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expert testimony

Plaintiff, Harrison JC, LLC, a limited liability company, owned Unit 302 in Harrison Bridge Plaza, a 4-story condominium with commercial units on the first floor and residential units on the remaining floors.  Plaintiff Harrison bought the unit in February 2010 and had leased it to various tenants.  The unit experienced water seepage and leakage from the ceiling of its unit on 11 occasions from April 2014 through March 2021.  Plaintiff sued the unit owners above its unit, as well as the condominium association, HB Association, and Patrician Associates Management, the manager of the condominium association for the damage resulting from the leaks.  The issue in Harrison JC, LLC v. Harrison Bridge Plaza Condominium Association, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1895 (App. Div. Aug. 7, 2024) was whether the plaintiff could pursue its claim for property damage from the water seepage and leakage without the retention of an expert.

The units above the plaintiff’s unit were owned by Claudia Santos and Joel Costas, Unit 401, and Ying Zi Zhu, Unit 403.  Per the Master Deed, unit owners’ responsibilities were limited to the interior of the walls, ceilings, and floor surfaces of their units.  The common elements, including roofs, parking lot and lobby, were owned and controlled by HB Association and were managed and maintained by defendant Patrician under a contract.

Plaintiff Harrison filed a lawsuit, claiming that it suffered property damage, loss of rental income, and out of pocket expenses when its unit experienced water seepage and leakage from the ceiling of its unit.  It is undisputed that the leaks happened and that all but the final leak was repaired.  Plaintiff claimed that the leaks originated in either Unit 401, Unit 403, or the common elements of the building.  It sued HB Association based upon negligence and its duty to maintain and repair the common elements of the building.  It sued Patrician based upon a breach of a contractual obligation to maintain and repair the common elements of the building and, last, it sued the unit owners for negligence for creating or failing to repair the leaks in their units that damaged plaintiff’s unit. 

However, plaintiff failed to retain an expert to offer any opinion with respect to the cause or origin of any of the leaks. At the close of discovery, all defendants filed for a summary judgment.  They argued that plaintiff was unable to establish liability without an expert opinion.  Plaintiff, in opposing the motion, argued that an expert opinion was not necessary under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The trial court granted summary judgment to each of the defendants.  It found that plaintiff was unable to establish liability without an expert report and found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to plaintiff’s claims and that “the jury could not be left to speculate as to the cause and origin of the leaks and whether defendants’ negligence was the cause of damage to plaintiff’s unit.”

This decision was appealed.  Plaintiff argued that the court should have taken judicial notice that water flows downward, and water does not normally come through the ceiling of a residential unit unless there is some defect or negligence in the area above the unit causing the leak and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should have relieved plaintiff of its obligation to produce an expert report to prove negligence as to HB Association and Patrician.

The Appellate Division noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, if properly evoked, would enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facia case of negligence by allowing for the inference of negligence from undisputed facts.  However, the doctrine would only be applicable where “(a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality was within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (c) there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff’s own voluntary act or neglect.”  Finally, the doctrine would not be applicable where the injured party fails to exclude other possible causes of the injury.

The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court decision that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the facts of this case.  The Court found that “it is not within the common knowledge of the average juror that the acts of HB Association and Patrician, as the entities with control of the common elements of the building, were more likely than not the cause of the leakage in plaintiff’s unit.”  The Appellate Division found that without expert testimony to opine as to the origin and cause of the leaks, “jurors would be left to speculate as to whether HB Association and Patrician’s conduct negligently caused damage to plaintiff’s property.”  Finally, the Appellate Division noted that the design and maintenance of this condominium and the origin and cause of leaks in the building would not be matters within the ken of the average juror.

Further, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of the location of the leaks in its unit.  The leaks could have derived from the common areas, the units above Plaintiff’s unit, or from plaintiff’s unit as a result of acts by plaintiff’s tenants.  The Court found that expert testimony was necessary to prove that the leaks originated in an area within the exclusive control of HB Association or Patrician.  Without such expert testimony, a jury could not exclude plaintiff or its tenants as the negligent actors in causing the leaks without engaging in speculation.

Thus, the Appellate Division agreed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claim.  Because the plaintiff did not produce an expert report to offer an opinion as to the cause or origin of the leaks, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. sued J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. over a shipment it claimed was damaged while in the possession of J.B. Hunt.  Because the seal on the food-grade shipment was broken, the customer had rejected the shipment.  The issue in Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 990 (App. Div. May 30, 2024) was whether Mecca’s employee of 40 years could offer an opinion on the standard of care for transporting a sealed container of a food-grade substance across the country.

Mecca had been hired by ADM Logistics to transport and deliver 20 sacks of Fibersol, which is a soluble dietary fiber used in foods, drinks, and supplements, in a sealed container from New Jersey to Illinois.  The sacks of Fibersol were made of polyurethane and tied at the top so the Fibersol would not fall out.  Further, the Fibersol was packed inside a shipping container sealed with an exterior lock.  The seal has a specific lock to stop unauthorized personnel from accessing the load and attached to the seal is a number that corresponds to a pickup number.  Mecca’s employee testified that “seals are common in the industry and are not to be broken under any circumstances by another other than the receiver at the time of delivery, and if the seal is broken, the load was tampered with.”

When the defendant J.B. Hunt took possession of the shipment it received, it received a bill of lading and acknowledged receipt of the shipment at the point of origin in good order.  The bill of lading referenced the seal number.   J.B. Hunt transported the sealed container via train from New Jersey to Landers, Illinois where it arrived still sealed.  An inspection of the container in Landers showed that the seal remained intact.  The container remained in J.B. Hunt’s possession for 4-5 days in its yard in Landers before another entity who was not a party, F&S Logistics, attempted to deliver the shipment to its final destination.

When the container arrived at its final destination, the customer, Parke Toll, rejected the delivery because the container seal was broken, although none of the 20 sacks of Fibersol were examined or determined to have been opened or compromised, nor were their contents tested for damage or adulteration.  Although the bill of lading did not contain express language that the seal must be intact upon delivery, according to the customer, it was its policy, as an entity that deals with food products to attempt to always maintain a good seal record and reject shipments that arrive with a broken seal.  Therefore, the truck was resealed and returned to defendant’s truck yard.  The entire shipment of Fibersol was deemed unusable and eventually destroyed. 

Plaintiff Mecca filed a claim with J.B. Hunt’s cargo claims office “for product integrity compromised” due to the broken seal on the shipment which had precipitated a complete loss of the Fibersol.  J.B. Hunt denied the claim. 

Mecca filed this lawsuit against J.B. Hunt, claiming breach of contract and negligence for the cargo loss and damage.  At the trial court level, J.B. Hunt filed for a summary judgment and the contract claim was dismissed but the negligence claim was not dismissed. 

The trial court found that the negligence claim was based upon J.B. Hunt’s failure to deliver the Fibersol with an intact seal.  Further, the trial court noted that the record contained evidence indicating that if the seal was broken upon delivery, that goes against the industry standard. 

To establish the industry standard, plaintiff Mecca presented the testimony of its employee Andre Zielinski with 40 years’ experience in the industry to establish the requisite standard of care.  He testified that the seal was a lock and you place a specific lock on a load from stopping an unauthorized personnel to enter into the load.  The seal is common in the industry and, if it is broken, that means the load was tampered with.  At that point, the receiver can choose to either accept the load or refuse the load because it is not intact.  His opinion was based upon his many years in the shipping industry in which he worked as a traffic manager or variations of that title.

On the eve of trial, the defendant made a motion in limine to bar Zielinski’s deposition testimony on the standard of care because he had not been named as an expert witness.  The court granted that motion, ruling that he could not provide an opinion on the standard of care because plaintiff had failed to name him as an expert.  However, the court ruled that Zielinski could testify as a fact witness based on his personal observations about the seal.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial and the court did find that the seal was intact when that Fibersol arrived in Landers.  It further found that, while the container was in the defendant’s yard for 4-5 days, the seal had been broken by a J.B. Hunt driver prior to the receipt of the delivery to the customer. 

However, the court found that the negligence claim was predicated on a standard of care owed by J.B. Hunt as a transport company, which standard was too complex to be determined without expert testimony.  The trial court judge found that plaintiff was required to establish the appropriate standard of care through an expert. Because the plaintiff had failed to establish the standard of care owed by J.B. Hunt, the Court dismissed the complaint.

This appeal ensued.  Plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake in prohibiting its longtime employee, with his many years of experience in the shipping industry, from opining on the standard of care.  Further, plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake by determining expert proof was required to establish damages.  The Appellate Division agreed with both of these arguments. 

Initially, the Court noted as follows: “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence generally is entitled to deference absent a showing that the court abused its discretion such that the decision was so wide off the mark as to constitute a manifest in justice.”

Further, the Appellate Division stated that the courts “have required expert testimony to establish the standard of care in negligence actions or the underlying facts concern scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  Under the lay opinion evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 701, “a party to an action with expertise gained through such personal experience may express an opinion of the sort ordinarily provided by an expert.”

The Appellate Division noted that Zielinski’s testimony was admitted by the court but that the trial court did not accept it to establish the appropriate standard of care.  The Court found that this decision was an error by the trial court.  Because Zielinski’s undisputed testimony that he had been in the shipping industry for about 40 years, had been an employee by a few companies, mostly major freight forwarding companies, where he worked as a traffic manager or the like, his testimony about the seal was based on facts known to him in his professional role as plaintiff’s employee.  Because of his extensive professional experience and personal knowledge about the facts of the case, the Appellate Division found that Zielinski was qualified to opine on the requisite standard of care on this negligence claim.  Further, the Court found that Zielinski was not required to be designated as an expert witness or to prepare a report to testify as to the standard of care.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division remanded the matter back to the trial court for reconsideration of the trial evidence consistent with its opinion.

By: Eric Richwine, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

The issue before the New Jersey Appellate Division in Rodriguez v. Cano, No. A-1561-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1733 (App. Div. Oct. 12, 2023) was whether plaintiff Lenny Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) was denied a fair trial following a no-cause verdict in a damages-only auto negligence case in favor of defendant-driver Stephanie Cano.  Plaintiff contended that defense counsel went too far in cross-examining Plaintiff’s treating physician about a fraudulent medical services action pending against the physician.

In the trial court proceedings, Defendant Cano did not contest liability; rather, the sole issue for the jury to determine was the amount of damages to be awarded to Rodriguez. During trial, Rodriguez’s treating physician testified to his injuries following the accident. The defense counsel soon after cross-examined the physician, focusing on the fact that a major insurance company had a pending fraudulent medical services action against him. During this cross-examination, the defense counsel also noted that Mr. Rodriguez’s treatment was explicitly included in the insurance fraud complaint to provide an example of the physician’s fraud. The defense counsel reasoned that this line of questioning was for the purpose of establishing the physician’s credibility.

The trial court judge realized only after the cross-examination that this line of questioning, which ultimately implied that Rodriguez’s treatment was unnecessary (or even fraudulent), was inadmissible, and, as such, the court instructed the jurors to disregard the testimony. The judge also allowed Rodriguez’s counsel to engage in re-direct to provide the physician the opportunity to rebut and elaborate on the defense counsel’s accusations. During re-direct, Rodriguez’s physician became irate and made several allegations against the insurer for false allegations and bad faith.

Plaintiff’s Rodriguez’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The jury returned a no-cause verdict. Rodriguez’s counsel then moved for a new trial, which the trial court also denied. The judge reasoned that any errors were “harmless.” The judge further reasoned that the jury surely “didn’t consider the evidence that I told them … to disregard,” citing the amount of time the jury took to deliberate; because the jury “didn’t come back in five minutes,” the judge purported that the jury did not think of Mr. Rodriguez and the physician as “criminals” or “fraudsters.” Plaintiff Rodriguez appealed.

The Appellate Division first addressed the defense’s cross-examination of the physician and the timing of the trial court judge’s instruction to the jury to disregard the testimony. The Court cited Rule 608 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, which prohibits the use of specific instances of conduct through cross-examination in a civil action to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness. The Court quickly determined that defense counsel’s line of questioning was “patently improper” per Rule 608 and that the trial court’s verdict “cannot stand.”

The Court found that, despite the defense counsel’s purported reason for its cross-examination questioning, it was inadmissible and ergo the trial court did correctly instruct the jury to disregard the testimony. The Court further noted that, although the trial court was well-intentioned in allowing the physician the opportunity for re-direct following the defense counsel’s ambush, this decision was ultimately misguided and backfired, as evidenced by the physician’s outburst.

Stating that “the prejudice to [Mr. Rodriguez] … cannot be overstated,” the Appellate Division ultimately determined that the trial court’s denial of Mr. Rodriguez’s mistrial motion and motion for a new trial was improper; as such, the Court held that Plaintiff was denied a fair trial and reversed the trial court’s decisions and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, Robert Rogers and Joyce Rogers, entered into a real estate contract to purchase a home “as is” in an age-restricted community from defendants Nora and Christopher Conti.  Ms. Conti had moved out of the property at least a year earlier due to health issues.  The transaction was handled by her son as attorney-in-fact.  The issue in Rogers v. Conti, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 679 (App. Div. May 5, 2023) was whether the defendant buyers were entitled to rescind the sale after discovering mold behind the walls just three days after closing.

One year before the property was listed for sale, a leak had arisen in the hallway bathroom.  The seller’s son discovered the leak within 24 hours and made a total repair of the water intrusion, including replacing sheetrock and treating the area with an anti-microbial agent.

When the property was listed for sale a year later, the seller’s son did not disclose the prior leak on the seller’s disclosure form.  The plaintiffs had a professional inspection conducted which did not disclose any issues with the property.  However, three days after the closing, the buyers did discover mold behind some of the walls and asked to rescind the sale.  The sellers did everything to rescind the sale, including stopping the deed from being recorded, returning all proceeds from escrow, and offering to make buyers whole, even offering to cover the broker’s commission.  However, plaintiffs then insisted on consummating the transaction.

Plaintiffs refused to allow defendants to inspect the alleged mold condition and completely renovated the alleged condition, which eliminated any evidence of the alleged mold.  Plaintiffs thereafter filed this lawsuit, alleging breach of contract, civil conspiracy, intentional common law and consumer fraud, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

After discovery was completed, the defendant homeowners moved for a summary judgment, barring plaintiffs’ expert report as a net opinion and barring plaintiffs’ expert from testifying.  The trial court did grant a summary judgment to the defendants.  The trial court judge found that defendants did not make any misrepresentation and also found that plaintiffs’ expert report was a net opinion. 

Plaintiffs argued upon appeal that there were material facts at issue, precluding summary judgment and claimed that the trial court made a mistake by assuming the role of the jury in determining defendants did not make a material misrepresentation of fact relevant to the real estate transaction.  Further, the plaintiffs claimed that if defendants had given proper disclosure of the water leak at the time of the contract, plaintiffs would have proceeded in a different manner by either cancelling the contract or conducting a more extensive inspection of non-visible portions of the property.  Plaintiffs claim that the defendants had an independent duty to disclose the prior year’s leak.  Further, they argued that the judge should have allowed their evidence of a mold-like condition to be presented to the finder of fact as lay testimony under the common knowledge doctrine.

The Appellate Division found that the two critical documents were the sales contract and the disclosure statement.  In the disclosure statement, defendants expressed that they were unaware of any leaks, backups or other problems relating to any of the plumbing systems and fixtures.  The buyers (plaintiffs) expressly affirmed their decision to buy the property “as is” in the sales contract and not based on any representations made by the seller.  The Court noted that when the term “as is” is used in connection with the sale of realty, it acknowledges that the purchaser is “acquiring real property in its present state or condition.”  However, this principle assumes that the seller has satisfied its duty to disclose all latent defects that are not readily observable. 

The Appellate Division pointed out that the disclosure statement asks questions about the present condition of a property, not any prior occurrences on the property.  The previous leak had been fully remediated and was not inquired about and did not require disclosure.  Hence, defendants answered the statement accurately.  The Court found that plaintiffs cannot establish any duty on the part of defendants to disclose an unknown, latent condition, particularly in light of their own professional inspection and that the property was being sold in an “as is” condition.

Upon appeal, plaintiffs did not argue that the trial court made a mistake in determining that the plaintiffs’ expert rendered a net opinion, instead argued that lay testimony should be sufficient on the cause of mold.  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court decision that plaintiffs cannot prove causation without admissible expert testimony.

Here, plaintiffs could not establish defendants had a duty to disclose an unknown mold condition, much less breach of that duty.  Further, the Appellate Division found that in the absence of an expert report, plaintiffs would not be able to prove that the alleged mold condition was caused by the water leak remediated a year prior to the closing.  Thus, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court decision in granting summary judgment to defendants and affirmed the trial court decision. 

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