Special Education/504

Parents may initiate a due process petition on behalf of their child against a school district or charter school with the New Jersey Office of Special Education Programs (“OSEP”) for special education related claims arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1.1 et seq., which include disagreements regarding identification, reevaluation, classification, educational placement, the provision of a free appropriate public education, or disciplinary action. However, the right to initiate a due process hearing does not extend to a request to compel a school district to produce student records, according to a recent decision issued by Administrative Law Judge John S. Kennedy on March 21, 2016 in D.O. o/b/o M.O. v. Jackson Township Board of Education, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 137 (2016).

In this case, the Jackson Township Board of Education (“Board”) successfully dismissed the case on the basis that the parent maintained no legal right to request copies of D.O.’s educational records through a due process petition. Judge Kennedy rejected the parent’s argument that the IDEA guarantees the right of access to student records, determining that none of the provisions of the IDEA or the New Jersey regulations provide for this right. The parent unsuccessfully argued that he is entitled to raise this student records issue via due process because there is currently a disagreement between the parties regarding the student’s special education placement. Judge Kennedy rejected this argument, explaining that the placement, a separate distinct issue, was not before him in the current due process petition filed by the parent.

Although the parent’s due process petition was dismissed, Judge Kennedy did not address whether the parent is completely barred from initiating a formal complaint demanding that the school district produce copies of the requested student records. That is, the parent could file a separate petition with the New Jersey Bureau of Controversies and Disputes (“BCD”) seeking this relief. School districts should be aware of whether the claims alleged by a parent can be raised in a due process petition initiated with OSEP or a petition with BCD, as each of these venues adhere to different procedures, timelines, and standards.

On November 23, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Caridad F. Rigo granted the Clifton Board of Education’s Request for Emergent Relief to complete a psychiatric evaluation of a special education student and to place her in an alternative interim educational setting due to escalating behaviors.  Clifton Bd. of Educ. v. K.M. o/b/o K.M., OAK Dkt. No. EDS 18260-15, Agency Dkt. No. 2016-23665, 2015 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 576 (Nov. 23, 2015).  K.M. was an eighth grade female student classified as emotionally disturbed eligible for behavior plans, counseling, among other interventions.  K.M. exhibited significant behavioral and discipline issues.  K.M. had been suspended from school for approximately sixteen days and received three in-school suspensions/detentions during the 2015-2016 school year for behaviors.  On October 27, 2015, the school district suspended her for taking videos of other students with her cell phone during class and then posting these videos on the internet.  The videos showed K.M. using profanity and ridiculing and harassing other special education students in her class.  Thereafter, on November 6, 2015, the school district moved for emergent relief when K.M.’s parents refused consent for a psychiatric evaluation and to change her placement to an alternative educational setting.

Judge Rigo determined that the school district met the requirements for emergent relief pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(s) – (1) a showing of irreparable harm, (2) that the legal right underlying the claim is settled, (3) a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim, and (4) that the equities are in its favor.  Specifically, Judge Rigo found irreparable harm because K.M. already had a break in educational services and “the district is at a loss as to what to do next for K.M.”  Without the parents’ consent for a psychiatric evaluation, the school district would be unable to provide a free appropriate public education to K.M.  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(b) a school district may file for due process to compel parental consent for an evaluation.  Moreover, Judge Rigo found that K.M.’s behaviors significantly disrupted the operations of the school and other students’ ability to access an education.  Under this background, Judge Rigo determined that there was likelihood of success on the merits and a balance of equities in favor of the district.

School districts are not without recourse when they are unable to obtain parental consent to evaluate a student or change a student’s placement when the student’s behaviors are escalating.  School districts should first implement reasonable interventions to maintain the behaviors and/or work collaboratively with parents to explore various options.  However, when these strategies fail, a school district may file for emergent relief to complete an evaluation and change a student’s placement to an alternative interim setting until a more appropriate placement and program can be developed.

On September 22, 2015, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision that will have widespread implications for New Jersey school districts in defending against claims brought by parents of special education students pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).  The IDEA authorizes the courts to award compensatory education as remedy to a special education student who is successful in his or her claim that a public school district deprived the student of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”).  For numerous years, school districts relied upon the two-year statute of limitations set forth in §1415(f)(3)(C) of the IDEA and adopted by the New Jersey Administrative Code in N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(a)(1) to bar requests for compensatory education beyond two years of the date on which the due process petition was filed.  However, the Third Circuit in G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16776 (3d Cir. 2015) held that a special education student’s right to compensatory education under the IDEA is not barred by the general two-year statute of limitations.

The heart of the dispute was the interpretation of two provisions of the IDEA:  the statute of limitations pursuant to §1415(f)(3)(C) requiring a parent to file a due process complaint against a school district within two years of the date the parent knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint and § 1415(b)(6)(B) which permits a parent to bring a claim regarding an alleged violation that occurred “not more than two years before the date the parent…knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.”  According to the Third Circuit, while the IDEA imposes a two-year filing deadline, it does not create a two-year remedy cap with respect to claims for compensatory education.

G.L.’s parents filed a due process complaint in January 2012 alleging that the school district denied him a FAPE and requested compensatory education from September 2008, when G.L. was first enrolled in the school district, through March 2010, when the parents withdrew G.L. from the district.  The parties did not dispute that March 2010 was the date on which the parents “knew or should have known” about the alleged violation – also referred to as the reasonable discovery date.  The Pennsylvania Hearing Officer, who heard the case at the trial level, determined that the provisions of the IDEA barred relief for any violations occurring more than two years before the filing date.  Therefore, even if the parents were successful in their due process petition, their remedy would have been limited to the time period between January 2010 and March 2010.  The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania disagreed with the Hearing Officer and held that the relief for compensatory education “may extend from two years before the reasonable discovery date through the date the complaint was filed, which could be up to two years after the reasonable discovery date, for a maximum period of relief of four years.”  Id. at 11.  The District Court had adopted a “2+2” remedy cap.

When the case came before the Third Circuit, the Court analyzed the perceived discrepancy between the two-year statute of limitations set forth in §1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B), which permits a parent to bring a claim regarding an alleged violation that occurred “not more than two years before the date the parent…knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.”  The Court established that the “knew or should have known date” is essentially the reasonable discovery date.  While the Court recognized that §1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B) are facially similar, it drew a critical difference between the two provisions in that § 1415(b)(6)(B)’s “two-year limitations period runs backward instead of forward from the reasonable discovery date.”  Id. at 18.  In short, the Third Circuit concluded, based on the statutory context and structure, the U.S. Department of Education’s interpretive guidance, and the legislative history, that §1415(b)(6)(B) “is simply an inartful attempt to mirror §1415(f)(3)(C)’s two-year statute of limitations.  That is, both sections reflect the same two-year filing deadline for a due process complaint after the reasonable discovery of an injury, and §1415(b)(6)(B) neither imposes a pleading requirement nor in any respect alters the courts’ broad power under the IDEA to provide a complete remedy for the violation of a child’s right to a free appropriate public education.”  Id. at 4.

School districts should be mindful that they may be forced to litigate cases alleging a denial of FAPE beyond two years of the date on which the complaint is filed, so long as the parent files the due process petition within two years of the reasonable discovery date.  Critical to limiting compensatory education claims will be establishing the “knew or should have known date” (reasonable discovery date).  The Third Circuit did not address this issue, as the parties did not dispute the reasonable discovery date in G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District.