Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

Negligence

Plaintiff Artherine Price was at the Quaker Bridge Mall on May 10, 2018, when she twisted her ankle in the parking lot of the Mall.  She claims that she fell in the crosswalk while walking from her parked car to enter the store and sued the Mall defendants for her injuries.  The issue in Price v. Quaker Bridge Mall, LLC., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 591 (App. Div. April 10, 2024) was whether the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed due to her failure to identify the exact cause of her injury.

Plaintiff testified that her ankle twisted, and she almost fell as she was in the crosswalk.  She could not identify the exact location of where the incident occurred within the crosswalk.  She also testified that she never saw anything in the crosswalk, before or after the incident that caused her to twist her ankle.  Even after the incident, when she returned to the crosswalk with the security guard, she was unable to point to the specific spot where the incident occurred.  The best she could state was that the incident occurred in an area where the pavement was cracked.  Hence, she believed that the cracked or broken pavement caused her to twist her ankle.

The Mall defendants filed for a summary judgment dismissal based upon the plaintiff’s deposition testimony.  The trial court judge found that there was no dispute that plaintiff was injured in the Mall’s parking lot.  However, the issue was that plaintiff could not establish causation.  Even when she went to the location a few days later and took photographs, she was unable to identify any particular cause.  Because the mere happening of an accident was insufficient to establish negligence, the trial court judge granted defendants’ summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff appealed that decision to the Appellate Division.

Upon appeal, Plaintiff acknowledged that her deposition testimony had inconsistencies regarding causation and that a jury could conclude at trial that such inconsistencies adversely affected her credibility.  Plaintiff argued that they did not provide a basis for the trial court judge to disregard her testimony and grant defendant’s summary judgment.

The Appellate Division noted that proximate causation is a basic element of tort law.  The court stated that “[to] establish causation a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s act or omission was both the factual and proximate cause of his or her injury.”  It would be the factual cause if, but for the event, the injury probably would not have happened.

Here, the Appellate Division was convinced that defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  The Court noted “that [t]he judge’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and reveal there is no dispute of fact regarding causation.”  The Court further pointed out that plaintiff was unable to establish that “but for” defendants’ actions or omission she would not have twisted her ankle because she cannot establish what condition caused her to twist her ankle. 

Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that she failed to make a showing sufficient to establish causation, which is an essential element of her case.  Therefore, the Court agreed that defendants were entitled to summary judgment and affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing her lawsuit. 

Plaintiff Reginald Jones was injured when he was attempting to cross in the middle of Isabella Avenue in Irvington.  While stepping off the curb, his foot became stuck in a hole in the street adjacent to the curb.  It caused him to fall and suffer injuries.  The issue in Jones v. Township of Irvington, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 176 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2024) was whether he could pursue a claim against the Township for its failure to remediate the pothole. 

Personal injury claims against public entities are governed by the Tort Claims Act.  To be able to sue a public entity for tort liability for injuries caused by that entity’s property, under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, the plaintiff must establish the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury and that the condition was either created by an employee of the public entity or the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition. However, even if the plaintiff is able to present those proofs, the public entity would not be liable for the dangerous condition of its property “if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.”

There were two issues in this case.  First, the issue was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently established that there was a dangerous condition of the Township’s property at the time of his accident.  Second, the issue was whether the Township had notice that the property was in a hazardous condition.

While the parties conducted discovery, there were no depositions taken and there were no experts retained.  The only evidence of the pothole were 11 photographs of the roadway produced by the plaintiff.  The photographs showed a hole which was surrounded by vegetation growth, cracked, and filled with garbage and vegetation.  According to the plaintiff, the hole measured about 19 inches long, 19 inches wide, and 16 inches deep.

Once discovery concluded, the Township filed for a summary judgment.  It argued that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a dangerous condition of its property.  Plaintiff opposed that motion, arguing that the Township had constructive notice of the ‘“large sinkhole.’”

The trial court judge granted the motion for summary judgment.  The judge ruled that plaintiff had failed to present any competent evidence other than speculation and legal conclusion to prove that the hole was in a dangerous condition.  The trial court judge noted that the only evidence in support of the condition of the property were the photographs attached to plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories which were not glossy color photos, nor were they provided with any certification stating who took the photos and when they were taken. Further, the plaintiff failed to prove that the Township had notice of the condition.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, again on the same basis due to the plaintiff’s failure to prove the Township had prior notice of the condition or had adequate proofs as to its actual condition.  The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff had failed to establish liability under the Tort Claims Act due to lack of evidence that the Township either caused the hole in the street or had actual or constructive notice of the hole. In support of the notice argument, plaintiff cited to a Township Public Works website that street sweepers were on Isabella Avenue twice a week.  However, the Court found this information insufficient to show that the Township had constructive notice of the hole. 

The Court also found that plaintiff had failed to offer any expert testimony or proofs showing that there were any reports about the hole which could have established that the Township had actual notice thereof.  Last, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff had failed to submit any proofs that the Township acted in a “palpably unreasonable manner.”  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff’s claim was based on nothing more than ‘“mere speculation.’”

The appeals court also agreed with the trial court that the photographs themselves were insufficient competent evidence due to the lack of foundation as to these photographs.  The plaintiff had failed to offer any competent testimony “concerning the measurements of the hole, who took the photographs, when they were taken, and if they were altered.” 

Hence, the Appellate Division agreed that plaintiff failed to meet his burden under the Tort Claims Act to “establish that the Township had or could have had actual or constructive notice of the hole in the middle of Isabella Avenue.”  Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit. 

This case involved an emotional distress claim filed by plaintiff Richard Sperazza in waking up to find the body of his murdered friend and co-worker in the hotel room they were sharing during a work assignment.  Plaintiff and his deceased friend and co-worker were sharing a hotel room during an out of town work assignment.  The issue in Strayer v. Wingate at Wyndham, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 90 (App. Div. Jan. 19, 2024) was whether the plaintiff had a claim for a negligent infliction of emotional distress against the defendant Wingate at Wyndham for the emotional harm he suffered on waking up to find the body of his murdered friend and co-worker in their hotel room.

Plaintiff Sperazza had been employed by Osmose Utilities Services, Inc. as a technician who worked with his friend and roommate, Ivan Scott Strayer.  Plaintiff, Strayer, and other utility workers were assigned to work crews which travelled to various locations around the country and lived together in hotels while on assignment.  Plaintiff and Strayer had been hotel roommates on other work assignments and also socialized frequently outside of work.  Plaintiff was the best man at Strayer’s wedding and plaintiff considered Strayer family and attended his family functions.

Plaintiff and other members of the Osmose work crew had been staying at the Wingate Hotel in Vineland.  The crew consisted of five crew members including plaintiff, Strayer and two brothers, Charles Pulcine and his brother Larry Pulcine, and the crew leader, Mark Knowles.  Larry Pulcine had recently joined the crew.  Knowles made the hotel reservations and advised the front desk clerk who was staying in which room.  The crew members were assigned to three rooms in which plaintiff and Strayer were assigned to Room 404, the Pulcine brothers were assigned to Room 405 and Knowles was assigned to Room 406.

On the evening of the murder, plaintiff ate at a restaurant located in front of the hotel.  Strayer eventually met him at the restaurant but returned to the hotel room.  When plaintiff returned later to their hotel room around 10:00, he observed the television was on and Strayer appeared to be sleeping.  Thereafter, he received a text message from Chuck Pulcine, inviting him to hang out and drink some beers in his room.  At about 10:05 p.m., plaintiff went to Pulcine’s room, although he briefly returned to his room to grab a few beers while Strayer stayed in their hotel room.  He then returned to the Pulcines’ room where he stayed until about 11:30 p.m.

While plaintiff was in the Pulcines’ room, Larry had left for about 30 minutes, stating he was going to do laundry and when he returned, Larry was “shooting his mouth off.” Therefore, plaintiff returned to his hotel room and went to sleep.

When plaintiff woke up around 5:00 to 5:15 a.m. and Strayer was still in bed, plaintiff went over to look at him.  He noticed that “his eyes were open” but “nothing really going on.”  He grabbed his foot which was ice cold, checked his pulse twice and panicked and ran out of the room.  He felt shock at finding his friend’s body and feared for his own safety.  He later learned that Strayer had been shot with a handgun.  However, plaintiff did not witness the murder and did not encounter the murderer in his hotel room and, further, was not physically harmed himself.

It was later learned that Larry had obtained a key card from the front desk to the plaintiff’s room and shot Strayer sometime between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m. while plaintiff was across the hall in the Pulcines’ hotel room. 

Strayer’s wife brought a wrongful death and survivorship action against the defendant hotel, among other defendants.  Plaintiff brought a separate action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for discovering the body of his murdered friend.

Plaintiff obtained a hotel management operations expert who opined that the Wingate Hotel “was aware of its safety obligations and deviated from the industry standard of care that created a foreseeable risk of harm to the hotel’s guests.”  Further, the expert opined that “Larry’s criminal acts were the type of criminal activity that adequate safety and security measures are intended to prevent and were, therefore foreseeable.”  According to the expert, the failure to identify or properly register the Osmose crew was inconsistent with proper keycard control “and resulted in a foreseeable risk of harm to guests.”  The expert opined “that the implementation and enforcement of a proper keycard controlled protocol system could have prevented Larry’s unauthorized entry into plaintiff’s and Strayer’s room.”

At the trial court level, the defendants moved for a summary judgment, which was granted.  The trial court judge found that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that defendant hotel’s actions proximately caused plaintiff’s emotional injuries.  He found that the injuries were not based upon the handing of a keycard and that neither defendants nor their employees caused any of the emotional distress being suffered by plaintiff.  While acknowledging that defendant’s employee should not have given the keycard to Larry Pulcine, he noted that the crew members were all friends and he had seen them together and it was not as if he was giving a keycard to a stranger.

This appeal ensued.  Plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake in granting defendant’s summary judgment because he has a direct claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon defendants’ breach of duty it owed directly to him.  Plaintiff relied on the case of Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559 (1965) in support of his claim for emotional distress.  The Appellate Division rejected this argument.

For a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress for witnessing harm suffered by others, the individual must be able to allege that they were “fearful of immediate injury.”  The Appellate Division found that, under these facts, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.  While he may have felt fear when he discovered his roommate’s dead body, there was no evidence in the record that he had a “reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.”  To the contrary, plaintiff did not even realize at the time that Strayer had been murdered and he thought that Strayer had died from natural causes.  He did not encounter the murderer in his hotel room and was not present when Strayer was murdered.  Because of his failure to present any evidence that he suffered a reasonable fear of personal injury, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff was unable to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Hence, it upheld the trial court decision, granting summary judgment and dismissing the case.

Under New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 (the Comparative Negligence Act), for a lawsuit based upon negligence claims, juries are allowed to apportion fault for an accident to multiple parties and assign liability in terms of a percentage of fault to each party. What happens if a plaintiff is assessed a percentage of fault for the accident? As long as a plaintiff is not determined to be more than 50% at fault, the plaintiff can recover damages for their injuries but at a reduced amount based upon their percentage of fault.

If the jury determines that both the defendant (or defendants) as well as the plaintiff, are liable for the accident, it must assess each party’s responsibility, which has to add up to 100%. (N.J.S.A. 2A:15-2). If a plaintiff is determined to be no more than 50% at fault, any monetary award made by a jury in favor of the plaintiff would be reduced by that percentage assessed against the plaintiff.  As an example, if the jury found that both the plaintiff and the defendant were each 50% liable and awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in damages, the verdict would be molded so that the plaintiff’s net recovery would be $50,000. Using this same example, however, if the plaintiff is assessed to be 51% negligent, the plaintiff would recover $0 in damages.

So what happens if there is more than one defendant and each defendant is assessed a portion of fault? From whom can the plaintiff collect? Under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3, a plaintiff can only recover the percent damage award assessed against that defendant – unless the defendant is found to be at least 60% at fault. Using my example above, if there are two defendants (and assuming no comparative negligence is assessed against the plaintiff) and each defendant is found to be 50% responsible for the accident, then the plaintiff can only recover 50% of the award from each defendant ($50,000 each). However, if liability is assessed 60% against one of defendant and 40% against the other defendant, then the plaintiff can proceed to collect the entire $100,000 award against the defendant who was found to be 60% negligent.

There is an exception to this rule for public entities (i.e., municipalities, counties, public boards, and the State). Negligence claims against public entities are governed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (N.J.S.A. 59:1, et seq.) According to N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1, public entities shall be liable for no more than their share of damages equal to the percentage of the negligence attributable to that entity. Hence, regardless of the percentage of liability assessed against a public entity for negligence in causing or contributing to an accident, a plaintiff is limited to collecting only that percentage of fault assessed against that entity.

Now what happens when a plaintiff does collect the whole award from one defendant because one of the defendants is found to be at least 60%? That’s when contribution rights can kick in. With the filing of their answer, defendants can assert a cross-claim for contribution and/or indemnification pursuant to Rule 4:7-5. Actually, defendants have 90 days after service upon the complaint upon them or upon the party against whom the cross-claim is asserted, whichever is later, to file a cross-claim against that defendant. After that time period, the defendant would have to file a motion and ask the court for permission to file the cross-claim. If a defendant does end up paying more than its “share,” it can try to pursue the co-defendant for that defendant’s percentage of fault assessed against the co-defendant.

By: Ruhani K. Aulakh, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Priscilla Godoy was standing in between two parked cars in a line of several cars on May 5, 2018.  As she was standing in between these cars, a Jeep Cherokee involved in a police chase crashed into a parked car several feet away from Godoy.  The crash caused all the parked cars to collide, crushing Godoy.  As a result of this collision, Godoy sustained fatal injuries.  The issues in Godoy v. Washington, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1170 (App. Div. July 13, 2023) were whether the police officers pursuing the Cherokee were negligent and reckless in their pursuit and whether the police officers engaged in willful misconduct in the apprehension of the Cherokee.

On May 5, 2018, defendant police officers Paul Hamilton and Vanessa Lorenzo were on duty in Newark.  The officers spotted a Jeep Cherokee that was stolen during an armed carjacking earlier that night for which the Newark Police Department had issued a Be on the Lookout Order (“BOLO”).  Hamilton and Lorenzo attempted to stop the car; however, the Cherokee did not stop, so the defendants began a pursuit with Hamilton driving. 

During the pursuit, the police officer’s vehicle traveled at around forty-five miles per hour, while the Cherokee traveled at approximately fifty-five miles per hour.  The pursuit was monitored by a Communications Division Officer and a field supervisor; however, officers Hamilton and Lorenzo did not inform their supervisor of the speed of the Cherokee.

The pursuit lasted approximately ninety-five seconds.  After sixty seconds, the driver of the Cherokee veered off road into a park where the driver went over a speed bump and lost control of the vehicle.  This caused a chain reaction which involved three additional vehicles, pinning Godoy between two of these vehicles.  After Godoy was injured, the driver of the Cherokee fled the scene, but officers Hamilton and Lorenzo did not pursue him.

Godoy’s estate filed suit against the two defendant police officers, arguing that the defendants were negligent and reckless in their pursuit of the Cherokee.  Further, the plaintiff argued that the defendants acted with willful misconduct in not complying with policies while continuing the pursuit.

In deciding to pursue the Cherokee, the defendants were governed by procedures set forth both in the Newark Police Division General Order and the New Jersey Attorney General’s Policy.  Both policies authorize officers to pursue a vehicle when they reasonably believe that a violator has committed an offense and they believe that violator poses an immediate threat to the safety of the public.  Once the officers choose to pursue the vehicle, they must immediately notify the Communications Division of pertinent information, such as the reason for the pursuit, the direction of travel, identifying factors of the vehicle, and the speed of the pursued vehicle. 

The plaintiff conceded that the defendants were justified in their pursuit of the vehicle; however, the plaintiff argued that the officers were in violation of policy when they did not report the speed of the pursued vehicle.  The defendant police officers moved for summary judgment, claiming that under the Tort Claims Act, they were immune from liability.  The trial court granted summary judgment on all counts, holding that the defendants were immune from liability unless there was evidence of willful misconduct.  The lower court further reasoned that there was no evidence of willful misconduct because reporting the speed of the pursued vehicle was not a requirement; rather, it was up to the discretion of the police officers.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of the defendants’ willful misconduct.  The plaintiff further argued that the trial court erred in determining that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on good faith immunity.

In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Appellate Division first analyzed good faith immunity.  The court upheld that the officers were immunized, looking to state Supreme Court precedent from Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 367 (1993).  There, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 59:5-2 immunizes absolutely all negligence of a public employee when the negligence, combined with the conduct of the escaping person, leads to injury.  The Court set forth a narrow exception in that decision, holding that immunity does not exonerate a public officer from liability if their conduct was outside of the scope of employment or constituted willful misconduct.

To determine whether the narrow willful misconduct exception applied in this case, the Appellate Division again looked to state Supreme Court precedent in Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 123-30 (1995), which defined willful misconduct in the context of a police pursuit.  There, the Court established a two part test for willful misconduct which required that the public employee disobey a specific lawful command or standing order and that the public employee intended to violate it.

Here, the Appellate Division applied the Fielder test and held that in order for the plaintiff to establish willful misconduct, the plaintiff must have demonstrated that the defendants disobeyed a standing order that required them to report the speed of the Cherokee to Communications and that the defendants knew of the standing order, knew that they were violating it, and intended to violate it.  The Court held that because there was no standing order requiring the defendant officers to report the speed of the Cherokee, there was no willful misconduct on their behalf.  Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

By: Eric Richwine, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Plaintiff Michael Racine slipped and fell while walking inside defendant Rite Aid’s Irvington, New Jersey, store.  He suffered a fractured left tibia, resulting in him filing a complaint against the defendant, in which he alleged negligent maintenance of and failure to conduct reasonable inspections of the premises.  The trial judge had granted summary judgment to the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of any “dangerous condition” on the premises.  The issue on appeal in Racine v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 959 (App. Div. June 14, 2023) was whether constructive notice can be inferred by the presence of dirt in a condition.

Plaintiff testified that he had not noticed anything on the floor as he entered the store looking to purchase hair gel, which was on a shelf close to the entrance.  He reported that he soon after fell, and after which, he noticed a “dark greasy spot” on the floor which he believed to be a mixture of dirt with either hair gel or grease.

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial judge “drew all inferences against plaintiff rather than the reverse” and that he sufficiently established that defendant had “constructive notice of the condition that caused [plaintiff] to slip.”  The Appellate Division first considered whether the plaintiff was relieved of the burden to prove constructive notice via the mode of operation exception, i.e., by demonstrating that the dirty substance here was likely to occur as the result of the nature of Rite Aid’s business.  The Court quickly determined that this was not the case.

The Appellate Division then turned to whether or not a jury could find that defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition.  Plaintiff contended that, because “the substance appeared dirty,” the factfinder could logically infer that “the substance had been on the floor for a significant time.”  Plaintiff supported this argument by citing the Court’s decision in Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Stores, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1957), in which a plaintiff slipped and fell just inside an entrance of a store on an “all wet” and “all dirt” floor, which the Court declared was sufficient to put the defendant store on constructive notice.  

However, the Appellate Division distinguished the facts in Parmenter to those before the Court here; namely, the dirty, wet floor in the defendant store of Parmenter was the result of an all-morning rainstorm that was continuously tracking in dirt and rain into the store upon the opening and closing of its doors.

Here, there was no such storm.  The Court emphasized that, unlike in Parmenter, the plaintiff here could not identify the cause or duration of the “dangerous condition” of the dirty substance on the floor of the store.  Further, the Court rejected the contention that the presence of “dirt” permitted a speculative inference that the substance had been on the floor for an adequate period of time as to place the defendant on constructive notice.

As such, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that defendant was put on constructive notice of the dirty substance on its store’s floor, nor was he able to successfully argue that a jury could infer such. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff, Samira Aly, was a customer at defendant A&H Bagels.  While walking to throw out her trash, she fell and suffered a serious injury.  Both deposition and video surveillance footage showed a brown substance on the floor near where she fell.  The issue in Aly v. A&H Bagels & Deli, Inc., 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 695 (App. Div. May 8, 2023) was whether the trial judge made a mistake in refusing to charge the “mode of operation” standard in considering the summary judgment motion filed by the defendant A&H. 

Unfortunately, both the incident report and a log of inspections to the premises was lost in a subsequent fire.  However, Aly’s fall on the brown substance was documented through A&H Bagels’ surveillance footage but the footage was taken into police custody after the fire and never viewed by Aly.

At the trial court level, the defendant A&H filed a motion for a summary judgment dismissal, which was granted.  Plaintiff Aly appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to apply the appropriate “mode of operation” standard and, even absent the applicability of the mode of operation standard, the plaintiff argued that A&H Bagels should have had constructive notice of the brown substance on the floor near the trash receptacle.

While in a typical premises liability case, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had notice of the alleged dangerous condition that caused the accident, when the mode of operation rule applies, it creates an inference of negligence and the burden shifts to the defendant to negate the inference by submitting evidence of due care.  When this doctrine applies, it relieves the plaintiff of proving that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  Instead, it requires a defendant to show that it did “all that a reasonably prudent man would do in light of the risk of injury the mode of operation entailed.”

The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s failure to apply the mode of operation standard and found that it should have been applied.  The Court noted that “[l]ike the businesses previously found to have created the hazard by their self-service nature, A&H Bagel’s format requires courts to contemplate its duty through a mode of operation standard as well.”  Further, the Appellate Division found that the trial court failed to adhere to the summary judgment standard of giving all reasonable inferences to the plaintiff when it granted A&H Bagel’s motion.

The Court noted that the customers at the bagel shop purchased sandwiches, coffee in cups, and juices in closed containers at the counter and then carry their food and beverages to their seats to eat before disposing of their trash in the receptacle.  The customers wait on themselves after being served at a counter.  The Appellate Division noted that “this is exactly the situation where the burden should shift to the defendant to show that they acted reasonably considering this specific business format.”  Further, the Court held that “[t]he dangerous condition caused by the brown substance near the trash receptacle was a foreseeable risk posed by the bagel shop’s mode of operation.”  Hence, the Appeals Court found that the mode of operation rule did apply to this scenario.

The Appellate Division further reversed the trial court’s ruling that, even if the mode of operation rule did apply to this setting, A&H Bagels had met its burden because “they did all that a reasonably prudent shop would do considering the risk of injury the mode of operation entailed.”  The Appellate Division found that the trial court improperly concluded that A&H Bagels took all reasonable actions.  The Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact that only a jury could decide.  It was disputed exactly how much of the brown substance was on the floor, whether the brown substance caused the fall and also how soon before the fall were their inspections and garbage changes.  It should have been up to the jury to decipher whether defendant acted reasonably no matter whose burden it becomes to prove that.

Therefore, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal.  It found that the mode of operation standard should have been applied.  Further, assuming it is applied, the jury must decide whether the defendant acted reasonably based upon its “mode of operation” to protect its invitees from the alleged dangerous condition, i.e., the brown substance on the floor. 

Plaintiff Irina Galperin suffered an injury when she fell at Macy’s, located in the Garden State Plaza Shopping Center in Paramus, New Jersey, upon stepping from a tile walkway to a carpeted area.  While she initially claimed that she fell due to liquid on the floor, she later claimed that she fell when her foot got caught on the edge of the carpet which bordered the tile walkway inside the Macy’s store.  The issue in Galperin v. Macy’s, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 589 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2023) was whether plaintiff would be able to maintain a negligence claim against Macy’s in light of her failure to identify the exact dangerous condition which caused her fall and the lack of an expert to identify a breach of duty in the design of the flooring.

In answers to Interrogatories, plaintiff certified “she was caused to slip and fall due to a dangerous condition, namely liquid on the floor.”  However, in her deposition, she disavowed this response and stated that she was unable to identify anything on the floor that caused or contributed to the fall.  She submitted an amended Interrogatory answer, stating that when she fell, the front of her right foot got caught on the edge of the carpet which bordered the tile walkway.  Further, she testified at her deposition that the incident occurred after she stepped off the escalator and walked toward the store’s exit.  She stated that there were too many people in the aisle and, while trying to go around the customers, she fell on the border of tile and carpet and struck a table display with a metal frame.  As for the cause of her fall, she simply stated it was the border between the tile and carpet. 

At the trial court level, Macy’s filed a motion for a summary judgment dismissal, arguing that plaintiff failed to identify a dangerous condition that caused her accident and she did not establish Macy’s possessed actual or constructive notice of any such condition.  Further, to the extent that plaintiff was maintaining that the purported height differential constituted a hazardous condition, Macy’s argued that “any claim was beyond the ken of the average juror thereby requiring expert testimony, which she failed to provide.”

The trial court agreed with Macy’s that plaintiff had failed to offer any proof of a dangerous condition.  The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that “the mere existence of a transition from tile to a carpet, without even some kind of torn or ripped carpet, broken tiles, or misleveled surface, constituted a dangerous condition.”  Further, plaintiff had failed to submit any factual or expert proofs that the flooring violated some code or regulation or standard that a reasonably prudent business owner would meet.  The court agreed that a claim that the border between the tile and the carpet created a defect required expert testimony. 

Hence, the trial court granted the summary judgment as to Macy’s.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff made the same arguments to the Appellate Division that were made to the trial court.  However, the Appellate Division rejected those arguments and agreed with the trial court and noted that the “mere showing of an accident causing the injuries sued upon is not alone sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence.”  The Court noted that the plaintiff had failed to identify anything related to the tile or carpet that caused her to fall.  The vague statements that her foot caught on the edge of the carpet and something between the tiles and the carpet caused her to fall were found to be insufficient to establish a dangerous condition.  Further, the Appellate Division agreed that an expert would be necessary to establish the existence of a dangerous condition that the transition area was dangerous due to a design or installation defect.

Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, stating that “[i]n light of plaintiff’s inability to identify the circumstances of her fall, expert testimony was necessary to establish the area where she fell was in some manner dangerous, if for no other reason than to exclude other potential causes of the accident and avoid pure speculation by the factfinder.” 

Plaintiff Stephanie Ugaro was injured at work when a ceiling tile fell on her while she was in the bathroom. She sued the defendants who owned, managed and maintained the building where she worked under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  The issue in Ugaro v. Livingston Circle Associates, L.P., 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 381 (App. Div. Mar. 16, 2023) was whether the elements of res ipsa loquitur had been established so as to create a presumption of negligence by defendants.

Plaintiff had been employed by Verizon to work at a call center located in Livingston, New Jersey which was owned by defendant Livingston Circle Associates (“Livingston”) and managed by Eastman Management Corporation (“Eastman”).  Pursuant to the lease between Verizon and Livingston, Livingston had the obligation to maintain all parts of the building which included replacing all plumbing in bathrooms.

One evening, plaintiff went into the women’s restroom on the third floor of the building.  After she entered one of the stalls, the ceiling tile above the stall collapsed and struck her.

She sued the defendants, alleging that they were negligent in failing to provide safe premises to her as an employee of a tenant – a business invitee.  The defendants certified that their investigation of the incident disclosed that the cause of the ceiling collapse was water leaking from a broken pipe.  They determined that the water had leaked from the pipe, had accumulated on the ceiling tile above the third floor bathroom, which caused the tile to become saturated with water and collapse. 

At the trial court level, defendants filed for a summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff could not show that they had been negligent because they had no notice that the broken pipe was leaking water.  In opposition, the plaintiff argued the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur created a presumption of negligence and a jury should decide if defendants can rebut that presumption. 

The trial court considered plaintiff’s argument and determined that the plaintiff had established two of the three elements necessary to establish res ipsa loquitur, i.e. that the building and its components, including the ceiling tile and pipes, were under the exclusive control of defendants and plaintiff’s injury was not the result of her own voluntary act or neglect.  The third prong, however, was the issue, which was whether the occurrence “bespoke negligence.” 

The trial court reasoned that plaintiff was unable to establish the third prong because the root cause of the ceiling collapse was not visible or accessible for purposes of inspection or repair without breaching a wall or floor.  Plaintiff had failed to proffer any evidence as to the specific cause of the plumbing failure.  She also did not offer an expert as to the “proper protocols, policies or procedures for inspection, testing or maintenance of a plumbing system in a commercial building of this character, including of piping that is obscured by walls, floors and ceilings.”  Hence, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants.

The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order and contended that she did establish all three elements for the application of the res ipsa loquitur presumption and that the case should have been decided by a jury whether defendants were liable.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court decision.  It agreed with the plaintiff that the three elements triggering the res ipsa loquitur inference were established.  Thus, the question of whether defendants can rebut their presumption of negligence must be presented to a jury.

The Court pointed out that res ipsa loquitur “is an equitable doctrine that allows, in appropriate circumstances, a permissive inference of negligence to be drawn against a party who exercises control of premises with an unsafe condition that causes injury to another.”  If this inference applies, it will ordinarily allow the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and survive a motion to dismiss at the summary judgment stage.  If the case goes to trial, and the jury is instructed on the res ipsa loquitur inference, the jury may accept or reject the inference.

The Appellate Division agreed that there was no dispute that plaintiff established two of the elements of the res ipsa loquitur inference.  It was undisputed that defendants maintained exclusive control over the maintenance and upkeep of the building.  Further, it was undisputed that plaintiff’s injuries were not the result of her own voluntary act or neglect.  The remaining issue was whether “the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence.”

The Court found that the focus of the defendants and the trial court was misplaced.  It noted that plaintiff was injured by a falling ceiling tile and that a ceiling tile does not ordinarily fall, and if it does, that occurrence “bespeaks negligence.”  The defendants’ proofs concerning the leaking pipe were not “so overwhelming that they destroy any reasonable inference of negligence.”  The Appellate Division pointed out that the jury need not accept plaintiff’s inference that defendants were negligent and need not accept defendants’ contention that it would be unreasonable to inspect pipes which were within a wall.

The Court noted that once a res ipsa loquitur inference was established, the burden shifts to defendants to present countervailing proofs that were so overwhelming that they destroy any reasonable inference of negligence.  Here, the defendants never offered any explanation as to why the pipe broke, nor were there any proofs in the record as to how long the pipe was leaking before sufficient water accumulated on the ceiling tile and caused the tile to fall on plaintiff.  Plus, the Appellate Division found that “a reasonable jury could accept plaintiff’s inference of negligence and reject defendants’ arguments that it would be unreasonable for them to conduct an inspection of pipes in bathrooms, even pipes enclosed in walls.”

The Appellate Division also rejected the idea that an expert report was essential to plaintiff’s case.  It noted that the facility manager testified that there was an access panel in one of the fourth floor bathrooms, which was easily opened and, at that point, one could see indications that water was leaking behind the wall.  The facility manager explained that he would need to break through the wall to see the pipe itself, but that water damage could be seen before he broke the wall.   Hence, the Court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants were negligent in not conducting at least periodic inspections to look through the access panel.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s decision.  The Court found that the res ipsa loquitur inference should be charged to the jury “and the jury can determine whether it accepts the inference or accepts defendants’ explanation for why they were not negligent.”  Therefore, the Court reversed the summary judgment order in favor of the defendants and remanded the matter for trial.

Plaintiff Thomas Seltzer, an employee of Bloomingdale’s, was injured when he fell on a staircase used solely for Bloomingdale employees in the store.  He sued the mall owner Riverside Square for negligence, claiming that it had some degree of control over the staircase which allegedly had irregular steps.  The issue in Seltzer v. Riverside Square Limited Partnership, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 453 (App. Div. Mar. 27, 2023) was whether the defendant mall owner owed a duty to plaintiff if it did not own or maintain Bloomingdale’s or the interior staircase.

Bloomingdale’s, which was built as a stand-alone department store in 1959, was now part of a 2-level enclosed shopping mall constructed around it.  The mall was owned and operated by Riverside Square.  Under the terms of an agreement with Bloomingdale’s, Riverside Square had no authority to modify Bloomingdale’s or the staircase.

The defendant Riverside Square moved for a summary judgment dismissal, contending that it owed no duty to Seltzer because it did not own or maintain Bloomingdale’s or the staircase.  The trial court judge denied summary judgment.  The court found that “there are genuine issues of material fact relative to both the subject accident and the issue of control and the degree thereof, regarding the overall area where [Seltzer] had his trip and fall accident is a disputed fact.”  The court felt that it had to accept Seltzer’s version of facts, and as such grant him the benefit of all inferences that such facts support. 

Riverside Square filed an application before the Appellate Division on an interlocutory basis, seeking leave to appeal.  The Appellate Division agreed to accept the interlocutory appeal. [“Interlocutory” means the appeal is filed before the final conclusion of the case.]

The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s decision.  The Court found that the trial court was incorrect in finding that there were genuine issues of material fact.  The Appellate Division pointed out that there was no question that there was a valid agreement concerning Riverside Square’s responsibility and obligations toward Bloomingdale’s property.

The Court further held that Riverside Square did not owe a duty to Seltzer.  It pointed out that the staircase where Seltzer was injured was part of Bloomingdale’s premises when the department store was built, long before the mall was built.  The Court noted that there was no support in the record for Seltzer’s contention that Riverside Square “retains some degree of control and responsibility over issues such as repairs and maintenance, even on property of its admitted tenant Bloomingdale’s.”  Additionally, the Appellate Division held that under the clear terms of the agreement with Bloomindale’s, Riverside Square had no obligation to maintain any aspect of Bloomingdale’s premises.  Further, there were no facts indicating Riverside Square exercised any control or maintenance over the staircase that would contradict its interpretation of the agreement.

Thus, Seltzer’s liability expert’s opinion concerning the construction and maintenance of the staircase was “of no import” because Riverside Square did not construct the staircase and had no duty to ensure it could be safely traversed.

Thus, the Appellate Division found that there were no genuine issues of material facts in dispute and that Riverside Square was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  Therefore, it reversed the trial court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for an entry of an order granting summary judgment dismissal of Seltzer’s action.

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