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Workers’ Compensation

Often cases are referred to this insurance defense attorney where the policy was cancelled prior to the alleged date of loss. The claimant-petitioner has retained an attorney and has filed a Claim Petition in the Division of Workers’ Compensation. The petitioner’s counsel has reviewed the New Jersey Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau website and found the policy which would have been in effect at the time of the date of loss and has named that carrier. The carrier retains counsel and seeks to deny the claim for lack of coverage.  The question is whether there is sufficient evidence to prevail on a Motion to Strike Carrier.

Prior to filing a Motion to Strike Carrier, there are certain steps and documents which should be reviewed between counsel and the carrier regarding the effectiveness of the cancellation. In New Jersey, there is a strong public policy favoring uninterrupted workers’ compensation coverage for all employees. As a result, an insurance carrier must strictly comply with all statutory and regulatory mandates regarding any cancellation of a policy.

It is therefore beneficial to review N.J.S.A. 34:15-81, Cancellation of Contract. The Statute lays out three individual steps which must be followed in order for cancellation to be effective. Section 81 states that no policy for workers’ compensation coverage is deemed cancelled until the following three criteria are met:

  • (a) At least ten days’ notice in writing of the election to terminate such contract is given by registered mail by the party seeking cancellation thereof to the other party thereto; and
  • (b) Until like notice shall be filed in the office of the commissioner of banking and insurance, together with a certified statement that the notice provided for by paragraph “a” of this section has been given; and
  • (c) Until ten days have elapsed after the filing required by paragraph “b” of this section has been made.

While the foregoing three steps appear to be straightforward, there are various ways in which a potential issue may arise and therefore result in a finding of improper cancellation. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that there needs to be strict compliance with the Statute in order for cancellation to be effective. Sroczynski v. Milek, 197 N.J. 36 (2008).

Consider an example of a policy issued to an employer for a policy period beginning on February 1, 2019 through February 1, 2020. During the policy period, the employer fails to make payments on the policy leading to a cancellation. The carrier sends a notice to the employer on July 1, 2019 stating the following:

“We hereby notify you that the policy identified above will be cancelled effective 12:01 a.m. July 30, 2019 in accordance with the cancellation condition of the policy and that all liability of the Company under such policy will cease at that time. Premium adjustment will be made to the date of cancellation and statement rendered. The reason for this action is: Nonpayment of Premium.”

With respect to the first step in cancelling a policy, a notice needs to be generated by the carrier and sent to the employer with at least 10 days’ notice of the date of the cancellation. So far, our cancellation example appears to comply with subsection (a) of the Statute as the notice is sent on July 1, 2019 and gives more than 10 days’ notice.

Subsection (a) of the Statute also states that this notice must be sent by “registered mail.” The Statute does not define “registered mail.” In practice, the carrier should send the notice to the employer by certified mail. The carrier should retain any and all transmittal information with the USPS regarding sending of the notice of cancellation as these documentary proofs are vital in the carrier’s Motion to Strike Carrier for Lack of Coverage.

The sending of the notice of the cancellation to the employer is not the end of the journey for the carrier. The carrier must also submit a “like notice” to the office of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance. The Statute does not require “exact same notice,” but rather states “like notice.” The Commissioner of Banking and Insurance in New Jersey has designated the Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau (CRIB) as the entity to receive the like notice.

CRIB requires that the like notice be submitted electronically and has provided a reference form to be used by carriers for the submittal of like notice.

You can see from the above form that at the bottom of the submittal there is a certification for which the carrier must provide a signatory. The certification is required in the like notice submittal to CRIB. Subsection (b) of the Statute has two clauses which must be adhered to in order for the cancellation to be effective. The first is that the like notice is filed with CRIB, the second is a certified statement must be provided by the carrier that the employer was provided notice in accordance with subsection (a), i.e., that the employer was provided notice of the election to terminate via registered (‘certified’) mail with at least 10 days’ notice.  These steps are required.

Finally, the Statute requires one last step for the policy to be effectively cancelled. Subsection (c) of the Statute requires that at least 10 days have elapsed since the filing of the notice with CRIB prior to the cancellation being effective.

Let us return to our example policy which is being cancelled by our hypothetical carrier. The policy period is for the year February 1, 2019 through February 1, 2020 and, due to nonpayment of premium, the policy is being cancelled. The notice of cancellation is sent to the employer via registered mail on July 1, 2019 stating that the policy will be cancelled effective July 30, 2019.

The carrier should at that time submit the like notice to CRIB that the policy is being cancelled with the effective date of cancellation being reported as July 30, 2019.

What then occurs if the like notice to CRIB is not submitted until August 15, 2019 and an injury occurs to an employee at the company on August 5, 2019 and the company did not obtain replacement coverage? In this practitioner’s experience, any issue with the filing of the like notice creates strong arguments by petitioner’s counsel that the policy was not effectively cancelled. The carrier will try to argue that the policy was effectively cancelled July 30, 2019 per the notice to the employer and that it is incumbent upon the employer to obtain proper coverage.

The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act provides certain timelines and a procedure which must be strictly complied with in order for the policy to be cancelled. In this example, the carrier did not provide the like notice to CRIB until after the date of the loss. As a result, the carrier cannot show compliance with subsection (b) and subsection (c) of the Statute.

Let us move the date of loss then to August 20, 2019 and the like notice still is submitted to CRIB on August 15, 2019. The carrier can now show that the loss occurred after the date of cancellation and after the filing of the like notice with CRIB. However, again, this fact scenario will likely result in an improper cancellation and a covered loss. Subsection (c) of the Statute requires that at least 10 days have passed since the filing of the notice with CRIB. In this example, only 5 days have expired. As a result, the petitioner will have a strong argument that the policy was still in effect at the time of the loss despite the policy being cancelled as of July 30, 2019.

While the foregoing examples appear to result in simple solutions, Section 81 of the Statute often results in lengthy litigation regarding proper proofs of cancellation. As a result, the carrier should retain detailed documentary proofs and evidence of each step of the cancellation in order to properly seek to be stricken for lack of coverage from a pending claim.   Readers with questions on cancellation can reach the undersigned at knagy@capehart.com.

The post How to Properly Cancel a Workers’ Compensation Policy appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

Practical Advice in New Jersey Workers’ Compensation

The general rule is that an injured worker is entitled to TTD for the time frame that the authorized treating doctor placed the employee out of work.

Pursuant to Monaco v. Albert Maund, Inc., 17 N.J.  Super. 425 (App. Div.), 21 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1952), generally, TTD continues until the employee is able to resume work or until the employee “is as far restored as the permanent character of the injuries will permit” [placed at MMI], whichever happens first. This means that TTD can cease in either of the following situations: a. The employee is placed back to work and authorized treatment is ongoing and continuing; or b. The employee is placed at MMI from treatment, even if the employee is discharged with permanent work restrictions (irrespective of whether the restrictions can be accommodated).

In addition to the above rule, there are some tricky situations where TTD benefits may be stopped for other reasons.  Below are hypothetical situations regarding TTD, and how we would recommend handling each scenario.

Scenario 1: Bob works for a large retailer and is injured on February 2, 2022. Bob is receiving authorized treatment and is initially not placed out of work. On March 14, 2022, Bob is caught stealing from the register at work, as well as stealing $4,000 worth of merchandise from the electronics department. The authorized doctor places Bob out of work as of March 17, 2022; it is anticipated he will be out of work for a few months. After an investigation into the theft, Bob is terminated for cause on March 28, 2022. The employer pays TTD from March 17, 2022 through the date of his termination, March 28, 2022. Bob alleges that he is owed TTD from March 17, 2022 onward, as he was placed out of work by the authorized doctor on March 17, 2022 and has not yet been returned to work.

Our position is that Bob is owed TTD only for the date range of March 17, 2022 through March 28, 2022, the date of the termination.

There are quite a few cases dealing with this issue. In all of the cases, the main point comes down to this: The purpose of TTD is to compensate for actual lost wages. As such, in a situation like this, our position would be that Bob is not owed TTD after March 28, 2022.

The most important case on this scenario is Cunningham v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 386 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 492 (2006), where the Court stated that Cunningham must “prove that he actually lost income…because of his disability”. The Court noted that TTD is wage replacement for “actual lost wages”, and not “theoretical or fictitious wage loss”.

 The Court in Cunningham was guided by the holding of Outland v.  Monmouth-Ocean Educ. Serv. Comm’n, 154 N.J. 531 (1998). In Outland, the Court held that in order for a teacher who teaches during the school year to be entitled to TTD during the summer months, she must prove that she would have had summer employment. The case of Gioia v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. A-0667-10T4 (App. Div. October 11, 2011) also deals with an employee terminated for misconduct (in that case, violation of the employer’s drug policy), and the holding of Gioia makes it clear that TTD is for actual lost wages, not theoretical lost wages. In a case where an employee is terminated for cause, at the point of his termination, he no longer has wages. If there is no actual wage loss, TTD is not owed.

Scenario 2: Nate has been placed out of work by the authorized doctor and is not working. TTD is being issued. The authorized doctor, on May 15, 2022, recommends that Nate undergo a shoulder surgery. Nate receives all surgical clearance and on May 22, 2022, the authorized doctor schedules the surgery to occur on June 5, 2022. However, Nate has a pre-planned vacation June 4- June 18. Then he is moving residences during the end of June, and then will have family visiting during July as well as various other summer activities, so he wants to push the surgery back until at least August 15. Nate asserts that he is entitled to TTD during the time frame of May 22, 2022 through August 15, 2022.

Our position is that Nate is not entitled to TTD during the time frame of May 22, 22022 through August 15, 2022.

Nate is refusing treatment, for reasons that are not related to any health or medical issues. An employee not complying with the authorized doctor’s treatment plan, and treatment schedule, based on a personal reason or personal preference, is not entitled to TTD benefits.

Our position is that if petitioner is not actively treating, or is missing appointments, he is not entitled to TTD under N.J.S.A. 34:15-19, which states that after an injury, an employee must submit himself for physical examination within this state, as often as may be reasonably requested, and, “the refusal of the employee to submit to such examination shall deprive him of the right to compensation during the continuance of such refusal”. Since Nate is failing to, or refusing to, comply with treatment and is not cooperating with authorized treatment, he is not entitled to TTD during his non-cooperation.

Scenario 3: Ronald, an electrician, was injured on January 15, 2022. The authorized doctor places Ronald out of work February 10 through March 1, 2022. On March 2, 2022, Ronald is released to work light duty; the doctor noted that full duty was anticipated on or around April 2, 2022. The employer can accommodate light duty work and can pay Ronald his usual salary in his temporary light duty position; Ronald was offered the light duty position on March 2, 2022. Ronald refuses the light duty position, as he does not want to work “desk duty”; Ronald maintains he is owed TTD from March 2, 2022 through April 2, 2022 (or whenever he is in fact returned to work full duty).

Our position is that Ronald is not entitled to TTD as of March 2, 2022, the date that light duty was offered, and declined.

We recommend relying on Harbatuk v. S & S Furniture Systems Insulation, 211 N.J. Super. 614 (App. Div. 1986) in a situation like his. If the employee is offered a light duty job, and the employee refuses the light duty job, the employer can terminate TTD upon the refusal. For this reason, it is a good idea to put the light duty offer in writing, dated, and reference the date that the authorized doctor placed the employee back to work light duty, and the date light duty could be accommodated, particularly as under Williams v. Topps Appliance City, 239 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 1989), “the burden is on the employer to show that light work was offered to [the employee] and that it was refused”.

The above scenarios re-emphasize two important things to keep in mind with respect to issuance of, and entitlement to, TTD benefits: (1) TTD is to compensate for actual lost wages; and (2) An employee’s refusal to comply with offered light duty and/or the authorized doctor’s recommended course of treatment may be cause for TTD to be terminated.

The post Advice To Employers In Dealing With Complex TTD Scenarios appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

For those readers who are interested in learning about current issues in workers’ compensation, I highly recommend the 2021 LexisNexis book entitled “Workers Compensation Emerging Issues Analysis.”  I was asked to review this book and found it to be chock full of cutting-edge articles written for attorneys, employers, physicians, adjusters, carriers and third party administrators.

The book consists of a collection of well-written articles by prominent authors from around the nation in the field of workers’ compensation law. A large portion of the book is devoted to COVID-19 pandemic issues ranging from how to analyze compensability of COVID-19 occupational disease claims, what presumptions really mean, and the impact of the pandemic on the traditional going-and-coming rule.  Among the most enlightening articles was one written by Michael C. Duff, Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming.  The author discusses how presumptions actually work in the law, comparing the specific language in presumption laws from various states, and focusing on how employers may attempt to rebut the statutory presumptions. 

In addition to the analysis on pandemic issues, there are also many other articles of interest to practitioners, including the impact of medical marijuana and opioid laws, understanding the AMA Guidelines in workers’ compensation, (used in most states but not in New Jersey), ride-sharing and the independent contractor defense, as well as a summary of state laws dealing with weekly limits on total disability in workers’ compensation.

One of the most impressive sections contained in this book is the state-by-state legislative and case law analysis.  For each state there is a section called “trends analysis” and a section that reviews cases of interest to practitioners and employers since 2020. I liked reading the developments in each state because it makes it easy to spot and track legal trends in workers’ compensation.  For attorneys, claims managers, supervisors and employers with business in several states, the book is absolutely essential. 

“Workers’ Compensation Emerging Issues Analysis” was co-edited by Mr. Thomas Robinson, Esquire and the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN).  Mr. Robinson is the esteemed co-author of Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (LexisNexis) and Larson’s Workers’ Compensation, Desk Edition (LexisNexis).  The NWCDN is a nationwide network of independent law firms dedicated to promoting excellence in the practice of workers’ compensation law.  NWCDN runs some of the best seminars available to member practitioners and employers at various venues around the country.

As an avid reader of all things workers’ compensation, I enjoyed the fact that there was so much original thought in this book. The articles raise many questions that employers and practitioners will be trying to answer in the coming years. Frankly, anyone involved with workers’ compensation will benefit by reading this book.  For further information on this book, please click here.

The post Book Review Of “Workers’ Compensation Emerging Issues Analysis” appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

Client: Community Medical Center

Court: Appellate

Brief Attorney: Michael McCaffrey, Esq.

Trial Attorney: Anne Hammill Pasqua, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

The petitioner filed a Motion for Medical Treatment seeking a right total knee arthroplasty revision supported by the opinion of Dr. Post. Respondent opposed the Motion based upon the opinions of authorized provider, Dr. Arthur Mark, as well as a second doctor, Dr. Michael Sidor. Both doctors did not recommend further treatment as it was not likely to cure or relieve the petitioner of the effects of the injury under N.J.S.A. 34:15-15. There was the risk that further surgery would have a poor result.  Following testimony of the petitioner and all three doctors, the judge denied the motion and petitioner appealed.

On appeal, respondent maintained that the denial was appropriate as there was more than sufficient evidence to support the judge’s opinion and in finding Dr. Sidor more credible than petitioner’s expert, Dr. Post.  Respondent further argued that Dr. Mark’s opinion, as the authorized treating doctor, is entitled to greater weight than that of Dr. Post.  At Oral Argument, Respondent highlighted that the medical testimony and evidence that further treatment was not only not necessary but likely to cause more harm as explained by Dr. Sidor and Dr. Mark.   The appellate court agreed and affirmed. The appellate court also touched upon petitioner’s complaints being out of proportion to what one would expect in a typical patient.

Client: Hoboken BOE (JIF)

Court: Appellate

Brief Attorney: Andrea L. Schlafer, Esq.

Trial Attorney: Andrea L. Schlafer, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Ms. Ryan-Wirth filed a claim petition and motion for medical and temporary disability benefits seeking an order compelling the Hoboken Board of Education to pay for her fusion surgery as well as temporary disability benefits. 

Petitioner, a full-time school nurse at the Hoboken Middle School, applied for a position as a student monitor for some extra income.  The service was known as the A.M. Care Program for students who needed to arrive early to school. Teachers and other staff who provided monitoring services received a stipend of $30 per day. Petitioner arrived on September 10, 2019 but claimed to have received very little instruction on her first day. The next day on September 11, 2019, she came to school early with the intention of participating in the A.M. Care Program.  However, she instead engaged in a Cardio Class occurring in the gymnasium.

Ms. Ryan-Wirth testified that upon entering the school she was greeted by the Principal, who was dressed in workout clothes. She claimed the Principal informed her that there was no need for any additional A.M. Care Program monitors that morning, but that she was welcome to participate in the Cardio Club. Ms. Ryan-Wirth maintained that she felt pressured to participate in the Cardio Club because the Principal was her boss. Ms. Ryan-Wirth suffered serious back injuries on September 11, 2019, while pulling a car tire in a relay race, falling backwards on her rear end. 

On cross examination, petitioner admitted that she had a personal motive for wanting to participate in the Cardio Club.  She said that six weeks after giving birth, her doctor cleared her to exercise.  She went for walks and she went to the gym twice a week. After giving birth, she participated in a weight loss challenge to lose 30 pounds by Christmas for a cash prize.

Petitioner’s attorney maintained that petitioner was on school grounds on a work day when she was injured, and she felt pressured to participate in the Cardio Club.  The Judge of Compensation ruled against petitioner and held that petitioner’s injury did not arise from work.  Petitioner appealed.  The Appellate Court first reviewed the recent decision in Goulding where a cook volunteered to participate in a Family Fun Day and was injured while cooking for guests and employees. In that case the Supreme Court ruled that Ms. Goulding’s injury was not a recreational activity because she was doing the same work she always did during the week and because she did not participate in any of the games or activities.

The Appellate Division believed that Ms. Ryan-Wirth was not participating in a recreational activity under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 because the Cardio Club was not really a social or recreational activity given its emphasis on learning for students.  But as to petitioner the Appellate Division held that the activity did not arise out of work. 

Client: Meridian Rehab/ Zurich American Insurance Company

Court: Appellate Division

Trial Attorney:  Carla P. Aldarelli, Esq.

Brief Attorney:  Maura Burk, Esq. 

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

After a full five-day trial and testimony on petitioner’s Motion for Medical and/or Temporary Disability Benefits seeking left knee treatment, the Workers’ Compensation Judge denied petitioner’s Motion for Medical and/or Temporary Disability Benefits, finding for Respondent and finding that Respondent’s medical expert was more credible than petitioner’s medical expert. The Court concluded that petitioner failed to establish that any need for treatment to her left knee was work related.

Petitioner then appealed the Workers Compensation Court’s finding.

The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the Motion for Medical and/or Temporary Disability Benefits, finding that the Workers’ Compensation Judge properly concluded that petitioner was not entitled to additional treatment to her left knee because her current condition was not caused by a work-related incident. The Appellate decision noted that there was ample evidence presented at the workers’ compensation level to support the Judge’s conclusion that petitioner’s current left knee condition was not related to her work injury.

To view the case, please click here.

By: Gitika Kapoor, Law Clerk
Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On June 8, 2021, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in Richter v. Oakland Board of Education that an employee is not required to establish adverse employment action such as demotion or termination in a failure to accommodate disability claim brought against an employer under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).  In addition, the Court considered whether the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”). The Court held that the NJLAD and WCA are not in tension with each other, and the WCA did not bar the plaintiff’s lawsuit.

In Richter, a teacher who suffered from Type 1 diabetes was assigned a late lunch period and experienced a hypoglycemic event in the classroom.  As a result, she suffered a seizure, lost consciousness, and struck her head on a lab table and the floor, causing excessive bleeding. She filed a workers’ compensation claim and received compensation for her medical bills and disability benefits. She later brought a NJLAD action asserting a failure to accommodate disability claim against the Oakland Board of Education. In her complaint, she alleged that, despite repeated requests to alter her schedule, the principal failed to accommodate her request to be assigned an earlier lunch time. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board, which the Appellate Division reversed.

On the NJLAD issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a failure to accommodate claim may arise from an “employer’s inaction, silence or inadequate response to reasonable accommodation request,” and that causing harm to the employee through an adverse employment action is not a necessary element of the claim. The Court recognized that a failure to accommodate is itself an actionable harm, because the wrongful act is the employer’s failure to fulfill its duties under the law. Importantly, the Court noted that a lack of demonstrable consequences in the form of adverse employment action may affect damages. 

Regarding the WCA, the Court held that the statute’s exclusive remedy provision did not bar the plaintiff’s NJLAD claim, reasoning that the legislature intended for the NJLAD to supplement other legal remedies. According to the Court, the NJLAD and WCA both aim to protect workers in the workplace and can function harmoniously, without conflicting with each other. Therefore, the WCA did not bar the plaintiff’s lawsuit.

On May 12, 2020, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed whether an employer can maintain a subrogation action to recoup workers’ compensation benefits paid for economic loss where (1) its employee is barred from maintaining an action against the tortfeasors due to his election of the limitation-on-lawsuit option in his personal automobile policy; (2) the employee’s losses were covered by workers’ compensation benefits; and (3) the employee neither sought nor received personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits.  In N.J. Transit Corp. v. Sanchez, 2020 N.J. LEXIS 520 (N.J. May 12, 2020), an equally divided Court answered that question in the affirmative.

On December 2, 2014, David Mercogliano, while acting in the course of his employment, was driving a vehicle owned by his employer, New Jersey Transit (“NJT”), when he was rear-ended by a vehicle being driven by Sandra Sanchez and owned by Chad Smith.  Mercogliano sustained minor injuries for which he received treatment, and was medically cleared to return to work without restriction two months after the accident.

At the time of the accident, Mercogliano was insured under an automobile policy for which he had elected the limitation-on-lawsuit option provided for under the Auto Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“AICRA”).  Under AICRA, when the limitation-on-lawsuit option has been selected, a person injured in a car accident cannot recover noneconomic damages against the person legally responsible for the accident, unless his injury falls into one of the categories specifically enumerated in AICRA.  Here, there was no dispute that Mercogliano’s injury did not fall within any of the specified categories, and that he thus could not recover for noneconomic injury against Sanchez or Smith.

NJT’s workers’ compensation carrier paid Mercogliano $33,625.70 in workers’ compensation benefits, including medical benefits, temporary indemnity benefits, and permanent indemnity benefits.  With his losses covered by workers’ compensation benefits, Mercogliano neither sought nor received PIP benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy.

In its capacity as Mercogliano’s employer and subrogee, NJT filed a complaint against Sanchez and Smith seeking to recoup the workers’ compensation benefits it paid to Mercogliano.  NJT relied on N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f), a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act which authorizes employers who have paid workers’ compensation benefits to injured employees to assert subrogation claims against the persons legally responsible for those injuries.  Here, NJT alleged Mercogliano’s injuries resulted from the negligence of Sanchez in causing the accident, and also asserted a vicarious liability claim against Smith as the owner of the vehicle and as Sanchez’s employer.

Sanchez and Smith moved for summary judgment dismissing NJT’s complaint. They claimed that NJT could not assert a subrogation claim because AICRA prevented Mercogliano from pursuing a third-party action against them, given his election of the limitation-on-lawsuit option in his personal insurance policy.  Sanchez and Smith further argued that because Mercogliano would have been eligible for PIP benefits had he not qualified for workers’ compensation benefits, AICRA barred NJT’s claim for reimbursement. 

In response, NJT argued that because its subrogation claim was based entirely on workers’ compensation benefits paid for economic losses (medical expenses and lost wages), and because Mercogliano received no PIP benefits, AICRA did not bar its suit against Sanchez and Smith.

Analyzing the legislative history of AICRA, along with the collateral source rule set forth therein, the Court found that the Legislature intended to allocate the burden for injuries incurred during the course of employment to employers and their workers’ compensation carriers.  As such, where an injury is compensable under both the Workers’ Compensation Act and AICRA (via PIP benefits), the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the primary source of recovery of medical expenses and lost wages.  In this scenario, the PIP carrier is relieved of the obligation to pay those benefits, such that PIP benefits are neither collectible nor paid.

Here, NJT paid workers’ compensation benefits for Mercogliano’s economic losses.  As a result, Mercogliano neither pursued nor received PIP benefits.  Under these circumstances, AICRA’s prohibition on the admission of evidence of PIP benefits “collectible or paid” was not implicated, as PIP benefits were neither collectible nor paid.

The Supreme Court found that the Workers’ Compensation Act reflects the Legislature’s clear intent to allow employers and carriers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits to assert subrogation rights against third-party tortfeasors.  The Court found no evidence that when the Legislature enacted AICRA, it intended to bar employers and insurers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits for economic loss from seeking reimbursement from third-party tortfeasors where the employee’s losses were covered by workers’ compensation benefits and he neither sought nor received PIP benefits.  An equally divided Court thus affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to allow NJT to pursue its subrogation claim against Sanchez and Smith.

Client: RWJ Barnabas Health

Court:  Superior Court of New Jersey
Appellate Division

Trial Attorney:  Christina M. Adinolfi Shea, Esq.

Brief Attorney: Christina M. Adinolfi Shea, Esq. and Caroline N. Yount, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

The New Jersey Appellate Division decided on October 16, 2019, that a nurse who was walking from work premises to a parking lot following her shift at Jersey City Medical Center/RWJBH was not in the course of employment when she was struck by a motor vehicle.

Petitioner had appealed the ruling of a Judge of Compensation that her injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.  The Judge had found petitioner was injured on a public street, not within the control of the hospital and that the hospital did not exercise daily control and maintenance of the parking lot. The Appellate Division agreed that petitioner was not injured in the course of her employment and did not suffer a compensable injury.

Client: United Airlines/Sedgwick

Court:  Workers’ Comp Court in Newark

Trial Attorney:  Prudence M. Higbee, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

In the reported case of Marconi v. United Airlines, 460 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 2019), the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of two claims against United Airlines for lack of jurisdiction. Richard Marconi lived in New Jersey and suffered a work injury to his left hip on January 31, 2015 working for United Airlines in Philadelphia.  United paid full benefits to Marconi under Pennsylvania law, but eventually Marconi brought two claim petitions in New Jersey seeking permanency benefits that were not available in Pennsylvania.  One claim petition was for the accident in 2015 and the other was an occupational claim alleging work exposures from 1988 to the present.  Mr. Marconi admitted he was not hired in New Jersey and worked most of his career in Philadelphia, with only a brief period of employment at Dulles Airport.

United moved to dismiss both claim petitions for lack of jurisdiction in New Jersey.  Petitioner argued that even if residency alone was insufficient for a finding of jurisdiction, Professor Larson’s fourth factor, namely “place where the industry is localized,” in conjunction with petitioner’s residency in New Jersey is sufficient for a finding of jurisdiction.  However, the Appellate Division disagreed, explaining the concept of localization should be analyzed in terms of advancement of company interests, not its mere presence in the State. In this case, the Court found that, “nothing in the course of Marconi’s two-decade employment with United advanced the company’s localized interests in New Jersey.  In these circumstances, although United maintained a localized business interest in Newark, New Jersey has no substantial interest in exercising its jurisdiction over the petitions.”  As such, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissals of both claim petitions.

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