Policy

In every state, two investigative forms have an enormous impact on helping employers save money and win cases in workers’ compensation: first, a detailed Employee Accident Form filled out entirely by the injured employee and signed by the employee, and second, a detailed Supervisor’s Report Form.   This practitioner has tailored both forms for the use of firm clients.  I have written extensively in the past about the enormous value of an effective Employee Accident Form, and this blog will explore why a Supervisor’s Report Form also helps win cases and reduces workers’ compensation costs.  Clients who use both forms have enhanced their chances of prevailing geometrically.

Many employers traditionally have a combined one-page form for the supervisor to fill out one section and for the employee to fill out another section.  Sometimes the supervisor writes what the employee tells him or her, and then the employee only signs the form.  This is not effective in court because the employee can reject what the supervisor wrote as inaccurate.  It is always better for the employee to complete the Employee Report in his or her own handwriting.   It is also hard to tell if the supervisor is writing what he or she thinks or what he or she was told.  The abbreviated Supervisor’s Form will ask “How did the accident happen?” and the supervisor may write:  “Employee slipped on ice.”   Much later it may become clear to defense counsel that the supervisor really did not think this accident ever happened.  He wrote just what the employee told him, but the form had no place for the supervisor to raise doubts.  So cases get accepted, bills get paid, and surgery ensues when all of this should have been denied.  In short, these abbreviated forms are like an appetizer to an entrée.  You get much more out of two separate and detailed forms filled out as close as possible to the time of the incident.

So what makes an effective Supervisor’s Report Form?  To ask it another way, what information should an employer strive to obtain in a supervisor’s form that will help prepare the defense of a workers’ compensation claim and often help win the claim? In this practitioner’s view, these are the essential elements in a powerful Supervisor’s Report Form:

  • Information that would determine if there is a notice defense or late reporting issue;
  • Detailed information on the time, date and mechanism of injury;
  • A list of witnesses to the incident, if any;
  • Detailed information on what others saw or were told by the employee about the incident or accident;
  • Specific information about the employee’s job duties generally and on the date of the incident;
  • Information on second jobs or other physical activities engaged in by the employee in the years prior to the incident or accident;
  • Information on motor vehicle accidents, home injuries or sports injuries that the employee was involved in during the past few years;
  • Information on whether the employee was offered or declined medical attention.

All of this information – and more — can be easily captured within two pages, and this approach can be used in any state.  But in states like New Jersey, where there are no depositions or interrogatories permitted in traumatic claims, a comprehensive Supervisor’s Report Form is imperative! This form and the Employee Accident Form will often be the only useful discovery that employer will ever get in many cases.  For employers with a high volume of comp claims, using these two forms will consistently lead to success because patterns develop, and supervisors become more adept at understanding the workers’ compensation process.  The carrier, TPA, self-insured employer and defense counsel will be able to make intelligent decisions on whether to deny the claim or accept it, and if denied, how to win the case and not pay for unrelated surgery, lost time and permanency benefits.

There are no reliable statistics on how many comp claims involve some kind of legal issue as opposed to clearly witnessed accidents where there really are no issues other than the extent of permanency. This practitioner believes that perhaps fifty percent to two thirds of claims are unwitnessed or are questionable because the injured employee was known by the employer to have the health condition prior to the accident, or the mechanism of injury simply makes no sense. These are the kinds of claims that bedevil employers and can wreck budgets and explode reserves.  Most employers know their employees pretty well and have an instinctive sense when there is something wrong with a claim.  Defense attorneys get litigation files well after the claim occurs, and they pore over the supervisor’s report form, only to conclude that there just is far too little information on the form to win the case.  Memories fade quickly, and any claims professional or defense lawyer knows how hard it is to resurrect the facts of a claim with a supervisor or witness in a discussion that occurs 12 or 24 months later.

The solution is simple:  require a few extra minutes to obtain a more detailed series of questions right up front.  Some of the 22 questions on this practitioner’s two-page form require simple yes or no answers, such as “Did you personally observe the incident involving this employee?” and “To your knowledge, was this accident witnessed or unwitnessed?”   Some of the questions require a few sentences of description: for example, “If you did not witness the incident but others told you about it, describe exactly what they told you, who spoke with you, and what that individual said.”

How much does this cost to implement? The answer is it costs nothing.  This is what it requires: an extra two or three minutes to complete over the traditional one page form.  In exchange for an investment of two or three more minutes, employers get a useful form that paints a clear picture of whether the claim should be denied, whether there are strong defenses, and who the witnesses will be to help the employer win the case.  It doesn’t matter what state the employer is in, as this approach is universal.  There is no training required for supervisors because this kind of supervisor’s form must be self-explanatory and simple.

Clients of Capehart who are interested in reviewing this practitioner’s Employee Accident Form or the Supervisor’s Incident Report Form should contact the undersigned.

If an employee came to her employer and advised that she had been diagnosed with cancer, wouldn’t you automatically assume that the employee falls with the definition of “disabled” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) due to the diagnosis alone? Not so fast.  In a recent Third Circuit case, Alston v. Park Pleasant, Inc., No. 16-1464,  2017 WL 627381 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2017), the Court reminded employers that nothing should be assumed and that each case requires an independent factual analysis. Just because an employee provides an employer with a specific diagnosis, this does not automatically mean that the employee is considered disabled under the ADA.

Facts

Joanie Alston (“Alston”) was hired by Park Pleasant, Inc. in 2011 as the Director of Nursing at an adult care facility.  Thereafter, in 2012, Alston’s performance started to deteriorate. In June 2012, Alston’s supervisors and HR Director met with her to advise her that her performance was not meeting expectations. Alston was put on a performance plan.  Five days later, Alston missed work to have a biopsy done.  On July 12th, Alston was diagnosed with early stage breast cancer.  Thereafter, Alston’s performance continued to deteriorate and by late July, Alston’s supervisors were meeting with Alston weekly to discuss her performance deficiencies.  In August 2012 Alston was terminated.

Alston brought suit against Park Pleasant, Inc., claiming discrimination on the basis of age, race, color and disability.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Park Pleasant, Inc.  Alston then appealed only the Court’s granting of summary judgment in regards to her claim of discrimination on the basis of disability. The District Court had found that summary judgment was appropriate because Alston failed to prove that she had a disability.  The parties did not dispute that Alston had breast cancer but the question was whether or not Alston had presented enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her cancer qualified as a disability.

Holding

The 3rd Circuit found that Alston had not established that she was disabled under the ADA.  Although cancer can – and generally will– be considered a disability under the ADA, the Court explained that there still must be an individualized assessment in each case as to whether or not the cancer substantially limits a major life activity (as required to fall within the protections of the ADA) for the specific employee.  To undertake the individualized assessment, courts have required some evidence of the plaintiff’s substantial limitation – even when the limitation seems self-evident. In the instant case, the Court found that Alston never claimed during the litigation that her cancer limited any substantial life activity (including immune system function or normal cell growth).  Alston’s Complaint made no mention of any type of limitations.  At her deposition, Alston testified that she was not limited in any major life activity.  Since Alston only supported her claim of disability by a generalized statement that she was diagnosed with cancer, without more, Alston failed to make out the prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA.

What does this case mean to you?

This case should remind employers that although the ADA is usually interpreted broadly, it is still important to conduct an individualized analysis of each employee and his/her specific illness/condition.  Each situation is fact specific, and only when an employee meets certain requirements, will he/she be entitled to the protections provided by the ADA.

Don Drysdale, a skilled carpenter, works for Craftsmen Trades and seldom goes to the company office in Mt. Laurel, N.J.  He generally spends weeks or even months working at major job sites.  On May 1, 2017 he drives his personal vehicle from his home in Cherry Hill, N.J. to a job site in Woodbridge, N.J. where a large commercial building is being constructed.  He has been working at that site for a month.  As he is driving up the Turnpike, a truck veers into his lane and strikes his vehicle, causing Mr. Drysdale serious injuries.  Is he covered for workers’ compensation purposes?

The starting point is to study the language of N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, which states that “employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work . . . provided, however, when the employee is required by the employer to be away from the employer’s place of employment, the employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer; but the employment of employee paid travel time by an employer for time spent traveling to and from a job site or of any employee who utilizes an employer authorized vehicle shall commence and terminate with the time spent traveling to and from the job site.”

This first question to ask is whether this commercial site is the “employer’s place of employment?”  The answer to that question is probably no since Craftsmen Trades has an office in Mt. Laurel, N.J.  That is the employer’s place of employment.  The second question is whether this commute falls under the special mission exception cited above for those trips that are “away from the employer’s place of employment?”  The answer to this question is also likely no because this location in Woodbridge would qualify as a job site since Drysdale works there for weeks or months at a time.  So we have to consider what the test is for driving to and from a job site.

Based on the statutory language above, Don Drysdale’s drive is only covered if he is using an employer authorized vehicle or if he is paid travel time for the commuting segment of his day.  In this case, he is driving his personal vehicle, so he does not meet the “authorized vehicle” exception.  But we do not yet know whether he is paid travel time.  If not, the commute is not compensable.

One case which is helpful on this issue is Mahon v. Reilly’s Radio Cabs, Inc., 212 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 1986).  In that case the injured worker, a New Jersey Transit employee, was traveling on a New Jersey Transit Bus, driven by defendant Cruz, from Hoboken to his place of employment.  He paid no fare as he was provided free transportation on all NJ Transit buses as part of his Collective Bargaining Agreement.   The bus stopped at a dangerous angle in the street, and when Mahon exited the bus and walked into the street, a cab driven by Cruz struck him causing serious injuries.  Mahon sued the cab driver and NJ Transit.  NJ Transit argued that petitioner was in the scope of his employment and therefore could not sue his own employer.  NJ Transit further contended that Mahon was provided free transportation in an employer authorized vehicle.  Both the trial court and the appellate court disagreed with these arguments.

First, the Appellate Division distinguished the “place of employment” from “job site” in the above statute.  “In this case before us, the plaintiff’s accident did not occur while he was traveling to a job site away from the employer’s place of employment.  Rather, he was injured while on the way to the place of employment.”  What this meant is that the language about authorized vehicle and travel time did not apply.  Secondly, the Court said that when someone is driving to his or her place of employment, it does not matter if the transportation is cost free to the employee.  “That he was provided free transportation on NJT buses as a benefit of his employment, which he could utilize in commuting to work, does not operate to bring this travel within the scope of his employment.”  The Court cited to Nebesne v. Crocetti, 194 N.J. Super.  278 (App. Div. 1984) for the proposition that an employer does not render a commute to work compensable just because the employer reimburses all travel expenses.

The analysis workers’ compensation practitioners should make when dealing with commuting issues is this:

  1. Was the employee commuting to the employer’s place of employment? If that is the case, the travel is not compensable, including alternate places of employment.  So if an employer has an office in Trenton, an office in Parsippany and an office in Harrisburg, PA., and throughout the year the employee has to drive to all three offices, the commute to any of these offices is not compensable because all three locations would qualify as an employer’s place of employment.
  2. Was the employee commuting to a job site? If so, this commute is only compensable if the employee was using an authorized company vehicle or paid travel time.
  3. Was the employee reporting to a location that is not the employer’s place of employment and not a job site?  If so, this commute will likely qualify as a special mission and the commute will be covered because it will be “away” from the employer’s place of employment.

On February 15, 2017 Governor Chris Christie signed a new law requiring health insurance coverage for treatment of substance abuse disorders and certain restrictions on the prescription of opioids and other Schedule II drugs.  The bill is touted as one of the most aggressive in the nation, and compensation practitioners are asking what will be the impact on New Jersey workers’ compensation?

There are several key provisions contained in this bill that will have an impact on workers’ compensation practitioners.  First, the bill sets time limits for how long prescriptions may be written.  This aspect of the bill will directly impact workers’ compensation physicians.  The initial prescription for an opioid cannot exceed a five-day supply for acute pain. After the fourth day, upon consultation with the medical provider, the physician can issue a subsequent prescription up to a 25 day supply.  The bill does not say whether “patient consultation” means an in-person visit or a telephone call.  However, emergency regulations are being promulgated on a number of issues right now, and this is likely to be one area addressed in those regulations. It should be noted that the language of the bill focuses on “acute” pain patients, and it seems clear that this language does not apply to chronic pain patients.

The bill also requires the provider to take steps that many workers’ compensation pain management doctors in New Jersey already perform:

  • Taking a thorough medical history, including the patient’s experience with non-opioid medications and non-pharmacological pain management as well as substance abuse history;
  • Conducting and documenting a physical examination;
  • Developing a treatment plan focused on the cause of the patient’s pain;
  • Accessing the Prescription Monitoring Program, which is an invaluable resource that tracks all prescriptions for narcotics and opioids from all providers going back several years.

When physicians renew prescriptions beyond the five-day period, they must document the rationale for the issuance of the subsequent prescription. The bill recites that prior to the initial and the third prescription, the practitioner must discuss with the patient the risks associated with the drug being prescribed, including risks of overdosing, the reason why the prescription is necessary, and alternate modes of treatment.

Most New Jersey pain management physicians in workers’ compensation already have pain management agreements or contracts entered into between the patient and provider, setting forth the terms of treatment.  The bill now requires such agreements to be executed at the time of the third prescription of an opioid drug.  These pain management contracts are crucial because they establish what the patient must do to continue to obtain opioid medications and what must not be done.  Urine samples and other measures are generally part of these pain management agreements.

The new bill creates staged and mandatory counseling with documentation designed to assure the public that pain medications are seriously evaluated by the prescribing physician.  If the controlled dangerous substance or other prescription opioid is continuously prescribed for three months or more, the practitioner must, a minimum of every three months, review the course of treatment as well as any new information about the etiology of the patient’s pain and progress.  Most importantly, the physician must assess prior to every renewal whether the patient is experiencing problems associated with physical and psychological dependence and then document the results of the assessment.  The physician must consider stopping the use of the controlled substance, decreasing the dosage or trying some other drug or treatment modality to reduce dependency.

Workers’ compensation carriers and third party administrators can expect greater detail in reports generated by pain management physicians as a result of this legislation.  These reports should focus on the standards outlined above, particularly whether the patient is at risk of or becoming dependent on opioids and whether some other modality should be used.  Employers, carriers and third party administrators will certainly take note of those physicians who expend time thoroughly documenting these issues and explaining the rationale for their recommendations.

The bill also recites language from guidelines issued by the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General on March 1, 2010 regarding the limitation of Schedule II controlled dangerous substances to quantities which do not exceed a 30-day supply.   That guidance is now incorporated in this bill and does allow a physician to issue multiple prescriptions for up to a 90-day supply with renewals on a 30-day basis.

This bill may have the effect of enhancing the use of pain management physicians who eschew the use of opioids and prefer instead to do interventional modalities, such as injections and blocks.  There are a variety of pain management doctors in New Jersey, and not all of them prescribe opioids or Schedule II controlled dangerous substances.  Some prefer other modalities precisely because of problems associated with opioids.

One other central aspect of this bill pertains to health insurance carriers which now must provide coverage for treatment of those with substance abuse disorders.  That aspect will not have much impact at all on workers’ compensation because employers, carriers and third party administrators have been paying for many years for reasonable and necessary care of those with work-related substance abuse disorders (usually from addiction to authorized prescriptions of opioids and prescription narcotics).  Many workers’ compensation cases involve workers who have become addicted to opioids used in connection with worker injuries, requiring admission to licensed programs designed to wean them off narcotics.

For health insurance carriers, this new coverage provision is important because it mandates payment of benefits for the first 180 days per plan year of inpatient and outpatient treatment of substance abuse disorders, if such treatment is deemed medically necessary by the covered person’s physician, licensed psychologist, or psychiatrist.

Without a doubt, this legislation highlights a growing problem in the State of New Jersey in connection with high numbers of patients who have become addicted to and dependent on opioids to function in their lives.  Without intending to do harm, some pain management doctors have in the past effectively traded acute pain relief for long term dependency and addiction.  That is less likely to occur in the future on account of this legislation.

The undersigned will keep readers posted as the new emergency regulations emerge on this important legislation.  The effective date of this legislation is May 16, 2017.   My thanks to our librarian Francine Viden for her assistance on research of this and prior legislation.

New employee overtime rules slated to take effect on December 1, 2016, have been placed on a nationwide temporary “hold” pending a final Court hearing on the matter. The new Fair Labor Standards Act regulation, which would have doubled the minimum salary threshold for those not eligible for overtime pay, has been delayed by a Federal Court in Texas. The question is: “What do we do now?”

What Happened? A Federal Court in Texas placed a nationwide “hold” on the regulation scheduled to take effect on December 1st requiring employers to make hard decisions on whether to double the pay for certain salaried employees (exempt from overtime) or pay them overtime for more than 40 hours worked in a week. In enjoining the implementation and enforcement of the new rule, the Court held that Federal law does not grant the Department of Labor the authority to use a salary-level test or an automatic updating mechanism (for minimum salaries). In doing so, the Court held that “[w]ith the Final Rule, the Department exceeds its delegated authority and ignores Congress’s intent by raising the minimum salary level such that it supplants the duties test” and that “[i]f Congress intended the salary requirement to supplant the duties test, then Congress, and not the Department, should make that change.”

What did the Regulation Actually Require?  It would have raised the minimum salary for every salaried employee not paid for overtime hours (approximately 4.2 Million nationwide) from $23,660 to $47,476 and also provided for automatic increases every three years beginning in January, 2020.

What Does the “Hold” Mean for Your Organization?   It means that you do not have to raise the “exempt” employees’ salaries beginning on December 1st (or pay them overtime) even if they work more than 40 hours. However, this may be a temporary delay since the Court issued only a temporary order until the issues can be decided after a full hearing and final decision.

What Do We Do if We Already Gave or Promised Our Salaried Employees Raises? This is a very sensitive topic since it may not only involve legal issues, but may affect your organization’s morale and finances.  In the first instance, you may want to consult with your legal counsel regarding your options which may include leaving those decisions in place (paying the raises or beginning to pay formerly “exempt” employees overtime) or advising employees that the raises (and/or overtime pay) will be postponed pending the final legal decisions on these issues. Other options may be available based on the nature of your business, your organizational structure, and any actions you have already taken to implement the FLSA regulation.

What is Our Recommendation?  First, consider the impact of any collective bargaining or employment agreement that may be in place. Second, and most important, and whatever path you choose, your reaction to the “hold” should be done with great care and after seeking advice from your legal team.

The Honorable Russell Wojtenko, Jr., Director and Chief Judge, issued a Memo effective October 21, 2016 to all workers’ compensation attorneys advising that the administrative rules on motions for medical and temporary disability benefits will be strictly enforced.  What this means to employers, carriers, third party administrators and practitioners is that motions for medical and temporary disability benefits must be handled right away and forwarded to counsel immediately.  Otherwise respondents will lose motions based solely on failure to meet certain time deadlines noted below.

The Director’s Memo cites N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.2, which says that “a respondent shall file an answer within 21 days of service of the motion or within 30 days after service of the claim petition, whichever is later.”

“The respondent’s exam shall be completed within 30 days of receipt of the motion and the report issued in not more than 35 days from receipt of the motion and shall not delay the start of the hearing of the motion except for good cause shown.”

This is not a new rule. The prior rule was amended in 2002 to state exactly what the Director has quoted above.  However, the rule has been seldom enforced since 2002 primarily because it is extremely difficult for respondents to get an exam within 30 days of the filing of the motion and still harder to get a report within 35 days of the filing of the motion.  Some doctors will not schedule within 60 days, much less 30 days, and it often takes a doctor 10 to 14 days to issue a report.

The Director’s memo concludes by stating, “The following requirements on motions for medical and temporary disability benefits shall be strictly enforced.”  We advise that carriers and third party administrators, when served with motions for medical and temporary disability benefits, must send such motions immediately to defense counsel.  An answer must be filed within 21 days, unless the motion comes with the claim petition (in which case the time is extended to 30 days). The time is running from the date the carrier, third party administrator or self-insured receives the motion.  If the carrier holds the motion for 10 days without acting on it, then there remain only 11 days to file an answer, 20 days to get the defense exam and only 25 days to obtain the report.

These timelines will be extremely problematic for all respondents statewide because treating and IME doctors can seldom find scheduling slots within a few weeks and then turn around a report in a few days.  Because of these somewhat unrealistic timelines established in 2002, many employers will soon lose and pay orders on cases for which there were valid defenses.  All employers, carriers, third party administrators and counsel should develop reliable methods to handle motions for medical and temporary disability benefits.  A motion for medical and temporary disability benefits should be treated now like a 911 call.

Practitioners should bear in mind that the Director also reminded claimants’ counsel that a valid motion must contain affidavits or certifications in support of the motion.  The Memo adds that the motion should include reports of a physician, stating the medical diagnosis and the specific type of diagnostic study, referral to a specialist, or treatment sought.  Motions which do not meet these requirements will be rejected.  This is less onerous on petitioners and their counsel because a deficient motion can always be refiled later with adequate paperwork.  But once an order is entered against respondent, the only route left to respondent is an appeal.

Many employers have a policy of mandatory post-injury drug testing.  Those policies must now be reconsidered and largely jettisoned. The underpinning of the new OSHA policy on drug testing is the belief that blanket post-injury drug testing policies deter proper reporting of injuries.  On May 12, 2016 OSHA published new final rules against discrimination and injury and illness reporting.  The new rule became effective August 10, 2016.  The rule itself does not mention blanket drug testing policies, but the Comments to the rule make clear OSHA’s position.

The way OSHA gets to drug testing is through Section 1904.35(b)(1)(iv) which prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee for reporting a work-related injury or illness.  While the evidence seems threadbare that employers retaliate against employees who report work injuries by requiring post-accident drug testing, employers have to deal with the new rule, like it or not.

Here is the new standard contained in the Comments to the rule.  “To strike the appropriate balance here, drug testing policies should limit post-incident testing to situations in which employee drug use is likely to have contributed to the incident, and for which the drug test can accurately identify impairment caused by drug use.”  Employers rightly question how they will develop the expertise to know when drugs are contributing to an accident. The Comments suggest that it would not be reasonable to drug test an employee who reports a bee sting, a repetitive strain injury, or an injury caused by a lack of machine guarding or a machine or tool malfunction.  That sort of testing, in the view of OSHA, “is likely only to deter reporting without contributing to the employer’s understanding of why the injury occurred, or in any other way contributing to workplace safety.”

Another harm that OSHA sees in drug testing is that it can be perceived as punitive or embarrassing to the employee and therefore likely to deter injury reporting.  OSHA states that “this final rule does not ban drug testing of employees.  However, the final rule does prohibit employers from using drug testing (or the threat of drug testing) as a form of adverse action against employees who report injuries or illnesses.”

So how can an employer perform post-incident drug testing while at the same time convincing OSHA that it is not doing this to deter reporting of injuries or illnesses?  OSHA says that drug testing which complies with a requirement of state or federal law or regulation is fine because the motive of the employer will be considered non-retaliatory. But those examples of drug testing do not address the issues most employers face.

OSHA adds the following opaque comment: “Employers need not specifically suspect drug use before testing, but there should be a reasonable possibility that drug use by the reporting employee was a contributing factor to the reported injury or illness in order for an employer to require drug testing.”  What “reasonable possibility” means is anyone’s guess at this point in time.  Questions abound on how an employer will be able to acquire in the short window of time following an accident sufficient information to make a decision to drug test under the “reasonable possibility” standard?  A huge percentage of workers’ compensation accidents are unwitnessed, and drug use is widespread in our society generally.  One can argue that there is always a reasonable possibility that drugs may be involved in work injuries, but clearly OSHA is looking for something beyond broad generalities like this.  The Comments provide no examples of what OSHA is looking for.  The likely effect of this rule will be to deter employers from drug testing after work injuries, and ultimately this will make workplaces and workers less safe.

Employer groups will surely challenge this rule in federal court.  In the interim, employers should know that maximum penalties are now $12,000 per violation and over $120,000 for repeat violations. Given the new rule is now in effect, we recommend that employers, if they have not already done so, take a fresh look at their drug testing policies.

Employers will be relieved to hear that the New Jersey Appellate Division recently handed down a pro-employer decision regarding the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”).  The case of Ortiz v. Penske Truck Leasing, No. A-3742-14T3 (App. Div. September 13, 2016) re-emphasizes the legal principle that in order for an employee to prevail regarding a CEPA claim, he/she must establish an objectively reasonable belief that an employer’s practice violates a law, regulation or clear mandate of public policy concerning public safety.  If an employee cannot provide an objectively reasonable belief as to why the employer’s practice(s) violates the law, a regulation or public policy, the employee’s CEPA claim should be dismissed as a matter of law.

Facts of the Case

Plaintiff, Julio Ortiz, was hired by Penske Truck Leasing (“Penske”) in 2004 as a technician and later became a foreman. In April 2011, Plaintiff and a former Penske supervisor sent an anonymous e-mail to Penske’s CEO and President alleging, among other things, violations of the preventative maintenance (“PM”) process.  Although the Penske vehicles received annual inspections, there was also an internal process of inspecting the vehicles every 6,000-20,000 miles (PM Process).  This process went above and beyond the federal requirements of an annual inspection.  In Plaintiff’s e-mail to the CEO and President, Plaintiff claimed that the PM process was falsified and the falsified process was known as a “Paper PM.” A Paper PM was a PM that was notated as completed in the computer system but no physical work was ever actually performed on the vehicle. Plaintiff was never told to perform a Paper PM but he had heard technicians talking about it during breaks.  Plaintiff did not have any information about Paper PMs directly.

In August 2011, over four months after Plaintiff had sent the anonymous e-mail to Penske CEO and President, Penske began investigating a grievance filed by Plaintiff and a report that Plaintiff had falsified a leave request form.  Following Penske’s investigation into the grievance and alleged forged report, Penske terminated Plaintiff for dishonesty during the grievance process.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed suit against Penske claiming wrongful termination in violation of CEPA.  Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated because he objected to, and refused to participate in, alleged illegal business practices (Paper PMs).  The matter went to trial and a jury awarded Plaintiff $90,000 in damages. Thereafter, Penske filed for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”).  The court granted the JNOV and overturned the jury award based upon its determination that Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that he objectively and reasonably believed that Penske’s conduct threatened public safety.  Plaintiff appealed the granting of the JNOV to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Court reviewed the case and indicated that “a jury’s factual determination will be disturbed only if the court finds that the jury could not have reasonably used the evidence to reach its verdict.”  In this case, the Appellate Court found that even though Plaintiff believed that the Paper PM practice threatened people’s safety, Plaintiff never provided any evidence as to exactly how it threatened public safety.  Plaintiff never identified any paper document that caused any truck or vehicle to be unsafe. Moreover, Plaintiff never testified as to how the Paper PM practice threatened or endangered the public safety.

The applicable section of CEPA “bars any retaliatory action against an employee when the employee objects to or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.” A plaintiff must establish a substantial nexus between the complained of conduct and a clear mandate of public policy.  This analysis distinguishes an employee’s objection to, or reporting of, an employer’s illegal or unethical conduct from a routine dispute in the workplace regarding the merits of internal policies procedures and practices.

Here, the Appellate Court held that Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of safety rules and regulations and a clear mandate of public policy applicable to Paper PMs.  There was no testimony that any vehicle ever left the premises in an unsafe manner.  In fact, all required yearly inspections were completed.  Thus, there was no evidentiary basis that a jury could conclude that Plaintiff had an objective reasonable belief that the Paper PM practice threatened public safety.  The Appellate Court affirmed the Court’s granting of the JNOV.

What does this mean for employers?

             Employers are encouraged to understand the requirements for an employee to prove a CEPA claim.  If your company is served with a Complaint and it looks as though the employee is claiming a violation of CEPA based upon an internal workplace dispute, rather than illegal activity or a violation of public policy, the case may be subject to dismissal. Contact your employment attorney immediately when served with any employment litigation so the attorney can evaluate the case and create a strategy to defend your company!

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