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After testifying at her deposition that she had no intention to undergo surgery, Plaintiff Yvonne Terrell changed her mind and testified at trial that she would have the surgery, causing the Appellate Division in Terrell v. Chitra, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 84 (Jan. 16, 2026), to consider whether that changed testimony would allow her to claim future medical costs from the surgery.

After a motor vehicle accident in 2018, Terrell sued Defendant Penafranc Chitra for injuries to her neck, back, and right shoulder. Noting the acute, traumatic herniated disc in her spinal column, Terrell’s primary treating doctor, an orthopedic surgeon, recommended she have a cervical discectomy and fusion. He explained the significant risks of the surgery to Terrell, which included paralysis and death. Terrell, a nurse and primary care-giver for a disabled son, worried about how a surgery would affect her and did not have the surgery in 2019 or 2020. Even after several other doctors’ opinions, she testified at her deposition that she felt the risks were too great to have the surgery. In his report in mid-2022, her medical expert stated Terrell, though still in pain, chose not to have the recommended surgery. Prior to trial she never amended any of her discovery responses to indicate any intention to have the neck surgery.

Ahead of trial, Chitra conceded that the accident was her fault, allowing the case to proceed on the issue damages alone. Working off of Terrell’s choice not to have surgery, Chitra’s attorneys asked the court to bar any evidence Terrell intended to introduce regarding the future medical costs of her surgery. The court agreed, and prevented her medical expert from offering an opinion as to those future medical costs.

At trial in the Fall of 2023, Terrell changed her story. She said her son had recently passed away and, since she intended to retire shortly and she did not want to have pain for the rest of her life, stated “surgery may help,” and she wanted to have the surgery – but made no firm decision to do so. In light of that testimony, Terrell, over the defense’s objection, asked the court to reconsider it’s decision on barring evidence of her future medical costs. The trial court agreed, and allowed her to introduce her medical expert’s testimony as to both her need for the surgery and its cost, $250,000. Upon hearing this testimony, the jury returned a verdict of $1,300,000; $1,000,000 for pain and suffering and $300,000 for future medical costs, including the surgery.

Chitra appealed. Critically, she claimed that Terrell’s future medical costs were inadmissible due to both her failure to disclose her intention to have the surgery prior to trial and because the introduction of the cost of the claimed surgery tainted the jury’s award on pain and suffering.

The Appellate Division agreed. It found that Terrell’s failure to amend her discovery responses at any time before trial to show any intention to have the surgery prejudiced defendant’s ability to defend against her claims that the surgery may occur. At no time from her deposition until she testified, including a lengthy pre-trial process and Chitra’s motion to strike evidence of future medical costs, did Terrell provide any suggestion she considered surgery; if she had done so, the defense could have prepared their defense accordingly. Because she did not, the Court determined, she prejudiced Chitra’s defense. The Court also noted she never made a definitive statement that she would have the surgery and, as her attorney admitted at oral argument before them, she still had not had it by late 2025.

Finally, the Court determined that because the trial court improperly allowed Terrell to present her expert’s opinion of her future medical costs related to the surgery, that evidence tainted  the jury as to the value of her injuries and affected their decision on pain and suffering. As a result, the Court vacated the full $1,300,000 judgment and sent the entire case back to the trial court for a new trial on damages, barring Terrell from introducing any of the contested evidence as to the purported surgery or its costs.

Of note, affecting the Court’s determination of prejudice, the Court found that had Terrell made a definitive statement as to surgery before the close of discovery in 2021, or if she had the surgery, that surgery would have been covered by her Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits available through her auto insurance. But, because of her indecision and failure to have the surgery, the PIP statute of limitations may have expired, barring Chitra to seek reimbursement from the insurer.  The Court found that Terrell must bear the consequences of failing to choose to have surgery when PIP benefits would have been available to pay for it. Moreover, by rule, PIP-payable future medical costs are not admissible at trial and should not have been presented to the jury.

The small details matter.  A petitioner will always have problems at trial when there is very little congruence between the allegations contained on the claim petition and the statements which petitioner gave to the employer and treating doctors at the time of the accident. That is the message in the case of Makins v. Palace Rehab & Care Center and Premier Cadbury, LLC, A-2263-23, A-2276-23 (App. Div. April 24, 2025).

Petitioner was a certified nursing assistant (CNA) who provided essential care to patients. She injured her back in 2013 while working for Palace Rehab with pain and numbness into her right leg. She received an award in that case and reopened that award on June 12, 2018.

On June 19, 2018, petitioner, who was then working for Premier Cadbury, filed two additional claim petitions.  The first claim petition alleged an injury on February 11, 2018, which aggravated her low back with pain into her legs while “picking up a resident.”  In the second claim petition, she alleged that she injured her back, left knee and left hip picking up a patient on June 8, 2018. Cadbury denied both claims, and the case proceeded to trial. The parties agreed to a bifurcated trial.  That meant that the case would be tried on the issue of the occurrence of an accident and causal relationship without medical experts necessarily testifying. 

During the first date of trial, petitioner said she did not remember whom she reported the first incident to but later she said she told her supervisor, whose name she did not recall.  She said she was lifting a patient when something happened to her low back.  She admitted to finishing work the day of the alleged injury on February 11, 2018.  She worked the next two days.  She then went to a hospital on February 14, 2018, and stayed home two days, returning to work on light duty before resuming full duty.

The petitioner’s version of the second alleged incident on June 8, 2018 was similar.  She said she was lifting a patient, putting her on a toilet, when she felt sharp pain in her back.  She also said that she bent down to pick up a box of tissues that the patient dropped but then she fell to the floor, striking her back and left hips.  She said she told a nurse who entered the room what had occurred. She recalled signing an incident report but claimed she had not read the incident report because she was in too much pain.  She said Susan, who completed the incident report, told her to see her family doctor.  She was referred to an orthopedist, who gave her an injection.  She was then referred to Dr. Kepler, a surgeon.  She also had two visits with Concentra, which were arranged through her employer.

Cadbury’s counsel focused heavily during trial on numerous inconsistencies in this case:

1)  The incident report of February 16, 2018, which was signed by a supervisor but not by petitioner, contained a handwritten response to the question about how the incident happened: it read “overall strain on back – did not occur with just [one] resident.” Defense counsel asked petitioner to comment on this description.  The judge observed that during her response,  “petitioner’s head went down, she would not make eye contact with respondent attorney, she did not speak for a period that was uncomfortable, shrugging with [a] lack of expression.”  She then said she did not recall making that statement.

2)  Regarding the alleged incident on June 8, 2018, petitioner admitted that she signed the incident report but said that she had not read it. She denied ever saying the words contained in the report: “Employee was simply walking, passing out trays and performing routine duties when she felt sharp pain in her left hip like a dislocation – now has radiated to lower back.”  Petitioner testified, “This didn’t happen like this.”

3)  Petitioner was shown a document entitled “Workers’ Compensation – First Report of Injury or Illness.”  She said she did not agree with the description on that document, namely: “Employee was simply walking, passing out trays and performing routine care when she felt a sharp pain in her left hip/lower back.”

4)  Petitioner was also shown notes from a physician’s assistant in the orthopedic practice for her June 13, 2018 appointment. She did not agree with the description: “[The patient] states that she has been having low back pain for approximately a month. She states that a few [sic] last week at work when she was in a standing position, her leg gave out and she did not fall.  She states that her knee has been feeling painful as well.”

5)  Petitioner also disagreed with a statement contained in a June 14, 2018 appointment at Concentra: “Patient states that as she was walking her left leg gave out, she was able to prevent herself from falling, she states she sat down and rested and later in the day the same thing happened again. She reports since then she has been experiencing lower back pain, left knee and left hip pain.  She states that her left knee appears to slip out of place and she is unable to resume regular activity until it returns to a normal position.  She reports a history of arthritis to the back.  She denies slipping, tripping or other mechanics of injury.”

6)  Petitioner also disagreed with the note from a Concentra doctor in her June 18, 2018 appointment where the physician described her as having a “preexisting condition.”

7)  Petitioner also was shown a note from her orthopedic physician at her July 2, 2018 appointment.  The doctor wrote that petitioner had “a history of chronic recurrent lower back pain for many years” and “severe osteoarthritis of her left knee.”  The doctor also wrote that petitioner denied any specific injury and admitted that her symptoms began “insidiously.”  Petitioner did admit that she had preexisting problems but did not recall this specific discussion.

8)  Petitioner also did not recall the history contained in an IME performed at Cadbury’s request which referenced a prior August 8, 2017 incident when petitioner felt pain while helping a 200-pound patient get off a toilet. Petitioner did not recall being examined by the doctor and did not recall that particular history.  In fact, she disagreed with that description of a 2017 injury.

On examination by the attorney for Palace, (the first employer), petitioner did agree with a statement by Dr. Kepler in his May 21, 2019 report that she suffered two injuries at Cadbury on February 11, 2018 and June 8, 2018, both of which aggravated her back and leg pain.

Cadbury produced two witnesses:  a Director of Nursing in 2018 and an Executive Assistant and Supervisor for the front desk. These witnesses testified to the procedures that Cadbury followed for reporting an injury at work.  The first witness testified that the information on the First Report of Injury Form came from the information on the Incident Report. The second witness testified that she created the incident report for the alleged February 11, 2018 accident based on what petitioner had reported to her.

The Judge of Compensation admitted into evidence over objection from petitioner’s attorney the incident reports and the Workers’ Compensation First Report under the Business Records exception to hearsay.  The Judge permitted the petitioner on the final day of trial to bring in a doctor to challenge impeachment evidence but petitioner declined to do so.  Certain documents were introduced into evidence by all parties, and the Judge of Compensation rendered a decision finding that … “petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her injuries were causally related to the alleged accidents at Cadbury.”  The Judge dismissed both claim petitions with prejudice.  The Judge also noted that he did not give the First Report of Injury Form any weight in arriving at his decision.  He specifically stated that he found petitioner not to be credible.

Petitioner appealed and raised several issues.  The first issue pertained to petitioner’s competence to testify.  Petitioner was asked by the judge at the outset of testimony whether she was under the influence of anything that would interfere with her ability to testify.  She said no.  Then her own attorney asked her if she was under the influence of medications.  She said yes, that she was taking oxycodone and muscle relaxers which affected her memory.  She also said she was suffering from memory issues related to Long Covid.  The Appellate Division commented, “The problem with that argument is that petitioner and her counsel chose to have her testify, fully aware of what medication she had taken and her Long Covid condition and their potential effects on her memory.  Nothing in the record indicates petitioner or her counsel asked the judge for an adjournment…”  The Court also noted that petitioner initially told the Judge of Compensation that she was not under the influence of anything that would cloud her judgment. Furthermore, the Appellate Court noted that the Judge of Compensation focused more on “the differences in her demeanor when she testified about facts that were in her favor and when she testified about facts that were not in her favor.”

The next issue on appeal was the decision to bifurcate the trial.  Counsel for petitioner challenged the trial judge’s decision to bifurcate the trial because it contended that this may have prevented petitioner from producing testimony from her treating physicians.   The Appellate Court said there was no error in bifurcating the trial because neither party objected to this approach.  The Court also noted that the Judge of Compensation allowed petitioner to bring in medical testimony on the final date of trial but petitioner’s counsel declined. The Appellate Court commented that in this case the judge found that petitioner was not credible in her claims that work accidents happened.

The last argument on appeal was that the Cadbury incident and first reports should not have been admitted into evidence because they did not meet the test of a business record under N.J.R.E. 803 (c)(6).  Counsel also argued that petitioner was denied due process when Cadbury did not produce the author of the incident report. The Appellate Court noted that the Judge of Compensation gave no weight to the First Report of Injury Form.  The Court also noted, “… [A] Judge of Compensation is not bound strictly by the Rules of Evidence, see N.J.S.A. 34:15-56, and may admit documents into evidence without authentication testimony,” citing Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dept., 175 N.J. 244 (2003). The Court also observed that petitioner did admit that she signed the first page of the June 8, 2018 incident report, “which contained a description of the purported accident that did not match the description petitioner gave on her claim form or in her testimony.” Finally, the Court commented that all counsel in the case consented to the admission of certain documents into evidence; hence there was no due process violation.

The dilemma for petitioner in this case was the inability to overcome the inconsistency between the allegations in her claim petitions and the contrary statements in the incident reports and doctors’ notes close in time to the alleged accidents.

The case of Hernandez v. La Fortaleza, Inc., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 22 (App. Div. Jan. 5, 2024) is a lesson as to why counsel should not coach their witness during trial.  This case involved a slip and fall accident in which the plaintiff Hernandez claimed that she fell on an uneven raised defect on the property of defendant La Fortaleza.  The case proceeded to trial via a virtual trial where, on a lunch break, the plaintiff’s attorney coached the witness as to her testimony. 

Plaintiff Hernandez was the first witness at the virtual trial.  The trial court judge told her that she had to be alone and on her own while she testified, except that her husband could be in the room.  During her direct testimony, her attorney showed her a photograph of the defendant restaurant and the area where the fall occurred.  She was trying to explain in her testimony where the fall occurred in the photograph.   The plaintiff’s husband was in the room but the judge admonished him that he had to remain quiet while she was testifying.  The plaintiff’s attorney explained to the Court that the plaintiff was having trouble manipulating the curser on the screen.  Therefore, the Court recessed the trial for lunch and instructed Mrs. Hernandez’s attorney to straighten out issues with the exhibits and utilization of the curser.

Defense counsel objected and claimed that, on the critical issue of liability, no coaching would be tolerable.  The trial judge restated her point to the plaintiff’s attorney that no one else can be in the room but plaintiff’s husband and that her husband must be visible behind her but cannot speak until it is his opportunity to testify.

Unfortunately for the plaintiff, during the recess, the conversation between the plaintiff, her husband, and her attorney was recorded.  In this recorded conversation, the attorney coached the plaintiff as to her testimony, telling her how she should respond to his questions and how she should testify as to where she fell.  After the recess, defense counsel continued the objection about coaching and advised the Court that plaintiff’s attorney’s microphone was on during recess and he listened to the attorney coaching the witness with the witness’s husband.  Defense counsel requested that the Court grant a mistrial. 

The judge polled the jurors and made certain that they had not overheard the recess conversation.  She concluded that the jury itself was not tainted.

The next day, defense counsel renewed his request for a mistrial or a dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.  The trial judge listened to the recording and concluded that the plaintiff’s attorney, despite being warned about coaching, had coached the plaintiff and directed her to testify as to where the slip and fall occurred.  Hence, the trial court judge felt that she was compelled to declare a mistrial.  The trial court judge ordered that plaintiff and/or their counsel reimburse the Court for the cost of the interpreter and court services.  The judge also permitted defendant to file a motion for dismissal with prejudice.

The defendant did file such a motion and the judge entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.  She based it in part on the transcript of the conversation, as well as the certification of two bilingual paralegals from defense counsel’s office who heard the recess conversation.  One of them heard plaintiff state that it had been so long she didn’t remember where she fell.

In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, the judge found as follows:

“The conduct of the attorney here to invite a client to state that an accident occurred in a particular place when she had no independent recollection to resolve the issues of liability where she was the only witness to the fall itself introduces prejudice too great to present to the finder of fact.”

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal.  Plaintiff argued that the trial judge made a mistake in the exercise of her discretion because there was no fraud on the Court and the sanction of dismissal was too severe.  However, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s decision.

The Appellate Division noted that plaintiff’s husband failed to comply with the judge’s instruction on coaching Hernandez and, further, the plaintiff’s attorney after indicating he would not talk to plaintiff about her testimony at any time during the testimony, even during a lunch break, proceeded “to perpetuate a falsity” by directing the plaintiff to create an issue of liability by “stating that an accident occurred in a particular place when she had no independent recollection.”

While the Appellate Division found that a dismissal with prejudice was a drastic remedy, to be employed “only sparingly,” it found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this lawsuit.  The Court found that the plaintiffs shared the blame and the fraud because they received instructions from the judge concerning coaching.  Instead of listening to the judge, the plaintiffs willingly participated in a scheme to provide false testimony in an ongoing trial.  Based upon this falsified testimony, the Appellate Division found that the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice was merited. 

Further, the Court found that the public interest was served by a dismissal with prejudice.  It noted that “[a] misrepresentation to a tribunal is a most serious breach of ethics because it affects directly the administration of justice.”  This dismissal warns plaintiffs and their attorneys that “their behavior will not be tolerated and that their conduct was so egregious as to cause them to suffer a drastic remedy – the loss of their cause of action.”  The Appellate Division further noted that “it informs other litigants that they risk dismissal if they commit a fraud on a court.”

Thus, the trial court’s decision was affirmed and the dismissal was upheld by the Appellate Division.

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