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Court Finds County Not Liable for Fall on Public Sidewalk Adjacent to County Road

Plaintiff Frances Hice tripped and fell and suffered injuries as a result of an uneven public sidewalk slab on Watchung Avenue in Bloomfield.  The sidewalk abutted a private residence owned by defendants Jose Cruz and Angelica Delacruz.  The sidewalk was adjacent to a road (Watchung Avenue) owned by the County of Essex.  The issue in Hice v. State of New Jersey, 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2039 (App. Div. Oct. 28, 2025) was whether the County could be held responsible for a fall which occurred due to an uneven sidewalk adjacent to its roadway.

The uneven sidewalk was caused by tree roots from a tree located on the Cruz-Delacruz property.  Plaintiff initially sued the Township, the State, the County, and the homeowners.  By the time the appeal occurred, the only remaining defendant was Essex County.

The County owned the Watchung Avenue roadway in Bloomfield but, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 27:16-8, it owned the roadway between the curblines, excluding sidewalks.  The sidewalk itself where plaintiff fell was not owned by the County, the homeowners, nor the Township of Bloomfield.  Rather, the sidewalk was considered a right of way and residential property owners would be responsible for maintaining it.

About two years before plaintiff fell, the County began a resurfacing project and was mandated, as part of the project, to install curb ramps compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) at the corners of all roadways.  This project included installation of a ramp near the sidewalk slab where plaintiff tripped.  The scope of the project, however, was limited to replacing the existing pavement markings, sidewalk and curb necessary for the installation of the handicap ramps.

It was undisputed that plaintiff did not fall on the handicap ramp or on the slab next to the handicap ramp.  Rather, plaintiff fell three slabs away from the end of the sidewalk where one of the new ramps was installed.  Plaintiff did concede that this distance was approximately 12 feet from the newly installed ramp.

Plaintiff obtained an expert report from an engineer, Dr. Wayne Nolte.  Dr. Nolte acknowledged that the property adjacent to the sidewalk was owned by the homeowners and that the sidewalk’s maintenance was the responsibility of the abutting property owner.  In his report, however, he stated that the sidewalk between the handicap ramps was required by the ADA standard to have elevation differentials no more than ¼ of an inch.  He concluded that the installation of the handicap ramps exceeded this height differential and, therefore, did not comply with the ADA standard.  But, he did not dispute that the location of the elevation differential, where plaintiff fell, was not on the handicap ramp, nor on the slab next to the ramp.

The defendant homeowners and the County filed for summary judgment at the trial court level.  A summary judgment dismissal was granted by the trial court judge, dismissing out both the homeowners and the County.

While plaintiff appealed both orders for summary judgment, he settled out with the homeowners before the appeal was heard.  Thus, upon appeal, the Appellate Division only dealt with the challenge to the order granting summary judgment to the County. 

The Appellate Division pointed out that a public entity may be held liable for an injury caused by a condition on its public property.  But, liability as to a public entity would only pertain to the property owned or controlled by the public entity. 

Plaintiff argued that the County constructed the ramp in violation of ADA due to the height differential.  Plaintiff argued that the uneven sidewalk caused the plaintiff to trip and fall and be injured.  Further, plaintiff contended that the County created the dangerous condition and, therefore, it had actual or constructive notice of it.

The Appellate Division pointed out the flaws in these assertions.  First, it was undisputed that the plaintiff fell on the sidewalk approximately three sidewalk slabs from the County’s worksite and not next to the handicap ramp.  There was no evidence that the County owned or was responsible for the entire sidewalk.  In fact, the Township Code clearly provided that the abutting property owner was responsible for the installation, repair, or replacement of sidewalks. 

Further, the County did not take control of that portion of the sidewalk when it began construction of the ADA compliant ramp.  The record did not show that the uneven sidewalk where plaintiff fell was caused by the County’s work.  Because there was no evidence showing that the County took control over the entire sidewalk, it had no legal duty to repair the part of the sidewalk where plaintiff fell.

Plaintiff argued that when the County undertook the responsibility of installing the handicap ramp, it had an obligation to ensure that there was nothing greater than ¼ of an inch height differential along the entire sidewalk.  The Appellate Division pointed out that the plaintiff provided no legal support for extending this legal duty to a portion of the sidewalk under the control of the abutting property owner and not the County. 

Hence, the Court declined “to expand a public entity’s duty to inspect and potentially repair sidewalks abutting County roadways not under their control or ownership to ameliorate any potential hazard.”  Because the Appellate Division found no genuine of issue of fact as to whether the County owned or controlled the sidewalk where plaintiff fell, the Court found that the trial court judge had properly granted summary judgment to the County and it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.

Homeowner Not Responsible for Plaintiff’s Injury Caused by Slip on Ice in Front of Home

Plaintiff Joseph Costigan was walking on the sidewalk in front of the home of the defendants Gurprit and Sneh Bains when he slipped and fell on a patch of ice and struck his head.  He claimed that the drainage system on defendants’ property, that ran down the driveway and across the sidewalk, was faulty and caused the ice.  The issue in Costigan v. Bains, 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2091 (App. Div. Oct. 29, 2025) was whether the plaintiff needed an expert to support the theory that the drainage system caused the water to collect on the sidewalk, which could be a hazard when the weather was cold. 

Plaintiff  had retained Mark Marpet, Ph.D., P.E. as an engineering expert who issued a report that the defendants’ drainage system created a hazard by leading the drain water from the gutters and basement sump pump onto the driveway and sidewalk, where it could freeze and create a slip hazard.  In his opinion, the elements did not cause the hazard because it had been two days before the accident since any precipitation fell.

Defendants retained the services of Stephen Pellettiere, a certified meteorologist, to provide an expert opinion regarding the weather conditions on the day of the accident.  He relied on certified weather reports from the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and opined that there had been a winter storm and snow/ice event on the day of the incident with approximately a half inch of snow on the ground when plaintiff slipped and fell.  He disagreed with Dr. Marpet’s report that it was not snowing at the time and noted that Dr. Marpet used erroneous weather underground data that contradicted the certified NOAH observations.  In Mr. Pellettiere’s opinion, it was highly unlikely that preexisting ice and snow was in place at the time of the incident because of rainfall of less than an inch ending 40 hours before the incident and temperatures were well above freezing after the rain had ended two days before the incident.

At the trial court level, the defendants filed a motion to strike Dr. Marpet’s report as a net opinion and asked for a summary judgment dismissal.  They argued that Dr. Marpet’s opinion that the drainage system created a hazard “lacked any measurements or demonstration of any slopes or angles or anything about water capacity and failed to provide any discussion about the sidewalk.”  Further, defendants argued that Dr. Marpet used erroneous data indicating there was no precipitation on the day of the fall when in fact there was an ongoing storm.  Defendants further argued that Dr. Marpet’s opinion failed to satisfy any of the requirements for an expert report because it contained “nothing but his pure conclusions.”

The trial court heard the arguments and agreed with the defendants, granting defendants’ motion to strike Dr. Marpet’s report as a net opinion and also granted a summary judgment dismissal.  The trial court found that Dr. Marpet’s report “constituted an inadmissible net opinion because it failed to explain the pertinent scientific principles and how he applied them to formulate the basis for his opinion.”  The trial court further noted that “Dr. Marpet did not analyze the rates of evaporation for rain water under the conditions of freezing temperatures, provide any measurements of the slope of defendants’ property, calculate the volume of water that could have exited the drain, or author scientific support from a qualified meteorologist.”  Thus, the trial court determined that Dr. Marpet did not provide the “why and wherefore of his opinion but rather offered only a mere conclusion.”

As for the summary judgment dismissal, because the trial court found that Dr. Marpet’s report was an inadmissible net opinion and plaintiff needed to present an expert opinion to establish that the drainage system worsened the conditions of the sidewalk beyond the natural hazards created by the storm, the court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact that could defeat defendants’ summary judgment motion.

Further, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s argument that he could proceed without an expert.  Without an expert, it was mere speculation that the drainage system somehow caused the sidewalk conditions.

The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment dismissal to the Appellate Division.  Upon appeal, the plaintiff did not argue that the trial court made a mistake in barring his expert.  Rather, upon appeal, plaintiff argued that he did not need an expert to be able to argue that the defendants’ drainage system caused water to collect on the sidewalk, which could be a hazard when the weather was cold.

The Appellate Division first noted that residential property owners can be liable “if their actions create an artificial, dangerous condition on an abutting sidewalk, thereby negligently introducing a new element of danger other than one created by natural forces.”  Further, the Court noted that “homeowners have no duty to maintain the sidewalks abutting their property so long as they have not affirmatively created a hazardous condition.”  Thus, for plaintiffs to overcome defendants’ immunity from sidewalk liability, the plaintiff must present competent evidence showing defendants created or exacerbated a hazardous condition on the sidewalk. 

Plaintiff was asserting that the defendants’ drainage system routed precipitation from a prior storm causing it to pool on the sidewalk which then froze to form a sheet of ice.   However, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that expert testimony would be needed to establish that the cause of the water on the sidewalks was from the defendants’ drainage system. 

The Court found that the “topography of defendants’ property, the relative slope and manner in which water drained off the property, and whether the drainage system led to water pooling on the sidewalk under the facts presented here, required an expert’s specialized and technical knowledge to establish defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s slip and fall injury.”  The Appellate Division ruled that a jury would not be competent “to supply the requisite standard by which to measure defendants’ conduct and would be left to speculate.”  Thus, the Court agreed with the trial court that defendant’s negligence could not be established without the aid of an expert and upheld the summary judgment dismissal. 

New Jersey Supreme Court Imposes Duty Upon Owner of Vacant Commercial Lot to Maintain the Public Sidewalk Abutting the Property

Plaintiff Alejandra Padilla allegedly tripped, fell, and suffered injuries on the sidewalk that abutted the vacant commercial lot in Camden owned by the defendants Young Il An and Myo Soon An.  This property had been purchased more than 25 years previously but no building was ever constructed.  The issue in Padilla v. Il An, 2024 N.J. LEXIS 575 (June 13, 2024) before the Supreme Court was whether the owner of a vacant commercial lot had a common law duty to maintain the abutting public sidewalk in reasonably good condition.

On September 11, 2019, plaintiff allegedly was injured while walking on the public sidewalk abutting the vacant commercial lot located on Westfield Avenue in Camden, New Jersey that was owned by the defendants.  According to her deposition, plaintiff suffered several injuries from the fall, including a broken foot and injured arm, and underwent surgery for her injuries.  She claims to suffer continuing symptoms, including migraines, pain, and memory loss.

The lot abutting this public sidewalk had been owned by the defendants 27 years before plaintiff’s fall.  According to defendant Young Il An, they bought the lot intending to construct a building there but due to economic conditions, they gave up that plan.  They also did not purchase liability insurance to cover the lot because, according to the defendant, insurance companies did not really want to insure it.  After the fall, the defendants did have the sidewalk abutting the subject lot repaired. 

Plaintiff sued defendants based upon their alleged negligence in failing to reasonably maintain the sidewalk abutting the subject lot.  At the trial court level, the defendants were successful in obtaining a summary judgment dismissal.  The trial court held that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff, relying on the Appellate Division’s decision in Abraham v. Gupta.  In the Abraham case, the Appellate Division held that “the liability imposed on commercial property owners to reasonably maintain abutting sidewalks does not apply to sidewalks abutting vacant lots.”  The trial court’s rationale was that the defendants did not have a duty to maintain the sidewalk because it abutted a vacant lot that was not generating any income.

This summary judgment dismissal in the Padilla case was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  The Appellate Division ruled that Abraham remained good law as applied to the subject lot and declined to impose any duty upon the defendant vacant lot property owner to maintain the abutting sidewalk in a safe condition.

Plaintiff filed a petition for certification on the issue of whether owners of vacant commercial lots owe a duty of care to pedestrians to reasonably maintain the sidewalks abutting those lots.  The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s petition, bringing this issue before the Supreme Court.

Plaintiff urged the Supreme Court to reverse the Appellate Division’s decision, contending that the Abraham case should be reversed.  Plaintiff contended that the Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc. case which imposed a duty of care upon commercial properties, as opposed to residential properties, to maintain the abutting public sidewalk, did not distinguish among types of commercial properties or consider whether those properties had active businesses on them.  Plaintiff further argued that imposing a duty of care would be fair because the subject lot was capable of generating income. 

The Supreme Court noted that in the four decades since the Stewart case, the New Jersey courts “have adhered to the rule imposing liability on commercial landowners.”  The issue in this case was whether that liability should be extended to commercial landowners of vacant lots.  The Court adopted a bright-line test, concluding that a duty should be imposed on owners of vacant commercial lots to maintain the abutting sidewalks in reasonably good condition.

The Court noted that there would be “something profoundly unfair about commercial property owners purchasing vacant lots and having no responsibility whatsoever from maintaining the area where the general public traverses.”   Hence, the Court ruled that all commercial landowners, including owners of vacant commercial lots “must maintain the public sidewalks abutting their property in reasonably good condition and can be held liable to pedestrians injured as a result of their negligent failure to do so.”

The Court explained that once “an individual or an entity purchases a lot in a commercially zoned area, meaning the only use to which that land can be put as commercial, the purchaser has begun a commercial endeavor and intends to make money.”  The Supreme Court rejected any type of profitability test to determine whether a duty should be imposed upon a commercial landowner, finding that profitability would be a difficult task to determine.  Thus, it found that a bright-line rule that commercial property owners owe a duty “is the most workable rule to protect the general public and ensure consistency in our courts.” 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant property owners and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Personal Injury Claim Resulting From Fall on Snow and Ice Barred by Ongoing Storm Rule

Plaintiff Joseph Devaney was working as a security guard for G4S at facilities owned by defendant Chemours Company.  On the day of the accident, there was a winter storm with light snow, sleet, and freezing rain.  During the course of plaintiff’s inspection of the premises, he slipped and fell, suffering injuries.  The issue in Devaney v. Chemours Co. FC, LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 776 (App. Div. May 2, 2024) was whether the ongoing storm doctrine decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court after the date of his fall applied to bar his claim.

As a security guard, plaintiff’s responsibilities including inspecting  incoming and outgoing cars at Chemours entrance and exit.  He would walk through the doorway to conduct his inspection.  Four days before his fall, there was a winter storm that resulted in less than 4 inches of snow.  On the day of the accident, January 8, 2018, there was a winter storm that began around 2:00 p.m. and did not end until around 9:30 p.m.  When Chemours became aware of the icy conditions, they contacted their snow contractor and alerted their security guards.

Plaintiff’s shift began around 6:00 p.m.  At around 8:30 p.m., while walking his usual path, he slipped and fell on the asphalt into the doorway between the areas he was inspecting.  He suffered injuries as a result of his fall.

At the trial court level, the defendant landowner Chemours filed a motion for summary judgment, relying upon the case of Pareja v. Princeton International, which was granted.   In Pareja, the Supreme Court adopted the ongoing storm rule which held that commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the conclusion of the storm.  Based upon the adoption of this rule, it “relieved commercial landowners of the duty to continuously clear snow and ice from their property throughout the duration of an inclement winter weather event.”

Based upon those circumstances of this accident, it was undisputed that plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred during the snowstorm.  Accordingly, the Court found that the ongoing snowstorm rule applied and it relieved the defendant of any duty of care it may have owed plaintiff.

Plaintiff argued that the ongoing storm rule should not have been applied retroactively to accidents that occurred prior to the adoption of the rule.  Plaintiff argued that contradicted “the negligence jurisprudence that provides individuals recourse if they are seriously injured due to a defective sidewalk.”  The trial court judge rejected that argument. 

The Appellate Division found that the trial court correctly rejected the argument because there was nothing in Pareja which required prospective application only.  In fact, in Pareja, the Court applied the “newly rendered ongoing storm doctrine” to a 2015 slip and fall that had occurred during an ongoing storm.

The plaintiff also argued that the rule should not be extended to include sidewalks of “highly secured, restricted – access industrial facilities such as Chemours.”  The Appellate Division also rejected that argument, finding that Pareja rejected the distinction between public and private ownership, to ensure uniformity.  It declined to draw arbitrary lines for the type of property that fall under Pareja.  Hence, it found that there was no reason to limit Pareja’s application to exclude facilities such as Chemours.

Based upon Pareja, remediation was only required within a reasonable period of time after the storm had ended.  Thus, liability did not attach to the defendant landowner until after the storm ended, which in this case was about 9:00 p.m., well after the plaintiff fell.

Therefore, the Appellate Division was satisfied that the trial court correctly considered the entire record and found that the ongoing storm rule barred plaintiff’s negligence claim against defendant as a matter of law.  Therefore, the trial court decision was affirmed, which dismissed the lawsuit.

Post Office Found Not Liable for Fall Due to Drop Off From Cement Sidewalk

Plaintiff Richard Rauso slipped and fell while at the premises at the United States Post Office in South Bound Brook, New Jersey.  He sued the defendants Post Office and Ofaniyim Holdings, LLC, which owned the property upon which the Post Office is located and leased it to the United States, for injuries suffered in the fall.  The issue in Rauso v. United States of America, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94360 (D.N.J. May 31, 2023) was whether the defendants were liable for the plaintiff’s fall, which occurred when he was walking down the Post Office’s cement sidewalk, his foot slipped and he fell onto the adjacent dirt path.

On the day of the accident, the plaintiff arrived at the Post Office and parked his vehicle in the parking lot on the side of the Post Office.  He then walked from the parking lot to the entrance of the Post Office via the cement walkway which connected the parking lot to the entrance.  There was a dirt path adjacent to the cement walkway that plaintiff did not utilize. 

When he exited the Post Office, he used the same cement walkway.  However, it was raining as he walked back towards his vehicle.  As he was walking, his foot slipped and he fell onto the adjacent dirt path.  He broke his ankle as a result of the fall.

The defendants United States and the property owner Ofaniyim both filed for a summary judgment dismissal, arguing that the plaintiff had not made out a prima face case of negligence.  They argued that the plaintiff failed to show that either defendant breached its duty to provide a reasonably safe walkway for the Post Office customers because plaintiff failed to offer evidence that a dangerous condition existed.  Further, the defendants argued that, even assuming the cement sidewalk or the adjacent dirt path constituted a dangerous condition, neither defendant was liable because the danger was open and obvious. 

The District Court applied New Jersey law in deciding this motion.  Under New Jersey law, to establish negligence, “a plaintiff must establish four elements to sustain a negligence action (1) duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages.”  Here, plaintiff contended that the junction of the cement sidewalk and the adjoining dirt path was a dangerous condition due to the unmarked and unsupported several inch elevation change.  Plaintiff’s expert measured a 2” drop from the cement sidewalk surface to the dirt path touching the sidewalk edge.  One foot away from the sidewalk, plaintiff’s expert also measured a 5” drop between the sidewalk and dirt path. 

The District Court noted that New Jersey courts had found that a drop off at the edge of a road or path can, under some circumstances, create a dangerous condition.  However, the mere existence of a drop off or a height differential in the walkway is not sufficient in itself to find a substantial risk of injury sufficient to constitute a dangerous condition. 

The District Court noted that plaintiff’s own deposition testimony contradicted the existence of a dangerous condition.  It was his testimony that the sidewalk itself had no defects or obstructions; it was raining heavier than a drizzle when the accident occurred; he walked along the cement sidewalk to and from the Post Office and viewed the cement sidewalk as safer than walking up the dirt path, which was muddy and wet.  On the way back from the Post Office, he walked close to the right edge of the cement sidewalk such that he was in close proximity to the drop-off and the adjoining dirt path.  It was when he was walking back to the parking lot on the cement sidewalk, he fell and landed on the adjacent dirt path.

Thus, the Court noted the record was clear that the Post Office did provide an adequate cement sidewalk for plaintiff to access its building.  To the extent that the dirt path qualified as a dangerous condition, the District Court noted that the record was equally clear that the condition was open and obvious.  Plaintiff was aware of the condition and he failed to avoid it.  Therefore, the Court found that defendants had not breached their obligations to plaintiff.   Thus, the District Court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, dismissing the case. 

Owner of Vacant Lot Adjoining Public Sidewalk Held Not Liable for Injury Caused by Fall on Sidewalk

Plaintiff Alejandra Padilla slipped and fell on the sidewalk adjoining a vacant lot in Camden, which was owned by the defendants Myo Soon and Young Il an.  She claimed to have suffered permanent injuries as a result of her fall.  The issue in Padilla v. Young Il an, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 14 (App. Div. Jan. 4, 2023), was whether the defendants, as owners of the vacant lot, abutting the public sidewalk, owed a duty to the plaintiff to safely maintain that sidewalk.

At the trial court level, the defendants filed for a summary judgment dismissal on the basis that they did not owe a duty to plaintiff.  The trial court judge agreed, based upon prior precedent, that “they had no duty to maintain the sidewalk because it abutted a vacant lot which was not generating any income.”  The trial court judge rejected the plaintiff’s argument that defendants could have generated income by either developing or selling the property.  While the trial court judge acknowledged that the prior Supreme Court case of Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., held that the owner of a commercial property had a duty to the plaintiff to safely maintain an abutting sidewalk, the subsequent Appellate Division decision of Abraham v. Gupta found that duty did not apply where the property could not generate income to purchase liability insurance.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff renewed her argument that Stewart should apply because the property was capable of generating income by operation of a commercial activity on it and defendants bought and sold the property for a commercial profit.  Further, plaintiff noted that there was a municipal ordinance that required that the sidewalks in the City “shall be kept in repair by the owner or owners of the abutting property at the cost and expense of the owner or owners of the lands in front of which any such sidewalk is constructed.”

Upon appeal, the Appellate Division rejected the argument that the ordinance provided any private remedy to persons injured as a result of the breach of the ordinance.  It reaffirmed the longstanding precedent regarding the lack of liability for violation of the duty imposed by an ordinance upon abutting property owners to maintain sidewalks.  The Appellate Division also agreed with the trial court judge that the Abraham case remained good law that an owner of an non-income producing vacant lot owes no duty to the public to maintain the lot’s abutting sidewalk in a safe condition.  Thus, it affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit. 

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