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The Legal Importance of Interactive Process

One of the most important duties that is imposed by anti-disability discrimination laws is the obligation to accommodate a disabled employee in performing the essential job duties of a desired employment position. As part of that obligation, both federal and New Jersey state law impose a duty upon the employer to engage in an interactive dialogue process after an employee requests an accommodation as part of the required effort to work towards finding a suitable accommodation. One of the areas where employers get in the most trouble in complying with anti-disability discrimination requirements is in failing to adequately engage in this required interactive process.

Under the law, the interactive process is deemed to be a two-way street where both the employer and the employee bear a good faith duty to attempt to work constructively in an effort to either find a potential accommodation or determine that no such accommodation is available in the given circumstances. The reason that failing to follow the process can get employers in so much legal trouble is because it is an easy employment law requirement for judges to know and understand and in almost every conference I have had with a judge one of the first questions that I get asked in these cases is was an interactive process undertaken and how did its outcome affect the dispute at hand.

So, what does the interactive process require? It requires active dialogue and the exchange of possible ideas to resolve an accommodation request. While many employers would love to deny an accommodation request summarily, employers are wise to take advantage of the opportunity of utilizing the process to gain meaningful information from the employee, such as medical information and possible alternative accommodation options, that may allow for a better resolution of the request. Establishing as an employer that you made every effort to work with a disabled employee to find a workplace accommodation serves to buttress the defense against any discrimination lawsuit for failing to provide those requested accommodations.

Along with actually engaging in the interactive process, documentation of those efforts is also critical to establishing needed defenses if a challenge is raised to process compliance in any discrimination case. Where possible, exchange accommodations ideas and requests for information through writings, such as emails, with the requesting employee, so you have that needed paper trail of compliance regarding your communications through this process. If the interactive process is more verbally oriented, always make sure to follow up in some writing what was addressed as part of the process, so you have confirmatory documentation of what was discussed and how issues were ultimately addressed. I am also a big fan of using some form of written documentation in describing the outcome of the process, whether this is a denial or acceptance of an accommodation request. When there is a denial, the written documentation should explain why. When any type of accommodation is granted, there should likewise be documentation outlining the scope of the agreed upon accommodation so there is no confusion regarding how job duties have been accommodated. In both situations, this is again effective use of documentation to set up possible defenses should any legal issues arise out of the interactive process.   

Therefore, in sum, always remember the importance of the interactive process whenever a workplace accommodation request is raised by an employee in your workplace. Engage in that process in good faith and always document your efforts as part of the process to establish a written history of your efforts in case any subsequent litigation ensues. You will be happy that you did.            

Employee Health and School Safety: Terminations Under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

Does an allergic reaction qualify as a disability under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD)? Is it unlawful to terminate someone due to symptoms from an allergic reaction? In a recent case, Dechert v. Totowa Bd. of Educ., No. A-0545-24, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 436 (App. Div. Mar. 11, 2026), the New Jersey Appellate Division considered these issues in the context of a school district employee. The Court ultimately concluded that the allergic reaction at issue did not qualify as a disability, and even if it had, the school board was within its rights to terminate the employee in order to protect the welfare of both the employee and the students.

Plaintiff, Stacie Dechert, was employed as a special education aide for the Totowa School District during the 2022–23 school year, providing one-on-one assistance to children with severe disabilities aged 6 to 8. From the start of her employment, Plaintiff disclosed that she had a pre-existing condition, sciatica. She never had any difficulty performing her job because of this condition. Plaintiff routinely wore a back brace at work and testified at a deposition that “she never experienced any negative treatment…due to her back issues.”

In April 2022, Plaintiff’s sciatica flared, and her doctor prescribed multiple narcotic pain medications for use as needed. On May 4, 2022, she injured her back when she was attempting to prevent a student from leaving the classroom. She received permission to go home during the school day to retrieve her back brace. While at home, she took half of a Flexeril and a half of Oxycodone, two different narcotics, for pain and returned to work.

Upon her return to work, Plaintiff experienced severe stomach pain and shortness of breath. She told a student who was in the bathroom to tell another teacher that she was not feeling well and could not breathe. She went in and out of consciousness in the restroom. The school nurse found her on the floor of the restroom, in a state resembling a seizure. Police administered oxygen, considered Narcan, and Plaintiff was transported to the hospital for treatment of an allergic reaction.

On May 6, the superintendent advised Plaintiff that she should resign from her employment and reapply the following school year. She declined, providing a doctor’s note on May 12 clearing her to return to work for her back injury. The note made no mention of the May 4 incident related to the medication she had taken. That same day, the school district terminated Plaintiff’s employment, advising that it was terminating her “with the students’ and staff’s best interests, safety, and welfare in mind…” and that they “firmly believe[d] that “there was good cause and justification to support [the] decision.”

In August 2022, Plaintiff filed suit under the LAD, asserting that she was disabled due to sciatica and alleging discriminatory termination. Both parties later moved for summary judgment. At oral argument, Plaintiff claimed that her allergic reaction constituted a disability. The school district argued that the Complaint alleged that sciatica was her only disability and that she was terminated due to her allergic reaction, which is not a disability.

The trial Court found in favor of the school district. It held that Plaintiff’s only disability was sciatica and there was no evidence of discrimination. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court erred by failing to consider her allergy as a separate disability.

On appeal, the Court upheld the trial court’s findings.  It found no evidence that Plaintiff’s sciatica played any role in her termination, and her one-time reaction to medication did not meet the LAD’s definition of a disability. Even assuming the reaction qualified as a disability, the school district had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination: protecting the welfare and safety of students and staff.

This case is significant because it underscores the fact that not all medical conditions constitute a disability under the LAD. It also reinforces that, even if an employee has a medical condition, termination may be lawful if continued employment could compromise the safety or welfare of others.

Endometriosis and Its Qualification as a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

Employment discrimination cases under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) often turn on whether the employee’s medical condition qualifies as a disability under the statute. While some medical conditions clearly fall within the statute, others remain legally unsettled. In the case of Proffitt v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety, No. 5:23-CV-00306 (E.D.N.C. July 25, 2025) a federal Court faced an unsettled question regarding severe menstrual pain and endometriosis constituting a disability under the ADA. The Court found that these medical conditions can qualify as disabilities in certain circumstances.

By way of background, Plaintiff Christian Proffitt had experienced painful menstrual cycles since middle school. She claimed that the pain on the first day of her cycle each month was so severe that she was confined to her bed. For more than a decade, she managed her pain with 800 milligrams of ibuprofen. Thereafter, her doctor prescribed various opioids for her pain. In March 2024, Proffitt received a formal diagnosis of endometriosis.

Proffitt, began working for North Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS) in December 2020 as a Juvenile Court Counselor (JCC) trainee. The JCC training program lasts 12–24 months, and successful trainees may be promoted to permanent positions.

In April 2022, Proffitt went to the emergency room due to pain from her menstrual cycle and missed two or three days of work. She provided her supervisor with a doctor’s note. On May 6, 2022, Proffitt spoke with her supervisor by phone about two medical issues, including her heavy menstrual cycles and painful cramps. She explained that she might need to work from home for one day each month. Endometriosis was also discussed, although Proffitt did not have a formal diagnosis at this time. During this conversation, Proffitt’s supervisor allegedly criticized the amount of medical leave she had taken from work, stating that she had used an excessive amount of time off and that this reflected poor work ethic.

On May 12, 2022, Proffitt, her supervisor, and the Court Counselor Chief met to discuss concerns about Proffitt’s work performance. During the meeting, Proffitt again mentioned that she might need to work from home due to her menstrual pain. The Court Counselor Chief denied the request, stating that if he allowed her to work from home, he would have to allow every woman in the office to do the same. Proffitt claims that during this meeting she was told she would not be promoted and would be terminated at the end of her training period. NCDPS disputes that this was said. That same day, Proffitt submitted her resignation.

Proffitt then filed a lawsuit against NCDPS asserting several legal claims, including a claim that NCDPS violated her rights under the ADA. The parties then filed summary judgment motions against each other. Within their motions the parties disputed, among other things, whether Proffitt was considered disabled under the ADA.

The Court analyzed whether Proffitt’s painful menstrual cycles constituted a disability under the ADA, meaning whether it qualified as an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities. To demonstrate the severity of her condition, Proffitt relied on several types of evidence. She submitted online posts in which she described her debilitating symptoms and their impact on her daily life. She testified that she had missed college classes because of her cramps, and that the pain caused her to vomit and lie paralyzed in bed for an entire day. She also submitted doctors’ notes documenting that her painful menstrual cycle caused her to miss work.

Although federal courts have historically been divided on whether endometriosis qualifies as a disability under the ADA, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina concluded that Proffitt had presented sufficient evidence that her endometriosis substantially limited her major life activities. Specifically, having to be bedridden at least one day a month with pain and vomiting, interfered with her ability to engage in multiple major life activities. As a result, Proffitt’s ADA claim survived summary judgment and was allowed to proceed. The case ultimately settled.

The key takeaway from this case is that determining whether someone is disabled under the ADA is a complex and fact-specific issue. When an employee reports a medical condition and requests an accommodation, management should avoid responding with an immediate “no” even if the condition initially appears mild. Each accommodation request must be evaluated carefully, with attention to the individual’s specific circumstances, before a decision is made as to how to respond.

Advice To Employers In Dealing With Complex TTD Scenarios

Practical Advice in New Jersey Workers’ Compensation

The general rule is that an injured worker is entitled to TTD for the time frame that the authorized treating doctor placed the employee out of work.

Pursuant to Monaco v. Albert Maund, Inc., 17 N.J.  Super. 425 (App. Div.), 21 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1952), generally, TTD continues until the employee is able to resume work or until the employee “is as far restored as the permanent character of the injuries will permit” [placed at MMI], whichever happens first. This means that TTD can cease in either of the following situations: a. The employee is placed back to work and authorized treatment is ongoing and continuing; or b. The employee is placed at MMI from treatment, even if the employee is discharged with permanent work restrictions (irrespective of whether the restrictions can be accommodated).

In addition to the above rule, there are some tricky situations where TTD benefits may be stopped for other reasons.  Below are hypothetical situations regarding TTD, and how we would recommend handling each scenario.

Scenario 1: Bob works for a large retailer and is injured on February 2, 2022. Bob is receiving authorized treatment and is initially not placed out of work. On March 14, 2022, Bob is caught stealing from the register at work, as well as stealing $4,000 worth of merchandise from the electronics department. The authorized doctor places Bob out of work as of March 17, 2022; it is anticipated he will be out of work for a few months. After an investigation into the theft, Bob is terminated for cause on March 28, 2022. The employer pays TTD from March 17, 2022 through the date of his termination, March 28, 2022. Bob alleges that he is owed TTD from March 17, 2022 onward, as he was placed out of work by the authorized doctor on March 17, 2022 and has not yet been returned to work.

Our position is that Bob is owed TTD only for the date range of March 17, 2022 through March 28, 2022, the date of the termination.

There are quite a few cases dealing with this issue. In all of the cases, the main point comes down to this: The purpose of TTD is to compensate for actual lost wages. As such, in a situation like this, our position would be that Bob is not owed TTD after March 28, 2022.

The most important case on this scenario is Cunningham v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 386 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 492 (2006), where the Court stated that Cunningham must “prove that he actually lost income…because of his disability”. The Court noted that TTD is wage replacement for “actual lost wages”, and not “theoretical or fictitious wage loss”.

 The Court in Cunningham was guided by the holding of Outland v.  Monmouth-Ocean Educ. Serv. Comm’n, 154 N.J. 531 (1998). In Outland, the Court held that in order for a teacher who teaches during the school year to be entitled to TTD during the summer months, she must prove that she would have had summer employment. The case of Gioia v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. A-0667-10T4 (App. Div. October 11, 2011) also deals with an employee terminated for misconduct (in that case, violation of the employer’s drug policy), and the holding of Gioia makes it clear that TTD is for actual lost wages, not theoretical lost wages. In a case where an employee is terminated for cause, at the point of his termination, he no longer has wages. If there is no actual wage loss, TTD is not owed.

Scenario 2: Nate has been placed out of work by the authorized doctor and is not working. TTD is being issued. The authorized doctor, on May 15, 2022, recommends that Nate undergo a shoulder surgery. Nate receives all surgical clearance and on May 22, 2022, the authorized doctor schedules the surgery to occur on June 5, 2022. However, Nate has a pre-planned vacation June 4- June 18. Then he is moving residences during the end of June, and then will have family visiting during July as well as various other summer activities, so he wants to push the surgery back until at least August 15. Nate asserts that he is entitled to TTD during the time frame of May 22, 2022 through August 15, 2022.

Our position is that Nate is not entitled to TTD during the time frame of May 22, 22022 through August 15, 2022.

Nate is refusing treatment, for reasons that are not related to any health or medical issues. An employee not complying with the authorized doctor’s treatment plan, and treatment schedule, based on a personal reason or personal preference, is not entitled to TTD benefits.

Our position is that if petitioner is not actively treating, or is missing appointments, he is not entitled to TTD under N.J.S.A. 34:15-19, which states that after an injury, an employee must submit himself for physical examination within this state, as often as may be reasonably requested, and, “the refusal of the employee to submit to such examination shall deprive him of the right to compensation during the continuance of such refusal”. Since Nate is failing to, or refusing to, comply with treatment and is not cooperating with authorized treatment, he is not entitled to TTD during his non-cooperation.

Scenario 3: Ronald, an electrician, was injured on January 15, 2022. The authorized doctor places Ronald out of work February 10 through March 1, 2022. On March 2, 2022, Ronald is released to work light duty; the doctor noted that full duty was anticipated on or around April 2, 2022. The employer can accommodate light duty work and can pay Ronald his usual salary in his temporary light duty position; Ronald was offered the light duty position on March 2, 2022. Ronald refuses the light duty position, as he does not want to work “desk duty”; Ronald maintains he is owed TTD from March 2, 2022 through April 2, 2022 (or whenever he is in fact returned to work full duty).

Our position is that Ronald is not entitled to TTD as of March 2, 2022, the date that light duty was offered, and declined.

We recommend relying on Harbatuk v. S & S Furniture Systems Insulation, 211 N.J. Super. 614 (App. Div. 1986) in a situation like his. If the employee is offered a light duty job, and the employee refuses the light duty job, the employer can terminate TTD upon the refusal. For this reason, it is a good idea to put the light duty offer in writing, dated, and reference the date that the authorized doctor placed the employee back to work light duty, and the date light duty could be accommodated, particularly as under Williams v. Topps Appliance City, 239 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 1989), “the burden is on the employer to show that light work was offered to [the employee] and that it was refused”.

The above scenarios re-emphasize two important things to keep in mind with respect to issuance of, and entitlement to, TTD benefits: (1) TTD is to compensate for actual lost wages; and (2) An employee’s refusal to comply with offered light duty and/or the authorized doctor’s recommended course of treatment may be cause for TTD to be terminated.

The post Advice To Employers In Dealing With Complex TTD Scenarios appeared first on NJ Workers' Comp Blog.

NJ Supreme Court Holds Adverse Employment Action Not a Required Element of a Failure to Accommodate Claim

By: Gitika Kapoor, Law Clerk
Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On June 8, 2021, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in Richter v. Oakland Board of Education that an employee is not required to establish adverse employment action such as demotion or termination in a failure to accommodate disability claim brought against an employer under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).  In addition, the Court considered whether the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”). The Court held that the NJLAD and WCA are not in tension with each other, and the WCA did not bar the plaintiff’s lawsuit.

In Richter, a teacher who suffered from Type 1 diabetes was assigned a late lunch period and experienced a hypoglycemic event in the classroom.  As a result, she suffered a seizure, lost consciousness, and struck her head on a lab table and the floor, causing excessive bleeding. She filed a workers’ compensation claim and received compensation for her medical bills and disability benefits. She later brought a NJLAD action asserting a failure to accommodate disability claim against the Oakland Board of Education. In her complaint, she alleged that, despite repeated requests to alter her schedule, the principal failed to accommodate her request to be assigned an earlier lunch time. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board, which the Appellate Division reversed.

On the NJLAD issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a failure to accommodate claim may arise from an “employer’s inaction, silence or inadequate response to reasonable accommodation request,” and that causing harm to the employee through an adverse employment action is not a necessary element of the claim. The Court recognized that a failure to accommodate is itself an actionable harm, because the wrongful act is the employer’s failure to fulfill its duties under the law. Importantly, the Court noted that a lack of demonstrable consequences in the form of adverse employment action may affect damages. 

Regarding the WCA, the Court held that the statute’s exclusive remedy provision did not bar the plaintiff’s NJLAD claim, reasoning that the legislature intended for the NJLAD to supplement other legal remedies. According to the Court, the NJLAD and WCA both aim to protect workers in the workplace and can function harmoniously, without conflicting with each other. Therefore, the WCA did not bar the plaintiff’s lawsuit.

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