Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

Workers’ Compensation

Client: New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority

Court:  Appellate Division

Trial Attorney:  Keith E. Nagy, Esq.

Brief Attorney:  Keith E. Nagy, Esq. and John H. Geaney, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Petitioner appealed the Workers Compensation Court’s finding that she was not entitled to wage reconstruction after a full trial on the issue. After trial, the lower court found that the petitioner did not sustain her burden of proof as she found the petitioner capable of a myriad of strenuous activities and found that the petitioner failed to prove that she lacked the potential for full time employment. Petitioner appealed arguing that she never returned to full-time employment and that she had a significant injury.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Court’s finding that the petitioner did not sustain her burden of proof pursuant to Katsoris v. South Jersey Publishing Co., 131 N.J. 535 (1993). The Appellate Division noted that the applicable standard is that an enhanced award utilizing wage reconstruction is to compensate the injured employee “for his loss of earning capacity, i.e., diminution of future earning power.” Id. at 546 (quoting Torres v. Trenton Times Newspaper, 64 N.J. 458, 460-61 (1974)). That diminution includes the employee’s capacity to work full time either now or in the future. Id. at 548. The Appellate Division found that the record supported the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s findings that the petitioner’s accident did not diminish her capacity to perform full-time work.

To view case, click here.

 

Client: Sprint PCS

Court:  Appellate Division

Trial Attorney:  Michelle L. Duffield, Esq.

**Results may vary depending on your particular facts and legal circumstances**

Petitioner obtained an award of 30% permanent partial disability in 2003 arising from a work-related motor vehicle accident dating back to 1999. The award was for a bulging disc at C6-7 and disc protrusions at L4-5 and L5-S1. Petitioner later reopened the award and sought total and permanent disability benefits with the Second Injury Fund. We successfully argued that petitioner’s subsequent increased disability was not related to the 1999 work accident but to subsequent non-work injuries.

To view case, click here.

 

[vc_row css=”.vc_custom_1523707422008{padding-right: 15px !important;padding-left: 15px !important;}”][vc_column][vc_custom_heading source=”post_title” font_container=”tag:h2|text_align:center” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]Ashley Mollenthiel Fiore, Esq. and Andrea Schlafer, Esq. will be presenting at the South Jersey Claims Association Event on March 13, 2018. The presentation will focus on Key Workers’ Compensation Defenses – what you need to know to assist in limiting case exposure potential and to win cases! The presentation will also delve into Hot Topic Issues being litigated in Workers’ Compensation Court.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row full_width=”stretch_row” content_placement=”top” bgtype=”dark” css=”.vc_custom_1523736111362{padding-top: 50px !important;padding-bottom: 0px !important;}”][vc_column width=”1/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1523736080043{margin-bottom: 35px !important;}”][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_btn title=”Register Now!” style=”modern” align=”center” button_block=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eventbrite.com%2Fe%2Fsj-claims-ce-class-march-13-2019-tickets-57664376703||target:%20_blank|”][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1523736104702{margin-bottom: 35px !important;}”][/vc_column][/vc_row]

Julio Pendola fractured his ankle in 2014 picking up a customer and filed a petition in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.  He asserted that he worked exclusively as a driver for Classic, which had over 100 cars.  He purchased his own car after consulting with Classic.  The company required Pendola to paint the car silver and affix the Classic logo to the sides and front of the car with the company’s phone number.  Classic also required Pendola to purchase a two-way radio for installation in the car.  Eventually they changed to computer tablets to dispatch drivers.  All of these expenses were paid for by Pendola along with the medallion, gas, maintenance on his car and liability insurance.

Classic dispatched all the passengers which Pendola picked up.  He could not pick up passengers off the street like a taxi driver.  Pendola paid Classic $150 per week and then kept his fares, grossing between $500 to $700 per week.  Pendola could work when he wanted to work. He had to keep the car clean and dress appropriately.  Otherwise he would be suspended.

Testimony at trial revealed that Classic considered itself to be merely a dispatching service and that drivers were considered independent contractors.  The color of the cars was an article of compliance with the City of Newark Taxi Division.  The company would check on the cleanness of cars that were being used.  The company also furnished drivers with business cards, receipts, vouchers for credit cards, and sometimes key chains and pens.  The company did not issue a 1099 or W-2 because the company considered drivers not to be employees.  The drivers simply would keep their fares.

The Judge of Compensation ruled in favor of Classic and found that Pendola was an independent contractor.  The judge noted that Pendola was free to accept or reject fares and was not supervised by anyone.  In regard to whether Pendola’s work was an integral part of Classic’s business, the Judge of Compensation found that Classic was not dependent on Pendola.  No one driver was essential to the business.

On appeal the Appellate Division observed that drivers were not free to pick up any nearby passenger.  They had to request the ride from the dispatcher, who would then decide which driver would get the assignment.  The Court thought it significant that the company would evaluate the condition of cars.  The Court disagreed on the analysis of the functional relationship between Pendola and Classic.  “It cannot be seriously disputed that Pendola was one of the ‘cogs’ in Classic’s operation.  His work as a driver willing to provide the rides Classic arranged was essential to the success of its business.”

The Appellate Division viewed Classic as more than a dispatching company but instead viewed it as a transportation company.  The Court noted that it had found Classic to be an employer in a prior case along the same lines in 1999.  It saw no reason to vary from that prior decision and reversed in favor of Pendola.

The case can be found at Pendola v. Milenio Express, Inc., d/b/a/ Classic, A-0225-17T2 (App. Div. October 26, 2018).  It shows how New Jersey courts will likely consider drivers for companies like Lyft and Uber when such cases find their way to the Appellate level.

The post UBER Style Business Found To Be Employer of Driver appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

[vc_column][/vc_column][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_column][vc_custom_heading source=”post_title” font_container=”tag:h2|text_align:center” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]This is a one-day seminar designed for practitioners, physicians and insurance professionals. Our audience is always participatory and interactive, and attendees come from all areas of the workers’ compensation world including adjusters, supervisors, attorneys, physicians, nurses, investigators, HR managers, managed care professionals, and all sizes of employers in both the public and private sector.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][vc_row][vc_column][/vc_column][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][/vc_row][vc_row full_width=”stretch_row” content_placement=”top” bgtype=”dark” css=”.vc_custom_1523736111362{padding-top: 50px !important;padding-bottom: 0px !important;}”][vc_column width=”1/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1523736080043{margin-bottom: 35px !important;}”][vc_btn title=”Seminar Schedule” style=”modern” align=”center” i_icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-calendar” add_icon=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fmillenniumseminars.com%2F%23schedule||target:%20_blank|”][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_btn title=”Register Now!” style=”modern” align=”center” button_block=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fmillenniumseminars.com%2F%23register||target:%20_blank|”][vc_column_text]

First 15 registrants will receive a courtesy copy of Geaney’s New 2017 Workers’ Compensation Manual, a $220 Retail Value.

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1523736104702{margin-bottom: 35px !important;}”][vc_btn title=”Seminar Speakers” style=”modern” align=”center” i_align=”right” i_icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-users” add_icon=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fmillenniumseminars.com%2F%23speakers||target:%20_blank|”][/vc_column][vc_row][/vc_row][/vc_row][vc_column][/vc_column][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text]

[vc_row css=”.vc_custom_1523707422008{padding-right: 15px !important;padding-left: 15px !important;}”][vc_column][vc_custom_heading source=”post_title” font_container=”tag:h2|text_align:center” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]This is a one-day seminar designed for practitioners, physicians and insurance professionals. Our audience is always participatory and interactive, and attendees come from all areas of the workers’ compensation world including adjusters, supervisors, attorneys, physicians, nurses, investigators, HR managers, managed care professionals, and all sizes of employers in both the public and private sector.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row full_width=”stretch_row” content_placement=”top” bgtype=”dark” css=”.vc_custom_1523736111362{padding-top: 50px !important;padding-bottom: 0px !important;}”][vc_column width=”1/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1523736080043{margin-bottom: 35px !important;}”][vc_btn title=”Seminar Schedule” style=”modern” align=”center” i_icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-calendar” add_icon=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fmillenniumseminars.com%2F%23schedule||target:%20_blank|”][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_btn title=”Register Now!” style=”modern” align=”center” button_block=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fmillenniumseminars.com%2F%23register||target:%20_blank|”][vc_column_text]

First 15 registrants will receive a courtesy copy of Geaney’s New 2017 Workers’ Compensation Manual, a $220 Retail Value.

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1523736104702{margin-bottom: 35px !important;}”][vc_btn title=”Seminar Speakers” style=”modern” align=”center” i_align=”right” i_icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-users” add_icon=”true” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fmillenniumseminars.com%2F%23speakers||target:%20_blank|”][/vc_column][/vc_row]

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_cta h2=”The Essential New Jersey Workers’ Comp Seminar” style=”classic” add_button=”bottom” btn_title=”Register Now!” btn_style=”flat” btn_size=”lg” btn_align=”center” btn_button_block=”” btn_i_icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-ticket” btn_add_icon=”true” btn_link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fmillenniumseminars.com%2F%23register|||”]This is a one-day seminar designed for practitioners, physicians and insurance professionals. Our audience is always participatory and interactive, and attendees come from all areas of the workers’ compensation world including adjusters, supervisors, attorneys, physicians, nurses, investigators, HR managers, managed care professionals, and all sizes of employers in both the public and private sector.[/vc_cta][/vc_column][/vc_row]

It is not uncommon for injured workers to suffer additional injuries due to car accidents on the way to a physician’s office or physical therapist’s office. So what are the rules in New Jersey on compensability?

Q. Is the injured worker covered for workers’ compensation purposes in a car accident on the way to treatment?

A. The case of Camp v. Lockheed Electronics, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 415 (1981) provides the answer to this question. In that case the employee fell at work on December 27, 1968 injuring her coccyx, low back and right leg. Then a year later petitioner was driving back from a visit to her physician when she was seriously injured in a car accident on March 9, 1969. She ended up having surgery in 1970. Her lawyer failed to file a claim petition for the car accident, and the petitioner received no award of compensation. The Appellate Division reversed in favor of petitioner, noting that Professor Larson’s treatise on workers’ compensation summarized the law around the nation on this issue:

A fall or automobile accident during a trip to a doctor’s office has usually been considered sufficiently causally related to the employment by the mere fact that a work-connected injury was the cause of the journey, without any necessity for showing that the first injury in some way contributed to the fall or accident.

The basic rule then is that an injury on the way to authorized treatment is compensable.

Q. Is the injured worker covered in a car accident on the way to an IME for permanency?

A. There is no case directly on point but there is a case which states that an injury in a car accident on the way to a fitness for duty examination requested by the employer does not arise out of work. In this practitioner’s opinion, a commute to an IME for purposes of permanency is not compensable because there is no authorized treatment involved. That is the essence of the rule in Camp noted above. A claimant who pursues permanency benefits does so as part of a litigation process. Both parties send the claimant to respective experts, but the attendance at the exams is due to litigation, not for purposes of treatment.

Q. What if an occupational facility uses a company like Uber to pick up the injured worker from work or home and then take the employee to treatment? Is a car accident on the way to treatment covered under those circumstances?

A. In the opinion of this practitioner, such an injury would be compensable under the rule in Camp. It would make no difference that the injured worker was not driving his or her own car. The rule in Camp would still apply because the employee was on the way to authorized treatment.

Q. Does an employer have a lien if the injured worker sues another driver who causes a car accident on the way to treatment?

A. Yes, since the car accident is a workers’ compensation injury, the employer has lien rights to any recovery from that accident under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40.

More and more occupational facilities are offering to transport injured workers to PT or doctors’ appointments either from work or home, using Uber or Lyft or similar services. A motor vehicle accident in such circumstances will almost certainly lead to a civil law suit because fault will likely lie with either that of the transport service driver or the other driver. The employer must pay workers’ compensation benefits, but there is a high likelihood of a third party claim with subrogation rights reserved to the employer.

On December 15, 2016, a decision following trial in New Jersey was handed down on the question of whether medical marijuana can be ordered under workers’ compensation.  Petitioner Andrew Watson worked for 84 Lumber and was injured on November 6, 2008.  He received an award of one third of partial total in 2012 apportioned 50% of the hand and 12.5% for complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS).  The terms of the settlement required respondent to approve ongoing pain management treatment with Dr. Peter Corda.  Petitioner received prescriptions on a monthly basis, including 120 Endocet/Oxycodone tablets as well as other pain medications such as Ibuprofen 800mg and lidocaine patches.

In late 2013 petitioner consulted with Dr. Corda about participating in New Jersey’s medicinal marijuana program (MMP).  Dr. Corda referred petitioner to his partner, Dr. Jeffrey Drew Polcer, who possessed the required credentials to do medical marijuana evaluations.  Petitioner saw Dr. Polcer and complained of burning pain and swelling in his left hand with extreme sensitivity to light touch.  He said that his narcotic medications were not providing him with sufficient relief.  Petitioner admitted to Dr. Polcer that he had experimented with marijuana and obtained a significant reduction in pain.

Dr. Polcer diagnosed petitioner with neuropathic and complex regional pain syndrome of the left hand and recommended petitioner for medicinal marijuana.  He noted that neuropathic pain is one of the better indications for medicinal marijuana.  He further said that if successful with medicinal marijuana, petitioner should lower his use of narcotics.

The New Jersey Department of Health issued an Attending Physician Statement to the Petitioner which authorized petitioner to register for the MMP and purchase one ounce of marijuana per month for three consecutive months. Petitioner received his Patient Registration Card and then used the card to purchase medicinal marijuana at authorized dispensaries, making his first purchase on March 28, 2014.  Petitioner submitted the invoices and proof of cash payments to the respondent’s carrier for reimbursement, but the carrier denied reimbursement.

Petitioner filed an Emergent Motion to Enforce the terms of the Order Approving Settlement from 2012.  The respondent disputed Dr. Corda’s referral to his partner and contended Dr. Polcer was not an authorized physician.  Respondent also withdrew authorization of Dr. Corda in favor of Dr. Morris Antebi, who was asked to perform an IME of petitioner.

The Judge of Compensation, the Honorable Ingrid L. French, A.S.J.W.C., preliminarily entered an order requiring respondent to reinstate authorization of Dr. Peter Corda for pain management.  Trial then ensued on the central issue regarding medical marijuana as curative treatment.

Drs. Corda and Polcer refused to testify at trial because they had ongoing business relationships with the respondent’s third party administrator. Instead, petitioner offered the testimony of Dr.  Edward Tobe, Board Certified in Neurology and Psychiatry.  Respondent had petitioner examined by Dr. Morris Antebi, whose report supported the position of respondent.  However, Dr. Antebi also refused to testify and therefore his report was excluded from evidence.  Respondent tried to offer into evidence three explanatory letters written by Dr. Corda to the third party administrator in response to a request for explanation on his initial referral and Dr. Polcer’s recommendations. These three letters were written subsequent to Dr. Corda’s initial referral to Dr. Polcer for the MMP and tended to undercut Dr. Corda’s initial position in the case, but the trial judge would not allow these reports to go into evidence without Dr. Corda’s testimony, which he refused to provide.

Dr. Tobe testified that Dr. Polcer’s plan to begin a course of medicinal marijuana was medically appropriate.  He added that this plan made particular sense since it would lead to a reduction in the use of opiates. Dr. Tobe discussed the risks in using Percocet (oxycodone) in respect to kidney and liver function.  He said narcotics impact alertness, concentration, memory, and cognitive function, potentially causing emotional detachment.  In addition, possible side effects are loss of teeth, blurred vision, constipation, urinary retention and cardiac problems.

Concerning medical marijuana, Dr. Tobe said that the medicinal version is not tainted with contaminants that street marijuana might contain.  He said that one is less likely to have cravings with the medicinal product.  He did not agree that medicinal marijuana is a gateway drug, although he did admit that marijuana can have similar side effects as opiates in respect to withdrawal, impaired concentration and loss of memory. In his view, medicinal marijuana offers promising prospects as a pain management modality.

Based primarily on the testimony of Dr. Tobe, Judge French found that petitioner’s trial use of medical marijuana was medically warranted.  She concluded, “While the Court is sensitive to the controversy surrounding the medicinal use of marijuana, whether or not it should be prescribed for a patient in a state where it is legal to prescribe it, is a medical decision that is within the boundaries of the laws in the State of New Jersey.  In this case, there is no dispute that all of the credible evidence presented confirms that this Petitioner is an appropriate candidate for New Jersey’s medical marijuana program.”

An equally significant aspect of this case had to do with respondent’s challenge to the referral by Dr. Corda to Dr. Polcer.  The judge focused on the issue of whether a respondent has a right to object to a referral from the authorized doctor to another physician.  “Whether it is a second opinion directed by a Respondent/Carrier or a referral to an alternative specialty directed by an authorized doctor, this Court interprets the statutory language as requiring an analysis that focuses on whether the referral is in the best interest of the injured worker.”

The Court acknowledged that Dr. Corda failed to discuss his recommendation of Dr. Polcer with the respondent/carrier or obtain pre-approval for the referral.  “Medical experts must be given sufficient latitude in directing the care of an injured worker.  Here, the Court will not allow the respondent to deny authorization of a treatment, which has now proven to be beneficial to the Petitioner, simply because the doctor did not allow the Respondent an opportunity to second guess his medical opinion.” 

The Judge entered an order requiring respondent to pay for the costs of the medical marijuana program and prescriptions and ordered respondent to authorize either Dr. Corda (who since became licensed to participate in the MMP) or Dr. Polcer for petitioner’s ongoing participation in New Jersey’s MMP.

This case is not binding on other courts because it is a Division level decision.  Nonetheless, this decision will be studied by other judges and practitioners given that there are few trial decisions in New Jersey on the use of medicinal marijuana for workers’ compensation treatment.  Respondent could not prevail in this case because defense counsel never offered any expert testimony to rebut the opinions of Dr. Tobe.  The failure to produce expert testimony put respondent at an impossible disadvantage and all but guaranteed that Dr. Tobe’s testimony would carry the day on the issue of the reasonableness and necessity of medical marijuana.  Based on the evidence presented, the Judge of Compensation made the only decision she could make.  The most compelling evidence in favor of petitioner was that the use of medical marijuana would decrease the use of narcotics.

This case is also extremely useful in dealing with an often litigated issue of whether respondent is bound by a referral from the authorized doctor to another physician.  The 2012 court order in this case only referred to treatment by Dr. Corda.  Interestingly, the Court did not focus on the basic rule of agency, namely that a principal is bound by the actions of his or her agent.  Rather, the Court addressed the rule in Benson v. Coca Cola to the effect that the Court can make a retroactive analysis of the alleged “unauthorized treatment” to determine whether the treatment should be ordered.  The rule under Benson is that if the treatment proves helpful, that fact would strongly favor a conclusion that respondent must pay for it.  In this case, the only evidence presented at trial (Dr. Tobe’s testimony) supported petitioner’s position that medical marijuana helped relieve petitioner’s pain levels.

 

Plaintiff Philip Vitale was injured while working as a security guard for Allied Barton Security Services, LLC (“Allied Barton”), which contracted with defendant Schering-Plough Corporation to provide security services to its facilities. Plaintiff had signed a disclaimer, waiving his right to sue any of Allied Barton’s customers to which he may be assigned. In the published decision of Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 2016 N.J. Super. LEXIS 114 (App. Div. Aug. 22, 2016), the Appellate Division held that this waiver was unenforceable.

Plaintiff had been working as a security guard with Allied Barton for 4 years before the accident. While he was assigned to many of defendant’s work sites, he was never directly employed by defendant Schering-Plough, which had its own in-house security employees. He had been promoted to the position of field manager, supervising Allied Barton’s security guards who worked at defendant’s sites.

This accident occurred when plaintiff was going down the stairs of the guardhouse basement. Apparently, he tripped over a bag of ice melt and fell down the stairs. Plaintiff claimed to have suffered injuries to his neck, shoulder, and lower back, as well as cognitive difficulties.

The matter was tried before a jury, which awarded $900,000 in damages. Defendant appealed on the basis that the court erred in refusing to grant it summary judgment based upon the contractual waiver to sue signed by the plaintiff at the inception of his employment. The defendant argued that this waiver was valid and enforceable.

When plaintiff began his employment with Allied Barton, he signed a “Worker’s Comp Disclaimer.” Per this disclaimer, the plaintiff acknowledged that state Workers’ Compensation statutes covered his work-related injuries. Further, he agreed that, as a result, and in consideration of Allied Barton offering him employment, he would waive and release any and all rights to make a claim or commence a lawsuit from or against any customer of Allied Barton to which he may be assigned, “arising from or related to injuries which are covered under the Workers’ Compensation statutes.”

The Appellate Division found that enforcement of this waiver would be against public policy, as well as not “congruent” with the intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act for several reasons. First, the plaintiff would have been unaware of the risks he was taking because, when he signed the disclaimer, he did not know the identity of Allied Barton’s clients. Thus, he could not know the working conditions he might encounter while working at the facilities of Allied Barton’s clients

Second, this disclaimer created a disincentive for the defendant Schering-Plough to maintain a safe working condition for contractors working on its premises. Because the defendant would now be insulated from liability due to this disclaimer, it had a reduced incentive to maintain a safe work place for its contractors.

Third, to the extent this waiver would be waiving the plaintiff’s rights to recover for reckless or intentional conduct, the disclaimer is against public policy. The defendant argued that this disclaimer only waived claims covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) and claims of reckless and intentional misconduct are not covered by the Act. However, the Appellate Division stated that it did not view the Act’s “intentional wrong” exception as broadly as the defendant suggested. Conduct that could be viewed as reckless or intentional under general tort law could result in injuries covered by the Act and, hence, unlawfully waived by the disclaimer.

Last, the Appellate Division pointed out that enforcement of this disclaimer would be contrary to the Act because it would not permit the plaintiff to pursue the defendant as a joint employer, who could be liable to pay him workers’ compensation benefits. New Jersey recognizes that an employee may have two employer, both of which may be liable for workers’ compensation (the “joint employer doctrine”). There is a 3 part test developed to establish such a special-employment relationship with the “joint employer.”

The court pointed out that the type of relationship between Allied Barton and the defendant has been long recognized. Further, the court had previously recognized the concept of joint employment in a similar context where a company hired security guards and supplied them to work guarding other businesses’ sites. Thus, the Appellate Division appeared to implicitly rule that, should this disclaimer be enforceable, the plaintiff would be giving up his right under the Act to pursue a claim against Schering-Plough as a joint employer.

For these reasons, the court found the disclaimer to be unenforceable. It is apparent that the Court’s ruling was intended to protect the injured employee’s interests. Interestingly, although this decision is primarily grounded in workers’ compensation doctrine, it actually provides a civil remedy that would have been not been available to the employee, should the disclaimer have been deemed valid.

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