automobile accident

The Verbal Threshold is a requirement set by the New Jersey Legislature for an individual to be compensated for bodily injuries suffered in an auto accident. The Verbal Threshold, or the Limitation on Lawsuit option, was created to reduce the cost of car insurance by limiting a person’s ability to seek compensation for noneconomic damages. The Verbal Threshold is codified at N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.

When selecting a car insurance policy, a person has an option to select a lower premium in exchange for a limited right to seek compensation for damages occurring in a car accident. However, a person still has the option of selecting an unlimited right to seek compensation in exchange for a higher premium.

The Verbal Threshold is not a complete bar in seeking compensation for pain and suffering as the statute lists six exceptions. A person may proceed with a claim for pain and suffering if their injuries meet one of the following exceptions:

  1. Death
  2. Dismemberment
  3. Significant disfigurement or scarring
  4. Displaced fractures
  5. Loss of a fetus
  6. Permanent injury

Death, dismemberment, displaced fractures and loss of fetus are more clear-cut exceptions than significant disfigurement or scarring, or a permanent injury. Significant disfigurement or scarring, and permanent injuries are the most likely claims to be litigated. 

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has defined a “significant” scar or disfigurement as one that “an objectively reasonable person could find that the scar or disfigurement substantially impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person, rending the bearer unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, deforming the person in some manner.” Soto v. Scaringelli, 189 N.J. 558, 574 (2007). Other factors that courts are to consider are the “appearance, coloration, existence and size of the scar, as well as, shape, characteristics of the surrounding skin, remnants of the healing process, and any other cosmetically important matters.” Id.

In Soto, the court found a scar on a person’s shoulder was not “significant” enough to breach the threshold. The judge reviewed the scar in person and verbally described it for the record and noted that the surgeon had done a remarkable job. The judge described the scar as approximately four inches in length and that it was not noticeable absent a strong light. The judge dismissed the case without permitting a jury to decide whether the person should be awarded compensation.

A permanent injury is defined as one that has not healed and will not heal to function normally even with further medical treatment. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). This injury must be proven with objective medical evidence. A person’s subjective complaints alone will not overcome the threshold.

A doctor must certify that a person has suffered a permanent injury as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit. The doctor must state that their opinion is based on objective medical evidence and not solely dependent on the person’s subjective complaints. This certification must be provided to a defendant during the early stages of litigation for the case to continue. A court will dismiss a case absent this certification.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has found that an MRI showing a herniated disc as certified by a doctor is sufficient objective evidence to allow a case to proceed to a jury. Pungitore v. Brown, 379 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2005). A jury will then deliberate whether the plaintiff’s injuries combined with any testimony, that may include subjective complaints and limitations on their activities of daily living, amount to a permanent injury. If a permanent injury is found, a jury then may award the plaintiff compensation for the injuries caused by the car accident. 

The Verbal Threshold is not a complete bar to recovery but is a prerequisite for a person to overcome. This is in furtherance of the New Jersey Legislature’s goal of reducing the cost of car insurance by limiting car accident claims to those with severe injuries.

In Castano v. Augustine, 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS 22 (App. Div. Mar. 6, 2023), the Appellate Division was asked to consider whether, in the absence of a conviction or guilty plea to a DWI statute, New Jersey law barred the claim of a plaintiff who was seriously injured in an auto accident after admittedly drinking liquor and beer and having a blood alcohol concentration that exceeded the legal limit at the time of the accident.  Pursuant to the New Jersey automobile statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b)(loss of right to sue), if a person is convicted of, or pleads guilty of operating a motor vehicle in violation of a DWI statute, the person “shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or non-economic loss sustained as a result of the accident.”

Plaintiff was driving his motorcycle southbound in the left lane of Tonnelle Avenue in Jersey City at about 1:15 a.m. on November 20, 2019.  He had frequented three different bars since about 2:00 p.m. the day before, drinking beer and liquor at all of the bars.  He claimed that a tractor-trailer truck owned by defendant NFI Interactive Logistics, LLC and driven by its employee, Wendell Augustine, crossed into plaintiff’s lane of travel.  Plaintiff brought his bike down to avoid a collision but he struck the truck’s bumper and the wall dividing the southbound and northbound lanes of Tonnelle Avenue.

Plaintiff admitted during his deposition at times that he was drunk and other times he testified that, while having alcohol in his system, he was not drunk.  He also admitted to speeding at the time of the accident.  The EMTs who responded to the scene noted that plaintiff said he had been speeding and drinking but neither had an independent recollection of his condition.  One of the EMTs indicated that she would record it in her report if plaintiff was intoxicated but she did not do so.

It was undisputed that the police, who responded to the scene, never issued summonses to plaintiff for any motor vehicle offenses, including a DWI.  Plaintiff had his blood drawn at the hospital where he was treated for his injuries.  Defendants’ expert extrapolated from the alcohol level in his blood taken at the hospital that he had a blood alcohol level (BAC) of .159 to .162 at the time of the accident which would have been well in excess of the legal limit of .08.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50A defined the offense of DWI as operating a motor vehicle with a BAC of .08% or more.

At the trial court level, defendants filed for a summary judgment dismissal, arguing that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b), because plaintiff was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident, as a matter of law, he could not pursue a negligence claim for his damages.  The defendants argued that New Jersey’s policy in favor of deterring drunk driving meant the statute should apply even though plaintiff was not convicted of, nor did he plead guilty to DWI.  Plaintiff argued that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether he was legally intoxicated and, more importantly, because he neither pled guilty, nor was convicted of DWI, the statute simply did not apply.

The trial court judge found that the defendants were not entitled to a summary judgment.  He found that plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the accident was in serious dispute.  The Appellate Division granted defendants’ leave to appeal on an interlocutory basis. 

In a published decision, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision. The Court found that there was no ambiguity in the statutory language.  The language evidenced a clear intention to deny a plaintiff convicted of DWI, the possibility of prevailing and sue for damages arising from the motor vehicle accident by eliminating the convicted plaintiff’s “cause of action.” 

The Appellate Division pointed out that the Legislature “chose to limit such a draconian consequence only to those who actually had been convicted of DWI.”  The Court noted that “[b]y denying a cause of action to only those who have been adjudicated guilty of DWI beyond a reasonable doubt, the Legislature avoided the need for courts to resolve disputed facts, as in this case.”  Hence, the trial court’s decision denying summary judgment to the defendants was affirmed.

Plaintiff Glenn Hughes allegedly suffered injuries as a result of an October 17, 2017 automobile accident with defendant Jason Worthington.  On that date, defendant Worthington rear ended the plaintiff.  At trial, the defendant stipulated as to liability with the only issue to be decided at trial was whether plaintiff’s injuries were permanent and causally related to the accident.  The issue in Hughes v. Worthington, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2655 (App. Div. Dec. 30, 2022) was whether the plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain sufficed to constitute a permanent injury under the verbal threshold.

The case was tried before a jury and the defendant Worthington moved for a directed verdict based upon plaintiff’s failure to present objective, credible medical evidence to support his claim that he suffered a permanent injury.  That motion was granted and this appeal ensued.

The plaintiff alleged to have suffered injuries to his neck as a result of the accident.  Plaintiff’s doctor, Dr. Norman Stempler, testified that plaintiff lost range of motion in his neck as a result of the accident.  Further, he testified that an MRI taken two months after the accident supported his diagnosis that plaintiff suffered an aggravation of pre-existing degenerative disc disease.  However, upon cross examination, Dr. Stempler admitted that the degenerative disc disease of the plaintiff’s cervical spine pre-dated the accident and he could not observe an aggravation of this pre-existing condition of plaintiff’s MRI.  Further, he conceded that his opinion concerning the aggravation of the degenerative disc disease was derived from plaintiff telling him that he was asymptomatic before the accident but that, after the accident, he experienced a decreased range of motion in his neck.

Moreover, Dr. Stempler admitted that he could not determine if the findings on plaintiff’s MRI were acute or chronic.  He agreed that the range of motion testing had a subjective component.

At trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that plaintiff failed to demonstrate – with objective, credible medical evidence – that he suffered a permanent injury as a result of the accident.  The trial court noted that the plaintiff’s doctor formed his opinion based upon the plaintiff’s subjective complaint and, therefore, determined that Dr. Stempler improperly relied on subjective evidence.  Finally, the trial court concluded that, as a result, the plaintiff failed to establish by objective, credible evidence, a nexus between his alleged injuries and his automobile accident, as required by the New Jersey verbal threshold statute.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff claimed that his subjective complaints, i.e. his restricted range of motion, was sufficient to support Dr. Stempler’s opinion that there was a permanent injury.  The Appellate Division rejected that argument.

The Court noted that under the verbal threshold of the New Jersey automobile law, AICRA, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8, lawsuits are restricted for damages from automobile accidents unless the victim “sustains a bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fracture; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.”  Further, the Court noted that under this statutory provision “an injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ or both has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment.” 

The Appellate Division cited to prior case law that to vault this “threshold,” a physician must certify that the automobile accident victim suffered from a statutorily enumerated injury.  This opinion must be based on “objective clinical evidence.”  Further, the necessary objective evidence must be derived from accepted diagnostic tests and cannot be dependent entirely upon subjective patient response.  Thus, subjective tests alone, such as range of motion tests, will not suffice to meet this standard.

The Court further noted that “plaintiff was required to prove through expert testimony there was objective clinical evidence his injuries were permanent and causally related to the automobile accident.”  The Appellate Division found that his physician’s testimony concerning permanency was based solely on the plaintiff’s subjective claims concerning a diminished range of motion.  Hence, plaintiff failed to provide the requisite objective proofs that were required to meet the threshold. 

Dr. Stempler had based his opinion on plaintiff’s current complaints, which purportedly did not exist prior to the accident, that he had suffered a permanent injury.  However, Dr. Stempler also acknowledged that he was unable to determine if the degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine observed on the MRI was acute or chronic.  Thus, the Appellate Division found that “his testimony was not based on credible, objective evidence obtained from accepted diagnostic tests, and is, therefore insufficient to fault the threshold under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.”  Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that the trial court did properly grant the motion for a directed verdict, dismissing the lawsuit.

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