Motor Vehicle Accident

Following a motor vehicle accident in which she was injured by an underinsured driver, Plaintiff Lindsay Cirelli (Plaintiff) submitted a claim for underinsured motorists benefits (UIM) to her insurer GEICO for her injuries. Due to delays in GEICO providing her the UIM coverage she claimed, she sued GEICO for failing to provide her with UIM coverage as well as a claim for common law bad faith and New Jersey’s newly enacted Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA). As is commonly done by insurance company defendants in UIM/bad faith cases, GEICO moved to sever and stay any bad faith-related discovery until after the UIM matter is resolved. The issue in the published decision, Tenenbaum v. Allstate, 2026 N.J. Super.  LEXIS 49 (April 29, 2026) (both Tenenbaum and Allstate were companion parties who resolved their issues before this decision) was whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to sever and stay discovery on common law and IFCA bad faith claims before resolving the underlying UIM claim.

A UIM claim is when the value of an insured’s injuries from a motor vehicle accident exceed the liability limits of the driver who caused the accident, allowing the insured to pursue a claim against his insurer for UIM benefits. Under New Jersey common law, any party to a contract has the duty to act in good faith, this includes insurers when handling UIM insurance claims. A UIM cause of action arises, as here, in the event the insurer allegedly delays or denies payment on a valid claim. A common law bad faith claim flows from and is derivative of the UIM claim, arising in the event the insurer’s delay or denial was purportedly in bad faith. From this background, the New Jersey legislature recently passed the IFCA which provided a first-party, private cause of action for insureds to sue their insurers for an unreasonable denial or delay for their legitimate claims.

UIM/bad faith lawsuits are commonly brought together, and under those circumstances, New Jersey courts would traditionally sever (or “bifurcate”) the discovery to be conducted on the bad faith claim from discovery in the underlying UIM claim and, after determining the UIM claim, engage in the bad faith discovery. The general reasoning for this is that the insurer who would have to produce its claim file, including privileged material, in the bad faith litigation, which would prejudice its ability to defend the underlying UIM claim. Further, doing so promotes judicial economy and efficiency to hold off on timely, expensive, and wasteful bad faith discovery that may be mooted if the insurer succeeds in the plaintiff’s bad faith claim. Ultimately, because bad faith directly flowed from the right to UIM coverage, courts required an insured must show entitlement to coverage before pursuing a bad faith claim. As a result, courts consistently severed and stayed discovery in UIM/bad faith matters.

Under this framework, at the outset of her suit, Plaintiff demanded discovery from GEICO arising from her UIM claim and both her common law bad faith and IFCA claims. GEICO moved to sever and stay the UIM discovery from the bad faith discovery. Plaintiff opposed, arguing that the first-party IFCA claim trumped the prior reasons for severing and staying common law bad faith claims, the court found that the sever and stay practice did not apply to a first-party IFCA claim and allowed Plaintiff to pursue discovery on “any issue relevant to [the] entire complaint.” With this decision, Plaintiff attempted to depose GEICO’s CEO and two of its adjusters, obtain the entire claims file, and their “Reserves/Profit Loss Ratios” as to how long a case is held versus payment of the claim – all substantial demands. After motion practice, GEICO appealed, arguing that the simultaneous discovery on UIM/IFCA bad faith ran contrary to New Jersey practices and would allow any plaintiff to assert an IFCA claim in an effort to circumvent the traditional sever/stay practice.

The Appellate Division rejected the categorical conclusion that simple existence of an IFCA claim should bar the practice of severing and staying a bad faith claim and its discovery. Such a holding fails to address the underlying concerns of judicial economy, efficiency, and prejudice the sever/stay mechanism; it would allow bad faith discovery to continue without an insured first showing any entitlement to UIM coverage. Such a condition would permit plaintiffs to bypass a stay simply by alleging an IFCA violation and serve as an “open invitation” for plaintiffs to routinely tack bad faith claims onto every standard UIM solely to fish through insurer files. Moreover, discovery is already quite broad; to allow the deposition of a CEO and the discovery of sensitive reserve data underscore the burdens and inevitable and significant discovery disputes that would arise from permitting such a practice. The Appellate Division thus reversed the trial court and held that when both common law and IFCA bad faith claims accompanied a UIM claim, the proper course of action was to sever and stay bad faith discovery pending the outcome of the UIM matter, and remanded the matter back to the trial court.

The critical elements of the court’s determination was in the policies it propounded: judicial economy, efficiency, and avoiding protracted, expensive, and potentially unnecessary, discovery practice. It found that, because UIM matters typically resolve to moot bad faith discovery, requiring the right to UIM coverage before permitting such discovery reinforces the sever/stay procedure. It also set forth the precedent that, contrary to the trial court’s position, asserting an IFCA claim will not bypass the practice of severing and staying any bad faith claims.   

I had the pleasure of Speaking on Law Day in Plainfield Workers’ Compensation Court on May 1, 2024 and wanted to share with readers part of the discussion in our session, namely the discussion of the New Jersey authorized vehicle rule contained in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36.  This is one of the most unknown but significant rules pertaining to when work starts and when work ends.  Practitioners, adjusters and employers are far more aware of the premises rule, the special mission rule, and the paid travel time rule than they are about the authorized vehicle rule.

Since the passage of the major overhaul of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act in 1979, there have only been two significant published decisions that addressed in any detail the authorized vehicle rule, both cases involving the New Jersey Supreme Court.  The first was in 1992 in the case of Zelasko v. Refrigerated Express, 128 N.J. 329 (1992).  The case involved a truck driver who owned his own tractor and trailer.  Because his home community prohibited parking a trailer overnight, he had to park the trailer in a neighboring town in a friend’s yard.

On April 12, 1990, Mr. Zelasko made a delivery to Supermarkets General in Woodbridge.  He then drove to the terminal of his employer, Refrigerated Express, in Old Bridge to unload some pallets.  After that he started to drive to the neighboring town where he parked his trailer.  On the way he heard some rattling noises from the remaining pallets and became concerned about a problem.  He pulled off the road and stopped the truck.  He climbed onto the trailer to check the pallets but then fell from the trailer, suffering injuries.

The petitioner argued that his injury was covered under the authorized vehicle rule.  The Court focused on the following language of the statute which actually blends into one phrase two different rules (travel time and the authorized vehicle rule):   “…. But the employment of employee paid travel time by an employer for time spent traveling to and from a job site or of any employee who utilizes an employer authorized vehicle should commence and terminate with the time spent traveling to and from a job site or the authorized operation of a vehicle on business authorized by the employer.”  The Court rejected petitioner’s claim because it concluded that petitioner had concluded his day when he returned to his employer’s place of employment to drop off pallets.  There was a lengthy dissent from Justice Handler, who argued that petitioner’s day was not finished because he still had to drive to a neighboring town, unhook the trailer and safely secure its contents.

Thirty one years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2023 delivered a more detailed opinion on the authorized vehicle rule in Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control, 256 N.J. 47 (2023).  The facts were unusual in this case.  The petitioner was a pest control technician who was given a company vehicle to transport pesticides and chemicals needed for work.  His day generally began by checking his iPad for assignments and then leaving from his home to go to the client location for pest control.  However, his employer required all the technicians to refill their pesticides and chemicals at the employer’s location in Monmouth County.  There was a limit to how much pesticide quantity the technicians could keep in their truck due to concerns about spoilage of the chemicals and possible theft.  Technicians would have to make sure they had just enough chemicals in their vehicles to meet the needs of the jobs each day. 

On the date of petitioner’s accident, he was driving to the employer’s location in Monmouth County to refill the supplies in his truck.  Petitioner had concluded that he did not have sufficient supplies to perform his scheduled daily assignments.  He was involved in a car accident on the way to his employer’s location with serious injuries.  The employer argued that petitioner was on his way to work and therefore the premises rule applied.  The Judge of Compensation dismissed the case.  Petitioner appealed and the appellate division reversed in petitioner’s favor.  The Supreme Court then affirmed in favor of petitioner.

The Court did not hold that the drive to work was a special mission, partly because the Court had already decided that this was an authorized vehicle rule case and perhaps partly because the statute says that a special mission must involve a commute away from the employer’s place of employment.  The Court found that petitioner was using an authorized vehicle when the accident occurred, on business authorized by the employer and with authorization from his employer.  The Court said, “Above All provided an authorized vehicle for operation by Keim.  Keim’s operation of that vehicle to the shop on the morning of the car accident was solely for business expressly identified and authorized by Above All, namely, to replenish supplies. The entire arrangement, both as to the vehicle’s location and the need to replenish supplies, reflected a business decision expressly designed by the employer to further the employer’s interests in safeguarding and maintaining the quality of its supplies and in minimizing travel time for employees, thus facilitating a robust appointment schedule.”

Most employees who use their car for business do not have company cars:  lawyers, accountants, sales persons, real estate agents, certain nurses, and others.  Does the authorized vehicle rule require that the company own the vehicle?  The Court said no.  The rule is not limited to just employer provided vehicles. It could apply to a vehicle owned by the employee. The Court did not go into further details about how a personally owned vehicle will be deemed an authorized vehicle but the quote in the preceding paragraph seems to focus future analysis on whether the actions of the employee are furthering the employer’s business interests.

Does this case suggest that the drive to work is now compensable?  The Court addressed this issue, “However, the ‘authorized vehicle rule’ does not apply every time an employee is driving a vehicle authorized by an employer.  And importantly, the ‘authorized vehicle rule’ does not categorically apply when an employee is merely commuting to work in either an authorized personal or work vehicle.”  Drives from home to work and back from work to home will almost always be considered not covered under workers’ compensation.

I want to thank the Director and Chief Judge Maria Del Valle Koch, Judge Fred Hopke and Judge Neme Akunne for hosting this very enjoyable Law Day seminar and for making everyone feel welcome in the very accommodating Plainfield vicinage.  I also want to thank my co-presenter Rick Rubenstein, Esq., and all the lawyers who attended and raised many good questions throughout afternoon seminar.

The post The Little Known “Authorized Vehicle Rule” in Workers’ Compensation appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

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