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Trusts, Estates and Succession

As wealth accumulates in this country and our population continues to age, the propriety of lifetime giving has increased. Gifts can be made out of sheer benevolence, but are also important in minimizing death taxes and long term care costs. This blog will review some of the key concepts involved in lifetime giving.

Gifts can be made by one of three sources: (1) an individual, (2) an agent under a durable power of attorney, and (3) a guardian. Gifts are made for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to, the desire to minimize estate taxes, the desire to minimize exposure to long term care costs, and simple benevolent intent.

When an individual makes gifts, which are subsequently disputed, the two main causes of action are lack of donative intent and undue influence. Many of the other grounds that can be utilized in a will contest, such as fraud, forgery, duress, and coercion, can be asserted as well.

The standard for donative capacity is generally seen as broader than that for testamentary capacity. The courts of the State have held that improvident giving may be construed as indicative of mental incapacity (See Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20 (1988)). A reading of Pascale indicates that valid gifting must have four elements: (1) an act constituting actual or symbolic delivery of the subject matter of the gift, (2) an intent to give, (3) an acceptance of the gift, and (4) the donor’s relinquishment of ownership and dominion over the subject matter of the gift. Contests to set aside lifetime giving should reflect, where applicable, that the donor could not meet this test.

Undue influence can be raised as to lifetime giving as well. In a will contest, a presumption of undue influence arises when both a confidential relationship exists as well as suspicious circumstances. In the case of lifetime gifts, this presumption arises when there is a confidential relationship and a person in that relationship has gained an advantage due to that confidence. (See In Re Dodge, 50 N.J. 192, 227-28 (1967); Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20 (1988)).

(a). Gifts by an Individual
When an estate planning attorney is assisting an individual in lifetime transfers, the same precautions utilized in screening testamentary capacity and undue influence in a will contest should be utilized. If litigation arises, the attorneys contesting or defending the gifts should explore the records of the estate planning attorney to ascertain whether or not any of these steps were taken.

(b). Gifts by Agents Under Powers of Attorney
Theoretically, gifts can be made under a power of attorney. However, there are a number of concerns which should be analyzed. First, the right type of power of attorney needs to have been executed. Specific powers, such as banking powers of attorney or real estate powers of attorney, do not cover gifting and thus cannot be used. Gifting should be acceptable if a general durable power of attorney is properly prepared. However, the mere fact that a document known as a “power of attorney” or “general durable power of attorney” is executed does not mean that gifting is allowed. In addition, the law generally prohibits self-dealing by individuals acting as agents under such powers.

When preparing a power of attorney, an attorney should carefully draft powers regarding gifting or creation of trusts on behalf of the principal. Such powers should discuss not only the fact that gifts can be made, but to what extent, for what purpose, and to what class of donees. Since spouses and children are typically the agents under such powers, the document should relieve the prohibition against self-dealing.

The aforementioned level of detail should be analyzed when an individual has gifted under a power of attorney. The general position of the Internal Revenue Service, which has been supported by case law, is that gifts for tax planning purposes cannot be undertaken under a general durable power of attorney unless specific language is included. As such, litigating attorneys should be reasonably able to assert that the absence of such provisions in a power of attorney used for gifting should void said gifts.

(c). Gifting By Guardians
Guardians frequently believe they have unlimited power. However, their authority to act is limited by the courts. It is possible that a guardian may be able to make gifts. However, gifting by guardians is clearly subject to two specific sets of rules. First and foremost, the statutory law of this State clearly mandates that gifting must be made pursuant to an order of the court. N.J.S.A. 3B:12-49 and 3B:12-50 clearly indicate that the court holds jurisdiction over transfers of the ward’s property. In addition, N.J.S.A. 3B:12-58 clearly states that gifting can be done only so long as the guardian can demonstrate to the court that the ward will be protected and that the individuals or entities which would be receiving gifts are the objects of the affection of the ward.

Second, any gifting must be made pursuant to the requirements of In Re Trott, 118 N.J. Super. 436 (Ch. Div. 1972). The Trott case, in relevant part, states that any gifting must be made proportionate to beneficiaries under the ward’s existing will or dispositive plan. In the absence of a will, trust, or other dispositive writing, the gifts will be made pursuant to the intestacy statute.

Note: The foregoing discusses the authority for gifts to be made by or on behalf of an individual. However, gifting is subject to laws effecting ordinary income, capital gains and gift taxes as well as issues regarding the propriety of making gifts to individuals who may have challenges such as special needs, marital problems and an inability to manage money. Thus, these concepts need to be addressed prior to gifts being made.

On April 1, 2011, Norman Webb lent $150,000 to his then son-in-law, Dan Krudys. The loan was for a term of four years and was memorialized by a promissory note executed by Krudys. In the next four years, Norman died, Krudys and Norman’s daughter, Cheryl divorced, Krudys defaulted on the note and Norman’s son, Scott, as Executor of Norman’s Estate filed suit against Krudys for the outstanding balance of $111,711.

After filing his response to the Complaint, Krudys asked the Estate whether a portion of the inheritance attributed to Cheryl was used to repay the note. After the Estate replied that it was not repaid, Krudys submitted discovery requests to the Estate seeking to know, among other inquires, the identity of the estate beneficiaries, whether beneficiaries of the estate received their share, and the amount of each share.

In Webb v. Krudys (Civ. No. 15-5247),the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey upheld the denial of these requests. It did so on two grounds. First, it noted that a beneficiary of an estate (in this case, Cheryl) was not a party to an action brought by the estate. Second, it found the discovery requests to be either overbroad or irrelevant.

In this day and age, such a ruling can be appreciated. In this era of social media and its resultant disrespect for boundaries, it is encouraging to see a court respect the privacy of individuals. Although proper discovery should always be afforded in litigation, one would hope that the tone of the District Court’s ruling should be followed by other jurists in affording discretion when warranted.

Over the past three decades, the increasing costs of long term care have led many individuals and families to look for ways to preserve the assets which they have spent a lifetime accumulating. In that regard, the discipline of elder law has arisen and has been a focus of practice for many attorneys. As the need for advocacy in this area of law has increased, so too has the number of non-lawyer individuals or other groups seeking to provide services in this area.

Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued what is known as Opinion 53. The purpose of this opinion was to distinguish actions which are permissible by non-lawyers as opposed to those which rise to the unauthorized practice of law. The Court recognized the legitimacy of certain functions by non-lawyers. Its basis in allowing same is based on federal Medicaid law which provides, in relevant part, that States “must allow individual(s) of the applicant or beneficiary’s choice to assist in the application process or during a renewal of eligibility.” 42 C.F.R. Section 435.908(b) includes “legal counsel, a relative, a friend, or other spokesman” in any hearing on agency action or decisions. 42 C.F.R. Section 431.206(b)(3). To that extent, the federal regulations permit States to certify staff and volunteers to act as application assistors. 42 C.F.R. Section 435.908(c). “Certified” assistance includes “providing information on insurance affordability programs and coverage options, helping individuals complete an application or renewal, working with the individual to provide required documentation, submitting applications and renewals to the agency, interacting with the agency on the status of such applications and renewals, assisting individuals with responding to any requests from the agency, and managing their case between the eligibility determination and regularly scheduled renewals.” Id. at (c)(2).

The Court strongly held, “While non-lawyer Medicaid advisors may provide these limited services, the Committee finds that it is the unauthorized practice of law when non-lawyers provide advice in matters that require the professional judgment of a lawyer. Hence, only a lawyer may provide legal advice on issues such as strategies for Medicaid eligibility, including provisions of wills and powers of attorney; on the need for guardianships and the authority to transfer assets; on nursing home laws; on transfers of property; on the impact of marriage and divorce; and on estate administration and the elective share.” In making this finding, the Court reflected upon instances where the advice of non-lawyers caused substantial harm to the public.

Specifically, it noted, “……, non-lawyer advisors advised a family member that she could receive monies as a caregiver when the family member did not qualify for that status; advised a family member to spend down an IRA when it would have been more reasonable to purchase an annuity with those monies; advised a family member to draw down her assets when it would have been more sensible to transfer monies to a disabled child; advised a family member to transfer real estate when it would have been prudent to address the significant tax implications of that plan; and the like.”

Abraham Lincoln has been quoted as saying, “He who represents himself has a fool for a client.” In issuing its opinion, the Court does not impede this right. On the other hand, it has taken a firm step to insure that non-attorneys do not make fools of those who would otherwise be represented by them.

Last month, a New Hampshire Court set an irrevocable trust and declared the assets therein available resources which should have been spent on long term care prior to Medicaid eligibility by the individual who established the trust. Specifically, in the Petition of Estate of Thea Braiterman No. 2015-0395 (N.H. July 12, 2016), the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that a Medicaid applicant’s irrevocable trust is an available asset even though the applicant was not a beneficiary of the trust because the applicant retained a degree of discretionary authority over the trust assets.

In 1994, Thea Braiterman established an irrevocable trust. The beneficiaries were her three children. Although she was not named as a beneficiary, she retained control over the trust as a Co-Trustee. Although she resigned as Trustee in 2008, she retained the right to appoint additional trustees and successor trustees including herself. The terms of the trust also gave her the ability to appoint any part of the income of the trust to any of the beneficiaries and did not limit her ability to impose conditions on the appointment of principal to the beneficiaries.

Thea entered into long term care at a nursing home in January 2014 and stayed there until her death in March 2014. In February 2014, an application for Medicaid benefits was made on her behalf. The application was denied as the Medicaid agency saw the trust as an available resource. In upholding the denial, the New Hampshire court held that an irrevocable trust is a countable asset even when the applicant is not a beneficiary if there are any circumstances in which payment can be made to the applicant. In doing so, the court ruled that there was nothing in the trust “to preclude [Ms. Braiterman] from requiring her children, as a condition of their receipt of the Trust principal, to use those funds for her benefit.”

The importance of this case cannot be overemphasized as it follows two earlier cases from other state courts this year which busted two Medicaid trusts (specifically special needs trusts). In those cases, the courts set aside such trusts due to improper expenditures. This case set aside the trust on the issue of control by the individual who established it. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that state Medicaid agencies are evaluating irrevocable trusts with increasing scrutiny. Thus, it is imperative that any trust created to establish or maintain Medicaid benefits must be conservatively drafted to insure the protection of the individual who sets them up and the beneficiaries to whom the use of the trust assets are directed.

In 1992, Ann Mark created two irrevocable trusts for the benefit of her three children. An attorney, Jared Scharf, assumed the role of trustee of these trusts in 1997. In 2008, Scharf established three separate trusts – one for each child – from assets held by one of these trusts.

In April 2010, Scharf invested $450,000 from these individual trusts in a hedge fund established by his son, Adam, and two other individuals although Adam was an attorney with no formal training or license relating to securities. It was agreed that Adam’s group would receive a 2% management fee plus 20% of all profits generated.

After an initial gain in 2010, Scharf increased the investments from these trusts to $2,200,000, notifying the trust beneficiaries of his intent in February 2011. Unfortunately, the hedge fund in which they were invested lost $869,702. Ironically, over the four year period in which a portion of the trusts were in the hedge fund, the overall value of the trusts increased from $20,260,499 to $36,127,538.

Notwithstanding, Ann Mark and her three children filed an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey seeking the removal of Scharf and requesting that he be held liable for the losses incurred by the trust investments in the hedge fund.

Although the trial court dismissed the relief sought, the Appellate Division reversed and held Scharf liable, stating there was a clear conflict of interest in his investments of trust assets with his son. The Appellate Division noted that he could have avoided liability if there was exculpatory language in the trusts. As same was absent, Scharf was deemed liable for the losses.

This case, in the Matter of May 1, 1992 Mark Family Trust, No. A-4056-14, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1848 (App. Div. Aug. 5, 2016) highlights the importance of careful trustee selection as well as thorough trust drafting. Although it appears that Scharf may have done a commendable job in the overall investments, the trust beneficiaries and their mother were clearly dissatisfied with his strategy. Prior to selecting a trustee, an individual who wishes to establish a trust should vet any potential trustee to make sure that his or her investment strategy is acceptable. In addition, the powers of the trustee should be thoughtfully set forth to insure proper authority, but prudent limitations as well.

Mark Babyatsky died on August 25, 2014. He was 55 years old. He left behind a wife, Elizabeth, and their two minor sons. He was also survived by a daughter, Amanda, who was the offspring from a prior marriage.

Shortly after he was buried, Elizabeth sought to disinter Mark’s remains and transfer them to another cemetery. Elizabeth felt that the two plots which she and Mark owned at the cemetery were poorly situated and too small. With the assistance of their rabbi, she purchased 8 lots at another cemetery.

In order to transfer remains in New Jersey, the law requires the consent of the surviving spouse, any adult children, and the owner of the internment space. Initially everyone agreed. However, after a personal dispute with Elizabeth, Amanda revoked her permission.

The Superior Court in Bergen County noted that disinterment is generally disfavored and clear evidence must be shown to support disinterment when there is a family dispute. The Court stated that the statutory rule could be set aside if equitable principles allowed same. In this case, the Court found that it was appropriate to do so because the reasons to move the remains were sound, other members of the family consented and supported the application, and the dissenting daughter did not have a particularly close relationship with her father.

In all, the Court decided the case on what it felt would be the decedent’s clear preference. In order to make sure those wishes are clear, we need to do so with our family members when we plan our estates.

Muhammed Belal Hussain died on March 10, 2013 with a will, which left 50% of the residuary estate to the Hussain Family Foundation, 25% to the decedent’s surviving brothers, and 25% to the decedent’s surviving nieces and nephew. The Foundation did not exist at the time of the decedent’s death. The attorney who drafted the will advised the decedent that if the Foundation was not formed, the gift would lapse and the intended bequest would pass to the other beneficiaries. Subsequent to the decedent’s death, the Foundation was incorporated and the executor of the estate admitted that he expected to run and be paid by the Foundation. The petitioner, the decedent’s brother, asked the Court to find that the residuary bequest to the Foundation failed because the decedent never established the Foundation.

Cy pres is an equitable legal doctrine under which a court may reform a written instrument with a gift to a charity as closely to the donor’s intention as possible so that the gift does not fail. The petitioner argued that the doctrine of cy pres was inapplicable because such doctrine only should be invoked to modify the exact terms of a will to effectuate a general charitable purpose. Petitioner further argued that the will did not have a general charitable purpose, and even if the will had such purpose, the extrinsic evidence indicated that the decedent changed his mind.

The respondent executor argued that the Court could glean charitable intent from the will as a whole, the decedent’s visits to an orphanage in Bangladesh, and an earlier holographic will from 2006 which included charitable benefit wishes.

In light of the extrinsic evidence, the Court could not find a general charitable purpose, and instead found the cy pres doctrine to be inapplicable. In making its determination, the Court cited the fact that the decedent knew that the gift to the Foundation would lapse if the Foundation was not formed. The decedent was aware of this fact for four years and chose to not take action. In further support of its holding, the Court noted that the decedent only participated in modest charitable giving during his lifetime, but never enough to deduct the amounts from his tax returns. The Court explained the result may have been different had the will included more specifics as to the charity. Because the gift failed, the bequest to the Foundation passed to the other residuary beneficiaries. Thus, it is important that clients understand the implications of naming an unformed charity in their estate planning documents.

 

Questions regarding this article may be sent to Publications@Capehart.com.

Joseph Rendeiro died on December 3, 2006. His Last Will and Testament, dated June 2, 2006, left a specific bequest of $10,000 to his granddaughter, Jessica Fagin, a $25,000 bequest to his sister, Mary Pereira, and the rest of his $2,218,733.66 estate to his son-in-law, Peter De Rosa who was also named Executor of the estate.

Jessica Fagin filed an action in the probate court seeking to set aside the Will on the grounds that the Will was the product of undue influence exerted by De Rosa and that her grandfather was not mentally competent when he signed the Will. In 2008, the matter was mediated and the parties reached an agreement whereby Jessica would receive $400,000 rather than $10,000.

In June 2009, De Rosa filed a New Jersey Inheritance Tax return and paid $178,925.57 plus interest. The return was rejected by the State which assessed the tax at $239,279.22. De Rosa had asserted that the tax due to the State should be calculated in a manner which incorporated the settlement with Fagin.

Fagin, as a granddaughter, was a Class A beneficiary and exempt from the inheritance tax. De Rosa, was a Class C beneficiary, who was subject to a tax calculated at rates ranging from 11% to 16%. De Rosa argued that the tax should be assessed in a manner reflecting the actual distribution. The State maintained that the tax to be assessed is calculated solely by the terms of the Will and shall not be altered by a settlement.

The Appellate Court agreed with the State. In De Rosa v. State of New Jersey (Docket No.: A-2995-14T1, Decided July 19, 2016), the Court maintained the standard set forth in Pope v. Kingsley, 40 N.J. 168, 174 (1963), that held that the inheritance tax must be calculated in accordance with the distribution made in a Will and not by the terms of a settlement.
The takeaway from this case is that settlements of contested probate matters should be undertaken with the knowledge that taxes will be assessed at the rates imposed as a result of the Will and that cannot be negotiated away. Thus, in determining whether a settlement is appropriate, a calculation of tax liabilities should be undertaken prior to reaching an agreement.

Last month, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the decision of a local Circuit Court which denied the request of a disabled party, James S. Corn, to establish a Special-Needs Trust on his behalf. James S. Corn, who is in his 50s, became disabled, suffering from memory loss. He receives both SSI and Medicaid.

His partner died leaving an inheritance to him in a third party special needs trust. However, she also left him as the beneficiary of her life insurance policies and bank accounts. These assets were worth approximately $260,000 which exceed the $2,000 asset cap for an individual who is receiving SSI and Medicaid. In order to cure this defect, Mr. Corn sought to establish a first party (self-settled) special needs trust in the Circuit Court.

The lower court denied Corn’s application, citing that it was against public policy to be able to shelter assets to maintain benefits that others have to pay through their tax dollars. The higher court reversed this decision citing the criteria needed to establish a self-settled special needs trust. Moreover, it held that States that participate in the Medicaid program must follow the federal regulations that come with the program. As special needs trusts are recognized by the federal regulations, Mr. Corn is allowed to establish a self-settled special needs trust on his behalf.

The decision is significant in that it reinforces the right for individuals to maintain their needs-based public benefits through the establishment of special needs trusts. However, the critical point that many commentators are missing is that the first party trust should have been unnecessary. Corn’s partner had set up a valid special needs trust in her estate plan. The problem, like with so many other situations that occur, is that attorneys and clients approach planning from a document approach, and fail to see the interrelationship between non-probate assets and trusts.

The solution in this matter should have been simple. When Corn’s partner set up her estate plan, she should have changed the beneficiaries on her life insurance policies and bank accounts so that those assets would pour into the third party trust automatically. Thus, it is imperative for clients and planners alike to recognize the need to position all assets – probate or otherwise – so that they flow in a manner consistent with the intention of the related wills and trusts.

Ten years ago, the landscape of asset protection or Medicaid planning changed dramatically with the passage of the Deficit Recovery Act (DRA) of 2006.  In relevant part, this act impeded prudent estate planning for individuals seeking to secure their assets from long term care costs by expanding the lookback period for gifting from three years to five years, and by deferring the calculation of any period of ineligibility so that it would not run until an individual’s assets were depleted.  It effectively created a minimum 5 year penalty for gifting which eliminated many of the middle class families whom both parties stress they are “looking out for” from even a modest amount of asset protection.

One protection which arose from this law, though, was what is known as a Medicaid annuity.  In essence, if an individual enters into a nursing home, his or her spouse who is remaining in the community, can keep the home, a car, and one-half of the liquid assets not to exceed $119,200.  However, if that spouse owns an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), he or she can convert same into an annuity, and keep that as well.

In order for the annuity to be accepted as exempt from being spent down for Medicaid eligibility, it must meet a variety of criteria.  It must be irrevocable, non-assignable, with immediate payout and actuarially sound among other requirements.  Over the past decade, many such annuities have been established and accepted by state Medicaid offices.

Over the past year, however, judicial intervention was necessary to avoid attacks by the States on this valid form of asset protection.   In 2010, Donna Claypoole entered a nursing home in Pennsylvania.  When her husband applied for Medicaid on her behalf, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services denied the application stating that annuities were countable assets and must be spent down.  The U.S. District Court, on appeal, upheld the State’s determination declaring annuities “sham transitions”.

Fortunately, the Third Circuit reversed this decision. Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015). In doing so, it noted that Congress created a safe harbor under which certain annuities are not to be counted as resources in determining Medicaid eligibility.  The annuities purchased by the Claypooles qualified for this protection.   Thus, Medicaid annuities remain a viable asset protection technique.

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