negligence

Plaintiff Artherine Price was at the Quaker Bridge Mall on May 10, 2018, when she twisted her ankle in the parking lot of the Mall.  She claims that she fell in the crosswalk while walking from her parked car to enter the store and sued the Mall defendants for her injuries.  The issue in Price v. Quaker Bridge Mall, LLC., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 591 (App. Div. April 10, 2024) was whether the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed due to her failure to identify the exact cause of her injury.

Plaintiff testified that her ankle twisted, and she almost fell as she was in the crosswalk.  She could not identify the exact location of where the incident occurred within the crosswalk.  She also testified that she never saw anything in the crosswalk, before or after the incident that caused her to twist her ankle.  Even after the incident, when she returned to the crosswalk with the security guard, she was unable to point to the specific spot where the incident occurred.  The best she could state was that the incident occurred in an area where the pavement was cracked.  Hence, she believed that the cracked or broken pavement caused her to twist her ankle.

The Mall defendants filed for a summary judgment dismissal based upon the plaintiff’s deposition testimony.  The trial court judge found that there was no dispute that plaintiff was injured in the Mall’s parking lot.  However, the issue was that plaintiff could not establish causation.  Even when she went to the location a few days later and took photographs, she was unable to identify any particular cause.  Because the mere happening of an accident was insufficient to establish negligence, the trial court judge granted defendants’ summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff appealed that decision to the Appellate Division.

Upon appeal, Plaintiff acknowledged that her deposition testimony had inconsistencies regarding causation and that a jury could conclude at trial that such inconsistencies adversely affected her credibility.  Plaintiff argued that they did not provide a basis for the trial court judge to disregard her testimony and grant defendant’s summary judgment.

The Appellate Division noted that proximate causation is a basic element of tort law.  The court stated that “[to] establish causation a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s act or omission was both the factual and proximate cause of his or her injury.”  It would be the factual cause if, but for the event, the injury probably would not have happened.

Here, the Appellate Division was convinced that defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  The Court noted “that [t]he judge’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and reveal there is no dispute of fact regarding causation.”  The Court further pointed out that plaintiff was unable to establish that “but for” defendants’ actions or omission she would not have twisted her ankle because she cannot establish what condition caused her to twist her ankle. 

Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that she failed to make a showing sufficient to establish causation, which is an essential element of her case.  Therefore, the Court agreed that defendants were entitled to summary judgment and affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing her lawsuit. 

Plaintiff Reginald Jones was injured when he was attempting to cross in the middle of Isabella Avenue in Irvington.  While stepping off the curb, his foot became stuck in a hole in the street adjacent to the curb.  It caused him to fall and suffer injuries.  The issue in Jones v. Township of Irvington, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 176 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2024) was whether he could pursue a claim against the Township for its failure to remediate the pothole. 

Personal injury claims against public entities are governed by the Tort Claims Act.  To be able to sue a public entity for tort liability for injuries caused by that entity’s property, under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, the plaintiff must establish the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury and that the condition was either created by an employee of the public entity or the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition. However, even if the plaintiff is able to present those proofs, the public entity would not be liable for the dangerous condition of its property “if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.”

There were two issues in this case.  First, the issue was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently established that there was a dangerous condition of the Township’s property at the time of his accident.  Second, the issue was whether the Township had notice that the property was in a hazardous condition.

While the parties conducted discovery, there were no depositions taken and there were no experts retained.  The only evidence of the pothole were 11 photographs of the roadway produced by the plaintiff.  The photographs showed a hole which was surrounded by vegetation growth, cracked, and filled with garbage and vegetation.  According to the plaintiff, the hole measured about 19 inches long, 19 inches wide, and 16 inches deep.

Once discovery concluded, the Township filed for a summary judgment.  It argued that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a dangerous condition of its property.  Plaintiff opposed that motion, arguing that the Township had constructive notice of the ‘“large sinkhole.’”

The trial court judge granted the motion for summary judgment.  The judge ruled that plaintiff had failed to present any competent evidence other than speculation and legal conclusion to prove that the hole was in a dangerous condition.  The trial court judge noted that the only evidence in support of the condition of the property were the photographs attached to plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories which were not glossy color photos, nor were they provided with any certification stating who took the photos and when they were taken. Further, the plaintiff failed to prove that the Township had notice of the condition.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, again on the same basis due to the plaintiff’s failure to prove the Township had prior notice of the condition or had adequate proofs as to its actual condition.  The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff had failed to establish liability under the Tort Claims Act due to lack of evidence that the Township either caused the hole in the street or had actual or constructive notice of the hole. In support of the notice argument, plaintiff cited to a Township Public Works website that street sweepers were on Isabella Avenue twice a week.  However, the Court found this information insufficient to show that the Township had constructive notice of the hole. 

The Court also found that plaintiff had failed to offer any expert testimony or proofs showing that there were any reports about the hole which could have established that the Township had actual notice thereof.  Last, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff had failed to submit any proofs that the Township acted in a “palpably unreasonable manner.”  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff’s claim was based on nothing more than ‘“mere speculation.’”

The appeals court also agreed with the trial court that the photographs themselves were insufficient competent evidence due to the lack of foundation as to these photographs.  The plaintiff had failed to offer any competent testimony “concerning the measurements of the hole, who took the photographs, when they were taken, and if they were altered.” 

Hence, the Appellate Division agreed that plaintiff failed to meet his burden under the Tort Claims Act to “establish that the Township had or could have had actual or constructive notice of the hole in the middle of Isabella Avenue.”  Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit. 

This case involved an emotional distress claim filed by plaintiff Richard Sperazza in waking up to find the body of his murdered friend and co-worker in the hotel room they were sharing during a work assignment.  Plaintiff and his deceased friend and co-worker were sharing a hotel room during an out of town work assignment.  The issue in Strayer v. Wingate at Wyndham, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 90 (App. Div. Jan. 19, 2024) was whether the plaintiff had a claim for a negligent infliction of emotional distress against the defendant Wingate at Wyndham for the emotional harm he suffered on waking up to find the body of his murdered friend and co-worker in their hotel room.

Plaintiff Sperazza had been employed by Osmose Utilities Services, Inc. as a technician who worked with his friend and roommate, Ivan Scott Strayer.  Plaintiff, Strayer, and other utility workers were assigned to work crews which travelled to various locations around the country and lived together in hotels while on assignment.  Plaintiff and Strayer had been hotel roommates on other work assignments and also socialized frequently outside of work.  Plaintiff was the best man at Strayer’s wedding and plaintiff considered Strayer family and attended his family functions.

Plaintiff and other members of the Osmose work crew had been staying at the Wingate Hotel in Vineland.  The crew consisted of five crew members including plaintiff, Strayer and two brothers, Charles Pulcine and his brother Larry Pulcine, and the crew leader, Mark Knowles.  Larry Pulcine had recently joined the crew.  Knowles made the hotel reservations and advised the front desk clerk who was staying in which room.  The crew members were assigned to three rooms in which plaintiff and Strayer were assigned to Room 404, the Pulcine brothers were assigned to Room 405 and Knowles was assigned to Room 406.

On the evening of the murder, plaintiff ate at a restaurant located in front of the hotel.  Strayer eventually met him at the restaurant but returned to the hotel room.  When plaintiff returned later to their hotel room around 10:00, he observed the television was on and Strayer appeared to be sleeping.  Thereafter, he received a text message from Chuck Pulcine, inviting him to hang out and drink some beers in his room.  At about 10:05 p.m., plaintiff went to Pulcine’s room, although he briefly returned to his room to grab a few beers while Strayer stayed in their hotel room.  He then returned to the Pulcines’ room where he stayed until about 11:30 p.m.

While plaintiff was in the Pulcines’ room, Larry had left for about 30 minutes, stating he was going to do laundry and when he returned, Larry was “shooting his mouth off.” Therefore, plaintiff returned to his hotel room and went to sleep.

When plaintiff woke up around 5:00 to 5:15 a.m. and Strayer was still in bed, plaintiff went over to look at him.  He noticed that “his eyes were open” but “nothing really going on.”  He grabbed his foot which was ice cold, checked his pulse twice and panicked and ran out of the room.  He felt shock at finding his friend’s body and feared for his own safety.  He later learned that Strayer had been shot with a handgun.  However, plaintiff did not witness the murder and did not encounter the murderer in his hotel room and, further, was not physically harmed himself.

It was later learned that Larry had obtained a key card from the front desk to the plaintiff’s room and shot Strayer sometime between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m. while plaintiff was across the hall in the Pulcines’ hotel room. 

Strayer’s wife brought a wrongful death and survivorship action against the defendant hotel, among other defendants.  Plaintiff brought a separate action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for discovering the body of his murdered friend.

Plaintiff obtained a hotel management operations expert who opined that the Wingate Hotel “was aware of its safety obligations and deviated from the industry standard of care that created a foreseeable risk of harm to the hotel’s guests.”  Further, the expert opined that “Larry’s criminal acts were the type of criminal activity that adequate safety and security measures are intended to prevent and were, therefore foreseeable.”  According to the expert, the failure to identify or properly register the Osmose crew was inconsistent with proper keycard control “and resulted in a foreseeable risk of harm to guests.”  The expert opined “that the implementation and enforcement of a proper keycard controlled protocol system could have prevented Larry’s unauthorized entry into plaintiff’s and Strayer’s room.”

At the trial court level, the defendants moved for a summary judgment, which was granted.  The trial court judge found that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that defendant hotel’s actions proximately caused plaintiff’s emotional injuries.  He found that the injuries were not based upon the handing of a keycard and that neither defendants nor their employees caused any of the emotional distress being suffered by plaintiff.  While acknowledging that defendant’s employee should not have given the keycard to Larry Pulcine, he noted that the crew members were all friends and he had seen them together and it was not as if he was giving a keycard to a stranger.

This appeal ensued.  Plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake in granting defendant’s summary judgment because he has a direct claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon defendants’ breach of duty it owed directly to him.  Plaintiff relied on the case of Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559 (1965) in support of his claim for emotional distress.  The Appellate Division rejected this argument.

For a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress for witnessing harm suffered by others, the individual must be able to allege that they were “fearful of immediate injury.”  The Appellate Division found that, under these facts, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.  While he may have felt fear when he discovered his roommate’s dead body, there was no evidence in the record that he had a “reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.”  To the contrary, plaintiff did not even realize at the time that Strayer had been murdered and he thought that Strayer had died from natural causes.  He did not encounter the murderer in his hotel room and was not present when Strayer was murdered.  Because of his failure to present any evidence that he suffered a reasonable fear of personal injury, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff was unable to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Hence, it upheld the trial court decision, granting summary judgment and dismissing the case.

Plaintiff Richard Finaldi (“Finaldi”) was in an automobile accident with defendant Matthew Knight (“Knight”), one of defendant Cornucopia Logistics, LLC’s (“Cornucopia”) dispatchers.  Knight had stolen a Cornucopia delivery van, fell asleep while operating the van, went through a red light and collided with plaintiff Finaldi.  Plaintiff Finaldi suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident.  An issue in Finaldi v. Knight, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 7 (App. Div. Jan. 3, 2024) was whether the defendant Cornucopia could be held responsible for its employee’s actions in causing this accident. 

Cornucopia had an agreement with Amazon to deliver groceries ordered through Amazon Fresh.  Pursuant to its agreement, Cornucopia had exclusive responsibility for its employees and employment conditions.  It used leased delivery vans to make the deliveries, which it stored at the Amazon Fulfillment Center in Avenel, where Cornucopia also had an office.

Back at the time of the accident, Cornucopia had several employees at this facility including managers, four dispatchers and about thirty drivers, each for the morning and the night shifts.  Each shift had one dispatcher.  The dispatcher would log in and assign the drivers their routes.  When a driver clocked in, the dispatcher would give them a handbag containing a key to a van, an EZ pass, vehicle registration and insurance and a scanner which permitted the drivers to scan each package in and out.  The scanner also acted as a GPS and had a camera.  It allowed supervisors to see where each driver had dropped off their last package.

When the vans were not in use, Cornucopia kept the keys in a cabinet behind the dispatch table.  It was supposed to be locked after the dispatcher checked in the drivers and gave them their handbags.  Each dispatcher had a key to the cabinet, as well as two of the managers.  The standard operating procedure was for the dispatcher to log in each key and take inventory of those keys.  The dispatcher would count the keys after the drivers returned.  If one of the dispatchers discovered a key was missing, they would see if the vehicle was in the parking lot and, if not, notify one of the managers.

Knight, initially worked for Cornucopia as a driver but, after his license was suspended, he became a dispatcher.  This position did not require driving so he could continue to work at Cornucopia.

The day before the accident, Knight had stolen the van to assist his mother in moving.  His plan had been to return the van to the facility in time for the next shift.  He entered the facility, found the cabinet with the keys to the van unlocked and took one of them.  Only after the accident did Knight inform the Cornucopia fleet coordinator that he had taken the van.  No one at Cornucopia knew the van was missing until after the accident.  According to the testimony, this was the first time that an employee had used a van for personal use. 

Plaintiff sued for Cornucopia for both negligent hiring and retention, as well as general negligence.

At the trial court level, Cornucopia moved for a summary judgment which was granted as to both claims.  The court found that Cornucopia owed no duty to plaintiffs because Cornucopia had no reason to know “that there was an enhanced risk of harm to a third-party by hiring Knight to work as a dispatcher.”  The court also found that there was no history of Cornucopia employees stealing vehicles and that it had adequate security measures in place.

Further, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs failed to establish that Cornucopia’s actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.  The court reasoned that Knight was not working at the time of the accident, he was not using the vehicle with Cornucopia’s permission, and Cornucopia took reasonable precautions to prevent against such actions.

A motion for reconsideration was also denied.  This appeal ensued.  Upon appeal, the Appellate Division noted that the threshold question was whether Cornucopia owed a duty to plaintiffs.  The Court held that for a Court to impose a duty, “there must be a foreseeable risk of harm.”  Plaintiffs argued in the appeal that Cornucopia’s employees did not follow its procedures to prevent and detect the theft of the van.

The Appellate Division rejected that argument.  It found that Cornucopia’s policy in keeping the keys in a locked cabinet, having the dispatcher on duty take inventory of them twice every shift, and that the Avenel facility not being in a high crime area did not result in an imposition of a duty upon Cornucopia. 

Further, the Appellate Division noted that Cornucopia had no reason to suspect an employee would take a van for their own personal use.  Its policies prohibited an employee from taking the delivery vans for their own use and an employee could be terminated for violating that policy. 

Hence, the appeals court declined to follow plaintiff’s argument that the unauthorized use of the van and the accident were sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty upon Cornucopia.  Moreover, the Court noted that even if it was foreseeable that an employee would steal one of the vans, it could not have known that Knight, who had no prior accidents as a driver for the company, would doze off at the wheel and collide with the plaintiff.  

Additionally, the Appellate Division rejected plaintiff’s argument that Cornucopia was negligent in promoting Knight to a dispatcher position after his license was suspended.  A license suspension alone did not suggest an employee would be deceitful or prone to theft.  It would not have put Cornucopia on notice that he would use its vehicle in violation of company policy.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision, dismissing the case as to Cornucopia.

Plaintiff Cheryl King was a guest at the defendant Harrah’s Atlantic City Hotel.  While walking through her hotel room, she hit her leg on the corner of the bed frame which caused her to trip and hit her head on the wall.  The issue in King v. Harrah’s Atlantic City Operating Co., LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70806 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2023) was whether the defendant hotel breached any duty owed to plaintiff that caused her injury.

Plaintiff claimed that the bed frame was improperly exposed and, thus, created a dangerous tripping hazard.  However, she had slept in the room at least once and had not reported any issues with the bed or the bed frame until after she fell.  She claimed that the defendant hotel was liable for her injuries and negligence because it knew of the alleged defect in the bed frame prior to her stay but had never sought to correct it.

It was not disputed that the defendant hotel owed plaintiff a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Rather, the issue was whether plaintiff could adequately demonstrate that defendant breached its duty.

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal.  It claimed that it was not liable for her alleged trip and fall incident.

To establish a breach of duty care, plaintiff must prove “that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the accident.”  The dangerous condition of the property must involve an unreasonable risk of harm.  The District Court noted that not every property condition on which persons can hurt themselves is unreasonably dangerous or hazardous.

Based upon the facts of this case, the plaintiff did not claim that the bed frame was broken or damaged, that it blocked her path as she walked around her hotel room, or that the bed frame ever moved from the original position it had presumably always occupied prior to her fall.  Her claim was that it was “defective” because one particular corner extended out beyond the mattress.

The District Court noted the following: “while it is clear that plaintiff tripped over a bed frame, the Court fails to comprehend based on the record before it how the bed frame was defective or otherwise posed an reasonable risk of harm.”  The Court found that the plaintiff had not submitted any evidence suggesting that the danger of this particular bed frame differed from the ordinary risks inherent in any other bed frame.  Further, she offered no expert testimony demonstrating that the bed frame created a dangerous condition or that it was contrary to industry standards.  The Court found that “plaintiff has failed to fully articulate any real defect at all, much less prove the existence of a dangerous one.”

Further, the Court noted that any danger that the bed frame could have posed was “undoubtedly neutralized by its clear and obvious visibility in the room.”    The simple fact that plaintiff tripped and fell does not make the bed frame unreasonably dangerous or hazardous as a matter of law.  Further, the Court found that it did not diminish the bed frame’s plain visibility, the appropriateness of its placement, or lessen the expectation that plaintiff should have taken reasonable care as she walked to avoid this particular injury. 

Based upon the facts, the District Court found that no reasonable jury could find that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the bed frame as a dangerous condition.  Any reasonable prudent person would have observed, in light of the dimensions of the bed, its presence in his or her lane of travel.  Because plaintiff could not prove that defendant breached its duty of care, the District Court found that her negligence claim must fail as a matter of law.  Hence, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted.

By: Eric Richwine, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

The issue before the New Jersey Appellate Division in Rodriguez v. Cano, No. A-1561-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1733 (App. Div. Oct. 12, 2023) was whether plaintiff Lenny Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) was denied a fair trial following a no-cause verdict in a damages-only auto negligence case in favor of defendant-driver Stephanie Cano.  Plaintiff contended that defense counsel went too far in cross-examining Plaintiff’s treating physician about a fraudulent medical services action pending against the physician.

In the trial court proceedings, Defendant Cano did not contest liability; rather, the sole issue for the jury to determine was the amount of damages to be awarded to Rodriguez. During trial, Rodriguez’s treating physician testified to his injuries following the accident. The defense counsel soon after cross-examined the physician, focusing on the fact that a major insurance company had a pending fraudulent medical services action against him. During this cross-examination, the defense counsel also noted that Mr. Rodriguez’s treatment was explicitly included in the insurance fraud complaint to provide an example of the physician’s fraud. The defense counsel reasoned that this line of questioning was for the purpose of establishing the physician’s credibility.

The trial court judge realized only after the cross-examination that this line of questioning, which ultimately implied that Rodriguez’s treatment was unnecessary (or even fraudulent), was inadmissible, and, as such, the court instructed the jurors to disregard the testimony. The judge also allowed Rodriguez’s counsel to engage in re-direct to provide the physician the opportunity to rebut and elaborate on the defense counsel’s accusations. During re-direct, Rodriguez’s physician became irate and made several allegations against the insurer for false allegations and bad faith.

Plaintiff’s Rodriguez’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The jury returned a no-cause verdict. Rodriguez’s counsel then moved for a new trial, which the trial court also denied. The judge reasoned that any errors were “harmless.” The judge further reasoned that the jury surely “didn’t consider the evidence that I told them … to disregard,” citing the amount of time the jury took to deliberate; because the jury “didn’t come back in five minutes,” the judge purported that the jury did not think of Mr. Rodriguez and the physician as “criminals” or “fraudsters.” Plaintiff Rodriguez appealed.

The Appellate Division first addressed the defense’s cross-examination of the physician and the timing of the trial court judge’s instruction to the jury to disregard the testimony. The Court cited Rule 608 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, which prohibits the use of specific instances of conduct through cross-examination in a civil action to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness. The Court quickly determined that defense counsel’s line of questioning was “patently improper” per Rule 608 and that the trial court’s verdict “cannot stand.”

The Court found that, despite the defense counsel’s purported reason for its cross-examination questioning, it was inadmissible and ergo the trial court did correctly instruct the jury to disregard the testimony. The Court further noted that, although the trial court was well-intentioned in allowing the physician the opportunity for re-direct following the defense counsel’s ambush, this decision was ultimately misguided and backfired, as evidenced by the physician’s outburst.

Stating that “the prejudice to [Mr. Rodriguez] … cannot be overstated,” the Appellate Division ultimately determined that the trial court’s denial of Mr. Rodriguez’s mistrial motion and motion for a new trial was improper; as such, the Court held that Plaintiff was denied a fair trial and reversed the trial court’s decisions and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, Sridhar Jayaraman, was a guest at Caesar’s Hotel and Casino in Atlantic City for a six-night stay.  While sitting at the bar with his girlfriend, he had with him a black plastic shopping bag, allegedly containing $120,000 in cash.  After he stepped away from the bar, an unknown male later identified as Frederick Exume (“Exume”), approached Plaintiff’s girlfriend, made conversation with her and stole the bag with the money.  The issue in the federal court case, Jayaraman v. Boardwalk Regency, LLC., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173841 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2023), was whether the casino breached any duty owed to Plaintiff to protect him from the theft of his money.

The incident happened during the early hours of February 8, 2022, when Plaintiff and his girlfriend arrived at the Toga Bar at the Defendant Boardwalk for a night cap.  Plaintiff, while sitting at the bar with his girlfriend had a black plastic shopping bag which allegedly contained $120,000 in cash.  He put the bag on a chair at a high-top table across from his girlfriend and stepped away.  Plaintiff, however, did not advise his girlfriend to watch the bag as he stepped away.

After he stepped away from the table, Exume approached Plaintiff’s girlfriend to make conversation with her.  After conversing with her, he reached under the table, extracting the bag without her detection, and then exited the casino.  Upon returning from the restroom, Plaintiff noticed the bag was missing and contacted Boardwalk Security.

Boardwalk Security investigated the incident and identified Exume through video surveillance as the individual that stole the bag.  The casino was familiar with Exume because two days previously, Exume was ejected from the casino for public urination and permanently barred by Boardwalk from its premises.  However, Boardwalk first learned that Exume was back on its premises only after Plaintiff reported the incident to the casino security and the casino security officers watched the theft on video surveillance.

Two days prior to the incident, Plaintiff had been approached by the casino security and advised not to carry large sums of money on his person in a shopping bag.  Security then escorted Plaintiff to his hotel room so that he could store his money in the safe provided in his room.

The defendant casino filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it breached no duty owed to Plaintiff and the case should be dismissed. In reviewing the arguments submitted in support of the defendant casino’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court noted that the existence of scope of a duty of care are legal issues to be determined by the court.  The Court noted that Boardwalk owed Plaintiff a duty of care to maintain safe premises.  That general duty included a duty to protect patrons from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties occurring in their premises. 

Boardwalk argued that it did not owe Plaintiff a duty to protect him from Exume’s conduct because it did not know or have reason to know that Exume would steal Plaintiff’s property.  Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that Boardwalk owed Plaintiff a duty to protect him from the foreseeable criminal acts of others, such as Exume’s.  He contended that it was foreseeable that a theft of property would occur on the floor of a busy Atlantic City casino.  Further, Plaintiff argued that it was reasonably foreseeable that a person permanently banned from a casino – no matter the reason – but later re-entered would commit the crime of theft.

However, the District Court noted that a foreseeability analysis would have to be conducted.  The Court noted that, under the law, a defendant business “should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal contact on the part of third persons . . . and may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.” 

With this duty in mind, even if the Court assumed that Exume’s theft of the money was foreseeable third-party criminal conduct and, thus, a duty should be imposed, which the Court did not decide, “Plaintiff must still provide some evidence that Boardwalk breached its duty to either; “(1) provide sufficient security services to afford Plaintiff reasonable protection from Exume’s conduct; or (2) take reasonable precautions to protect against Exume’s criminal conduct.”  The District Court found that the record contained no evidence to show either theory of a breach.

The Court noted that Plaintiff’s only argument for how Boardwalk breached its duty of care was that it should have enforced its ban of Exume from the premises.  However, the District Court found no evidence suggesting that Boardwalk failed to provide security services, or it otherwise failed to take reasonable measures to protect Plaintiff from Exume’s conduct. 

The Court noted that the casino security had warned Plaintiff to not carry large sums of money on his person in a shopping bag.  Further, that security escorted Plaintiff to his hotel room to store the money in a safe.  Thus, based upon this evidence, Boardwalk did maintain security services that were cognizant of the risk to a patron carrying large sums of money in an unsecured bag and took precautions against future thefts by advising Plaintiff to keep his winnings in a safe provided by Boardwalk.

Further, the Court found that Plaintiff did not provide evidence that Boardwalk failed to take reasonable precautions to enforce its ban of Exume. Boardwalk was not under a duty to stop any and all criminal conduct from occurring.  Rather, a business owner only had a duty to take precautions against criminal conduct that was foreseeable to the business owner.

Here, Plaintiff provided no evidence that Boardwalk or its security services failed to take reasonable steps to prevent Exume from entering the premises or that it failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the theft from occurring.  Plaintiff offered no suggestions for what more Boardwalk could have done to ensure Exume did not enter the premises after being banned.  Further, the Court noted that there was no evidence that Boardwalk knew Exume was on the premises but failed to remove him or that Exume did anything that reasonably should have apprised Boardwalk’s security of Exume’s presence. 

Thus, the District Court found that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to a breach in this matter because of Plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence to suggest Boardwalk breached its alleged duty owed to Plaintiff.  Thus, the Court found that even if Boardwalk owed Plaintiff a duty, its motion for summary judgment must be granted because there was no evidence to establish Boardwalk breached that duty.  Therefore, the Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed. 

Under New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 (the Comparative Negligence Act), for a lawsuit based upon negligence claims, juries are allowed to apportion fault for an accident to multiple parties and assign liability in terms of a percentage of fault to each party. What happens if a plaintiff is assessed a percentage of fault for the accident? As long as a plaintiff is not determined to be more than 50% at fault, the plaintiff can recover damages for their injuries but at a reduced amount based upon their percentage of fault.

If the jury determines that both the defendant (or defendants) as well as the plaintiff, are liable for the accident, it must assess each party’s responsibility, which has to add up to 100%. (N.J.S.A. 2A:15-2). If a plaintiff is determined to be no more than 50% at fault, any monetary award made by a jury in favor of the plaintiff would be reduced by that percentage assessed against the plaintiff.  As an example, if the jury found that both the plaintiff and the defendant were each 50% liable and awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in damages, the verdict would be molded so that the plaintiff’s net recovery would be $50,000. Using this same example, however, if the plaintiff is assessed to be 51% negligent, the plaintiff would recover $0 in damages.

So what happens if there is more than one defendant and each defendant is assessed a portion of fault? From whom can the plaintiff collect? Under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3, a plaintiff can only recover the percent damage award assessed against that defendant – unless the defendant is found to be at least 60% at fault. Using my example above, if there are two defendants (and assuming no comparative negligence is assessed against the plaintiff) and each defendant is found to be 50% responsible for the accident, then the plaintiff can only recover 50% of the award from each defendant ($50,000 each). However, if liability is assessed 60% against one of defendant and 40% against the other defendant, then the plaintiff can proceed to collect the entire $100,000 award against the defendant who was found to be 60% negligent.

There is an exception to this rule for public entities (i.e., municipalities, counties, public boards, and the State). Negligence claims against public entities are governed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (N.J.S.A. 59:1, et seq.) According to N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1, public entities shall be liable for no more than their share of damages equal to the percentage of the negligence attributable to that entity. Hence, regardless of the percentage of liability assessed against a public entity for negligence in causing or contributing to an accident, a plaintiff is limited to collecting only that percentage of fault assessed against that entity.

Now what happens when a plaintiff does collect the whole award from one defendant because one of the defendants is found to be at least 60%? That’s when contribution rights can kick in. With the filing of their answer, defendants can assert a cross-claim for contribution and/or indemnification pursuant to Rule 4:7-5. Actually, defendants have 90 days after service upon the complaint upon them or upon the party against whom the cross-claim is asserted, whichever is later, to file a cross-claim against that defendant. After that time period, the defendant would have to file a motion and ask the court for permission to file the cross-claim. If a defendant does end up paying more than its “share,” it can try to pursue the co-defendant for that defendant’s percentage of fault assessed against the co-defendant.

By: Ruhani K. Aulakh, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Priscilla Godoy was standing in between two parked cars in a line of several cars on May 5, 2018.  As she was standing in between these cars, a Jeep Cherokee involved in a police chase crashed into a parked car several feet away from Godoy.  The crash caused all the parked cars to collide, crushing Godoy.  As a result of this collision, Godoy sustained fatal injuries.  The issues in Godoy v. Washington, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1170 (App. Div. July 13, 2023) were whether the police officers pursuing the Cherokee were negligent and reckless in their pursuit and whether the police officers engaged in willful misconduct in the apprehension of the Cherokee.

On May 5, 2018, defendant police officers Paul Hamilton and Vanessa Lorenzo were on duty in Newark.  The officers spotted a Jeep Cherokee that was stolen during an armed carjacking earlier that night for which the Newark Police Department had issued a Be on the Lookout Order (“BOLO”).  Hamilton and Lorenzo attempted to stop the car; however, the Cherokee did not stop, so the defendants began a pursuit with Hamilton driving. 

During the pursuit, the police officer’s vehicle traveled at around forty-five miles per hour, while the Cherokee traveled at approximately fifty-five miles per hour.  The pursuit was monitored by a Communications Division Officer and a field supervisor; however, officers Hamilton and Lorenzo did not inform their supervisor of the speed of the Cherokee.

The pursuit lasted approximately ninety-five seconds.  After sixty seconds, the driver of the Cherokee veered off road into a park where the driver went over a speed bump and lost control of the vehicle.  This caused a chain reaction which involved three additional vehicles, pinning Godoy between two of these vehicles.  After Godoy was injured, the driver of the Cherokee fled the scene, but officers Hamilton and Lorenzo did not pursue him.

Godoy’s estate filed suit against the two defendant police officers, arguing that the defendants were negligent and reckless in their pursuit of the Cherokee.  Further, the plaintiff argued that the defendants acted with willful misconduct in not complying with policies while continuing the pursuit.

In deciding to pursue the Cherokee, the defendants were governed by procedures set forth both in the Newark Police Division General Order and the New Jersey Attorney General’s Policy.  Both policies authorize officers to pursue a vehicle when they reasonably believe that a violator has committed an offense and they believe that violator poses an immediate threat to the safety of the public.  Once the officers choose to pursue the vehicle, they must immediately notify the Communications Division of pertinent information, such as the reason for the pursuit, the direction of travel, identifying factors of the vehicle, and the speed of the pursued vehicle. 

The plaintiff conceded that the defendants were justified in their pursuit of the vehicle; however, the plaintiff argued that the officers were in violation of policy when they did not report the speed of the pursued vehicle.  The defendant police officers moved for summary judgment, claiming that under the Tort Claims Act, they were immune from liability.  The trial court granted summary judgment on all counts, holding that the defendants were immune from liability unless there was evidence of willful misconduct.  The lower court further reasoned that there was no evidence of willful misconduct because reporting the speed of the pursued vehicle was not a requirement; rather, it was up to the discretion of the police officers.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of the defendants’ willful misconduct.  The plaintiff further argued that the trial court erred in determining that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on good faith immunity.

In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Appellate Division first analyzed good faith immunity.  The court upheld that the officers were immunized, looking to state Supreme Court precedent from Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 367 (1993).  There, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 59:5-2 immunizes absolutely all negligence of a public employee when the negligence, combined with the conduct of the escaping person, leads to injury.  The Court set forth a narrow exception in that decision, holding that immunity does not exonerate a public officer from liability if their conduct was outside of the scope of employment or constituted willful misconduct.

To determine whether the narrow willful misconduct exception applied in this case, the Appellate Division again looked to state Supreme Court precedent in Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 123-30 (1995), which defined willful misconduct in the context of a police pursuit.  There, the Court established a two part test for willful misconduct which required that the public employee disobey a specific lawful command or standing order and that the public employee intended to violate it.

Here, the Appellate Division applied the Fielder test and held that in order for the plaintiff to establish willful misconduct, the plaintiff must have demonstrated that the defendants disobeyed a standing order that required them to report the speed of the Cherokee to Communications and that the defendants knew of the standing order, knew that they were violating it, and intended to violate it.  The Court held that because there was no standing order requiring the defendant officers to report the speed of the Cherokee, there was no willful misconduct on their behalf.  Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Richard Rauso slipped and fell while at the premises at the United States Post Office in South Bound Brook, New Jersey.  He sued the defendants Post Office and Ofaniyim Holdings, LLC, which owned the property upon which the Post Office is located and leased it to the United States, for injuries suffered in the fall.  The issue in Rauso v. United States of America, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94360 (D.N.J. May 31, 2023) was whether the defendants were liable for the plaintiff’s fall, which occurred when he was walking down the Post Office’s cement sidewalk, his foot slipped and he fell onto the adjacent dirt path.

On the day of the accident, the plaintiff arrived at the Post Office and parked his vehicle in the parking lot on the side of the Post Office.  He then walked from the parking lot to the entrance of the Post Office via the cement walkway which connected the parking lot to the entrance.  There was a dirt path adjacent to the cement walkway that plaintiff did not utilize. 

When he exited the Post Office, he used the same cement walkway.  However, it was raining as he walked back towards his vehicle.  As he was walking, his foot slipped and he fell onto the adjacent dirt path.  He broke his ankle as a result of the fall.

The defendants United States and the property owner Ofaniyim both filed for a summary judgment dismissal, arguing that the plaintiff had not made out a prima face case of negligence.  They argued that the plaintiff failed to show that either defendant breached its duty to provide a reasonably safe walkway for the Post Office customers because plaintiff failed to offer evidence that a dangerous condition existed.  Further, the defendants argued that, even assuming the cement sidewalk or the adjacent dirt path constituted a dangerous condition, neither defendant was liable because the danger was open and obvious. 

The District Court applied New Jersey law in deciding this motion.  Under New Jersey law, to establish negligence, “a plaintiff must establish four elements to sustain a negligence action (1) duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages.”  Here, plaintiff contended that the junction of the cement sidewalk and the adjoining dirt path was a dangerous condition due to the unmarked and unsupported several inch elevation change.  Plaintiff’s expert measured a 2” drop from the cement sidewalk surface to the dirt path touching the sidewalk edge.  One foot away from the sidewalk, plaintiff’s expert also measured a 5” drop between the sidewalk and dirt path. 

The District Court noted that New Jersey courts had found that a drop off at the edge of a road or path can, under some circumstances, create a dangerous condition.  However, the mere existence of a drop off or a height differential in the walkway is not sufficient in itself to find a substantial risk of injury sufficient to constitute a dangerous condition. 

The District Court noted that plaintiff’s own deposition testimony contradicted the existence of a dangerous condition.  It was his testimony that the sidewalk itself had no defects or obstructions; it was raining heavier than a drizzle when the accident occurred; he walked along the cement sidewalk to and from the Post Office and viewed the cement sidewalk as safer than walking up the dirt path, which was muddy and wet.  On the way back from the Post Office, he walked close to the right edge of the cement sidewalk such that he was in close proximity to the drop-off and the adjoining dirt path.  It was when he was walking back to the parking lot on the cement sidewalk, he fell and landed on the adjacent dirt path.

Thus, the Court noted the record was clear that the Post Office did provide an adequate cement sidewalk for plaintiff to access its building.  To the extent that the dirt path qualified as a dangerous condition, the District Court noted that the record was equally clear that the condition was open and obvious.  Plaintiff was aware of the condition and he failed to avoid it.  Therefore, the Court found that defendants had not breached their obligations to plaintiff.   Thus, the District Court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, dismissing the case. 

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