Plaintiff Ranjani Vaidyanathan was injured in an automobile accident on April 29, 2012 when the driver Joaquin Martinez (“Joaquin”) rear ended her vehicle. At the time, he was driving a vehicle owned by Venessa Martinez. He was very intoxicated, with his blood alcohol level tested at .31%, well past the legal limit. In the Law Division case, Vaidyanathan v. Martinez, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 128 (Law Div. Jan. 22, 2016), the issue was whether Joaquin was acting as Venessa’s agent at the time and, hence, making her liable for his actions.
Venessa had lent Joaquin her vehicle to go pick up her daughter at Venessa’s father’s house in Hillside and bring her back to Venessa’s house in Newark. At the time she lent her vehicle to Joaquin, she was unaware that he had consumed a 16 ounce pina colada. On the way to Venessa’s father’s house, Joaquin stopped off at a liquor store and consumed enough scotch to make him so intoxicated that Venessa’s father would not permit Joaquin to drive with her daughter in her car.
Joaquin left Hillside without Venessa’s daughter and en route to Newark, he rear ended plaintiff’s vehicle.
Plaintiff sued Venessa, claiming that Joaquin was acting as her agent to the extent he was performing a task for her. Vanessa argued that she should not be liable for Joaquin’s injuries because he exceeded the scope of his authority when he obtained a bottle of scotch and became too intoxicated to bring her daughter back to Newark. Thus, the issue to be decided by the court was the scope of the authority Venessa granted Joaquin and whether he exceeded the scope of that authority.
The court noted that, in New Jersey, when a vehicle is operated on a highway by someone other than the vehicle’s owner, there is a rebuttable presumption that the driver is acting as the owner’s agent. However, if the owner can produce evidence that the driver was acting outside the scope of their authority, the claim against the owner should be dismissed. An agency relationship may be terminated when the agent takes on an errand of their own and goes beyond the instructions of the vehicle’s owner.
Here, Venessa’s grant of authority to Joaquin was limited to driving to Hillside, retrieving her daughter, and returning her to Newark. When Joaquin, instead drove to a liquor store to purchase scotch and become too intoxicated to return her daughter to Newark, he exceeded the scope of that authority and he failed to accomplish her errand. Thus, his actions in buying and consuming the scotch terminated the agency relationship.
Accordingly, Venessa produced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of agency created by Joaquin in operating her vehicle. Thus, he was found not to be acting as Venessa’s agent. The trial court held that Venessa was entitled to a judgment in her favor, dismissing the complaint as to her.
