2021 telephone inquiry made to the adjustor by the attorney whether he had received a notice of claim from the plaintiff, the adjustor sent out a denial letter.

On November 2, 2021, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the County, asking for damages due to her accident. She alleged in her complaint that she had filed a notice of tort claim but did not identify the entity upon which the notice of claim was served. However, in discovery, plaintiff produced a copy of the notice of claim, showing that it had been filed with the State Department of Treasury. The notice identified the accident as occurring in Middlesex County Greenway and the responsible agency as Middlesex County. Yet, plaintiff produced no evidence that she filed the notice with the County.

Thereafter, the County filed for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim with the County. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the police report and her attorney’s letter to the adjustor constituted “substantial compliance” with the notice requirement of the Tort Claims Act. The motion was initially denied without prejudice and the judge permitted the parties to conduct discovery.

After discovery, the County then re-filed its summary judgment motion on the notice of claim issue. Now plaintiff argued that the County must have received a copy of the notice from the State because the County conducted an investigation. In the alternative, she argued that she substantially complied with the notice requirement. The trial court accepted the latter argument and denied the motion.

However, thereafter, the County filed a summary judgment on the merits of the case, arguing that the temporary parking of the loader along the paved path did not constitute a dangerous condition and that plaintiff did not act with due care to avoid the loader as she attempted to pass it. That argument the trial court accepted and granted summary judgment, dismissing the lawsuit.

That decision prompted the plaintiff to appeal the dismissal of her lawsuit to the Appellate Division. The County cross-appealed, arguing that its prior motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the notice requirement of the TCA should have been granted.

As it turns out, the Appellate Division agreed with the County that its motion on the notice requirement should have been granted, reversing the trial court’s denial of that motion. Hence, it did not reach the plaintiff’s appeal on whether summary judgment should not have been granted on the merits, finding it be moot

The Appellate Division noted that the Tort Claims notice provision serves several purposes. It permits the public entity time to review and settle meritorious claims prior to a lawsuit being filed, it provides prompt notification of the claim to adequately investigate the facts and prepare a defense, it affords the public entity a chance to correct the conditions, and informs the public entity in advance as to the indebtedness or liability that it might expect.

The notice of claim was due 90 days from the accrual of the incident, which here made it due by November 24, 2020. While plaintiff addressed her notice of claim to the State Department of Treasury, there was no evidence that she filed it with the County. Filing with the State Department of Treasury would not constitute filing this notice with the County. It must be filed directly with the specific entity against whom the claim is being made.

Next, the Court considered whether the written notification by plaintiff’s attorney constituted “substantial compliance” so as to fulfill the notice requirement. The Appellate Division found it lacking.

The notice must include basic information, including the person’s name and address. That requirement was fulfilled with the attorney’s letter and the police report.

It must identify the date, place and circumstance of the incident giving rise to the claim and must include the name of the public entity or employee causing the injury or damage, if known. The Court found that requirement also fulfilled.

But the Appellate Division found that the letter and police report did not provide “a general description of the injury, damage or loss incurred,” nor did it indicate “the amount claimed, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage or loss, insofar as it may be known.”

The Court found that plaintiff claimed substantial injuries beyond a lacerated chin. Plaintiff failed to notify the County of the extent of her injuries. As a result, the County was unable to assess its indebtedness or potential liability. In addition, neither the operations report, the police report, nor the attorney’s letter identified plaintiff’s theory of the County’s liability for her claimed damages.

Further, the Court pointed out that the plaintiff failed to provide any explanation as to why she completed the State’s claim form, but failed to file with the County, the correct entity. The Appellate Division found that “[f]iling the incorrect form with the incorrect entity does not constitute a series of steps taken to comply with the notice provisions of the TCA.”  Nor did she provide any reasonable explanation why her attorney’s letter did not describe her injuries, quantify her damages, or set forth a theory of defendant’s liability for those damages.

The Court held that this failure to file a notice of claim prejudiced the County because “it was deprived of the opportunity to investigate and attempt to remediate a purported dangerous condition and assess and attempt to settle plaintiff’s damages claim prior to the filing of the complaint.”

Therefore, the Appellate Division concluded that the trial court’s finding that plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice provisions of the TCA was not supported by the evidence in the record. The Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion filed by the County based upon the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice requirement and remanded the matter back to the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit on that basis.

Court Upholds Oral Settlement of Personal Injury Claim Immediately Following Auto Accident

Plaintiff Ravon Hinton was involved in an automobile accident with Defendant Keyla Rivas Acosta on September 17, 2023. Immediately following the accident, Hinton offered to Defendant to settle the claim if Defendant would pay him $500 in cash. Acosta agreed to settle and, after negotiation as to the amount, paid Plaintiff $400. The issue in Hinton v. Acosta, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 806 (App. Div. Apr. 22, 2026) was whether this oral settlement agreement was enforceable so as to bar the lawsuit subsequently filed by Hinton against Acosta.

The accident happened when Hinton was walking across an intersection in Paterson and was struck by Acosta’s car. It was a dark and rainy night and Hinton was wearing dark clothing. Immediately following the accident and before police arrived Hinton told Acosta that there was no need to call the police or file an insurance claim or pursue any legal action against her in exchange for $500 in cash.

Despite that offer, Acosta contacted the Paterson police department and Officer Cesar Nunez arrived to respond to the call. Thereafter, the interaction between Hinton and Acosta was captured on Nunez’s body worn camera. In the footage on the camera, it shows Hinton repeatedly expressing his desire to accept $500 cash from Acosta. Caught on camera are the negotiations between Hinton and Acosta concerning a cash settlement for this accident in which Hinton eventually agreed to accept $400 to settle.

However, Acosta did not have that much cash and told the officer she would need to stop at an ATM to secure the funds to pay plaintiff. Hinton, Acosta, and the officer thereafter located an open ATM and, while on the officer’s camera, she withdrew the agreed upon cash and handed it to Hinton.

Despite this agreement, Hinton retained counsel who filed a civil complaint against Acosta on May 13, 2024. The lawsuit claimed that Hinton suffered serious injuries to his brain, neck, back, and knee due to the accident. Acosta’s attorney filed an answer, denied liability and included the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction and release based upon the oral agreement between the parties as a complete defense to the lawsuit.

Defendant Acosta thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to enforce the oral settlement made at the scene of the accident. She used certifications from the officer and witnesses, deposition testimony from the officer, as well as his body camera video footage to support her motion.

The trial court judge granted the motion, dismissing the lawsuit. He found that the body worn camera footage and the officer’s testimony supported that the plaintiff was lucid, aware of the implications of his conduct, controlled the negotiations, and that there was clear evidence of an offer and acceptance.

This appeal ensued. Plaintiff argued that there was no meeting of the minds, that a hearing should have been held concerning its viability as a contract and plaintiff’s waiver of his personal injury claims were unenforceable because the settlement agreement occurred within 30 days of the accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 17:29B-15.

The Appellate Division noted that settlement agreements “are encouraged as a matter of public policy because they promote the amicable resolutions of disputes and lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by … courts.” These types of agreements are governed by principles of contract law. They are freely enforceable unless there is fraud or other compelling circumstances that should bar their enforcement.

To be valid, a settlement requires an offer and acceptance. And, the terms of the agreement “must be sufficiently definite [so] that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained by each party with reasonable certainty.” The Court further noted that once the parties agree on essential terms and show an intent to be bound by those terms, then they have created an enforceable contract.

Here, plaintiff argued that he never accepted defendant’s offer to settle and that he did not have the requisite capacity to enter into an agreement. He also argued that the body worn camera footage was ambiguous.

The Appellate Division disagreed with plaintiff’s position. The Court found that the officer’s body worn camera footage showed that the parties voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement. That footage showed that a valid agreement was reached. Further, the footage showed that the plaintiff was not pressured into this settlement. To the contrary, it showed that Hinton repeatedly stated that “he just wanted his money” and “wanted to go home.”

The Court also rejected the argument that N.J.S.A. 17:29B-15 applied to these circumstances. Under this statute, no insurance release or waiver of rights by a claimant to compensation for personal injury or wrongful death, arising from an accident, executed within 30 days is enforceable without a written disclosure informing the claimant that he may seek legal representation.

The Appellate Division found that this statute only applied to a waiver or release with an insurance company and that it did not apply to private party settlements – which is what happened in this case. Hence, the Court found this statute to be inapplicable.

Thus, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss this lawsuit based on the oral agreement reached between Hinton and Acosta at the scene of the accident.

A Plaintiff’s Complaints of Pain Without an Objectively Permanent Injury Fails to Meet the Verbal Threshold

In January, 2019, Plaintiff Martchela Popova-Mladenov was injured in a motor vehicle accident when Defendant Jason Coigne swerved into her lane on I-295 in Mount Laurel, causing her to hit him. She complained of neck pain, but she chose not to go to the ER. A month later, complaining of lower back pain, a doctor took an X-ray, which showed “mild degenerative disc disease.” She had a lumbar MRI a few months later, which showed a pre-existing, degenerative condition to her lower back. In 2021, Popova-Mladenov filed a lawsuit against Coigne, alleging she sustained permanent injuries to her lower back. The issue in Popova-Mladenov v. Coigne, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 258 (App. Div. Feb. 12, 2026) was whether Popova-Mladenov met the “verbal threshold” and could prove she had sustained a permanent injury through objective clinical evidence, rather than only exhibiting subjective complaints of pain.

New Jersey’s Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) allows drivers seeking New Jersey automobile insurance to choose between one of two tort options: “limitation on lawsuit” and “no limitation on lawsuit.” Those who choose the “limitation on lawsuit” option, otherwise known as the “verbal threshold,” can only succeed in a lawsuit for non-economic “pain and suffering”-type damages if their injuries meet the “verbal threshold.” They can do so by proving they have one of several listed injuries, including, among others, a “permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” They also must prove their permanent injury through accepted diagnostic tests, and not entirely upon their subjective responses or complaints of pain.

Prior to trial, both parties obtained experts to offer opinions on Plaintiff’s claims of injuries to her lower back. Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Joshua Landa, arrived at the conclusion that the accident caused damage to Popova-Mladenov’s lumbar spine, including a permanent aggravation of pre-existing degenerative changes. Defendant Coigne’s expert, Dr. Seven Carl Hausmann concluded that the objective clinical evidence from the MRIs of her lumbar spine showed her condition was “consistent with degenerative spondylosis, which is age-related” and was not due to, and pre-dated, the accident. Plaintiff produced a second report from Dr. Landa to rebut Dr. Hausmann’s conclusions, confirming that the condition of her lower back pre-dated the accident, but that condition made them “susceptible to injury,” and the pain she experienced after the accident had not resolved and was “likely a permanent injury.” The emphasis on “likely,” included in the opinion, is important.

At trial, Dr. Landa testified on Popova-Mladenov’s behalf, stating that though the objective condition of Plaintiff’s spine pre-dated the accident, he confirmed that his opinion that she had a permanent injury was based on her continued, subjective complaints of pain. After Plaintiff had introduced all of her evidence, Coigne asked the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. He argued that Plaintiff failed to meet the verbal threshold because Dr. Landa could not prove she had a permanent injury based on objective medical evidence, only Plaintiff’s ongoing, subjective pain. The trial court agreed and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, and she appealed.

In reviewing the trial court’s opinion, the Appellate Division focused on Dr. Landa’s opinion that Plaintiff “likely” had a permanent injury, and that, after he admitted the MRI established the condition of her lumber spine was degenerative and pre-dated the accident (and could not show objective evidence of an injury caused by this accident), Dr. Landa based his conclusions as to Plaintiff’s permanency for the purposes of the verbal threshold on her complaints of pain alone. The Appellate Division referred to New Jersey Supreme Court precedent, which stated that subjective complaints of pain, “standing alone, are insufficient to satisfy the verbal threshold,” and a plaintiff must present objective clinical evidence from diagnostic tests, like an MRI, establishing a permanent injury.

Here, the Appellate Division concluded that Dr. Landa could not identify anything in Plaintiff’s lumbar MRI that showed objective medical evidence of an injury caused by the accident. As a result, because his conclusion that she sustained a permanent injury to her lower back was based solely on Plaintiff’s own complaints of pain, and no objective diagnostic test, she could not meet the verbal threshold, and the trial court properly dismissed her complaint.

Court Bars Admission of Prior Conviction at Trial

At the federal court personal injury trial in Erodici v. Boardwalk Regency LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72542 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2026), one of the pre-trial issues raised was whether the prior criminal conviction of Plaintiff Marcus Erodici was admissible. Evidence of prior criminal convictions can be used to attack the credibility of a witness. The Plaintiff filed a pre-trial motion, called an in limine motion, to exclude evidence of Erodici’s prior criminal conviction for racketeering. Defendant Boardwalk Regency argued that it should be permitted as impeachment testimony.

The applicable court rule of evidence governing the admissibility of criminal convictions under both federal and New Jersey state rules of evidence is Rule 609. Pursuant to this rule of evidence, convictions may be used as evidence of truthfulness for impeachment purposes.

However, under the federal rules (Rule 609(b)), if more than 10 years has passed (as of the date of the trial) since the witness’s conviction or release from confinement, whichever is later, then “evidence of the conviction is admissible only if the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, with the proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof.”

New Jersey has a similar rule of evidence, in determining admissibility under these circumstances, in which the court will consider:

  1. Whether there are intervening convictions for crimes or offenses and, if so, the number, the nature, and seriousness of those crimes or offenses;
  2. Whether the conviction involved a crime of dishonesty, lack of veracity or fraud;
  3. How remote the conviction is in time;
  4. The seriousness of the crime.

In Erodici, Plaintiff argued that evidence of his criminal conviction for racketeering should be precluded because he was released from incarceration 13 years ago and “the probative value of that conviction does not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect.” Defendant argued that he was released from probation less than 10 years before the trial and, hence, the 10 year rule would not apply.

The Court found that the fact that Plaintiff was only released from probation within the 10 year period had no relevance to the application of this rule. The time period would run from when he was released from custody, not probation.

Under the federal case law, convictions more than 10 years old are presumptively excluded. Evidence of these types of convictions are admitted “very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.”

Here, the Court found that the evidence of Plaintiff’s conviction must be excluded at trial. Defendant made no argument for why the probative value of his conviction would substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect. And, the District Court found that this was not one of the “exceptional circumstances” meriting the inclusion of such evidence. The Court noted that his racketeering conviction would have little probative value in this premises liability case.

Thus, the District Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence of his racketeering conviction at his personal injury trial.

Broken Glass on a School Playing Field Potentially a “Pollutant” for Insurance Claim

After discovering broken glass embedded in its grass athletic fields, Oak Knoll School made a claim to its insurer, Utica National, to pay for the clean up. In making its claim, Oak Knoll pointed to a specific pollution clean-up provision in its insurance policy in which Utica would pay expenses to extract “pollutants” from the insured’s land; “pollutants” was defined in the policy to include any solid irritant or contaminant, including waste. Utica denied the claim and Oak Knoll filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court asking the court to determine the issue. On Utica’s motion to dismiss arguing Oak Knoll failed to state any claim as to coverage, the question in Oak Knoll Sch. of the Holy Child. v. Utica Nat’l Ins. Grp., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33875 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2026), was whether Oak Knoll’s policy’s language related to “pollutants,” included glass. 

The school’s position was that broken glass is a solid contaminant that made the field unsafe and unusable, arguing their claim fit squarely within the policy’s broad definition of “pollutants.” The insurer disagreed and took the position that broken glass is not a “pollutant” under New Jersey law and that pollution coverage in the policy applies only to traditional environmental hazards. 

After finding no New Jersey Supreme Court decision determined the issue of whether broken glass qualifies as a “pollutant,” the District Court had to predict how the state’s Supreme Court would rule. In doing so, they first reviewed New Jersey lower court decisions that rule solely on New Jersey law, then it looked at similar case law nationally, finally, they looked at how New Jersey and national case law handled analogous substances solid substances that materially alter land and limit its use (e.g., dirt, sediment, debris, scrap metal). Because the court found no New Jersey law or national law adjudicated whether glass was a pollutant under these circumstances, it relied on the third iteration of their analysis, analogous substances. In this analysis, the District Court found that most, but not all, of those cases involving similar solid substances held that those substances were considered “pollutants.” Due to the balance of the authorities tilting in favor of finding such solid substances to be pollutants, the District Court found this assessment supported coverage as their prediction as to how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule. But they did not find this to be determinative.

The fourth and final stage of the District Court’s analysis focused on New Jersey’s general legal principles in determining how and whether insurance policies should provide coverage. Those principles required a broad, liberal reading of insurance policies to allow coverage and reliance on the plain, ordinary meaning of terms the policy left undefined, resorting to a dictionary if necessary, which the District Court did. The Court noted Merriam-Webster defined “contaminant” as “something that contaminates,” and then “contaminates” as “to make unfit for use by the introduction of unwholesome or undesirable elements.” As a result, the District Court determined that the broken glass was an “undesirable element” in the grass sports field where it was discovered and rendered the field “unfit for use.”  

However, the District Court’s role in ruling on Utica’s motion to dismiss was not to determine the final issue of whether coverage was appropriate, but only if Oak Knoll could move forward on their claim for coverage, the Court noted that this did not get Oak Knoll “over the finish line” on their pursuit of coverage for the remediation of the “polluted” field.

Coverage for Auto Accident Denied Because Driver Was Not Permissive User

This matter concerned a coverage dispute as to an automobile accident between plaintiff Carrie and Ka-Sandra Allen and defendant Christian Kirch.  While driving his sister-in-law’s vehicle, defendant Kirch rear ended the Allens’ vehicle.  The vehicle operated by Kirch had been insured by New Jersey Manufacturer’s Insurance Company (NJM).  The issue in Allen v. Kirch, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 578 (App. Div. Mar. 24, 2026) was whether NJM properly denied coverage for the automobile accident because Kirch lacked actual or implied permission to use his sister-in-law’s vehicle when the accident occurred.

On the day of the accident, the owner of the vehicle, Kaitlynn Doheny, drove to her then-estranged husband Sebastian Kirch’s home so their children could visit with him.  She parked in the street and, upon entering the house, she placed her keys, her phone, and her purse on the counter because that is where “everyone put their keys when they came in the house.”  Shortly after she arrived, she laid down with her son to take a nap.

Sebastian later woke her up and advised her that Christian, Sebastian’s brother who was living with him at the time, was involved in a collision while driving Kaitlynn’s car.  According to Christian, he was driving her car to buy some “stuff”, which apparently included diapers for the children, when he struck the rear of the Allens’ car, which was stopped at a yield sign.  The accident resulted in the Allens being injured.

Before taking her car, Christian stated that he called Kaitlynn but she did not answer her phone.  Christian, who was originally from Peru, explained that “in my country, if you borrow a car from a relative it won’t be an issue but since I didn’t know so I just took her car because I needed to buy some stuff.”

Kaitlynn testified in a deposition that she was “friendly” with Christian but not close and she never resided with him.  Further, Christian never drove her car previously.  She had previously driven Christian to work probably less than five times. 

After the Allens filed their personal injury lawsuit against Christian and Kaitlynn, NJM sent a letter declining coverage under Kaitlynn’s policy for Christian’s operation of Kaitlynn’s vehicle.  It cited to the exclusion for liability coverage which stated as follows:

We do not provide liability coverage for any insured:. . . using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that such insured is entitled to do so.  This Exclusion. . . does not apply to a family member using your covered auto which is owned by you.

The policy defined the term family member as “a person related to you by blood, marriage, civil union under New Jersey law or adoption who is a resident of your household.” 

Following this declination, St. Paul Protective Insurance Company (“St. Paul”), the insurer of the Allens’ vehicle, filed a declaratory judgment action against NJM, seeking a declaration that NJM was required to insure Christian in the negligence action and included the Allens, Christian, and Kaitlynn as interested party defendants.

After discovery was exchanged, both the Allens and St. Paul filed for summary judgment, arguing that Christian was a permissive user under Kaitlynn’s insurance policy and, therefore, NJM was required to defend and insure him.  NJM cross-moved for summary judgment.  It argued that it was not required to defend Christian or cover any loss resulting from his driving, relying upon the policy’s permissive use exclusion.

After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the Allens and St. Paul’s motions and granted NJM summary judgment.  It found that NJM was not required to defend or insure for the damages resulting from the accident because Christian was not a covered user of Kaitlynn’s vehicle and “Christian had no reasonable belief Kaitlynn permitted his use of her car” on the date of the accident.

Further, the court found the “initial permission rule” inapplicable because there was no evidence that Kaitlynn had ever in the past granted Christian authorization to drive her car or established a regular arrangement by which Christian could infer standing permission.  It explained that there was no evidence to suggest that Christian could have reasonably believed he had permission and rejected his claim that Christian’s prior experience in Peru would create that reasonable impression in these circumstances.  Further, Christian did not qualify as a covered family member because he resided at a different address and was Kaitlynn’s brother-in-law.

Following this decision, the Allens appealed the summary judgment in favor of NJM, arguing that they had demonstrated that Christian had implied permission to drive the vehicle, mandating coverage under Kaitlynn’s policy.  Or, at the minimum, they argued that there were material issues of fact existing regarding the reasonableness of his belief that he was permitted to borrow her vehicle, which should have resulted in the denial of the summary judgment motion.

The Appellate Division cited to the Supreme Court’s clarification of the statutory “use” clause which requires coverage for only permissive use of an automobile.  It quoted the Supreme Court language that “if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy.” 

Thus, the threshold permissive use inquiry evaluates whether the initial use of the vehicle was with the “consent, express or implied, of the insured.”  Permissive use may arise from “a course of conduct or relationship between the parties in which there is mutual acquiescence or lack of objection signifying consent.”  It can also be shown by “a pattern of permitted use of the vehicle, which may give rise to an inference that the owner gave his consent to use on a subsequent occasion.”

In applying this law, the Appellate Division reviewed the record and agreed with the trial court that any damage caused by Christian’s use of the vehicle was not covered under Kaitlynn’s policy.  After reviewing the record, the Court noted that there was no suggestion of Christian’s prior use of Kaitlynn’s vehicle, authorized or otherwise.  The evidence showed only that she drove him to work less than five times.  Thus, the Appellate Division found that “any argument Christian drove the vehicle subsequent to some prior expressed authorization or in continuation of initially authorized use belies the record and fails from the outset.”

Further, the Court considered the events of that day.  It concluded “no confluence of events on the day of the accident suggests Christian had implied permission to use the car.”  The Appellate Division noted the evidence that Christian took Kaitlynn’s keys from the counter without authorization.  There was no evidence that she consented or asked Christian to take her car. To the contrary, Christian admitted that he attempted to call her to ask permission to use her car, did not reach her, yet he took the car anyway.  Thus, the Court was satisfied that no jury could find these actions constituted implied permission.

Further, the Appellate Division rejected the Allens’ claim that Christian held a reasonable belief to drive the car, or, in the alternative, that he was a family member covered by the policy.  The term “family member” did not apply because Christian was not a “resident” of Kaitlynn’s household.  There was no evidence that their lives were interdependent or comingled in any significant manner.  Christian did not reside in the same household with Kaitlynn.  To the contrary, he resided with his brother, from whom Kaitlynn was separated and living apart on the day of the accident.  Therefore, the Appellate Division found that the “family member” exception did not apply.

Additionally, the Court rejected the reasonable belief argument.  It found that the record did not support a viable claim that Christian possessed the “reasonable belief” that he was free to take and operate Kaitlynn’s car that day.  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that Christian’s claim that in Peru, members of families freely use each other’s vehicles and that he was using the car to purchase diapers for her children, did not constitute a “reasonable belief” that he had permission to use Kaitlynn’s car.  Thus, the Court found that NJM “fairly denied coverage” for damages resulting from Christian’s driving and that summary judgment was properly entered in favor of NJM.  Hence, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, granting summary judgment to NJM. 

Compensatory Damages Are Not a Binary Choice and Must Fairly Compensate a Plaintiff

In September, 2022, a driver of a truck owned by Defendant G&E Services, LLC (“G&E”) accidentally ran into a commercial building owned by Plaintiff Long Valley Realty Holding, LLC (“Long Valley”). Long Valley sued G&E for the building’s damage caused by the impact, including visible cracking to the building’s bollards, brick facade, adjacent sidewalk, and damage to portions of the roof. The two parties agreed that G&E was liable for the damage and proceeded to a bench trial on the issue of the value of the property damage. Based upon the opinions of two experts, an engineer and a licensed building contractor, Long Valley claimed its damages, the cost to repair the building, was $112,000; with no supporting evidence, G&E argued that cost was only $3,650. The trial court found Long Valley did not sufficiently prove the cost of the damages and awarded Long Valley damages of the lower amount. Long Valley appealed. The issue before the Appellate Division in Long Valley Realty Holding, LLC v. G & E Servs., LLC, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 461 (App. Div. Mar. 13, 2026), was whether the trial court properly determined the lower damages award.

At trial, Plaintiff’s engineer presented his opinion as to the scope of the damage, admitting that some of the condition of the building pre-existed the accident. Plaintiff’s contractor provided an estimation of replacement costs and repair costs, including a replacement of the entire roof, concrete work to the bollard and sidewalk, and structural repair to the cracked facade. Though agreeing that the roof had been towards the end of its useful life, his analysis evaluated the cost of these repairs at $112,000. G&E provided no expert testimony, and proposed the $3,650 cost of the repairs with no source of support. The trial court expressed concern that neither of Long Valley’s experts itemized the cost to perform the proposed repairs, and there was some disagreement between the two as to what damage was caused by the accident. Further, the court found that without an itemized list of repairs and their proposal of one gross figure of $112,000, it was forced to speculate how to apportion that full figure amongst the roof, the bollards, the facade, and concrete. As a result, though admitting that a higher award was likely correct, because it only had two values on which to rule, the trial court awarded Long Valley $3,650 in damages – finding that Long Valley’s full $112,000 damages claim was a “severe overreach.” The court likened its determination to a professional baseball arbitration, where the two sides propose a figure, and the arbitrator must pick one.

The Appellate Division disagreed. Though handcuffed by the limited review of a trial court’s finding of fact in a bench trial, it found that and because compensatory damages are meant to compensate a plaintiff for their actual injury or loss, while the plaintiff must provide a reasonable estimation of damages, that estimate does not need to be certain. It decided that when a plaintiff clearly sustained some damages, any uncertainty as to the amount of those damages will not preclude them from a reasonable recovery. In this case, where neither side proposed a repair estimate that contradicted that of Long Valley, indeed G&E did not even provide one at all, the trial court’s reliance on G&E’s lower figure was unreasonable. Further, the appellate court disagreed with the baseball arbitration analogy, particularly when G&E’s valuation lacked any foundation may have complicated the court’s ability to analyze the value of the loss, there are methods to arrive at a reasonable estimate; there was no “binary choice” between one or the other. However, because it expressly noted it was not dictating a result, the Appellate Division stopped short of awarding Long Valley its full valuation of damages. Instead, the court vacated the trial court’s award of $3,650 and asked it to consider the evidence in front of it, and nothing else, and arrive at an appropriate calculation of damages.

Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Against Municipality Dismissed Due to Failure to Prove Constructive Notice of Alleged Dangerous Condition

Plaintiff Margaret Kelly, as Guardian ad litem for Rebecca Kelly, filed a lawsuit on behalf of Rebecca due to an accident at her parent’s condominium complex.  Rebecca was a guest of her parents at Back of Bay Condominium Association in Wildwood, when she fell in a trash collection and utility common area exterior to the condominium unit owned by her parents.  She fell and suffered serious injuries when she stepped on one of six water meter pits in the area, causing the lid to dislodge and her foot to fall into the pit.  The issue in Kelly v. Back of Bay Condominium Association, Inc., 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 291 (App. Div. Feb. 19, 2026) was whether the City of Wildwood defendants could be held liable for her fall due to the condition of the loose pit cover.

Rebecca was a disabled individual with a condition known as “brittle bone disease.”  The accident happened when she was carrying a recycling container, attempting to place it in the area of the water meter pits, when she fell.  She stepped on one of the water meter pits and, due to the loose lid, it dislodged and her foot fell into the pit.  She suffered serious injuries to her left foot and ankle, requiring surgery.  She also suffered an injury to her shoulder.  She needed surgery on both her left foot and her shoulder due to her fall.

Within a few weeks of her accident, the Senior Meter Reader and Water Inspector for the City of Wildwood inspected the condominium’s utility area to observe where Rebecca fell.  He found that the lid had a frozen nut and it would not allow the lid to be locked down by whoever was there last.  As a result, he took it away, put it on his truck and put a new lid on it.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the condominium association, the City of Wildwood, the City of Wildwood Municipal Utility Authority, City of Wildwood Water Utility, and City of Wildwood Sewer Utility.  Plaintiff settled out with some defendants or reached voluntary dismissals as to others, but not the Wildwood defendants. 

In discovery, it was disclosed that the City had transmitters located on top of the lid and that the water meter pit and equipment in question was last replaced some years before the accident.  The testimony from the Water Director for the City was that the water meter pit lids had software or machines that pick up the readings from the meter and transfers the information remotely to staff as they ride up and down the street.  Thus, remote meter reading eliminated the need for quarterly on-site inspections of each meter and was both faster and more effective.  The meters were read electronically on a quarterly basis.

After the conclusion of discovery, the Wildwood defendants filed for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all claims.  In response to the motion, plaintiff conceded that there was no evidence of actual notice of the alleged dangerous condition posed by the loose lid.  However, plaintiff argued that there should be constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition.  The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment.  This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division noted that, under the Tort Claims Act, a public entity may only be liable for a personal injury caused by the dangerous condition of its public property.  Among other elements that a plaintiff must prove, the plaintiff must prove that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition for a sufficient time prior to the injury to take measures to protect against the dangerous condition.

Because plaintiff conceded that the Wildwood defendants lacked actual notice of the dangerous condition, the Appellate Division only analyzed whether plaintiff had established constructive notice under the Tort Claims Act.  The Court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish that the Wildwood defendants had constructive notice.  Plaintiff argued that under the City’s ordinances, the internal policies on lid safety and the replacement of the frozen nut after the accident supported “a reasonable inference that unsafe conditions were regularly observable and existed for a sufficient period of time to establish constructive notice.”

The Appellate Division pointed out that although the Wildwood defendants conceded that there was a loose pit lid and that such condition presented a danger, it is well settled that “the mere existence of an alleged dangerous condition is not constructive notice of it.”  There were no proofs showing that Rebecca, her family members, or any of the condominium’s residents had reported or complained about a loose or unsecured meter pit lid prior to the fall.  As the trial court noted, there was no information as to how long the lid was loose, whether it was for an hour, a week, a month or a year. 

Plaintiff also argued that constructive notice may be imputed to the Wildwood defendants based upon their duty to “inspect, detect and correct missing and loose lids.”  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court judge that this argument was a misinterpretation of the applicable law and would essentially impose strict liability on the part of the Wildwood defendants for any injuries that arose from any sort of dangerous condition that existed on their property.

The Court pointed out that such an interpretation of the Tort Claims Act would be antithetical to its statutory purpose “to provide general immunity for all governmental bodies except in circumstances where the Legislature has specifically provided for a liability.”  Thus, the Appellate Division agreed that the existence of a general duty, policy, or training for public utility employees was insufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of the Tort Claims Act under the circumstances presented. 

The Appellate Division also addressed whether the City’s conduct was “palpably unreasonable” in failing to detect and correct the loose water pit lid condition.  The Court found that because plaintiff did not establish that the Wildwood defendants had constructive notice of the loose water pit lid, its failure to repair it prior to plaintiff’s fall could not be viewed as palpably unreasonable conduct. 

Hence, for all of the above reasons, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss the lawsuit as to all of the Wildwood defendants.

Appellate Division’s Strict Reading of Auto Policy Denies Injured Driver UIM Benefits

In June, 2023, Plaintiff Michael Scott was injured in a car accident. At the time, he was driving a Jeep owned by his live-in girlfriend, Katie Opfer. Opfer was the lone named insured, Scott was listed as a driver, but not as a named insured. The driver at fault for the accident had a liability insurance policy carrying limits of $50,000. Opfer’s policy included uninsured and underinsured motorists (UM and UIM) coverage which provided $100,000 for each person, but contained explicit policy language that advised policy holders that the coverages in the policy may be limited by other  provisions in the policy. One such provision in the UM endorsement of the policy applied a “step-down” for UM/UIM coverage that narrowed the higher $100,000 UIM limits applying to only the named insured, resident spouse/civil union partner, and resident relatives; all others, specifically “any other person,” were only entitled to receive statutory minimum limits; $25,000 in New Jersey.

After filing suit against the at-fault party for his injuries and against Allstate for UIM benefits arising for his injuries out of the policy, Scott settled with the at-fault party for her full $50,000 policy limits. Allstate, claiming Scott, a listed driver but not a named insured, spouse, or relative, was not entitled to UIM benefits under the policy and asked the court to dismiss the suit. The trial court agreed and dismissed the suit against Allstate, causing Scott to appeal. The issue before the Appellate Division in Scott v. Snyder, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 177 (App. Div. Feb. 3, 2026) was whether Scott was in fact entitled to UIM coverage for his damages.

The Appellate Division looked at the policy and agreed with the trial court, affirming its decision in Allstate’s favor. Despite applicable law that requires courts to look at insurance contracts with “special scrutiny” due to the imbalance between insurer and their insureds in their understanding of insurance policies, the Court determined that the clear and unambiguous language of the policy did not provide UIM coverage for Scott. The Court specifically pointed to the language identifying who was entitled to UIM insurance, finding that Scott was neither a named insured, spouse/partner, or resident relative. As a result, he fell into the “step-down” category of “any other person,” to whom New Jersey’s minimum UIM coverage of $25,000 applied. More importantly, because the policy was limited by New Jersey statute, Scott would only be able to recover UIM benefits from Allstate if the UIM limits were in excess of his liability recovery from the at-fault driver. As a result, because the Court determined his UIM limits were $25,000, which is less than his liability recovery of $50,000, he was not entitled to UIM benefits from Allstate. If the Court had found he was entitled to the $100,000 UIM limits as a named insured, he would have been entitled to up to $50,000 of UIM coverage.

Appellate Division Rules That an Injured Plaintiff’s Changed Testimony at Trial Bars Her Claim for Future Medical Costs

After testifying at her deposition that she had no intention to undergo surgery, Plaintiff Yvonne Terrell changed her mind and testified at trial that she would have the surgery, causing the Appellate Division in Terrell v. Chitra, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 84 (Jan. 16, 2026), to consider whether that changed testimony would allow her to claim future medical costs from the surgery.

After a motor vehicle accident in 2018, Terrell sued Defendant Penafranc Chitra for injuries to her neck, back, and right shoulder. Noting the acute, traumatic herniated disc in her spinal column, Terrell’s primary treating doctor, an orthopedic surgeon, recommended she have a cervical discectomy and fusion. He explained the significant risks of the surgery to Terrell, which included paralysis and death. Terrell, a nurse and primary care-giver for a disabled son, worried about how a surgery would affect her and did not have the surgery in 2019 or 2020. Even after several other doctors’ opinions, she testified at her deposition that she felt the risks were too great to have the surgery. In his report in mid-2022, her medical expert stated Terrell, though still in pain, chose not to have the recommended surgery. Prior to trial she never amended any of her discovery responses to indicate any intention to have the neck surgery.

Ahead of trial, Chitra conceded that the accident was her fault, allowing the case to proceed on the issue damages alone. Working off of Terrell’s choice not to have surgery, Chitra’s attorneys asked the court to bar any evidence Terrell intended to introduce regarding the future medical costs of her surgery. The court agreed, and prevented her medical expert from offering an opinion as to those future medical costs.

At trial in the Fall of 2023, Terrell changed her story. She said her son had recently passed away and, since she intended to retire shortly and she did not want to have pain for the rest of her life, stated “surgery may help,” and she wanted to have the surgery – but made no firm decision to do so. In light of that testimony, Terrell, over the defense’s objection, asked the court to reconsider it’s decision on barring evidence of her future medical costs. The trial court agreed, and allowed her to introduce her medical expert’s testimony as to both her need for the surgery and its cost, $250,000. Upon hearing this testimony, the jury returned a verdict of $1,300,000; $1,000,000 for pain and suffering and $300,000 for future medical costs, including the surgery.

Chitra appealed. Critically, she claimed that Terrell’s future medical costs were inadmissible due to both her failure to disclose her intention to have the surgery prior to trial and because the introduction of the cost of the claimed surgery tainted the jury’s award on pain and suffering.

The Appellate Division agreed. It found that Terrell’s failure to amend her discovery responses at any time before trial to show any intention to have the surgery prejudiced defendant’s ability to defend against her claims that the surgery may occur. At no time from her deposition until she testified, including a lengthy pre-trial process and Chitra’s motion to strike evidence of future medical costs, did Terrell provide any suggestion she considered surgery; if she had done so, the defense could have prepared their defense accordingly. Because she did not, the Court determined, she prejudiced Chitra’s defense. The Court also noted she never made a definitive statement that she would have the surgery and, as her attorney admitted at oral argument before them, she still had not had it by late 2025.

Finally, the Court determined that because the trial court improperly allowed Terrell to present her expert’s opinion of her future medical costs related to the surgery, that evidence tainted  the jury as to the value of her injuries and affected their decision on pain and suffering. As a result, the Court vacated the full $1,300,000 judgment and sent the entire case back to the trial court for a new trial on damages, barring Terrell from introducing any of the contested evidence as to the purported surgery or its costs.

Of note, affecting the Court’s determination of prejudice, the Court found that had Terrell made a definitive statement as to surgery before the close of discovery in 2021, or if she had the surgery, that surgery would have been covered by her Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits available through her auto insurance. But, because of her indecision and failure to have the surgery, the PIP statute of limitations may have expired, barring Chitra to seek reimbursement from the insurer.  The Court found that Terrell must bear the consequences of failing to choose to have surgery when PIP benefits would have been available to pay for it. Moreover, by rule, PIP-payable future medical costs are not admissible at trial and should not have been presented to the jury.

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