Policy

Ever since New Jersey’s Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act was passed in 2010, one of the issues that employers have wondered about is whether an employee who used medical marijuana could be terminated for violating an employer’s drug and alcohol testing policy.  That question has been the subject of many court decisions throughout the country in other states with similar compassionate use laws with varying results.  On August 10, 2018, we finally received the first decision here in New Jersey addressing this important question.

In Cotto v. Ardagh Glass Packing, Inc., No. 18-1037 (D.N.J. August 10, 2018), a federal judge of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that an employer was not obligated under either the Compassionate Use Act or the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination to carve out an exception to its drug testing policy for the benefit of a medicinal marijuana user so that the employee could remain employed with that company.   Following a minor workplace accident, Plaintiff was required to take both breath and urine tests under the Defendant’s drug testing policy which required testing after every workplace accident.  He refused and the company placed him on a long term indefinite suspension until he compiled with the testing policy requirement.  Plaintiff refused to take the test because he knew he would fail due to his use of both Percocet and medical marijuana for long term pain management.  Prior to the accident, the Plaintiff performed his job without incident.  While the company did not have an issue with the Percocet use, it was unwilling to carve out an exception for medical marijuana use under its drug testing policy.

The district court held that there was no legal obligation on the part of the employer to allow for the marijuana use, in part, because while the Compassionate Use law shields employees from state criminal prosecution, federal law still makes marijuana use illegal, and an employer because of that could ban marijuana use amongst its employees without running afoul of anti-disability discrimination laws since the prohibition is directed not towards any disability but against the use of a federally prohibited drug prescribed for the treatment of the condition.

So, what is the implication of the Cotto decision for employers?  Because no New Jersey state court had ever addressed this issue, as a federal court, the judge in Cotto had to predict how a New Jersey state court would address the presented issue in Cotto.   What does that status mean?  Well, it means that, even with this decision in Cotto, a state court judge in a case presenting the same issue could rule differently than what happened in this case, and there are several such cases now awaiting decision in the New Jersey state court system.  So, while it is always positive to have a court decision that provides some direction on what to do in these kinds of situations, until a state court judicial ruling occurs, employers should still proceed with caution in how it addresses these types of issues, and it is best to seek legal advice before taking any type of adverse action against a medical marijuana user.  Also, if you have not done so yet, employers are wise to review their drug testing policies and decide in advance whether they wish to treat medicinal marijuana use like any other prescribed drug so you the employer are prepared in case the situation ever needs to be addressed in your workplace.

“The answer is not that simple,” suggested the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in a recent case in which a former employee for the Susquehanna Department of Veterans Affairs who did not follow the employer’s policy sued her employer, claiming her supervisor kissed her and made sexual advances toward her (Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018).

Aren’t Employers Shielded from Liability if They Have Policies and Procedures in Place?  The answer is, “Generally, yes.”  Under long-standing U.S. Supreme Court rulings (Faragher and Burlington Industries), employers can avoid liability in sexual harassment and discrimination cases if they had policies and corrective procedures in place when the acts occurred. In fact, this is precisely why your labor and employment advisors most likely counsel you to carefully review and update your harassment, discrimination, reporting, and investigation policies and to fully investigate any alleged acts of harassment or discrimination.

Why Question this Long-Standing Rule Now? Recognizing that the public agency had adopted an adequate policy to address complaints and that Ms. Minarsky failed to report her allegations of harassment (which we would think precludes her claim in the first instance), the Third Circuit held that having a policy in place “may not be enough.”  Rather, said the Court, an analysis must be undertaken to determine if the policy was “effective” and if the employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.”

So What Were the Facts?  In this instance, the employer had a “solid” policy outlining harassment prohibitions and reporting mechanisms and the employee failed to report the behavior.  However, concluded the Court, even though the employee did not actually report the abusive behavior at the time, she identified instances “where asserting herself rendered her work conditions even more hostile”.  For example, when she would object to the supervisor’s advances, he would react negatively and become “nasty.”  To make matters worse, the supervisor was warned twice about his inappropriate behavior towards other employees, he “warned Minarsky not to trust” the County Commissioners, and discovery revealed numerous other instances of harassing behavior by the supervisor. Thus, the Court held, “a reasonable jury could find that [her] fear of aggravating her work environment was sufficiently specific, rather than simply a generalized unsubstantiated fear,” creating a question as to whether she was justified in not reporting the unacceptable conduct. In fact, said the Court, “[a] jury could find that Minarsky reasonably believed that availing herself of the anti-harassment policy would be futile, if not detrimental.”

So What’s the Take-a-Way for Employers? In the first instance, even if you have a “solid” and updated harassment/discrimination/reporting policy (which you should revisit ASAP), that may not be enough! Here, said the Court, even though the employer had a policy in place, it may not have been effective since the employer was “faced with indicators that [the supervisor’s] behavior formed a pattern of conduct, as opposed to mere stray incidents, yet they seemingly turned a blind eye toward [his] harassment.”  The bottom line is if your entity is faced with any type of harassment claim, don’t rely solely on your policies and procedures. Each case is different — each employee has a different set of concerns — and each supervisor or co-worker accused of unacceptable conduct has behaved differently. In these instances, which are all fact-specific, consult your labor and employment counsel to ensure that you’re not “turning a blind eye” to a larger and more complicated problem.

Skilled practitioners know they must keep an eye on potential employment litigation stemming from workers’ compensation claims.  The case of Dallefeld v. The Clubs at River City, Inc., 2017 AD Cases 244151 (D. Illinois 2017) provides a good illustration.

Jason Dallefeld was the Director of Membership Sales, providing tours, selling memberships, and making sure other employees showed up for work at The Clubs.  He injured his right knee in 2009 at his previous job but continued to treat while working at The Clubs beginning in 2012.  Dallefeld informed the business manager, Ms. Robinson, and the president, Mr. O’Connell, of his knee injury.  He sometimes walked with a limp at his job. He told Robinson and O’Connell that he reinjured his knee on the job on four occasions in 2013 and 2014 at The Clubs.  The incidents involved slips on water and climbing stairs. Dallefeld did not lose time from work immediately after these incidents.

On March 26, 2014, Dallefeld’s doctor placed him off duty.  The physician said that Dallefeld aggravated his prior knee condition while working at The Clubs and would need surgery. On April 1, 2014, Dallefeld traveled to Florida with his girlfriend.  Dallefeld’s doctor approved light duty work in May 2014 before a planned knee surgery.  The light duty work issue was not resolved until June 2, 2014, when Dallefeld met with Robinson and O’Connell.  Dallefeld claimed that O’Connell told him to go have his surgery.  However, a termination letter had already been sent to Dallefeld on June 1, 2014.  That was never mentioned in the meeting on June 2, 2014.  O’Connell testified that the reason for the termination was that Dallefeld was never specific about when he was going to have his knee surgery and that Dallefeld’s job duties needed to be reassigned to two other employees at a busy time for The Clubs.

There was a dispute whether Dallefeld requested leave under the FMLA.  At least one other employee had been given FMLA leave.  Dallefeld claimed that he had never gotten a handbook, although he had been in meetings where the FMLA was discussed.  He essentially argued that he provided enough information to The Clubs that they should have notified him of his rights under the FMLA.

Dallefeld sued under the FMLA and ADA.  Regarding the FMLA, The Clubs argued that Dallefeld drove to Florida with his girlfriend during the period that his doctor took him out of work, and he continued to lift weights at The Clubs while out of work.  The employer also noted that Dallefeld did not schedule the surgery that his doctor wanted to perform.  However, the Court commented that driving and lifting weights did not prove that Dallefeld could give tours, which was one of the essential job functions.  The Court also observed that O’Connell claimed that he did not receive the May 21, 2014 work status note from Dallefeld.  That was an important issue of fact.  Under these circumstance, the Court said that a sufficient amount of disputed fact existed regarding notice by Dallefeld to take FMLA leave to survive summary judgment.

The work status note from May 21, 2014 also became a big issue in the ADA claim.  His doctor said in that note that Dallefeld was released to light work modified duty, and that he could not lift or carry more than 20 pounds and was limited to frequent lifting of ten pounds or less.  His doctor said that Dallefeld could have worked within these restrictions if The Clubs had given him an accommodation of not walking around and doing tours.  Dallefeld argued that this note was a request for accommodation. For his part, Dallefeld said that he could perform duties such as sitting at his desk, answering the phone and using the computer.

The Court concluded that a fact finder could find that Dallefeld’s May 21, 2014 note was in effect a request for reasonable accommodation.  For this reason, the Court allowed Dallefeld to proceed to a jury on this issue and denied The Clubs’ motion for summary judgment.

The case shows how problematic it is to terminate employment soon after the employee provides a note suggesting imminent surgery or a need for modified duty.  These facts should have alerted the employer to the potential for both FMLA and ADA application, and in the end the Court found potential violations of both laws.

The post Employer May Have Violated Both The ADA and FMLA Regarding Plaintiff’s Knee Injury Arising Out Of His Employment appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

A question that I frequently receive in my practice is:  should a company implement any sort of dating policy for employees, or even go so far as to actually ban such relationships totally among its employees?

As hard as it might be to believe, it was not long ago when such policies prohibiting dating amongst employees were common in many workplaces. Over the years, with the recognition that employees are spending so much of their time at work today, employers began to acknowledge the practicalities that romantic relationships can often develop between employees spending so much of their waking hours around one another. Ultimately, most employers came to accept the realities of such workplace romances.

At their root, these prohibitory policies were designed to control (in some way) the potential damage that could occur to the “business” relationship between such employees if the romantic relationship fizzled and ended.  Such policies were also designed to eliminate the always thorny situation of a supervisor becoming romantically involved with a co-worker over whom there was supervisory responsibilities.  In today’s current business climate where we are seeing an increase in sexual harassment complaints, should companies bring those discarded anti-dating polices back as a further means of preventing possible harassment claims in the workplace?

As I frequently advise my clients, the difficulties of enforcing anti-dating rules in the workplace today make me question the wisdom of implementing an outright ban on such dating.  Nevertheless, employers are wise to adopt a policy alerting employees to the fact that, while workplace relationships are not prohibited, the company’s anti- harassment policy still applies to protect employees when romantic relationships are pursued by a co-worker that are unwelcome.  Employees should likewise be reminded that the right to say “no” is to be respected, and when it is not, there will be consequences under the Company’s anti-harassment policy. Finally, it is also beneficial for employers to let employees know that, in cases where there is a supervised-supervisor romantic relationship, the supervised employee will be reassigned to another supervisor in order to eliminate potential claims by other supervised employees of favoritism and the possible negative fallout and tension that could happen when the romantic relationship ends.

While it might be hard to stop romantic relationships from happening in the workforce, implementation of a sound dating policy can assist in controlling any negative impact that such relationships could have on your business.

Scott Jeannette was an employee of General Mills Progresso. He went into cardiac arrest at work on June 7, 2011 and died nine days later from complications.   He left a wife, Nacole, and a four-year-old son, Chase. Nacole filed a dependency claim petition over six months past the two-year statutory filing deadline. General Mills Progresso denied the claim as time barred. The Judge of Compensation denied both the widow’s claim and her son’s claim as time barred, leading to an appeal.

Ms. Jeannette argued on appeal that she experienced a period of temporary incapacity, which should excuse her failure to file in a timely fashion. As to her son, she argued that his claim should be tolled due to his infancy.

The Appellate Division considered the main argument of Ms. Jeannette, which was that a decision by the Supreme Court in a non-workers’ compensation context mandated a more liberal interpretation of the workers’ compensation statute, as it reads, N.J.S.A. 34:15-51 requires claimants to file their petitions in workers’ compensation within two years of the date of the accident.   The statute also provides that “proceedings on behalf of an infant shall be instituted and prosecuted by a guardian, guardian ad litem, or next friend.”  The statute goes on to provide that any claims not filed within the two-year period are forever barred.

Counsel for Ms. Jeannette argued that the case of Lafage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412 (2001) should apply to workers’ compensation. In that case the Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed surviving children to bring a claim under the Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -6, for a parent’s death even after the statute of limitations period had expired.   The Appellate Division rejected the argument that this wrongful death statute applied to workers’ compensation cases:

While we acknowledge the Court’s directive to apply statutes of limitations flexibly, we cannot ‘rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the statute’s plain language.’

(citations omitted). The Court reasoned, “Here, the Legislature did not include a tolling provision for minors in the workers’ compensation statute, and we do not presume the omission was a legislative oversight.” The Court noted that the Legislature must have considered the rights of minors because they did provide for guardians to represent minors in workers’ compensation.

In essence, the Court relied on the clear reading of the workers’ compensation statute and acknowledged that workers’ compensation is a creature of statute. It will be interesting to see if the widow seeks certification from the Supreme Court on this issue. The case can be found at Jeannette v. General Mills Progresso, A-5417-15T2 (App. Div. February 6, 2018).

In the past few years there has been a rise in the number of cases where injured workers have been loaned money in advance of their workers’ compensation settlements by private pre-settlement companies.  This practice is more common in other states like Pennsylvania, but it is now creeping into New Jersey.  Companies which make private advances or loans to injured workers then attempt to appear at settlement and seek judicial enforcement of the amount due their company by placing their company’s loan on the settlement sheet.  In that way, the lending company can obtain a court order for direct payment by the employer, carrier or third party administrator.

In our office’s opinion, this recognition on the order approving settlement is improper.  We believe that pre-settlement companies have no right to be listed as an expense or payee on a court order, whether on a Section 20 or an Order Approving Settlement.  One of my partners has a case now involving a Pennsylvania resident injured in New Jersey who was advanced a large sum of money by a pre-settlement company unknown to any party other than petitioner and his attorney.  The claim petition was filed in New Jersey, and the parties have reached a substantial settlement on an order approving settlement under Section 22 (petitioner retains reopener rights).  The lawyer for the pre-settlement company appeared in court, asking the Judge of Compensation to include the loan as an expense to be paid by respondent on the order approving settlement.  We opposed this request.

N.J.S.A. 34:15-29 states, “Claims or payments due under this Chapter shall not be assignable, and shall be exempt for all claims of creditors from levy, execution or attachments.”   Child support liens and TDB liens are recognized as valid obligations in New Jersey.  Medical providers by statute also have a right to file a claim for reimbursement in New Jersey.  However, there is nothing in the statute or the rules of the Division that permit pre-settlement companies from appearing in court as a represented party to protect their loans or seek enforcement from a Judge of Compensation.

The Division of Workers’ Compensation has an interest in preventing such companies from expanding in New Jersey.  These companies do not make such loans out of charity:  they do so for reasons of financial gain at the expense of the injured worker.  One could argue that the whole practice of advancing a settlement with an injured worker in exchange for subsequent repayment violates the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act because under our law, only a Judge of Compensation can approve a settlement.  These are in essence private partial settlements between a lending company and petitioner as to future rights of compensation. They really constitute an end around the statute.

Another argument against placing a loan on an OAS is that it contravenes the rules against commutations.  An employer cannot make a commutation in New Jersey without filing a motion and obtaining court permission.  Paying a lending company in advance on unaccrued monies would be an illegal commutation without a motion for a commutation being first filed by the petitioner.  In New Jersey, most settlement are under Section 22.  Payments are made in weekly amounts, sometimes over several years, with claimants retaining reopener rights.  Pre-settlement lending companies have no right to step in and alter the statutory rules of payment.   Settlements in Pennsylvania and many other states involve lump sums, often rather large, but that is not how most settlements in New Jersey resolve.

Our office takes the view that all payments go to the petitioner under the Order Approving Settlement or Section 20 order.  This is prescribed under N.J.S.A. 34:15-64. The pre-settlement company has its contract with the petitioner and the petitioner only, and it must negotiate its terms of repayment directly with the petitioner without involving employers, carriers, third party administrators or Judges of Compensation.

 

Even if employees are not provided with a lunch break, throughout the course of the workday there are, almost always, short periods of time where an employee is present in the workplace but not performing actual job tasks. Some examples include a walk to the restroom, time spent in the restroom, time spent grabbing a glass of water from the kitchen etc. Most employers do not dock employees’ pay for these short periods of time that an employee is not performing a job task but what if an employer wanted to dock employees’ pay for these breaks? What if an employer decided that the employee should only be paid for time when job tasks are actually performed and that any break time – whether the break is one minute or twenty minutes– would be unpaid? Would this be lawful? In a precedential decision entitled, Secretary United States Department of Labor v. American Future Systems, Inc. d/b/a Progressive Business Publications, No. 2-12-cv-067171 (3d Cir. October 13, 2017), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed this question and confirmed that any non-exempt employee breaks, which are less than twenty minutes in duration, must be paid breaks in order to comply with the Fair labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

Facts of the Case

American Future Systems d/b/a Progressive Business Publications (“PBP”) is a company that employs sales representatives who are paid an hourly wage.  These employees also receive bonuses based upon the number of sales they receive per hour while they are logged into the system at their workstation.  PBP previously had a policy that employees were provided with two paid fifteen minute breaks per day.  In 2009, PBP changed its policy.  Under the new policy, employees are not provided with paid breaks but are allowed to log off of their computers at any time and for as long as they want to do so.  The employees are not paid for any time that they are logged off of the computer, no matter how long they were logged off.  The only exception is if an employee logged off and then logged back on within a period of 90 seconds, those 90 seconds will be considered paid time. PBP marketed its policy by explaining that it maximizes its employees’ ability to take a break from work at any time, for any reason and for as long as the employee desires (flex time).

Procedural History and Analysis/Decision

The Secretary for the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) filed suit, alleging that PBP’s break policy violated the FLSA. The DOL argued that the policy failed to compensate sales employees for breaks of twenty minutes or less (minimum wage issue). PBP moved for summary judgment and the DOL moved for partial summary judgment regarding the minimum wage claim.  The District Court granted the Secretary’s motion regarding the minimum wage issue.  The District Court found that the FLSA had created a bright line rule that employees must be paid for breaks that are twenty minutes or less.  PBP then appealed to the Third Circuit.

The Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s decision that PBP’s break policy violated the FLSA.  The Court stated that it is well established that some breaks constitute hours worked under the FLSA. The FLSA does not require employers to provide breaks for employees, but if they choose to allow short breaks of five to twenty minutes, employers must pay employees for breaks that are twenty minutes or less. Even if an employee is not actually performing job duties during this twenty minute or less break, this period of time is considered hours worked. The Court stated that PBP’s new break policy forced employees to choose between going to the bathroom or getting paid unless the employee could get to the bathroom, relieve him/herself, and then get back to his/her computer station all within 90 seconds.  The Court found that the employer’s break policy was contrary to the FLSA.

What does this mean to you?

Employers should review their policies regarding breaks in the workplace to confirm that their policies are in compliance with the FLSA. Make sure that you are aware of how long employees spend on breaks during the workday. If the break time is twenty minutes or less, it must be paid time.

Employers both love and hate social media.  On the one hand, it is a great tool to help your business succeed.  You can post advertisements and events that very quickly can be seen by hundreds if not thousands of people.  With the help of the public, one great post about how great your product is or a fantastic experience with one of your employees, can put your company name out there to people who may otherwise never hear of you.   On the other hand, those same social media sites can create huge headaches for a company not only because it allows the public the opportunity to provide immediate (and potentially negative) feedback, but because you have to contend with employee and prospective employee use of social media.

The issue of how social media affects your company is obvious right from the hiring phase.  Many employers fail to have a policy in place with regard to whether they search prospective employee social media postings (their public postings only!) and get themselves into trouble for failing to review all prospective employees or none at all.  In fact, failing to have a set policy and failing to keep detailed records with regards to any searches actually conducted on prospective employees can lead to an increased risk of discrimination claims and higher costs of discovery in the event litigation occurs due to e-discovery.  Not to mention the fact that the information found online might be exaggerated or inaccurate.

Additionally, many employers find themselves in hot water in an attempt to dole out discipline or terminate employees due to employee social media postings or public behavior.  There is a lot of misleading, inaccurate and false information online and failing to determine whether the information is factual can be costly.  Employers have to walk a fine line to keep the company from getting involved in costly litigation when relying on social media postings or public behavior as the reason for termination or discipline.  Having your employment counsel weigh in can save you a lot of time and hassle.

Furthermore, despite the fact that social media has been around in some form for a while now, a lot of employers are still playing catch-up and either have no social media policy at all or have a social media policy that is not effective because it is too broad or too narrow.  Many employers are aware of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), but believe that the provisions only apply to companies with a unionized workforce.  This, however, is not the case.  The provisions of the NLRA apply to both unionized and non-unionized employers.  One of the areas that the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has been cracking down is in employer discipline of employees for social media postings related to the company and work conditions (for both unionized and non-unionized employers).  The NLRB has also been cracking down on social media policies that are considered too broad and prohibit an employee from engaging in “concerted activity.”  As you probably already know, one of the protections provided by the NLRA is an employee’s right to engage in concerted activity, which is usually activity for employees’ mutual aid or protection related to wages, terms of employment or working conditions.

In a recent NLRB case (Butler Medical Transport, 365 NLRB No. 112 (July 27, 2017)), a former employee posted on a public Facebook page that she thought she had been improperly terminated.  In response to the post by the former employee, a current employee posted that she was sorry to hear that and that the former employee should think about getting a lawyer and contacting the labor board.  The current employee was fired for the post suggesting a lawyer.  The NLRB determined that the termination of the current employee for suggesting the former employee obtain a lawyer violated the NLRA since the post was concerted as it was made for the mutual aid and protection of employees.  Additionally, the NLRB determined that the company’s social media policy, which stated, “I will refrain from using social networking sights [sic] which could discredit Butler Medical Transport or damages its image,” was overbroad.

If you do not have a social media policy or you have one that may be too narrow or broad, it is time to update those employee handbooks.  Make sure you reach out to a labor and employment attorney first to make sure you are in full compliance with all federal and state laws related to social media or that could impact your policy.  If you do not have a set policy with regard to the use of social media in your hiring process, take the time to create one and make sure the people involved in the hiring process are aware and follow the policy as to all prospective employees.  Again, make sure you obtain the advice of your labor and employment attorney.  There are a lot of laws out there that relate to what can and cannot be done by employers with regard to social media and making sure you are fully compliant is imperative to avoid costly litigation.

As many employers already know, New Jersey has one of the broadest whistleblower protection laws in the United States.  In the past, the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) has been expansively interpreted to provide wide ranging protections to not only employees who engage in whistleblowing activities but also independent contractors, who while technically not employees, are nevertheless covered by the law because such persons frequently are performing similar types of services for companies.

One issue that has never been addressed in any reported New Jersey state court decision is whether volunteers who perform services for companies are also entitled (like independent contractors) to the protections afforded by CEPA for engaging in whistleblowing activities.  That has now changed and, surprisingly, the result was not what one would have expected given the way that CEPA’s coverage has been construed expansively in the past by New Jersey’s Courts.

In Sauter v. Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Co., No. 2, A-0354-15T1, 2017 WL 4020461 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 13, 2017), Plaintiff was a long time member of the Defendant’s all volunteer fire department.  Along with serving as a volunteer in Defendant’s fire department, Plaintiff was also a full time employee of the Monmouth County’s Sheriff’s Office.  Defendant’s fire fighters were all unpaid volunteers.  However, firefighters could participate in a Volunteer Length of Service Program (“LOSAP”), which provided a small amount of compensation to volunteers, ranging from $400 to $1150 a year, depending on length of service.  Members could access these funds only after they were no longer with the fire company.  Along with providing the opportunity to participate in the LOSAP, volunteer fire fighters were also provided with workers’ compensation coverage for any injuries occurring while providing services to the fire company.

Plaintiff was a twenty (20) year member of the fire department.  During that time, Plaintiff had accumulated $5,871 in LOSAP benefits. In 2013, the members of the fire department voted to terminate Plaintiff’s membership in the company.  As the court said in its decision, the Plaintiff’s twenty (20) years of membership was less than harmonious.  According to the court’s decision, the members of the department terminated Plaintiff because he was “abusive’, “angry”, and “belligerent.” Plaintiff in his lawsuit challenged his termination by claiming that it was wrongful under CEPA because he had previously engaged in certain whistleblowing activities that included challenging the filing of an insurance claim by the department because he thought it was fraudulent. Plaintiff likewise had complained that fire department members were wrongfully dumping their personal garbage in a fire department dumpster as well.

This was not the first CEPA action that Plaintiff filed against the Department. Earlier, in 2004, Plaintiff filed a previous CEPA claim after his brother (a fire company supervisor who actually voted for Plaintiff’s dismissal) was denied a contract to renovate the fire company’s hall.  That claim was ultimately settled, but even after the settlement, Plaintiff continued to complain that he was not provided with all the counsel fees that he thought were due to him.

In its reported decision, the Appellate Court held that the dismissal of Plaintiff’s CEPA claim in this case by the Trial Judge was appropriate because CEPA did not apply to persons who are strictly volunteers and not employees.  Relying upon the language of the CEPA statute itself, the court concluded that only persons who receive actual financial remuneration for the services that they perform are entitled to CEPA’s protections because the law was designed to protect such persons from suffering any adverse actions that would affect their continuing financial livelihood.  The Plaintiff had argued that the funds received through the LOSAP program were sufficient remuneration to make him an employee under CEPA. The court rejected this argument, finding that the minimal amount received did not approximate the monetary value of the services that firefighters actually provided to the Department.  The court also rejected Plaintiff’s additional request that CEPA’s coverage be expanded to include volunteers so they too could fall within CEPA’s protections just like independent contractors.  The court rejected this request to expand CEPA’s protections declaring that doing so would not serve CEPA’s goal of protecting a person’s livelihood from risk because of whistleblowing activities.

While technically this case did not involve an employer or employment type relationship, the decision can only be considered a positive one for employers because the court could have continued to expansively interpret CEPA and bring within its scope many other service providers that employers might retain who are not technically employees (as occurred with independent contractors) and are right now not covered by the law.  The case also serves as a continuing warning to employers that they must rigorously adhere to CEPA’s requirements because retaliation lawsuits remain commonplace and are still very popular claims being brought today in the New Jersey courts.  In this case alone, we see that this was the second CEPA claim that this Plaintiff filed against the very same fire department.  Thus, any type of perceived retaliation will no doubt result in similar types of lawsuits, so it is important, now more so than ever, that employers make employment related decisions on legitimate grounds, for legitimate business reasons, and not to retaliate against an employee for past whistleblowing conduct.

Your public entity employer supplies i-Phones and other computer related technologies to keep your employees connected to the office even after normal business hours. It is Saturday night, and you need an urgent answer to a pressing question. You email one of your low level managers.  He hears the “bing’ on his i-Phone, and sees your email. You are anticipating an immediate response from the employee. But, instead, the employee emails that he will respond to the question when he is back at work on Monday.

Is this a sufficient answer? In all likelihood, not in the USA for any employer, public or private, but what about France?  Well, thanks to a recently passed law there, known affectionately as the “Right to Disconnect Law,” French employees have the right to tell their employers that a response can wait until Monday.  The new law requires French employers with more than 50 employees to commence drafting polices that limit work-related technology usage outside the office.

Now, would a law like that have any chance of passage here in the USA?  Likely not, but employers of all kinds are wise to understand the significant legal issues that arise from employee use of work related technologies while performing employment services on such devices outside of the workplace and after the normal work day.

In our example, if the employee actually responded, would the time spent crafting the answer constitute compensable work time for the employee in having to respond immediately? It is indeed possible, and that would depend on whether the employee is exempt or non-exempt.  If non-exempt, the employee is required to be paid for all time spent in providing work related services. So, if that is the case here, the next question would be, how does the employee track such time, and does this public employer have policies in place directing how this non-office work time is to be reported for wage and hour purposes?  And, if the extra time causes this employee to exceed 40 hours of work during this work week, are you the public employer obligated to pay an overtime rate for this excess time worked?

Unfortunately, most employers (both public and private entities) lack the necessary policies to address these kinds of questions, and that is the key lesson all employers in the USA can learn from this recent French law.  Employers here in this country should, like their brethren in France are now required to do by law, begin formulating policies on how situations like the above will be addressed so you can avoid potential legal problems that can arise in these situations.  Whenever hourly non-exempt employees perform any kind of work for an employer’s benefit, federal and state wage and hour laws require payment of compensation for that time, and if the time worked results in an over 40 hour work week, then overtime obligations could arise. Just as importantly, the employer needs to ensure that such time gets tracked properly, and having polices in place that alert employees on their obligation to report, and on how to actually report such time, are a must if employers want to avoid potential wage and hour problems in this area.  No one wants a wage and hour investigator showing up at their doors, and it only takes one complaint from just one employee in this type of circumstance to raise the possibility of such an occurrence, even if you are a public employer.

In sum, while technology is a wonderful tool for today’s business world, it can cause you unexpected legal peril in these kinds of situations, and staying ahead of such dangers with well-crafted legal policies is the best way for all employers to avoid such lurking problems.

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