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storm in progress

Plaintiff Glenn Weidlich slipped and fell outside the front door of his condominium unit due to ice on the landing and fell down the stairs.  He sued the defendants, 313-319 First Street Condo Association Inc. and Clinton Hill Condo Association, among other defendants, claiming that they were negligent due to the unsafe condition of the exterior front stairs of the building.  At the time of his fall, there had been freezing rain.  The issue in Weidlich v. 313-319 First Street Condo Association, Inc., 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1366 (App. Div. July 22, 2025) was whether the ongoing storm rule immunized the condo association defendants from negligence for their failure to remove the ice from the stairs or whether one of the two exceptions to the ongoing storm rule applied.

Plaintiff owned and lived in the condominium unit located at 357 8th Street, Jersey City.  On the morning of January 5, 2022, as he stepped outside his front door, he slipped on ice on the landing and fell down the stairs.  Due to his fall, he suffered a torn patella tendon and underwent surgery.

Plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging negligence and premises liability.  He claimed that due to the unsafe condition of the exterior front of the stairs, he was caused to slip and fall on the steps.

At the conclusion of discovery, defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff fell solely because of the ongoing freezing rain and icy condition on the landing that morning and that they were immune due to the ongoing storm doctrine. 

The trial court found that plaintiff did slip and fall during an ongoing storm event.  It noted that the ongoing storm rule immunized “commercial landowners from negligence if they fail to remove an accumulation of snow and ice from public walkways during an ongoing storm,” citing to the Supreme Court Pareja v. Princeton International Properties case.  Further, the trial court found that neither exception to the ongoing storm rule was applicable.

This appeal ensued.  Unfortunately, for the plaintiff, the Appellate Division did agree with the trial court decision.

Plaintiff contended that the exceptions to the ongoing storm rule would prevent its application in his case.  He argued that there was a pre-existing dangerous condition of the stairs and that, further, the condition of the stairs was caused by a lack of maintenance and the recent paint job completed on the steps and landing. 

The Appellate Division noted the Supreme Court’s ongoing storm rule which affected the duty commercial landowners had to remove snow and ice accumulations and pathways during a storm.   The rationale of this rule was that “it is categorically inexpedient and impractical to remove or reduce hazards from snow and ice while the precipitation is ongoing.”  Thus, in Pareja, the Supreme Court held that “absent unusual circumstances, a commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice hazards arises not during the storm, but rather within a reasonable time after the storm.” 

However, the Pareja Court did identify two exceptions to the ongoing storm rule that may impose a duty on a commercial landowner.  Under the first exception, a commercial landowner may be liable if his or her actions increased the risk to pedestrians and invitees on the property by, for example, creating unusual circumstances in which the defendant’s conduct exacerbated and increased the risk of injury to the plaintiff.  Under the second exception, a commercial landowner may be liable where there was a pre-existing risk on the premises before the storm.  Under the second exception, a landowner may be liable for an injury during a later ongoing storm if it “failed to remove or reduce a pre-existing risk on the property.”

In this case, neither party argued that the defendants did not have a duty to maintain the stairs outside defendant’s condominium and clear ice and snow for them.  The dispute focused, instead, on whether one of the exceptions to the ongoing storm rule applied. 

The plaintiff argued that defendants’ conduct created and increased the risk by not addressing the deterioration of the surface of the steps which allowed water infiltration and imperceptible freezing to occur over the surface; second, that the wrong paint was used during a recent paint job which, in plaintiff’s opinion, made the steps sleeker and harder to negotiate when wet; and, third, affixing the handrails next to the steps too far from the pedestrian pathway.

The Appellate Division noted that the plaintiff admitted that he never reached any of the steps because he fell on the landing outside his front door that morning due to the icy conditions.  As for the condition of the steps, plaintiff admitted that there had been no precipitation on the days before he slipped and fell but that there was precipitation in the form of freezing rain and snow at the time of his fall.  But, regardless of the condition of the steps, the plaintiff fell on the landing before he reached the steps.  Therefore, the pre-existing condition of the steps did not satisfy any exception to the rule. 

As for the handrails, although plaintiff had an expert on that point, the expert report failed to provide any support for his conclusion that the handrails were too far away from the walking pathway to allow plaintiff to utilize them to stabilize himself or help him regain his balance after slipping on the ice.  The Court found that it was a bare conclusion, not supported by any credible evidence on the record.  Thus, the Court found it to be an inadmissible net opinion.

With respect to plaintiff’s lay opinion that the paint job made the landing more slippery, the Court also rejected that argument as satisfying one of the exceptions to the storm in progress rule. The defendants argued that an expert was needed to explain how the type of paint used made the steps more slippery.   Plaintiff’s expert offered no opinion as to this assertion and the Court found that this conclusion required expert testimony.  The Appellate Division found that, without an expert, the record failed to establish any nexus between the paint job and plaintiff’s fall.

For the above reasons, the Court agreed that the ongoing storm rule applied and none of the exceptions to the rule applied.  Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the lawsuit.

Defendant Hillside Estates, Inc. owned and managed Winding Woods Apartments in Sayreville, New Jersey.  Plaintiff, Hsi Rung Niu-Wang, was a tenant in the complex.  After plaintiff left her apartment to go to work, she walked towards her car and fell on black ice in the parking lot. The issue in Niu-Wang v. Hillside Estates, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1436 (App. Div. July 3, 2024) was whether defendant apartment complex owner could be liable for plaintiff’s injuries because they failed to pre-treat the apartment complex’s walkways and parking lots in light of the knowledge of an impending storm.    

This apartment complex consisted of over 130 buildings with separate parking lots for most of the buildings. Plaintiff was a resident in one of the buildings. The day before her accident, the National Weather Service issued a winter weather advisory for Middlesex County, warning the residents about a freezing rain “with the potential to cause ice accumulation on sidewalks, roads, and bridges in affected areas.”

In the early morning hours of the day of her accident, freezing rain coated parts of the complex’s exposed walkways and parking lots with a thin layer of ice. Defendant apartment complex conceded that they did nothing to prepare the walkways and parking lots for the storm beforehand.  Furthermore, they did not take any steps to address the icy conditions of their walkways and parking lots after the freezing rain began.

At about 7:45 a.m. on the morning of her accident, as the freezing rain continued to fall, plaintiff left her apartment to go to work.  She walked towards her car with one foot on the grass and another on the walkway.  When she eventually stepped onto the parking lot, she slipped on a patch of black ice, falling and breaking her left ankle. There was no dispute that the black ice that caused plaintiff’s fall was formed that morning when the drizzle froze as it hit the ground.  There was also no dispute that plaintiff’s injury occurred during the freezing rainstorm.

The defendant apartment complex filed for a summary judgment dismissal, which was granted.  The trial court judge found that there was “no independent duty that should be imposed upon commercial landlords to anticipate weather events and plan against them.”  The trial court judge ruled that the issue was dealt with in the Pareja v. Princeton International Properties case where the NJ Supreme Court specifically rejected a duty to pre-treat when it adopted the ongoing storm rule.

Nevertheless, plaintiff appealed the trial court decision and contended that defendant owed her a duty of reasonable care to maintain the parking lot in a reasonably safe condition.  She argued that the trial court judge misapplied Pareja because “the ongoing storm rule does not preclude the imposition of liability based upon defendant’s lack of action prior to a storm.”  Plaintiff contends that the ongoing storm rule in Pareja did not address whether defendant had a duty to have salted or sanded the parking lot before the storm began.

The Appellate Division rejected this argument. It noted that the NJ Supreme Court, in adopting the ongoing storm rule, concluded that a commercial tenant had a duty to address snow and ice accumulations in the parking lots and pathways only after a reasonable time following a storm. Moreover, the Appellate Division noted that the Pareja court specifically rejected “the notion that all a landlord needed to do to avoid liability was spread salt.”

In the case within, the facts were not disputed, such as that there was no ice or precipitation present before the storm. On the contrary, it was conceded that the ice formed during the storm. 

The Appellate Division found that it was bound by the NJ Supreme Court’s Pareja precedent that “commercial landowners do not have the absolute duty, and the impossible burden, to keep sidewalks on the property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm.”  More specifically, the Appellate Division noted that in adopting the ongoing storm rule, “the Supreme Court specifically declined to exclude liability where landowners had actual or constructive knowledge of an impending storm.”  Hence, the Court affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Joseph Devaney was working as a security guard for G4S at facilities owned by defendant Chemours Company.  On the day of the accident, there was a winter storm with light snow, sleet, and freezing rain.  During the course of plaintiff’s inspection of the premises, he slipped and fell, suffering injuries.  The issue in Devaney v. Chemours Co. FC, LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 776 (App. Div. May 2, 2024) was whether the ongoing storm doctrine decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court after the date of his fall applied to bar his claim.

As a security guard, plaintiff’s responsibilities including inspecting  incoming and outgoing cars at Chemours entrance and exit.  He would walk through the doorway to conduct his inspection.  Four days before his fall, there was a winter storm that resulted in less than 4 inches of snow.  On the day of the accident, January 8, 2018, there was a winter storm that began around 2:00 p.m. and did not end until around 9:30 p.m.  When Chemours became aware of the icy conditions, they contacted their snow contractor and alerted their security guards.

Plaintiff’s shift began around 6:00 p.m.  At around 8:30 p.m., while walking his usual path, he slipped and fell on the asphalt into the doorway between the areas he was inspecting.  He suffered injuries as a result of his fall.

At the trial court level, the defendant landowner Chemours filed a motion for summary judgment, relying upon the case of Pareja v. Princeton International, which was granted.   In Pareja, the Supreme Court adopted the ongoing storm rule which held that commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the conclusion of the storm.  Based upon the adoption of this rule, it “relieved commercial landowners of the duty to continuously clear snow and ice from their property throughout the duration of an inclement winter weather event.”

Based upon those circumstances of this accident, it was undisputed that plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred during the snowstorm.  Accordingly, the Court found that the ongoing snowstorm rule applied and it relieved the defendant of any duty of care it may have owed plaintiff.

Plaintiff argued that the ongoing storm rule should not have been applied retroactively to accidents that occurred prior to the adoption of the rule.  Plaintiff argued that contradicted “the negligence jurisprudence that provides individuals recourse if they are seriously injured due to a defective sidewalk.”  The trial court judge rejected that argument. 

The Appellate Division found that the trial court correctly rejected the argument because there was nothing in Pareja which required prospective application only.  In fact, in Pareja, the Court applied the “newly rendered ongoing storm doctrine” to a 2015 slip and fall that had occurred during an ongoing storm.

The plaintiff also argued that the rule should not be extended to include sidewalks of “highly secured, restricted – access industrial facilities such as Chemours.”  The Appellate Division also rejected that argument, finding that Pareja rejected the distinction between public and private ownership, to ensure uniformity.  It declined to draw arbitrary lines for the type of property that fall under Pareja.  Hence, it found that there was no reason to limit Pareja’s application to exclude facilities such as Chemours.

Based upon Pareja, remediation was only required within a reasonable period of time after the storm had ended.  Thus, liability did not attach to the defendant landowner until after the storm ended, which in this case was about 9:00 p.m., well after the plaintiff fell.

Therefore, the Appellate Division was satisfied that the trial court correctly considered the entire record and found that the ongoing storm rule barred plaintiff’s negligence claim against defendant as a matter of law.  Therefore, the trial court decision was affirmed, which dismissed the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Adel Hanna fell in the parking lot of the Woodland condominium complex on January 7, 2017, slipping on snow and ice in an unplowed parking lot.  The issue in Hanna v. Woodland Community Association, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2180 (App. Div. Nov. 17, 2022) was whether the defendant owner and property manager were entitled to a summary judgment dismissal based upon the ongoing storm rule enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props., 246 N.J. 546 (2021). 

The plaintiff sued both the owner of the property, Woodland Community Association (“Woodland”), and the management company, Diversified Property Management for his fall. Woodland had contracted with A. Guzzo Landscaping, LLC to provide snow and ice removal services for the property.  Plaintiff Hanna was a resident of the community and fell while walking through the snow to his daughter’s house.

The defendants filed for a summary judgment, relying upon the Pareja decision, where the Court adopted the “ongoing storm rule.” This rule held that “commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the conclusion of the storm.”  The trial court found that there were two storms on January 6 and January 7 and noted that plaintiff fell within an hour after the snow stopped falling on January 7.  Thus, the trial court found defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty pursuant to the ongoing storm rule.

While the trial court acknowledged that there was an exception to the ongoing storm rule for a pre-existing storm, it found that “there is no credible evidence in this record supporting the existence of left over ice from the January 6 storm.”  The plaintiff appealed this ruling and argued that the trial court should have found that summary judgment was precluded because he fell on ice from a pre-existing storm, which had not been remediated.

The facts showed that the snow on January 6 stopped falling at about 5:30 a.m. and left about one inch of snow.  The parties do not dispute that the snow contractor, Guzzo, was not called out to perform any snow or ice remediation for that storm.  In fact, no defendant took any remedial step with respect to the one inch of snow that fell on the ground.

Temperatures on that date rose above freezing.  The plaintiff’s expert report found that a combination of some sunshine and the above freezing temperatures resulted in a portion of the residual snow cover to melt and generate run off snow melt water, which then froze.

On the 7th, snow fell from about 4:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., leaving about 7 inches of snow.  The temperatures that day were well below freezing.  The lot was plowed from 11:00 a.m. to midnight.  This accident occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of January 7.  According to the plaintiff, the parking lot he walked through had not yet been plowed.  Plaintiff, through his expert, claimed that he slipped on ice that formed on the evening of January 6, when the one inch of snow that fell that morning melted, then refroze.  He claimed that the ice was then covered over by the snow on January 7.

Upon appeal, plaintiff Hanna alleged that the ongoing storm rule did not relieve the defendants of their duty to maintain the common elements of the condominium.  He claimed that the ongoing storm rule did not apply to condominium associations.  The Appellate Division rejected that argument, finding no distinction between a condominium association and a commercial landowner for purposes of the application of the ongoing storm rule.

Hence, the Appellate Division found that the ongoing storm rule did apply.  Pursuant to this rule, it suspends a landowner’s duty until a reasonable time after the cessation of precipitation and the duty arises within a reasonable time after the storm.  The Court noted that the ruling “makes clear landowners need not have all snow and ice cleared the moment snow stops falling.”

In this case, plaintiff fell within an hour after the snow stopped, according to his own expert reports.  Given the 7 inch snow storm falling on a 75 acre commercial property, it was not a reasonable time to have completed all snow removal activities within one hour of the snowstorm ending. 

However, the Appellate Division did find that there was a question in fact as to the defendants’ potential liability due to the pre-existing risk exception to the ongoing storm rule.  The Court found that there was a question of fact whether the January 6 storm actually created a pre-existing risk.  Because Hanna did see ice on the ground after he fell, the Appellate Division found that there was a reasonable inference from that finding that the ice Hanna saw was from the January 6 storm. 

Thus, the Court found that when that ice formed was a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment.  Because there was a factual question as to whether this exception to the ongoing storm rule applied, the Appellate Division reversed the summary judgment as to the defendant property owner and management company and remanded the matter back for trial.

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