In Castano v. Augustine, 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS 22 (App. Div. Mar. 6, 2023), the Appellate Division was asked to consider whether, in the absence of a conviction or guilty plea to a DWI statute, New Jersey law barred the claim of a plaintiff who was seriously injured in an auto accident after admittedly drinking liquor and beer and having a blood alcohol concentration that exceeded the legal limit at the time of the accident. Pursuant to the New Jersey automobile statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b)(loss of right to sue), if a person is convicted of, or pleads guilty of operating a motor vehicle in violation of a DWI statute, the person “shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or non-economic loss sustained as a result of the accident.”
Plaintiff was driving his motorcycle southbound in the left lane of Tonnelle Avenue in Jersey City at about 1:15 a.m. on November 20, 2019. He had frequented three different bars since about 2:00 p.m. the day before, drinking beer and liquor at all of the bars. He claimed that a tractor-trailer truck owned by defendant NFI Interactive Logistics, LLC and driven by its employee, Wendell Augustine, crossed into plaintiff’s lane of travel. Plaintiff brought his bike down to avoid a collision but he struck the truck’s bumper and the wall dividing the southbound and northbound lanes of Tonnelle Avenue.
Plaintiff admitted during his deposition at times that he was drunk and other times he testified that, while having alcohol in his system, he was not drunk. He also admitted to speeding at the time of the accident. The EMTs who responded to the scene noted that plaintiff said he had been speeding and drinking but neither had an independent recollection of his condition. One of the EMTs indicated that she would record it in her report if plaintiff was intoxicated but she did not do so.
It was undisputed that the police, who responded to the scene, never issued summonses to plaintiff for any motor vehicle offenses, including a DWI. Plaintiff had his blood drawn at the hospital where he was treated for his injuries. Defendants’ expert extrapolated from the alcohol level in his blood taken at the hospital that he had a blood alcohol level (BAC) of .159 to .162 at the time of the accident which would have been well in excess of the legal limit of .08. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50A defined the offense of DWI as operating a motor vehicle with a BAC of .08% or more.
At the trial court level, defendants filed for a summary judgment dismissal, arguing that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b), because plaintiff was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident, as a matter of law, he could not pursue a negligence claim for his damages. The defendants argued that New Jersey’s policy in favor of deterring drunk driving meant the statute should apply even though plaintiff was not convicted of, nor did he plead guilty to DWI. Plaintiff argued that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether he was legally intoxicated and, more importantly, because he neither pled guilty, nor was convicted of DWI, the statute simply did not apply.
The trial court judge found that the defendants were not entitled to a summary judgment. He found that plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the accident was in serious dispute. The Appellate Division granted defendants’ leave to appeal on an interlocutory basis.
In a published decision, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision. The Court found that there was no ambiguity in the statutory language. The language evidenced a clear intention to deny a plaintiff convicted of DWI, the possibility of prevailing and sue for damages arising from the motor vehicle accident by eliminating the convicted plaintiff’s “cause of action.”
The Appellate Division pointed out that the Legislature “chose to limit such a draconian consequence only to those who actually had been convicted of DWI.” The Court noted that “[b]y denying a cause of action to only those who have been adjudicated guilty of DWI beyond a reasonable doubt, the Legislature avoided the need for courts to resolve disputed facts, as in this case.” Hence, the trial court’s decision denying summary judgment to the defendants was affirmed.
