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Tort

The plaintiff Lyndsey Patton was walking in or near the intersection of Union Avenue and West Side Avenue in Jersey City when she was struck by a vehicle owned by defendant Jersey City Municipal Utilities Authority (“JCMUA”).  The accident occurred on June 30, 2019.  On or about September 10, 2019, the plaintiff’s attorney sent a notice of tort claim addressed to JCMUA, but sent it to City Hall on Grove Street instead of JCMUA’s place of business on Route 440 in Jersey City.  Plaintiff later successfully obtained leave from the trial court to file a late notice of claim on JMCUA, which determination was appealed.  The issue on appeal in Patton v. Wiley, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1400 (App. Div. July 7, 2021) was whether the plaintiff had demonstrated the “extraordinary circumstances” under the Tort Claims Act to allow a late filing of a notice of claim.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, a party pursuing a cause of action against a public entity under the Tort Claims Act must file a notice of claim within ninety days of accrual of the claim or else be forever barred from recovering from the public entity.  However, a court may exercise the discretion permitted by N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 to allow a late filing “provided that the public entity or a public employee has not been substantially prejudiced” by the delay and also provided that the plaintiff presents “sufficient reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances” for the failure to comply with this statutory requirement.

The question faced by the Appellate Division was whether the plaintiff had met the extraordinary circumstances standard to justify the late filing of the notice of tort claim.  There was no question that plaintiff failed to file a notice of tort claim on JCMUA within the ninety days.  The plaintiff delivered a notice of claim within the required time but to the wrong address.

The Appellate Division noted that there was no mystery as early as the date of the accident that the vehicle was owned by JCMUA and driven by one of its employees and also there was no mystery about the location of JCMUA’s place of business which was included in the police report and was also otherwise readily available through a simple internet search.  The Court held that the plaintiff’s failure to serve the notice of claim on JCMUA at the right location “was a product of attorney neglect or inadvertence” which did not meet the extraordinary circumstances threshold as required by the statute to allow the filing of a late notice of tort claim.

The plaintiff argued that there was little doubt that JCMUA was aware of the event because, in early September 2019, within ninety days of the action’s accrual, plaintiff’s counsel communicated with Qual-Lynx, the administrator who adjusts claims made against JCMUA. The plaintiff’s counsel also advised and served Qual-Lynx with a claim for no fault benefits because plaintiff did not own an automobile and was not otherwise covered by auto insurance.

The Court noted that this submission to Qual-Lynx, however, made no mention of a personal injury claim to be asserted against JCMUA or its employee, and it cannot seriously be argued that a notice or communications with a public entity’s adjuster or insurer about a related claim constitutes the notice required by N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.”  (emphasis added). Moreover, the Appellate Division noted that the Qual-Lynx representative certified in the opposition to plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a late notice of claim “that he told plaintiff’s attorney during their September 6, 2019 telephone call that plaintiff needed to serve a notice of tort claim directly on JCMUA.”  As of that date, there was still time left to serve a notice of tort claim on JCUMA within the ninety day time period.

While plaintiff thereafter did forward a notice of tort claim, it was sent to City Hall, not JCMUA’s place of business on Route 440.  The Appellate Division noted that this was not a situation where the claimant or her representatives might have been confused about the identity of the public entity that caused the injury.  She knew at the scene of the accident that the driver worked for the JCMUA and, further, in corresponding with Qual-Lynx within the ninety day time period, the plaintiff’s then attorney referred to Qual-Lynx’s insured as “Jersey City MUA.”

The Appellate Division noted that JCMUA was “aware of and had already conducted an investigation into the accident but, in light of the absence of a timely notice of claim, JCMUA had no reason to know plaintiff intended to make a personal injury claim against it.”  Based upon these facts and circumstances, the Court found that the plaintiff’s failure to serve the notice of tort claim was the product of attorney inadvertence.  Counsel was or should have been aware of the identity of the public entity that was involved in the accident, as well as the correct address for the JCMUA.

Finally, the Appellate Division found that “[w]hile it may be viewed as a displeasing result because it seems JCMUA was aware of the accident and aware Qual-Lynx had been in communication with plaintiff about her no fault benefits claim, there is no question the Legislature intended – when it amended N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 – to require a showing of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to set a high bar for relief.”

The Appellate Division noted that the Supreme Court had clearly established that attorney negligence or inadvertence did not constitute “extraordinary” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:8-9.  Hence, the Court found that it was “constrained” to conclude the judge mistakenly exercised his discretion in allowing plaintiff to file a late notice of tort claim.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s ruling in permitting the late notice of tort claim to be filed against the JCMUA.  Thus, the end result was that the claim against the JCMUA for this accident was barred.

 


Betsy G. Ramos, Esq. is a member of the firm’s Executive Committee and Co-Chair of the Litigation Group. She is an experienced litigator with over 30 years’ experience handling diverse matters. Her practice areas include tort defense, insurance coverage, Tort Claims Act and civil rights defense, business litigation, employment litigation, construction litigation, estate litigation and general litigation.

On April 9, 2017, plaintiff Jonathan Jeffrey was involved in a one vehicle motorcycle accident, resulting in complete quadriplegia.  Approximately six months after the accident, he consulted counsel, at which point, he learned that his injuries may have been caused or significantly aggravated by the emergency medical technicians who placed him in the ambulance.  In the published decision of Jeffrey v. State, 2021 N.J. Super. LEXIS 65 (App. Div. May 18, 2021), the plaintiff appealed an order of the Law Division denying his motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim.

Plaintiff’s injuries resulted in several surgeries, including spinal decompression and fusion surgery. He suffered a complete spinal cord transection at the C6-C7 level of his spinal cord, resulting in complete quadriplegia.

Plaintiff was released from the hospital on April 17, 2017 and transferred to a rehabilitation center for two months.  He continued to receive rehabilitation therapy on an out-patient basis for approximately four more months.

However, plaintiff remained completely disabled and unable to perform rudimentary movements, let alone to work.  He had an inability to voluntarily move the upper and lower parts of his body.

Plaintiff retained counsel on November 15, 2017.  At that time, plaintiff was using a wheelchair for mobility and had minimum movement of his upper body.  His decision to consult counsel was, in large part, due to a collection notice dated October 24, 2017 from the hospital.

Plaintiff filed a certification that the first time that he understood that he had a potential claim against the emergency medical services and/or other persons that provided medical care to him immediately after the April 2017 motorcycle accident was when he consulted counsel.  Thereafter, on March 20, 2018, his counsel filed a motion for leave to file a late tort claims act notice.  The lawyer certified that it was not until September 28, 2017 that she finally received sufficient information from a representative of the hospital to conclude that plaintiff’s permanent disabilities may have been caused by some or all of the medical care and treatment he received at the scene of the accident.  She sent in Tort Claims Act notices to the relevant public entities and thereafter filed a motion to seek leave to file a late notice of tort claim.

Pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff must file a notice of claim within ninety (90) days of its accrual (N.J.S.A. 59:8-8).  The Law Division judge has the discretion to grant a claimant leave to file a notice of claim beyond that ninety (90) day time frame, if he or she provides by Affidavit:

(1)        Extraordinary circumstances for his or her failure to file a timely notice of claim; and

(2)        The public entity or employees involved have not been substantially prejudiced by the plaintiff’s tardiness.

The plaintiff argued to the trial court judge that the gravity of his injuries made it “impossible or impractical to view this delay as a failure to exercise due diligence.”  The defendant argued that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion to find plaintiff did not show extraordinary circumstances to justify relief.

The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court judge mistakenly exercised his discretionary authority and reversed.  The Court found that the motion judge “failed to duly appreciate the magnitude of plaintiff’s injuries and their life-altering ramifications.”

In the appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Law Division made a mistake in finding that the accrual date was April 9, 2017, the actual date of his accident.  The trial court judge justified his decision in finding that, while it was difficult for the plaintiff to function in his daily life, there was insufficient evidence in the records to show that the plaintiff was not able to file a timely claim due to the severity of his injuries and his medical care.  The court had noted that the plaintiff was released for treatment by in-patient rehab and that there was nothing to indicate that plaintiff through a family member, friend or individual, was prevented from contacting or retaining legal counsel.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court judge “grossly misapprehended the magnitude of plaintiff’s injuries.  Plaintiff was 25 years old at the time of the accident.  In one catastrophic event, he lost complete movement and sensation of his body.”

The Court further pointed out that after completing two months of in-patient rehabilitation, it would “be beyond insensitive to impose a duty on plaintiff to seek legal advice through surrogates composed of family members or friends, during this life-altering adjustment period.”  The Appellate Division concluded that: “we are certain the Legislature did not intend for the judiciary to construe the term ‘accrual’ in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 in a manner that abandons all vestiges of basic human empathy.”

Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that November 15, 2017 was the accrual date for his claim.  Thus, plaintiff’s motion to seek leave of the court to accept the TCA notice of claim was only thirty-five (35) days beyond the ninety (90) day statutory requirement.

The Appellate Division noted that after plaintiff completed his two month in-patient rehabilitation program, plaintiff was then required to confront and adjust to his physical limitations.  Further, the Court noted that plaintiff’s inherent difficulties associated with shifting from a motorcyclist to a quadriplegic wheelchair user “cannot be viewed as a barrier to deny plaintiff access to our civil courts.”

Thus, the Appellate Division found that the facts were sufficient to constitute “extraordinary circumstances” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 which permits the filing of a late notice of tort claim.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s request to file a late notice of tort claims against the public entities that the plaintiff believed may have exacerbated his injuries.

 


Betsy G. Ramos, Esq. is a member of the firm’s Executive Committee and Co-Chair of the Litigation Group. She is an experienced litigator with over 30 years’ experience handling diverse matters. Her practice areas include tort defense, insurance coverage, Tort Claims Act and civil rights defense, business litigation, employment litigation, construction litigation, estate litigation and general litigation.

Client: Table Run Estates, Inc. and Condetta Brown Desgoutte

Court: New York Appellate Division, First Department

Trial Attorney:  Stephen J. Alexander, Esq.

Brief Attorney:  Alyson L. Knipe, Esq. 

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

The New York Appellate Division First Department affirmed a lower court’s decision to vacate a $2.2 million dollar default judgment that was entered against Defendants Table Run Estates and Condetta Desgouttee when their answer was stricken based on their prior attorney’s failure to appear for court conferences and depositions.

The First Department held that an attorney who was suspended from and subsequently disbarred for neglecting legal matters and who failed to communicate with clients served as a reasonable excuse under CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the default.  The court also found that plaintiff offered no evidence that she incurred any prejudice.  Therefore, the Appellate Division concluded that defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment was properly granted.

The New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“TCA”), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:13-10, requires that a Plaintiff seeking to recover damages from a public entity must prove as a threshold requirement that he or she sustained a “permanent loss of body function.”  N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey on January 3, 2017 issued an opinion, not yet approved for publication, which addresses this requirement in the matter of Moore v. Frucci, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1 (App. Div. Jan. 3, 2017).

The fact pattern is fairly unusual in that, on December 1, 2013, Plaintiff John Moore was standing on a Camden sidewalk observing police activity at a crime scene. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Detective Christopher Frucci drove an unmarked Camden City Police vehicle onto the sidewalk, and the vehicle struck Plaintiff in the rear of the right leg, causing Plaintiff to lose his balance, but not fall to the ground. Defendant Frucci denied that the vehicle struck Plaintiff, but liability was not an issue raised in Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  Rather, Defendants claimed that Plaintiff failed to meet the threshold to recover under the TCA.

Plaintiff sought treatment at an emergency department approximately 40 minutes after the incident.  X-rays of the right lower extremity were essentially negative. Plaintiff was also noted to be ambulating without difficulty. However, four days later, on December 5, 2011, Plaintiff commenced a course of physical therapy and chiropractic treatment, alleging injuries to his knee and ankle, as well as severe lower back pain. He continued this treatment for approximately six months.

On February 1, 2012, Plaintiff underwent an MRI of the right knee. The MRI report noted no fracture or contusions, but a “chronic appearing partial tear of the proximal ACL” and “small joint effusion.”

Plaintiff also came under the care of a board certified orthopedic surgeon on February 29, 2012. This doctor indicated that Plaintiff had suffered “aggravation of chronic lumbosacral sprain and strain” and a “right knee contusion with high-grade partial versus full thickness tear of the ACL.” Plaintiff was recommended to continue chiropractic treatment and physical therapy, and was fitted for a knee brace.

After periodic follow-ups with the surgeon and Plaintiff’s claims of persistent tenderness in the right knee, arthroscopic surgery was performed on August 30, 2012. The operative report describes the procedure as “diagnostic arthroscopy of right knee, partial synovectomy medial joint, lateral joint, notch, and suprapatellar pouch, and chondroplasty of patella.”  Plaintiff thereafter attended several post-surgical follow-up visits with the surgeon, as part of what the surgeon described as continuing “aggressive therapy,” which included two injections of the knee with Depo-Medrol and the lidocaine.

The surgeon also ultimately provided a permanency evaluation in which he stated that Plaintiff “has had an insult to his anterior cruciate ligament. There was a partial tear. He did have posttraumatic changes with chondromalacia patella and synovitis of the right knee.” The doctor also opined that Plaintiff might require knee replacement surgery in the future.

In his deposition, Plaintiff, who was employed as a public adjuster, claimed that he had difficulty climbing onto roofs, and when climbing stairs he experienced a “little bit” of pain in the knee. Plaintiff also testified that, given his condition, he paid more attention to his activities due to his knee.  He also claimed that given the right knee soreness and swelling, he was required to ice the knee three to four times per week. He claimed the problems with his knee limited his ability to participate in other activities of daily living, including hunting, riding dirt bikes and a motorcycle which he owned, and caused him pain and difficulty when he remained in the same position for an extended period of time.

The trial court ruled that the proofs set forth above were insufficient to create a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff had met the threshold of the TCA.  Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

On appeal, the Appellate Division set forth the specific language of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), which indicates that:

“No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00.  For purposes of this section medical treatment expenses are defined as the reasonable value of services rendered for necessary surgical, medical and dental treatment of the claimant for such injury, sickness or disease, including prosthetic devices and ambulance, hospital or professional nursing service.”

Therefore, in circumstances where a Plaintiff has incurred in excess of $3,600.00 in medical expenses, the Appellate Division noted that “to recover pain-and-suffering damages against a public entity the plaintiff must also prove: (1) an objective permanent injury, and (2) a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial.”  Toto v. Ensuar, 196 N.J. 134, 145 (2008).”  Further, Plaintiffs “may not recover under the TCA for mere subjective feelings of discomfort.  Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395, 403 (1997).”  In Brooks, although Plaintiff Brooks had ongoing pain and permanent restrictions of motion in the neck and back, her claims were still dismissed due to the fact that she could function in her employment and as a homemaker.  Id. at 406-407.  The Appellate Division also referenced the opinion in Ponte v. Overeem, 171 N.J. 46 (2002), in which even though Plaintiff in that matter sustained a knee injury which required surgery, the same still was determined not to meet the threshold.

Given all of the foregoing, in Moore the Appellate Division held that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof to establish the objective evidence that he had as a result of the incident sustained a permanent substantial injury to his knee. The Court relied heavily upon the fact that following the surgery, plaintiff remained “fully capable of performing in his employment and none of his avocational pursuits were significantly impaired. The discomfort he experienced while performing such activities was insufficient to meet the TCA threshold. Further, (the surgeon’s) suggestion of the possibility of future surgery was insufficient to establish a permanent loss of bodily function that was substantial.”

Thus, this recent Appellate Division opinion stands for the proposition that Plaintiff’s burden to meet the threshold of the TCA is a significant one, as even surgery may not be found sufficient to meet the same. This case shows that, even with objection evidence of a permanent injury, if a plaintiff is unable to show that the loss is substantial with respect to a limitation of his ability to work or his recreational or daily activities, it may be subject to dismissal based upon the TCA’s permanency defense.

By: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

In the recent unpublished Appellate Division decision, Mann v. Walder, Docket No. A-0863-11T1, decided October 31, 2013, the Court ruled that the plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against three New Jersey State Park police officers and the State of New Jersey was governed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“TCA”) N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. and that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of the Act. Thus, the Court upheld the dismissal of this suit.

This matter arose from the fatal shooting of Emil Mann, which was witnessed by his nephew, Carl Mann, the plaintiff in this case. As a result, he claimed emotional damages and sued the three officers involved in the shooting and the State Police.

The plaintiff, however, suffered no physical injuries. His medical expenses incurred only totaled $187. In support of his claim, he submitted an expert report from a physician, opining that he suffered from uncomplicated bereavement and maladaptive health behavior (overeating), affecting his general medical condition, which was secondary to his bereavement. However, the plaintiff was able to graduate from high school, sleep adequately at night without nightmares, was able to perform his job at T.J.Maxx, and, although he continued to distrust police officers, his fear of them had receded.

The issue in this case was whether he had suffered a permanent injury and had incurred related medical expenses that exceeded $3,600, both threshold requirements to maintain an action under N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). While the Court had previously ruled that emotional distress could constitute “pain and suffering” under the TCA, an emotional distress claim is barred unless the plaintiff suffered a permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses exceeded $3,600.

The Court noted that case law permits recovery of damages from emotional distress if subjective symptoms are accompanied by “the requisite indicia of permanent physical infirmity.” Here, the plaintiff contended that his weight gain from 250 to 350 pounds was a physical manifestation of permanent injury. However, the Appellate Division ruled that this weight gain did not rise to the level of a permanent loss of a bodily function.

Further, the plaintiff failed to meet the monetary threshold of $3,600. The plaintiff argued that the value of the services he received and will need in the future exceeds that amount. Because his expenses were reduced due to payment by Medicaid, he argued that his claim on this ground discriminates against him because he is poor. The Appellate Division seemed skeptical of this argument and, regardless, noted that there was no evidence submitted as to the value of the services received.

This case is illustrative of both the permanency and monetary threshold requirements for all personal injury claims submitted under the Act. Especially if there is no physical injury, an emotional distress claim must be scrutinized closely to determine if it satisfies the TCA’s permanency requirement. Additionally, all claims should be examined to determine if they satisfy the monetary threshold. Usually, the monetary threshold is not an issue but for an emotional distress claim or other claims such as a simple fracture with no physical therapy or a laceration with a scar but no future scar revision, the plaintiff may not satisfy this threshold.

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