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In January 2020, Plaintiff Salve Chipola attended a Clearview Regional High School’s basketball game, at which time he encountered an acquaintance, Defendant Sean Flannery speaking with a member of the school staff.  When attending a subsequent game at the school, a police officer prevented him from entering and handed him a letter from the school, informing him that he was banned from school grounds because of the belief that he was a drug dealer and was selling drugs to or purchasing alcohol for students.  He later learned that Defendant Flannery had made statements to the school official, alleging that Plaintiff was a drug dealer and had provided drugs and alcohol to the students.  Chipola sued Flannery, claiming that his alleged statements constituted a “false light invasion of privacy.”  The issue in Chipola v. Flannery, 2025 N.J. LEXIS 752 (Aug. 7, 2025) was what statute of limitations applied to this claim – one year or two years?

Chipola did not sue Flannery for false light invasion of privacy until about two years after the alleged incident.  In the lawsuit, he claimed that Flannery made false statements about him, creating a false impression of him as a drug dealer, harming his reputation and causing him emotional distress.  He further alleged that Flannery made these statements knowing they were false or in reckless disregard of the comments’ falsity and, as a result, his “reputation as a drug dealer was publicized throughout Gloucester County.”

Defendant Flannery filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Chipola had filed his complaint outside the applicable one-year statute of limitations for defamation, which he argued applied to a false light invasion of privacy claim.  The limitations period began to run on the date of the alleged comments, January 9, 2020.  The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing with the plaintiff’s argument that the one-year statute of limitations applied to this type of claim and barred the claims in the lawsuit.

Chipola appealed this decision to the Appellate Division which affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit in an unpublished opinion.  Thereafter, the matter was further appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.

Plaintiff argued that the two-year personal injury statute of limitations should apply, rather than the one-year statute of limitations governing defamation claims.  On the other hand, Defendant argued that false light claims were essentially the same in nature as one of defamation and, therefore, should be governed by the defamation’s one-year statute of limitations. 

The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and Appellate Division decisions that a one-year statute of limitations should be applied to a false light claim.  It noted that “the conduct at the heart of both defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims is essentially the same; in holding otherwise would cause false light to engulf the tort of defamation and eradicate the narrowed one-year limitations that is intended to balance potentially tortious behavior with free speech rights.”  It noted the overlap between the causes of action for false light and defamation, in conjunction with the practical considerations and free speech protections.  Further, the Court noted that a significant number of other jurisdictions throughout the country had applied the same statute of limitations to false light and defamation claims.

Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that false light claims would be subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as defamation claims.  Therefore, the lower courts’ decisions were affirmed, dismissing the lawsuit due to the failure to file the claim within the statute of limitations.

I had the pleasure of Speaking on Law Day in Plainfield Workers’ Compensation Court on May 1, 2024 and wanted to share with readers part of the discussion in our session, namely the discussion of the New Jersey authorized vehicle rule contained in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36.  This is one of the most unknown but significant rules pertaining to when work starts and when work ends.  Practitioners, adjusters and employers are far more aware of the premises rule, the special mission rule, and the paid travel time rule than they are about the authorized vehicle rule.

Since the passage of the major overhaul of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act in 1979, there have only been two significant published decisions that addressed in any detail the authorized vehicle rule, both cases involving the New Jersey Supreme Court.  The first was in 1992 in the case of Zelasko v. Refrigerated Express, 128 N.J. 329 (1992).  The case involved a truck driver who owned his own tractor and trailer.  Because his home community prohibited parking a trailer overnight, he had to park the trailer in a neighboring town in a friend’s yard.

On April 12, 1990, Mr. Zelasko made a delivery to Supermarkets General in Woodbridge.  He then drove to the terminal of his employer, Refrigerated Express, in Old Bridge to unload some pallets.  After that he started to drive to the neighboring town where he parked his trailer.  On the way he heard some rattling noises from the remaining pallets and became concerned about a problem.  He pulled off the road and stopped the truck.  He climbed onto the trailer to check the pallets but then fell from the trailer, suffering injuries.

The petitioner argued that his injury was covered under the authorized vehicle rule.  The Court focused on the following language of the statute which actually blends into one phrase two different rules (travel time and the authorized vehicle rule):   “…. But the employment of employee paid travel time by an employer for time spent traveling to and from a job site or of any employee who utilizes an employer authorized vehicle should commence and terminate with the time spent traveling to and from a job site or the authorized operation of a vehicle on business authorized by the employer.”  The Court rejected petitioner’s claim because it concluded that petitioner had concluded his day when he returned to his employer’s place of employment to drop off pallets.  There was a lengthy dissent from Justice Handler, who argued that petitioner’s day was not finished because he still had to drive to a neighboring town, unhook the trailer and safely secure its contents.

Thirty one years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2023 delivered a more detailed opinion on the authorized vehicle rule in Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control, 256 N.J. 47 (2023).  The facts were unusual in this case.  The petitioner was a pest control technician who was given a company vehicle to transport pesticides and chemicals needed for work.  His day generally began by checking his iPad for assignments and then leaving from his home to go to the client location for pest control.  However, his employer required all the technicians to refill their pesticides and chemicals at the employer’s location in Monmouth County.  There was a limit to how much pesticide quantity the technicians could keep in their truck due to concerns about spoilage of the chemicals and possible theft.  Technicians would have to make sure they had just enough chemicals in their vehicles to meet the needs of the jobs each day. 

On the date of petitioner’s accident, he was driving to the employer’s location in Monmouth County to refill the supplies in his truck.  Petitioner had concluded that he did not have sufficient supplies to perform his scheduled daily assignments.  He was involved in a car accident on the way to his employer’s location with serious injuries.  The employer argued that petitioner was on his way to work and therefore the premises rule applied.  The Judge of Compensation dismissed the case.  Petitioner appealed and the appellate division reversed in petitioner’s favor.  The Supreme Court then affirmed in favor of petitioner.

The Court did not hold that the drive to work was a special mission, partly because the Court had already decided that this was an authorized vehicle rule case and perhaps partly because the statute says that a special mission must involve a commute away from the employer’s place of employment.  The Court found that petitioner was using an authorized vehicle when the accident occurred, on business authorized by the employer and with authorization from his employer.  The Court said, “Above All provided an authorized vehicle for operation by Keim.  Keim’s operation of that vehicle to the shop on the morning of the car accident was solely for business expressly identified and authorized by Above All, namely, to replenish supplies. The entire arrangement, both as to the vehicle’s location and the need to replenish supplies, reflected a business decision expressly designed by the employer to further the employer’s interests in safeguarding and maintaining the quality of its supplies and in minimizing travel time for employees, thus facilitating a robust appointment schedule.”

Most employees who use their car for business do not have company cars:  lawyers, accountants, sales persons, real estate agents, certain nurses, and others.  Does the authorized vehicle rule require that the company own the vehicle?  The Court said no.  The rule is not limited to just employer provided vehicles. It could apply to a vehicle owned by the employee. The Court did not go into further details about how a personally owned vehicle will be deemed an authorized vehicle but the quote in the preceding paragraph seems to focus future analysis on whether the actions of the employee are furthering the employer’s business interests.

Does this case suggest that the drive to work is now compensable?  The Court addressed this issue, “However, the ‘authorized vehicle rule’ does not apply every time an employee is driving a vehicle authorized by an employer.  And importantly, the ‘authorized vehicle rule’ does not categorically apply when an employee is merely commuting to work in either an authorized personal or work vehicle.”  Drives from home to work and back from work to home will almost always be considered not covered under workers’ compensation.

I want to thank the Director and Chief Judge Maria Del Valle Koch, Judge Fred Hopke and Judge Neme Akunne for hosting this very enjoyable Law Day seminar and for making everyone feel welcome in the very accommodating Plainfield vicinage.  I also want to thank my co-presenter Rick Rubenstein, Esq., and all the lawyers who attended and raised many good questions throughout afternoon seminar.

The post The Little Known “Authorized Vehicle Rule” in Workers’ Compensation appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

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