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Wrongful Death

Two employees, Oscar Portillo and Selvin Zelayal, were killed when a trench collapsed on top of them while installing a drainage system.  Their respective estates sued the decedents’ employer, Defendant Bednar Landscaping Services, Inc., and co-employees Keith Bednar, Peter Liberatore, and Christopher Liberatore for wrongful death.  The issue in Estate of Oscar Portillo v. Bednar Landscaping Services, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1407 (App. Div. July 8, 2021), was whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated an intentional wrong, which was required to vault the statutory exclusive remedy defense to a third party action against the decedents’ employer under the New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation Act.

The defendants had been hired to install a French drain along the exterior perimeter of a private residence.  Defendant Keith Bednar designed the project.  He learned how to perform drainage work by observing others and through his years of hands-on experience.

Decedent Zelayal was the foreman on the jobsite and he supervised the other employees.  He had worked on three or four previous drainage projects which required the excavation of a trench that was deeper than 5 feet.  On this job, however, Bednar instructed Zalayal to dig a 9 foot deep, 300 foot long trench, approximately 2-3 feet in width.  According to Bednar, they had excavated trenches deeper than 5 feet eight times, but admitted that it was not something they did every day.  They never utilized a trench box, wood shoring, or any other method to secure the sides of the trenches on any of the projects or on this job.

It was Bednar’s testimony that he had gone into unprotected trenches that were deeper than his height ten times in his life.  It never occurred to him that the trench could collapse or cause injury to him or others working in the trench.  He also testified that he never thought about using a trench box.  Bednar testified that neither he nor any officer or employee of the company had taken an OSHA safety course before the accident.

The accident occurred during the second week of work on the job.  Zelayal opened the excavating machine to dig the trench.  When the desired depth was reached, he and other employees would go into the trench with hand tools and lay down pipe and gravel.  Because there had been some rain, pumps were used to evacuate groundwater from the trench while the workers installed the pipe.

The pipe was installed in sections.  Once the 12 foot drainage pipe was set in place, the open trench was backfilled and an adjoining section would be dug.

Defendant Bednar went to the jobsite only when Zelayal asked him to come.  He was onsite three days before the day of the accident and observed his employees in the 9 foot deep trench.  Defendant Libeatore went to the jobsite about five times just to deliver gravel. 

On October 1, 2014, Decedent Portillo and a co-worker were working in the trench when it collapsed on Portillo.  After Zelayal climbed into the trench to assist Portillo, the trench collapsed a second time and Zelayal was buried in the falling soil.  Both Portillo and Zelaya were pronounced dead at the scene.

Following an investigation in the accident, OSHA identified multiple violations of safety standards.  Most pertinent, OSHA issued a willful violations citation because “workers installing a French drain system in a trench or exposed to crushing injuries in the [nine] to [thirteen] foot deep trench which was not adequately sloped or protected by shields or shoring.”  There was a federal regulation which required “an employer to protect its working from a trench collapse by using sloping, shoring, or trench boxes in a trench deeper than five feet.”

The County Prosecutor’s Office also conducted an investigation and the corporate principals were diverted to pre-trial intervention.  Bednar Landscape waived indictment and pled guilty to one count of fourth-degree causing or risking widespread injury or damage.  Bednar Landscape requested a civil reservation under the court rules, which was granted.  Under the court rules, a civil reservation of a guilty plea can be permitted which would prevent an admission of guilt being used in a later civil proceeding.

After discovery concluded in this civil suit, Bednar Landscape moved for summary judgment, arguing that N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 barred plaintiffs’ claims because plaintiffs were collecting workers’ compensation benefits and defendants had not committed an “intentional wrong.”  The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment finding that “a jury simply could not conclude that defendants were substantially certain that their working conditions would cause great bodily harm or injury to one of their employees, which is a prerequisite to avoiding the exclusivity bar under the WCA.”  Further, the judge determined that plaintiffs had presented a very compelling case for recklessness or gross negligence but they cannot demonstrate an intentional wrong or that defendants were substantially certain of the harm that would result from allowing decedents to enter the trench without safeguards.  Judge rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the corporate guilty plea sufficed to meet the substantially certain test.

This appeal ensued and the plaintiffs argued that the trial court made a mistake in granting summary judgment.  The plaintiffs argued that the record was “rife” with material and substantial disputes of fact, issues which should have been reserved for consideration by a jury.  Further, plaintiffs contended that they did satisfy the intentional wrong standard, required to exempt their claims from the WCA bar and permit them to pursue common law tort claims.

Under New Jersey law, the Workers’ Compensation Act “is a tradeoff where employees relinquish their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to certain, but reduced, benefits when they suffer injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.”  New Jersey law does permit the employee to pursue a civil claim against his or her employer if they can overcome the statutory bar by satisfying the exception for an intentional wrong.  Under the statute, N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 provides:

If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common-law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.

The Supreme Court established the substantial certainty test in the case of Millison v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 (1985).  In Millison, the Supreme Court created the current “intentional wrong” framework and implemented a “substantial certainty” test which required an analysis of a “conduct” and a “context” prong.  Under this test, the Court “must examine not only the conduct of the employer, but also the context in which that conduct takes place: may the resulting injury or disease, and the circumstances in which it is inflicted on the worker, fairly be viewed as a fact of life of industrial employment, or is it plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the recovery only under the WCA.”

The Appellate Division reviewed prior New Jersey case law on the intentional act exception.  The Appellate Division found what distinguished those cases from the present case “is that those cases all involved the employer’s affirmative action to remove a safety device from a machine, prior OSHA citations, deliberate deceit regarding the condition of the workplace, machine, or in the case of Millison, the employee’s medical condition, knowledge of prior injury or accidents, and previous complaints from employees.”

Here, the plaintiffs must first establish that the defendants knew that their actions were substantially certain to result in injury or death to decedents.  The Appellate Division pointed out that the defendants had excavated 5-8 trenches deeper than 5 feet throughout the course of the company’s 20 year history.  Their business rarely engaged in the excavation of trenches. 

Further, the defendants testified that they were unaware of OSHA’s safety regulations concerning trenches.  OSHA had not inspected their previous trench sites, nor had OSHA ever issued any citations to defendants for any violations of its safety regulations.  Thus, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiffs could not “demonstrate defendants had knowledge regarding the unsafe trenching practice and a substantial certainty of the trench’s collapse and foreseeable injury or death to its workers.” 

The Court noted that to the contrary, defendants had previously undertaken projects where a deep trench was excavated without the required shoring or support and completed those projects without safety issues or incidents.”  Further, defendant Bednar testified that he had gone into deep on protected trenches multiple times in the past and never considered whether the trench could collapse.  Hence, the Appellate Division found that the record did not support plaintiffs’ claim that defendants knew their actions were substantially certain to cause injury or death.

Further, the Appellate Division found that the corporate guilty plea did not demonstrate that the defendants knew their actions were substantially certain to cause injury or death to an employee.  The statute to which the corporation pled guilty involved a person knowingly or recklessly failing to take reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate widespread injury or damage.  The Court noted that the criminal court did allow the defendant to take a civil reservation to prevent the guilty plea from being used against them in a subsequent civil case.  The Court stated that the “purpose of the rule is to avoid an unnecessary criminal trial of a defendant who fears that a civil claimant will later use his plea of guilty as a devastating admission of civil liability.”  The Court examined the basis of the plea and found that there were no inconsistencies between the defendants’ testimony at the plea hearing and the plaintiffs’ testimony in this case.  Thus, the Appellate Division upheld the civil reservation which barred the use of the criminal plea as a basis to impeach the testimony of the defendants in this case.

The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court judge that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the conduct prong which required a finding of substantial certainty of injury or death.  The Court also found that the context prong was similarly not met.  It pointed out that Millison and its progeny had “set a high threshold for the context analysis.”  While this case was tragic, it was not a situation in which the employer was aware of OSHA’s safety requirements, had been reprimanded by OSHA or in the past, deliberately deceived OSHA into believing that they had resolved safety issues and ignored prior injuries and complaints from employees.  Thus, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiffs’ claim also did not meet the context prong.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that there were no material disputed issues of fact to preclude the entry of summary judgment and that the trial judge correctly applied the facts to the applicable law.  Hence, the trial court judge’s decision to dismiss the complaint as to the defendants was affirmed.

This case arises from a tragic highway collision in which the defendant Stephen Rando’s SUV fatally struck the plaintiff’s son, Patrick Dutton, as he was riding his bicycle. The jury found that the defendant was 60% responsible for the accident while the plaintiff’s son Patrick was 40% responsible. The jury awarded the plaintiff, Patrick’s mother, Mary Dutton, representing her son’s estate, $500,000 in wrongful death damages and $108,000 in survivorship damages. The issue on appeal in the published decision of Dutton v. Rando, 2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS 27 (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2019), was whether an expert was needed for the jury to consider the wrongful death damages that the plaintiff claimed for the pecuniary value of the loss of her son’s advice, guidance, and companionship.

This lawsuit was filed under both the New Jersey Survivors Act, as well as the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act, alleging that the defendant’s negligent operation of his motor vehicle caused Patrick’s death. The defendant, on an in limine motion (a motion brought before trial), argued that the plaintiff’s wrongful death claim was barred because the plaintiff was not planning on introducing any evidence to substantiate the replacement cost of Patrick’s advice, guidance, and companionship. Such evidence would typically be offered through the use of an expert. The trial court denied the motion, finding it premature to decide whether the plaintiff had presented a factual basis for damages. The jury trial then proceeded.

At trial, the plaintiff did present testimony concerning her relationship with her son. Patrick’s Aunt Irene testified that Patrick had been living with her in the year prior to his death, while plaintiff lived in a homeless shelter. Patrick’s older brother testified that Patrick had been putting aside money every week to buy plaintiff a house or an apartment, saving between $20 and $50 per paycheck. Patrick’s aunt corroborated his brother’s account, although she recalled that Patrick had been saving between $50 and $75 per week and that he had intended to buy a car before purchasing a family home. Irene also testified that Patrick was a hard worker, working two jobs.

Plaintiff also testified that the companionship Patrick provided her was “definitely one of the important things” in her life. They spoke on the phone on a nightly basis and saw each other once or twice per week to have meals together, go to the park, or walk on the boardwalk among other activities. She testified that “he comforted her with his words, sense of humor and displays of affection.”

At the end of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal of the wrongful death claim. He renewed his argument that the plaintiff had not provided any evidence of the pecuniary value of Patrick’s services provided to plaintiff and that no reasonable juror could find the plaintiff had established proof of damages. However, the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the jury entered an award, finding defendant 60% liable and Patrick 40% liable for the accident and awarded $500,000 for the pecuniary loss of Patrick’s advice, counsel, and companionship on the Wrongful Death Claim and $108,000 for Patrick’s pain and suffering on the Survivor’s Act claim.

Upon appeal, the defendant argued that either expert or other specific testimony was required as a matter of law to establish the economic value of Patrick’s lost companionship. The defendant argued that without such testimony, the verdict could have only been premised on “pure speculation coupled with sympathy, passion and prejudice.”

The Appellate Division noted that under New Jersey’s Wrongful Death Act, when a defendant is liable for negligently causing a person’s death, the jury may award “such damages as they shall deem fair and just with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, together with the hospital, medical and funeral expenses incurred for the deceased, to the persons entitled to any intestate personal property of the decedent.” Prior case law made clear that a pecuniary loss could include the lost value of the decedent’s companionship and advice which would be limited strictly to the pecuniary element of such services as determined by what the marketplace would pay a stranger with similar qualifications for performing such services. (Green v. Bittner). Further, under Green v. Bittner, the Supreme Court found that our wrongful death statute is “too clear to allow compensation, directly or indirectly for emotional loss.”

The Appellate Division further noted that under New Jersey law, in cases involving the death of a child, the plaintiff may recover for “the pecuniary value of the child’s companionship, including his or her advice and guidance, as the parents grow older.” The jury is to focus on the existence of the relationship and the value of the advice, guidance and counsel that inhere in it. Once the parent-child relationship is established, the jury should “employ an objective standard for calculating the value of advice, guidance and counsel” based upon what the marketplace would pay for those lost services.

Importantly, even though the assessment of pecuniary losses from a decedent’s death may be burdened with the element of speculation, according to the Supreme Court, the determination of such questions “are not so beyond the common knowledge and common experience of jurors” to make expert testimony mandatory. While it is helpful, it is not necessary to use an expert to place a value on prospective services.

The Appellate Division found that the issue of the plaintiff’s wrongful death damages was properly submitted to the jury. The plaintiff had presented testimony showing that Patrick’s death caused the loss of future financial contributions to Plaintiff. Further, there was ample testimony regarding the companionship services that Patrick offered to the plaintiff. Based upon this evidence, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff had established a pecuniary injury.  The jury was entitled to determine the value of those services from lay testimony using its “common knowledge and experience.” Hence, the Court agreed that no expert testimony was necessary to establish the pecuniary value of such services. Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for the involuntary dismissal of plaintiff’s wrongful death claim, upholding the jury verdict.

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