Plaintiff Adel Hanna fell in the parking lot of the Woodland condominium complex on January 7, 2017, slipping on snow and ice in an unplowed parking lot. The issue in Hanna v. Woodland Community Association, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2180 (App. Div. Nov. 17, 2022) was whether the defendant owner and property manager were entitled to a summary judgment dismissal based upon the ongoing storm rule enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props., 246 N.J. 546 (2021).
The plaintiff sued both the owner of the property, Woodland Community Association (“Woodland”), and the management company, Diversified Property Management for his fall. Woodland had contracted with A. Guzzo Landscaping, LLC to provide snow and ice removal services for the property. Plaintiff Hanna was a resident of the community and fell while walking through the snow to his daughter’s house.
The defendants filed for a summary judgment, relying upon the Pareja decision, where the Court adopted the “ongoing storm rule.” This rule held that “commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the conclusion of the storm.” The trial court found that there were two storms on January 6 and January 7 and noted that plaintiff fell within an hour after the snow stopped falling on January 7. Thus, the trial court found defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty pursuant to the ongoing storm rule.
While the trial court acknowledged that there was an exception to the ongoing storm rule for a pre-existing storm, it found that “there is no credible evidence in this record supporting the existence of left over ice from the January 6 storm.” The plaintiff appealed this ruling and argued that the trial court should have found that summary judgment was precluded because he fell on ice from a pre-existing storm, which had not been remediated.
The facts showed that the snow on January 6 stopped falling at about 5:30 a.m. and left about one inch of snow. The parties do not dispute that the snow contractor, Guzzo, was not called out to perform any snow or ice remediation for that storm. In fact, no defendant took any remedial step with respect to the one inch of snow that fell on the ground.
Temperatures on that date rose above freezing. The plaintiff’s expert report found that a combination of some sunshine and the above freezing temperatures resulted in a portion of the residual snow cover to melt and generate run off snow melt water, which then froze.
On the 7th, snow fell from about 4:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., leaving about 7 inches of snow. The temperatures that day were well below freezing. The lot was plowed from 11:00 a.m. to midnight. This accident occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of January 7. According to the plaintiff, the parking lot he walked through had not yet been plowed. Plaintiff, through his expert, claimed that he slipped on ice that formed on the evening of January 6, when the one inch of snow that fell that morning melted, then refroze. He claimed that the ice was then covered over by the snow on January 7.
Upon appeal, plaintiff Hanna alleged that the ongoing storm rule did not relieve the defendants of their duty to maintain the common elements of the condominium. He claimed that the ongoing storm rule did not apply to condominium associations. The Appellate Division rejected that argument, finding no distinction between a condominium association and a commercial landowner for purposes of the application of the ongoing storm rule.
Hence, the Appellate Division found that the ongoing storm rule did apply. Pursuant to this rule, it suspends a landowner’s duty until a reasonable time after the cessation of precipitation and the duty arises within a reasonable time after the storm. The Court noted that the ruling “makes clear landowners need not have all snow and ice cleared the moment snow stops falling.”
In this case, plaintiff fell within an hour after the snow stopped, according to his own expert reports. Given the 7 inch snow storm falling on a 75 acre commercial property, it was not a reasonable time to have completed all snow removal activities within one hour of the snowstorm ending.
However, the Appellate Division did find that there was a question in fact as to the defendants’ potential liability due to the pre-existing risk exception to the ongoing storm rule. The Court found that there was a question of fact whether the January 6 storm actually created a pre-existing risk. Because Hanna did see ice on the ground after he fell, the Appellate Division found that there was a reasonable inference from that finding that the ice Hanna saw was from the January 6 storm.
Thus, the Court found that when that ice formed was a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment. Because there was a factual question as to whether this exception to the ongoing storm rule applied, the Appellate Division reversed the summary judgment as to the defendant property owner and management company and remanded the matter back for trial.
