negligence

Plaintiff Lavant Jones slipped and fell inside the vestibule of defendant Rite Aid’s Willingboro store.  She slipped on a plastic tablecloth and brochure that had blown off a display table setup by Rite Aid to promote a flu vaccine program.  In Jones v. Rite Aid, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1201 (App. Div. July 17, 2023), Rite Aid contended that the trial court should not have charged the jury with the mode of operation doctrine. 

 The table had a cardboard sign that advertised flu vaccines, brochures, flu vaccine sign-up sheets, and hand sanitizer placed on the tablecloth.  Plaintiff contended that, due to her fall, she suffered injuries to her neck, right shoulder, back, wrists and hand.

Plaintiff testified at trial that she walked into the store with her eyes focused straight ahead.  She fell because she got tangled up with the tablecloth and the cardboard.  She denied seeing the display table near the entrance or the blue tablecloth prior to her fall. 

At the trial, plaintiff’s counsel requested that the mode of operation jury charge be given to the jury.  Defense counsel did not object.  After a four day trial, the jury found that the plaintiff had suffered a permanent injury and awarded her $700,000 in damages, plus pre-judgment interest.

Following the jury award, defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury verdict was “grossly” disproportionate to plaintiff’s injuries and the mode of operation charge was erroneous and resulted in prejudice.  As to the mode of operation jury charge, the trial court judge concluded the charge was appropriate because the brochures were part of the “self-service” setup and used for “self-service purposes.”  The judge found that there was a nexus between the self-service and touching the items on the display table, the hand sanitizer and the brochures moving around, the sign-up sheets and the blowing wind that allowed for the mode of operation charge.

Upon appeal, the Appellate Division considered whether the mode of operation charge was properly given by the trial court judge.  The Court noted that the mode of operation doctrine applies when a “dangerous condition is likely to occur as a result of the nature of the [defendant’s] business, the property’s condition, or a demonstrable pattern of conduct or incidents.”

Further, the Appellate Division noted that “when the defendant’s business has a “self-service method of operation, the defendant is required to anticipate debris falling on the ground because of the carelessness of either customers or employees.”  When plaintiff successfully demonstrates that the mode of operation rule applies, “then an inference of negligence arises and shifts the burden to the defendant to produce evidence that it did all that a reasonably prudent person would do in the light of the risk of injury that the self-service operation presented.”

After considering these principles, the Appellate Division rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court made a mistake in charging the jury on mode of operation.  The Court found that the trial court judge properly concluded that facts supported the mode of operation jury charge.  The trial court judge determined that there was a reasonable factual nexus between the self-service defendant provided, its display items, the heavy hand sanitizer bottle used to prevent items from blowing off the table because of the wind and defendant’s advertisements and brochures for flu shots and vaccines to support the mode of operation charge.  Further, the Appellate Division noted in plaintiff’s testimony that she fell because of the blue tablecloth and brochure.

The Court noted that defendant failed to demonstrate that the blue tablecloth and brochure landed on the floor for reasons unrelated to the wind.  The store’s personnel testified that they were aware of the wind blowing items off the table. The Appellate Division found that the trial court judge properly determined that “the mode of operation charge was appropriate because the brochure on the display table was part of the self-service setup and used for defendant’s self-service purposes.”  Thus, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s determination to charge the jury with the mode of operation doctrine.

By: Eric Richwine, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Plaintiff Michael Racine slipped and fell while walking inside defendant Rite Aid’s Irvington, New Jersey, store.  He suffered a fractured left tibia, resulting in him filing a complaint against the defendant, in which he alleged negligent maintenance of and failure to conduct reasonable inspections of the premises.  The trial judge had granted summary judgment to the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of any “dangerous condition” on the premises.  The issue on appeal in Racine v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 959 (App. Div. June 14, 2023) was whether constructive notice can be inferred by the presence of dirt in a condition.

Plaintiff testified that he had not noticed anything on the floor as he entered the store looking to purchase hair gel, which was on a shelf close to the entrance.  He reported that he soon after fell, and after which, he noticed a “dark greasy spot” on the floor which he believed to be a mixture of dirt with either hair gel or grease.

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial judge “drew all inferences against plaintiff rather than the reverse” and that he sufficiently established that defendant had “constructive notice of the condition that caused [plaintiff] to slip.”  The Appellate Division first considered whether the plaintiff was relieved of the burden to prove constructive notice via the mode of operation exception, i.e., by demonstrating that the dirty substance here was likely to occur as the result of the nature of Rite Aid’s business.  The Court quickly determined that this was not the case.

The Appellate Division then turned to whether or not a jury could find that defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition.  Plaintiff contended that, because “the substance appeared dirty,” the factfinder could logically infer that “the substance had been on the floor for a significant time.”  Plaintiff supported this argument by citing the Court’s decision in Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Stores, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1957), in which a plaintiff slipped and fell just inside an entrance of a store on an “all wet” and “all dirt” floor, which the Court declared was sufficient to put the defendant store on constructive notice.  

However, the Appellate Division distinguished the facts in Parmenter to those before the Court here; namely, the dirty, wet floor in the defendant store of Parmenter was the result of an all-morning rainstorm that was continuously tracking in dirt and rain into the store upon the opening and closing of its doors.

Here, there was no such storm.  The Court emphasized that, unlike in Parmenter, the plaintiff here could not identify the cause or duration of the “dangerous condition” of the dirty substance on the floor of the store.  Further, the Court rejected the contention that the presence of “dirt” permitted a speculative inference that the substance had been on the floor for an adequate period of time as to place the defendant on constructive notice.

As such, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that defendant was put on constructive notice of the dirty substance on its store’s floor, nor was he able to successfully argue that a jury could infer such. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

By: Ruhani Aulakh, Law Clerk

Editor: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Plaintiff Philip Pantano, an employee of Container Services of New Jersey (“CSNJ”), was moving a piece of heavy equipment at work.  Lawrence Giamella was also working that day and used a forklift to help move the equipment.  Giamella dropped the equipment on the plaintiff’s foot, causing permanent damage that led to amputation of the plaintiff’s foot.  The plaintiff brought a personal injury action against CSNJ and Marine Transport, Inc. (MT), both of which are owned by the same person.  The dispute in Pantano v. New York Shipping Ass’n, 2023 N.J. LEXIS 597 (June 5, 2023) was whether the question of an employer’s vicarious liability under the borrowed-employee doctrine is a question of law to be decided by the court or a question of fact reserved for the jury.

At the trial court level, the court dismissed the claims against all defendants except for CSNJ, MT, and the companies’ landlords.  The remaining defendants all sought summary judgment, with the court granting both the landlord and CSNJ’s motions.  In its motion for summary judgment, MT argued that it was not Giamella’s employer and thus not vicariously liable for his negligence.  MT argued that although Giamella was on its payroll, Giamella was a “borrowed employee” working for CSNJ at the time of the accident.

At the jury trial, MT moved for judgment at trial pursuant to R. 4:40-1 on the same “borrowed employee” theory it had raised in its motion for summary judgment.  The trial judge reserved judgment on the motion until after the jury verdict and instructed the jury to presume that MT was vicariously liable, as counsel assented to have the court resolve the borrowed-employee argument.  The jury awarded plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium.  Outside of the jury’s presence, the trial judge determined that Giamella was a borrowed employee working for CSNJ and vacated the jury verdict.

Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision.  The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and reinstated the jury verdict.  The Appellate Division emphasized that the trial judge erred in reaching a conclusion on the merits of the borrowed-employee question.  Because MT moved for judgment at trial, the judge should have performed a directed verdict analysis in accordance with R. 4:40-1’s requirements.  The Appellate Division applied the directed verdict standard and determined there was substantial evidence to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden under R. 4:40-1.

MT filed a petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court, largely arguing that the borrowed employee question is a purely legal one that should not be decided by a jury.  MT also argued that the Court should not consider how a jury may weigh the factors for borrowed employee determination which the Court set forth in Galvao v. G.R. Robert Const. Co., 179 N.J. 462 (2004).  Rather, the court should decide the issue on a plenary basis.

The Court granted certification solely on the issue of whether an employer’s vicarious liability under the borrowed-employee doctrine was one to be reserved for the jury.  In making its determination, the Court went through several cases that addressed the borrowed-employee doctrine.  Cases dating back to almost a century ago had ruled that a jury rather than a judge was who properly decided the borrowed-employee question.  Since then, the New Jersey courts have consistently held that the borrowed-employee question is presumptively a jury question.  The Court reasoned that although Galvao did not explicitly address the jury’s role in borrowed-employee disputes, nothing in the case changed the traditional allocation of the jury’s role in such disputes.

The Court did note, however, that not all disputes over borrowed-employee status must be sent to the jury.  Specifically, where the evidence is so one-sided that there are no genuine disputed facts, the court may decide the issue without a jury. 

After completing an analysis of the case history, the Court returned to the dispute at hand. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the evidence was not sufficiently one-sided that the issue may be decided without a jury.  While the Court would typically remand the issue so it may be presented to the jury to resolve, the Court took the parties’ agreement into consideration.  The parties emphasized that they did not desire a remand; rather, they would accept a reinstatement of the jury’s verdict.

As such, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court reinstated the jury’s verdict and held MT vicariously liable for the damages award. 

Plaintiff, Samira Aly, was a customer at defendant A&H Bagels.  While walking to throw out her trash, she fell and suffered a serious injury.  Both deposition and video surveillance footage showed a brown substance on the floor near where she fell.  The issue in Aly v. A&H Bagels & Deli, Inc., 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 695 (App. Div. May 8, 2023) was whether the trial judge made a mistake in refusing to charge the “mode of operation” standard in considering the summary judgment motion filed by the defendant A&H. 

Unfortunately, both the incident report and a log of inspections to the premises was lost in a subsequent fire.  However, Aly’s fall on the brown substance was documented through A&H Bagels’ surveillance footage but the footage was taken into police custody after the fire and never viewed by Aly.

At the trial court level, the defendant A&H filed a motion for a summary judgment dismissal, which was granted.  Plaintiff Aly appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to apply the appropriate “mode of operation” standard and, even absent the applicability of the mode of operation standard, the plaintiff argued that A&H Bagels should have had constructive notice of the brown substance on the floor near the trash receptacle.

While in a typical premises liability case, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had notice of the alleged dangerous condition that caused the accident, when the mode of operation rule applies, it creates an inference of negligence and the burden shifts to the defendant to negate the inference by submitting evidence of due care.  When this doctrine applies, it relieves the plaintiff of proving that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  Instead, it requires a defendant to show that it did “all that a reasonably prudent man would do in light of the risk of injury the mode of operation entailed.”

The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s failure to apply the mode of operation standard and found that it should have been applied.  The Court noted that “[l]ike the businesses previously found to have created the hazard by their self-service nature, A&H Bagel’s format requires courts to contemplate its duty through a mode of operation standard as well.”  Further, the Appellate Division found that the trial court failed to adhere to the summary judgment standard of giving all reasonable inferences to the plaintiff when it granted A&H Bagel’s motion.

The Court noted that the customers at the bagel shop purchased sandwiches, coffee in cups, and juices in closed containers at the counter and then carry their food and beverages to their seats to eat before disposing of their trash in the receptacle.  The customers wait on themselves after being served at a counter.  The Appellate Division noted that “this is exactly the situation where the burden should shift to the defendant to show that they acted reasonably considering this specific business format.”  Further, the Court held that “[t]he dangerous condition caused by the brown substance near the trash receptacle was a foreseeable risk posed by the bagel shop’s mode of operation.”  Hence, the Appeals Court found that the mode of operation rule did apply to this scenario.

The Appellate Division further reversed the trial court’s ruling that, even if the mode of operation rule did apply to this setting, A&H Bagels had met its burden because “they did all that a reasonably prudent shop would do considering the risk of injury the mode of operation entailed.”  The Appellate Division found that the trial court improperly concluded that A&H Bagels took all reasonable actions.  The Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact that only a jury could decide.  It was disputed exactly how much of the brown substance was on the floor, whether the brown substance caused the fall and also how soon before the fall were their inspections and garbage changes.  It should have been up to the jury to decipher whether defendant acted reasonably no matter whose burden it becomes to prove that.

Therefore, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal.  It found that the mode of operation standard should have been applied.  Further, assuming it is applied, the jury must decide whether the defendant acted reasonably based upon its “mode of operation” to protect its invitees from the alleged dangerous condition, i.e., the brown substance on the floor. 

Plaintiff Irina Galperin suffered an injury when she fell at Macy’s, located in the Garden State Plaza Shopping Center in Paramus, New Jersey, upon stepping from a tile walkway to a carpeted area.  While she initially claimed that she fell due to liquid on the floor, she later claimed that she fell when her foot got caught on the edge of the carpet which bordered the tile walkway inside the Macy’s store.  The issue in Galperin v. Macy’s, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 589 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2023) was whether plaintiff would be able to maintain a negligence claim against Macy’s in light of her failure to identify the exact dangerous condition which caused her fall and the lack of an expert to identify a breach of duty in the design of the flooring.

In answers to Interrogatories, plaintiff certified “she was caused to slip and fall due to a dangerous condition, namely liquid on the floor.”  However, in her deposition, she disavowed this response and stated that she was unable to identify anything on the floor that caused or contributed to the fall.  She submitted an amended Interrogatory answer, stating that when she fell, the front of her right foot got caught on the edge of the carpet which bordered the tile walkway.  Further, she testified at her deposition that the incident occurred after she stepped off the escalator and walked toward the store’s exit.  She stated that there were too many people in the aisle and, while trying to go around the customers, she fell on the border of tile and carpet and struck a table display with a metal frame.  As for the cause of her fall, she simply stated it was the border between the tile and carpet. 

At the trial court level, Macy’s filed a motion for a summary judgment dismissal, arguing that plaintiff failed to identify a dangerous condition that caused her accident and she did not establish Macy’s possessed actual or constructive notice of any such condition.  Further, to the extent that plaintiff was maintaining that the purported height differential constituted a hazardous condition, Macy’s argued that “any claim was beyond the ken of the average juror thereby requiring expert testimony, which she failed to provide.”

The trial court agreed with Macy’s that plaintiff had failed to offer any proof of a dangerous condition.  The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that “the mere existence of a transition from tile to a carpet, without even some kind of torn or ripped carpet, broken tiles, or misleveled surface, constituted a dangerous condition.”  Further, plaintiff had failed to submit any factual or expert proofs that the flooring violated some code or regulation or standard that a reasonably prudent business owner would meet.  The court agreed that a claim that the border between the tile and the carpet created a defect required expert testimony. 

Hence, the trial court granted the summary judgment as to Macy’s.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff made the same arguments to the Appellate Division that were made to the trial court.  However, the Appellate Division rejected those arguments and agreed with the trial court and noted that the “mere showing of an accident causing the injuries sued upon is not alone sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence.”  The Court noted that the plaintiff had failed to identify anything related to the tile or carpet that caused her to fall.  The vague statements that her foot caught on the edge of the carpet and something between the tiles and the carpet caused her to fall were found to be insufficient to establish a dangerous condition.  Further, the Appellate Division agreed that an expert would be necessary to establish the existence of a dangerous condition that the transition area was dangerous due to a design or installation defect.

Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision, stating that “[i]n light of plaintiff’s inability to identify the circumstances of her fall, expert testimony was necessary to establish the area where she fell was in some manner dangerous, if for no other reason than to exclude other potential causes of the accident and avoid pure speculation by the factfinder.” 

Plaintiff Stephanie Ugaro was injured at work when a ceiling tile fell on her while she was in the bathroom. She sued the defendants who owned, managed and maintained the building where she worked under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  The issue in Ugaro v. Livingston Circle Associates, L.P., 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 381 (App. Div. Mar. 16, 2023) was whether the elements of res ipsa loquitur had been established so as to create a presumption of negligence by defendants.

Plaintiff had been employed by Verizon to work at a call center located in Livingston, New Jersey which was owned by defendant Livingston Circle Associates (“Livingston”) and managed by Eastman Management Corporation (“Eastman”).  Pursuant to the lease between Verizon and Livingston, Livingston had the obligation to maintain all parts of the building which included replacing all plumbing in bathrooms.

One evening, plaintiff went into the women’s restroom on the third floor of the building.  After she entered one of the stalls, the ceiling tile above the stall collapsed and struck her.

She sued the defendants, alleging that they were negligent in failing to provide safe premises to her as an employee of a tenant – a business invitee.  The defendants certified that their investigation of the incident disclosed that the cause of the ceiling collapse was water leaking from a broken pipe.  They determined that the water had leaked from the pipe, had accumulated on the ceiling tile above the third floor bathroom, which caused the tile to become saturated with water and collapse. 

At the trial court level, defendants filed for a summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff could not show that they had been negligent because they had no notice that the broken pipe was leaking water.  In opposition, the plaintiff argued the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur created a presumption of negligence and a jury should decide if defendants can rebut that presumption. 

The trial court considered plaintiff’s argument and determined that the plaintiff had established two of the three elements necessary to establish res ipsa loquitur, i.e. that the building and its components, including the ceiling tile and pipes, were under the exclusive control of defendants and plaintiff’s injury was not the result of her own voluntary act or neglect.  The third prong, however, was the issue, which was whether the occurrence “bespoke negligence.” 

The trial court reasoned that plaintiff was unable to establish the third prong because the root cause of the ceiling collapse was not visible or accessible for purposes of inspection or repair without breaching a wall or floor.  Plaintiff had failed to proffer any evidence as to the specific cause of the plumbing failure.  She also did not offer an expert as to the “proper protocols, policies or procedures for inspection, testing or maintenance of a plumbing system in a commercial building of this character, including of piping that is obscured by walls, floors and ceilings.”  Hence, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants.

The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order and contended that she did establish all three elements for the application of the res ipsa loquitur presumption and that the case should have been decided by a jury whether defendants were liable.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court decision.  It agreed with the plaintiff that the three elements triggering the res ipsa loquitur inference were established.  Thus, the question of whether defendants can rebut their presumption of negligence must be presented to a jury.

The Court pointed out that res ipsa loquitur “is an equitable doctrine that allows, in appropriate circumstances, a permissive inference of negligence to be drawn against a party who exercises control of premises with an unsafe condition that causes injury to another.”  If this inference applies, it will ordinarily allow the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and survive a motion to dismiss at the summary judgment stage.  If the case goes to trial, and the jury is instructed on the res ipsa loquitur inference, the jury may accept or reject the inference.

The Appellate Division agreed that there was no dispute that plaintiff established two of the elements of the res ipsa loquitur inference.  It was undisputed that defendants maintained exclusive control over the maintenance and upkeep of the building.  Further, it was undisputed that plaintiff’s injuries were not the result of her own voluntary act or neglect.  The remaining issue was whether “the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence.”

The Court found that the focus of the defendants and the trial court was misplaced.  It noted that plaintiff was injured by a falling ceiling tile and that a ceiling tile does not ordinarily fall, and if it does, that occurrence “bespeaks negligence.”  The defendants’ proofs concerning the leaking pipe were not “so overwhelming that they destroy any reasonable inference of negligence.”  The Appellate Division pointed out that the jury need not accept plaintiff’s inference that defendants were negligent and need not accept defendants’ contention that it would be unreasonable to inspect pipes which were within a wall.

The Court noted that once a res ipsa loquitur inference was established, the burden shifts to defendants to present countervailing proofs that were so overwhelming that they destroy any reasonable inference of negligence.  Here, the defendants never offered any explanation as to why the pipe broke, nor were there any proofs in the record as to how long the pipe was leaking before sufficient water accumulated on the ceiling tile and caused the tile to fall on plaintiff.  Plus, the Appellate Division found that “a reasonable jury could accept plaintiff’s inference of negligence and reject defendants’ arguments that it would be unreasonable for them to conduct an inspection of pipes in bathrooms, even pipes enclosed in walls.”

The Appellate Division also rejected the idea that an expert report was essential to plaintiff’s case.  It noted that the facility manager testified that there was an access panel in one of the fourth floor bathrooms, which was easily opened and, at that point, one could see indications that water was leaking behind the wall.  The facility manager explained that he would need to break through the wall to see the pipe itself, but that water damage could be seen before he broke the wall.   Hence, the Court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants were negligent in not conducting at least periodic inspections to look through the access panel.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s decision.  The Court found that the res ipsa loquitur inference should be charged to the jury “and the jury can determine whether it accepts the inference or accepts defendants’ explanation for why they were not negligent.”  Therefore, the Court reversed the summary judgment order in favor of the defendants and remanded the matter for trial.

Plaintiff Thomas Seltzer, an employee of Bloomingdale’s, was injured when he fell on a staircase used solely for Bloomingdale employees in the store.  He sued the mall owner Riverside Square for negligence, claiming that it had some degree of control over the staircase which allegedly had irregular steps.  The issue in Seltzer v. Riverside Square Limited Partnership, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 453 (App. Div. Mar. 27, 2023) was whether the defendant mall owner owed a duty to plaintiff if it did not own or maintain Bloomingdale’s or the interior staircase.

Bloomingdale’s, which was built as a stand-alone department store in 1959, was now part of a 2-level enclosed shopping mall constructed around it.  The mall was owned and operated by Riverside Square.  Under the terms of an agreement with Bloomingdale’s, Riverside Square had no authority to modify Bloomingdale’s or the staircase.

The defendant Riverside Square moved for a summary judgment dismissal, contending that it owed no duty to Seltzer because it did not own or maintain Bloomingdale’s or the staircase.  The trial court judge denied summary judgment.  The court found that “there are genuine issues of material fact relative to both the subject accident and the issue of control and the degree thereof, regarding the overall area where [Seltzer] had his trip and fall accident is a disputed fact.”  The court felt that it had to accept Seltzer’s version of facts, and as such grant him the benefit of all inferences that such facts support. 

Riverside Square filed an application before the Appellate Division on an interlocutory basis, seeking leave to appeal.  The Appellate Division agreed to accept the interlocutory appeal. [“Interlocutory” means the appeal is filed before the final conclusion of the case.]

The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s decision.  The Court found that the trial court was incorrect in finding that there were genuine issues of material fact.  The Appellate Division pointed out that there was no question that there was a valid agreement concerning Riverside Square’s responsibility and obligations toward Bloomingdale’s property.

The Court further held that Riverside Square did not owe a duty to Seltzer.  It pointed out that the staircase where Seltzer was injured was part of Bloomingdale’s premises when the department store was built, long before the mall was built.  The Court noted that there was no support in the record for Seltzer’s contention that Riverside Square “retains some degree of control and responsibility over issues such as repairs and maintenance, even on property of its admitted tenant Bloomingdale’s.”  Additionally, the Appellate Division held that under the clear terms of the agreement with Bloomindale’s, Riverside Square had no obligation to maintain any aspect of Bloomingdale’s premises.  Further, there were no facts indicating Riverside Square exercised any control or maintenance over the staircase that would contradict its interpretation of the agreement.

Thus, Seltzer’s liability expert’s opinion concerning the construction and maintenance of the staircase was “of no import” because Riverside Square did not construct the staircase and had no duty to ensure it could be safely traversed.

Thus, the Appellate Division found that there were no genuine issues of material facts in dispute and that Riverside Square was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  Therefore, it reversed the trial court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for an entry of an order granting summary judgment dismissal of Seltzer’s action.

Plaintiff Karimah Sharif slipped and fell, allegedly on ice, while walking down the exterior steps of the rear entrance of defendant’s commercial building.  On the morning of the accident, plaintiff had visited her son who had an office in the building and did not notice any ice on the steps.  The issue in Sharif v. Dominant Domain, LLC, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 368 (App. Div. Mar. 14, 2023) was whether the plaintiff was entitled to pursue a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant commercial property owner when she did not recall seeing ice, nor was plaintiff able to prove that the defendant property owner had actual or constructive notice of the ice on the steps.

While the plaintiff did not notice any ice while walking up the steps upon her arrival, when she left the building, she started going down the steps and ended up on the ground.  She testified at her deposition that she saw ice on the bottom steps but could not recall exactly how many of the five steps she traversed had ice.  Plaintiff could not recall seeing ice on the top couple of steps, which she claimed she slipped upon. 

It did not snow or rain on the day of the accident and plaintiff could not recall the last time it had snowed.  The owner of the building testified at a deposition that there was no precipitation on the steps, although there were leftover piles of snow from the previous storm.  Based upon the owner’s observation immediately after the accident, she did not observe any ice on the steps.

Further, the owner and her operations manager examined the steps each time they entered or exited the building.  The stairs were inspected up to 20 times a day.  However, on the day of the incident, the owner had entered the building only once before plaintiff’s fall.

The defendant property owner filed for a summary judgment, claiming that there was no evidence to demonstrate that it possessed actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition on the stairs.  The trial court judge rejected plaintiff’s claim and found that plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  Further, the trial court noted that the plaintiff failed to present an expert liability report to establish a standard of care regarding snow removal protocols and noted that the stairs were inspected several times a day.

Upon appeal, the Appellate Division agreed that the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of an alleged dangerous condition to pursue a negligence claim.  Further, the Appellate Division noted that “[a] defendant may counter with evidence it conducted regular inspections of the site where the injury occurred.”  To prove constructive notice, the plaintiff had to prove that the condition existed “for such a length of time as reasonably to have resulted in knowledge and correction had the defendant been reasonably diligent.” 

The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that there were no facts to support that the defendant proprietor had actual or constructive notice of an icy condition prior to plaintiff’s fall.  The Court noted the plaintiff’s lack of recall of seeing ice on the steps she fell upon either prior or after her fall.  She failed to offer evidence of weather conditions that could have proven ice accumulated on the steps between the time she went into the building in the morning and at the time she exited in the afternoon.  Further, she could not recall the last time it had snow or precipitated.

The Appellate Division noted the undisputed testimony that the proprietor and her staff frequently checked the exterior pathways around the building.  Further, it pointed out that the proprietor did not see any ice or precipitation in this area before or after the accident.  Thus, plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the defendant proprietor had actual or constructive notice of an icy condition on the steps. 

Finally, the Court noted that to the extent plaintiff attempted to claim a structural defect of an adjacent gutter which may have dripped and caused a patch of ice, she was required to proffer an expert report “about the construction, design, condition, or maintenance of the gutter or its placement in relation to the stairs.”  Hence, the Appellate Division found that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence and held that the defendants were entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.  Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case.

Plaintiff Adel Hanna fell in the parking lot of the Woodland condominium complex on January 7, 2017, slipping on snow and ice in an unplowed parking lot.  The issue in Hanna v. Woodland Community Association, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2180 (App. Div. Nov. 17, 2022) was whether the defendant owner and property manager were entitled to a summary judgment dismissal based upon the ongoing storm rule enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props., 246 N.J. 546 (2021). 

The plaintiff sued both the owner of the property, Woodland Community Association (“Woodland”), and the management company, Diversified Property Management for his fall. Woodland had contracted with A. Guzzo Landscaping, LLC to provide snow and ice removal services for the property.  Plaintiff Hanna was a resident of the community and fell while walking through the snow to his daughter’s house.

The defendants filed for a summary judgment, relying upon the Pareja decision, where the Court adopted the “ongoing storm rule.” This rule held that “commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the conclusion of the storm.”  The trial court found that there were two storms on January 6 and January 7 and noted that plaintiff fell within an hour after the snow stopped falling on January 7.  Thus, the trial court found defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty pursuant to the ongoing storm rule.

While the trial court acknowledged that there was an exception to the ongoing storm rule for a pre-existing storm, it found that “there is no credible evidence in this record supporting the existence of left over ice from the January 6 storm.”  The plaintiff appealed this ruling and argued that the trial court should have found that summary judgment was precluded because he fell on ice from a pre-existing storm, which had not been remediated.

The facts showed that the snow on January 6 stopped falling at about 5:30 a.m. and left about one inch of snow.  The parties do not dispute that the snow contractor, Guzzo, was not called out to perform any snow or ice remediation for that storm.  In fact, no defendant took any remedial step with respect to the one inch of snow that fell on the ground.

Temperatures on that date rose above freezing.  The plaintiff’s expert report found that a combination of some sunshine and the above freezing temperatures resulted in a portion of the residual snow cover to melt and generate run off snow melt water, which then froze.

On the 7th, snow fell from about 4:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., leaving about 7 inches of snow.  The temperatures that day were well below freezing.  The lot was plowed from 11:00 a.m. to midnight.  This accident occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of January 7.  According to the plaintiff, the parking lot he walked through had not yet been plowed.  Plaintiff, through his expert, claimed that he slipped on ice that formed on the evening of January 6, when the one inch of snow that fell that morning melted, then refroze.  He claimed that the ice was then covered over by the snow on January 7.

Upon appeal, plaintiff Hanna alleged that the ongoing storm rule did not relieve the defendants of their duty to maintain the common elements of the condominium.  He claimed that the ongoing storm rule did not apply to condominium associations.  The Appellate Division rejected that argument, finding no distinction between a condominium association and a commercial landowner for purposes of the application of the ongoing storm rule.

Hence, the Appellate Division found that the ongoing storm rule did apply.  Pursuant to this rule, it suspends a landowner’s duty until a reasonable time after the cessation of precipitation and the duty arises within a reasonable time after the storm.  The Court noted that the ruling “makes clear landowners need not have all snow and ice cleared the moment snow stops falling.”

In this case, plaintiff fell within an hour after the snow stopped, according to his own expert reports.  Given the 7 inch snow storm falling on a 75 acre commercial property, it was not a reasonable time to have completed all snow removal activities within one hour of the snowstorm ending. 

However, the Appellate Division did find that there was a question in fact as to the defendants’ potential liability due to the pre-existing risk exception to the ongoing storm rule.  The Court found that there was a question of fact whether the January 6 storm actually created a pre-existing risk.  Because Hanna did see ice on the ground after he fell, the Appellate Division found that there was a reasonable inference from that finding that the ice Hanna saw was from the January 6 storm. 

Thus, the Court found that when that ice formed was a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment.  Because there was a factual question as to whether this exception to the ongoing storm rule applied, the Appellate Division reversed the summary judgment as to the defendant property owner and management company and remanded the matter back for trial.

Plaintiff Alejandra Padilla slipped and fell on the sidewalk adjoining a vacant lot in Camden, which was owned by the defendants Myo Soon and Young Il an.  She claimed to have suffered permanent injuries as a result of her fall.  The issue in Padilla v. Young Il an, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 14 (App. Div. Jan. 4, 2023), was whether the defendants, as owners of the vacant lot, abutting the public sidewalk, owed a duty to the plaintiff to safely maintain that sidewalk.

At the trial court level, the defendants filed for a summary judgment dismissal on the basis that they did not owe a duty to plaintiff.  The trial court judge agreed, based upon prior precedent, that “they had no duty to maintain the sidewalk because it abutted a vacant lot which was not generating any income.”  The trial court judge rejected the plaintiff’s argument that defendants could have generated income by either developing or selling the property.  While the trial court judge acknowledged that the prior Supreme Court case of Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., held that the owner of a commercial property had a duty to the plaintiff to safely maintain an abutting sidewalk, the subsequent Appellate Division decision of Abraham v. Gupta found that duty did not apply where the property could not generate income to purchase liability insurance.

Upon appeal, the plaintiff renewed her argument that Stewart should apply because the property was capable of generating income by operation of a commercial activity on it and defendants bought and sold the property for a commercial profit.  Further, plaintiff noted that there was a municipal ordinance that required that the sidewalks in the City “shall be kept in repair by the owner or owners of the abutting property at the cost and expense of the owner or owners of the lands in front of which any such sidewalk is constructed.”

Upon appeal, the Appellate Division rejected the argument that the ordinance provided any private remedy to persons injured as a result of the breach of the ordinance.  It reaffirmed the longstanding precedent regarding the lack of liability for violation of the duty imposed by an ordinance upon abutting property owners to maintain sidewalks.  The Appellate Division also agreed with the trial court judge that the Abraham case remained good law that an owner of an non-income producing vacant lot owes no duty to the public to maintain the lot’s abutting sidewalk in a safe condition.  Thus, it affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit. 

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